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ABSTRACT 
 
The following thesis contains four empirical chapters focusing on the contagion, interest 
rate, foreign exchange rate, and investment risk exposures of financial institutions, 
respectively.  Chapter 1 provides an overarching view of the four empirical chapters and 
the main objective of the thesis.  Chapter 2 examines the return and volatility spillovers 
among the financial sector portfolios across the global financial markets from an US 
investor’s perspective.  The potential influence of the recent financial crisis on the return 
and risk interdependence among these sector portfolios has also been evaluated.  Financial 
institutions with different characteristic and size have been examined separately as well as 
jointly.  Chapter 3 and 4 investigate the interest rate and foreign exchange rate risk 
exposures of financial institutions, respectively.  In chapter 3, we evaluate the impact of 
changes in term structure on the equity value of financial intermediaries across major 
economies.  In chapter 4, the influences of both domestic and foreign currency fluctuations 
on the equity value of financial intermediaries are explored.  Furthermore, we split the 
sample period into pre- and post-crisis period to investigate the potential impact of recent 
financial crisis on the interest rate and foreign exchange rate risk exposure of these 
financial intermediaries under examination.  Chapter 5 focuses on the investment risk 
faced by financial institutions (mainly non-banking financial service firms, e.g. mutual 
funds, pension funds and hedge funds).  We shed light on the economic value of 
correlation timing for dynamic asset allocation strategies.  In order to further evaluate the 
influence of the rebalancing frequency on the economic value of the correlation timing, we 
assess the performance of the dynamic asset allocation strategy on both daily and monthly 
basis.  Finally, chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks that summarize the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial intermediaries (i.e. banks and insurers) play an important role in the in the 
transmission of monetary policy, maturity transformation, and the mobilization of 
financial resources.  Therefore, the stability and prosperity of these financial 
intermediaries – especially the systemic important ones1 – is vital from a social as well as 
regulatory perspective since it directly affects the supply of credit in financial market, 
which in turn supports the growth of real economy.   
Deregulation (e.g. the Gramm Leach Bliley Financial Modernisation Act in 1999) and 
consolidation/globalization in the financial sector have changed the landscape of the 
global financial industry dramatically over the recent decades.  As the financial sector 
becomes increasingly concentrated and interconnected, the systematic risk of the failure of 
these consolidated financial institutions has also increased.  In other words, the failure of 
large and well-connected institutions will have a significant and lasting impact on the rest 
of the global financial system.  Besides, through the establishment of financial holding 
companies and financial innovations,2  financial institutions that specialize in different 
areas (i.e. banks and insurers) can expose to similar risk factors.  That means the modern 
financial industry is more vulnerable to systemic shocks than ever before, as one common 
systematic event (e.g. credit crisis) can influence all the institutions in a similar fashion.  
                                                          
1 The Financial Stability Board defines systemic important financial institution as the one “whose distress or 
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activities”.  This definition is provided in 
the Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions (2011) report issued by Financial 
Stability Board in November 2011.  
2 For instance, the creation of insurance linked securities by insurance companies in the last decade exposes 
insurers to credit risk, which previously only face by banks. 
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Therefore, from a regulatory perspective, the risk transmission across financial institutions 
is an important issue, especially during periods of financial distress. 
In order to better regulate the financial intermediaries to prevent failures and/or 
contagions due to systemic distress events, it is important to first identify the risk factors 
and interdependences of financial institutions and quantify their magnitudes.  We employ 
asset pricing models to fulfil our research purpose as they provide a measure of the 
relationship between risk and changes in equity value of the firm (portfolio) under 
examination.  Better understanding of these relationships provides crucial insight about 
the risk management practice currently implemented by financial institutions and the 
effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework.  In addition, the recent financial 
turmoil starts from 2007 provides us a unique opportunity to evaluate the risk factors of 
financial sector across major economies and the spillover effect among them.  
Furthermore, financial institutions, especially non-banking financial service firms 
(e.g. mutual funds, pension funds and hedge funds), are also major providers of 
investment management/consultant services.  Large financial intermediaries across the 
global are offering fund management/advisory services for their wealth clients to generate 
income in the form of performance and/or management fees.  Asset allocation strategies, 
therefore, play an important role in the success of fund management/advisory business.  
The recent empirical studies on the behaviour of asset returns has identified numerous 
stylized facts (e.g. asymmetry effect between positive and negative shocks) regarding the 
conditional correlations among financial assets.  The implementation of these stylized facts 
(i.e. dynamic correlation timing), therefore, could be valuable for the success of portfolio 
management practise.    
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1.2. OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS 
The objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the interconnectedness and major risk 
factors faced by financial intermediaries across major markets.  Additionally, we 
investigate whether correlation timing strategy is able to provide enhanced risk adjusted 
performances for financial institutions that offer fund management services.   
Firstly, we assess the return and risk interdependence among financial 
intermediaries before and during the recent financial turmoil.  Existing literatures that 
focus on the spillover effect failed to capture the full extent of the recent crisis.  By 
employing a more comprehensive sample period with sector level portfolios, the current 
study is able to provide a more general picture regarding the interactions across financial 
sectors.  Next, we investigate the two major risk exposures, the interest rate and foreign 
exchange rate risk, of financial intermediaries separately.  The two empirical studies 
distinguish themselves from the previous literatures by adopting new estimation 
frameworks (i.e. modified VAR-BEKK model) and alternative pricing models (i.e. the 
incorporation of home and foreign currency value).  Finally, we compare the risk adjusted 
performances of dynamic correlation timing with the one based on static models.  This 
study aims to address the question of whether incorporating the stylized facts of 
conditional variance and correlation into the estimation framework will improve the 
investor’s utility.   
The empirical studies carried out in this thesis try to shed light on four research 
questions.  Each question provides some insight information regarding the risk related 
behaviour of financial intermediaries.  The first question focuses on the interconnectedness 
within the global financial market, and its impact during the recent crisis.  By analysing 
the risk and return spillovers across financial sector portfolios from different countries, we 
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show the interactions among global financial markets.  Furthermore, we investigate the 
difference in spillover pattern between the banking and insurance industry during the 
financial turmoil by conducting cross-sector spillover analyses.    
The second and third question investigates the return sensitivity of financial 
intermediary upon changes in the interest rate environment and currency value, 
respectively.  Previous empirical studies based on these two research questions find mixed 
results.  On one hand, the theoretical framework suggests that changes in interest rate 
environment/currency value will influence the value of assets and liabilities, which in 
turn has a significant impact on financial intermediaries’ equity value.  On the other hand, 
however, operational and financial hedging practise carried out by financial institution 
mitigates the impact of these risk factors.  In this thesis, we try to capture the relationship 
between fluctuations in interest rate/currency value and changes in equity value of 
financial intermediaries through alternative model settings.  For instance, instead of 
measuring the changes in interest rate environment with changes in a given bond index or 
interest rates with a certain maturity; we describe the former based on term structure 
model (i.e. Nelson-Siegel three factor model), which is able to accurately illustrate the 
shape changes in the entire yield curve.  For the third research question (i.e. the 
relationship between currency value and equity value of financial intermediaries), we 
incorporate both home and foreign currency value changes into the estimation framework.  
We argue that despite hedging activity being able to mitigate the currency effect, it is true 
for home currency value only but not for the foreign one.3  The proposed model not only 
enables us to shed light on the relationship between the home/foreign currency value and 
the equity value of financial intermediaries, but also provides us a reasonable explanation.  
                                                          
3 The currency value is defined as the trade weighted currency price index.  A detailed explanation of the 
latter is given in chapter 3. 
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Furthermore, we try to reveal and justify the potential changes in the relationship between 
interest rate environment/currency value fluctuation and equity value of financial 
intermediaries during the recent financial turmoil.    
The final research question focuses on the risk adjusted performances of various 
asset allocation strategies.  Volatility and correlation among asset returns are central 
inputs to portfolio selection and risk management.  In theory, the model that captures 
more stylized facts of returns’ second moment should provide more accurate variance-
covariance matrix estimations in statistical merits.  However, without transforming this 
superior performance into economic value, the former is of little use.  In the current study, 
we compare asset allocation strategies based on various conditional correlation estimation 
frameworks (i.e. dynamic/static correlation timing) in terms of the investor’s utility and 
risk adjusted reward they are able to generate.   
 
1.3. CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATION 
In general, the first three empirical chapters in this thesis contribute to the existing 
literature in three ways.  First, the first three empirical studies employ up-to-date 
multinational dataset covering both banking and insurance institutions, while previous 
literatures have ether focused on one particular type of financial institutions, or within one 
national market.  Second, to our knowledge, this thesis is the first empirical study to shed 
light on the impact of current financial crisis on the risk characteristic (both systemic risk 
and firm specific) of financial institutions.   Third, the empirical studies presented in this 
thesis adopt an alternative empirical framework based on multivariate GARCH models.  
The alternative framework takes into account the time-varying conditional variance as 
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well as correlation among the assets, which can improve the estimation efficiency and the 
accuracy of the estimated parameters.   
 The contribution of the final empirical chapter to the existing literature is twofold.  
First, the benefits of correlation timing vis-à-vis the static constant covariance strategy are 
explored and the impact of transaction costs and rebalancing frequency on the strategy 
performance is assessed. Second, the role of asymmetries and structural breaks in sector 
correlations is statistically and economically evaluated.  
 Our empirical findings have potential implications from the perspective of regulation, 
risk management, asset pricing and portfolio management.  The first empirical chapter (i.e. 
chapter 2) is important from a regulatory point of view.  The current financial crisis shows 
the importance of improving the resilience of financial institutions during stress market 
condition, and how collapse in a small corner of the financial market could tumble the 
stability of the entire global financial system through interdependence among these 
institutions.  Therefore, a crisis-led regulation framework targeting the interdependence 
across financial institutions/markets is vital to the stability of global financial system.  
 The second and third empirical chapter (i.e. chapter 3 and 4) have important 
implications in the area of regulation, risk management and asset pricing.  First, the 
characterisation of the risk profile of banks in terms of observable macro-variables – 
namely, the stock market and the yield curve/currency value – has important implications 
for bank regulators seeking to foster stability in the banking industry via market discipline.  
Second, better understanding of the risk characteristic of financial institution is important 
for improving the risk management effectiveness.  Finally, the yield and currency value 
sensitivity is crucial in the context of asset pricing and the existence of industry specific 
return generating process. 
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 The findings obtained from the final empirical chapter (i.e. chapter 5) could be 
valuable from a portfolio/asset management perspective.  As reducing risk while 
maintaining a desirable level of return becomes increasingly important in the asset 
management industry, better understanding the conditional volatility as well as 
correlation among financial assets – especially their asymmetry and structural break 
nature - is key for controlling/reducing the overall risk of the portfolio through 
diversification.   
 
1.4. LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
There are four empirical chapters within the thesis with each of them concentrating on one 
aforementioned research question.  Generally, the thesis can be separated into three parts.  
In chapter 2, which consists the first part, we investigate the interactions among global 
financial sectors before and during the recent financial turmoil.   The second part (i.e. 
chapter 3 and 4) analyses the relationship between changes in interest rate environment/ 
currency value and equity return of financial intermediaries across major markets.  The 
final part examines the economic value of various correlation timing strategies, and the 
empirical results are presented in chapter 5. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on the interconnectedness across the global financial 
industries.  By adopting a new estimation framework (i.e. modified VAR-BEKK model 
with return and volatility transmission), we can identify the pattern of return and 
volatility spillovers among financial intermediary types (i.e. banks and insurers) across 
major markets and quantify their magnitude before and during the recent financial 
turmoil in a more accurate manner.   Moreover, the size effect of the return and volatility 
transmission has also been taking into account by re-sampling the financial intermediaries 
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according to their market capitalization.  Finally, various reports from academics and 
practitioners alike have emphasised on the difference in the behaviour of equity return of 
banks and insurers during the recent financial crisis due to their different business models 
and risk characteristics.  In order to investigate this phenomenon, we further analyse the 
cross-sector return and risk transmission between the banking and insurance industries 
across markets and on a global level.    
The second empirical study (chapter 3) examines the interest rate risk exposure of 
financial intermediaries.  We measure changes in the interest rate environment as changes 
in the factor loading of Nelson-Siegel three-factor model, which is capable of accurately 
capturing the shape of an entire yield curve.  The new interest rate change measure 
enables us to investigate the impact of long-term, short-term interest rate changes as well 
as changes in the slope of yield curve on the equity value of financial intermediaries across 
major markets.  In order to evaluate the effectiveness of various market interventions 
carried out by central banks/governments across major economies, we also incorporate 
these intervention events into our empirical framework to directly measure their 
influences on the equity value of financial intermediaries in different markets.   
In chapter 4, the relationship between fluctuations in currency value and changes in 
equity value of financial intermediaries has been scrutinized.  Unlike the conventional 
approach that only focuses on the impact derived from home value fluctuations, changes 
in foreign currency value have also be involved into our estimation framework.  Our 
empirical framework is based on the “flight-to-quality” hypothesis, which suggests that 
investors prefer asset with higher credit quality compared to the lower ones.  Financial 
assets are usually traded in home currency terms and thus the need to obtain that currency 
is apparent.  Currency value, therefore, can be used as an indirect measure of investor’s 
10 
 
sentiment.  Given that changes in home currency value are usually hard to detect due to 
operational/financial hedging activities, the “flight-to-quality” effect is, therefore, more 
likely to be captured by changes in foreign currency value.      
We focus our attention on various correlation timing strategies and their economic 
value in chapter 5.  The risk adjusted performance of an asset allocation strategy is the key 
element for the success of portfolio managers.  As major players in the fund 
management/advisory industry, the economic value of different correlation timing 
strategies, therefore, provides valuable information for financial intermediaries.  In this 
study, we measure the economic value of dynamic correlation timing strategies based on 
the performance fee they are able to generate over the static asset allocation strategies.  The 
influence of transaction cost on the economic value of dynamic correlation timing strategy 
has also been taking into account, and we further examine the impact of rebalancing 
frequency on their break-even transaction costs. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis by providing an overview of our research and 
a general summary of the issues examined.  In addition, the chapter discuss and identifies 
a number of issues for risk management of financial intermediaries that worth further 
investigation. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 
INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG GLOBAL BANKING AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The sub-prime crisis in 2007 has led to the most severe post-war financial market crisis in 
recent history.  Despite the relative size of the problematic sub-prime mortgages is small 
compares to US economy, the impact of the crisis is devastating not only to the US 
financial market, but across the global4.  Researchers argue that the contagion effect from 
the US market to the rest of the global financial market is mainly through the channel of 
the banking sectors (Adrian and Shin, 2008; De Grauwe, 2008; Kollmann and Malherbe, 
2011).  The argument is based on the fact that the liquidity of banks suffered from the 
sudden decrease in asset price at the beginning of the crisis, which caused a liquidity and 
loss spiral and developed into a full blown financial crisis.5  
Several empirical studies have focused their attention on the contagion effect during 
the recent financial crisis.6  However, they failed to capture either the whole extent of the 
crisis period, or the impact across global financial markets.  For instance, Pukthuanthong 
                                                          
4 Eichengreen et al (2009) suggest that the total value of subprime mortgage related securities is only 3% of 
the US financial assets.  Adrian and Shin (2008) further argue that the total value of US subprime mortgage 
lending in 2006 and 2007 is only equivalent to 1% of the US equity market value, and it is less than 0.2% of 
the US household net wealth.  Brunnermeier (2009) shows that the stock market losses in the US alone is 
around 8 trillion US Dollar from October 2007 to October 2008. 
5 The shape fall in asset prices and liquidity condition around the global financial markets is due to the 
deleveraging process of the banks during the crisis period.  As banks suffer losses from their subprime 
mortgage lending, they are forced to sale their asset holdings to maintain their leverage ratio (Adrian and 
Shin, 2010) and become more cautious about lending (Acharya and Merrouche, 2009).  The crowded trades 
on financial assets cause asset price drop and the precautionary hoarding on lending activities reduces the 
market liquidity.  The asset price fall reduces the asset value of the banks, and force banks to sale even more 
assets to maintain the leverage ratio, which makes banks even more cautious about their lending activities.  
This vicious cycle is also called “liquidity spiral” or “loss spiral”.  For further discussion on the two “spirals” 
and development of the recent financial crisis, please refer to Blackburn (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), De Grauwe (2008) and Frank et al (2008). 
6 The contagion effect refers to the increase in linkages among the financial sectors or markets during the 
economic downturn or crisis period.  Please refer to Kaufman (1994), Dornbusch et al (2000), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000) and Kaminsky et al (2003) for excellent reviews on the topic. 
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and Roll (2009) examine the correlations among 81 financial markets across the global with 
a sample period over thirty years which ends at 8 February 2008.  Another study by 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) investigate the connections across the returns and volatilities of 
major financial markets from January 1992 to November 2007 based on weekly returns of 
local currency stock market indices.  Despite these studies find empirical evidence which 
supports the contagion effect among financial markets during the crisis period, they fail to 
capture the full picture of the crisis due to the sample period they employed.  
Brunnermeier (2009) claims that the recent financial crisis has two phases, it started with a 
subprime mortgage crisis since early 2007 and turned into a full blown global financial 
crisis in late 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.7  This argument is supported by 
Eichengreen et al (2009), who also show that the failure of Lehman Brothers is a critical 
turning point in the recent financial crisis, from which a relative small US housing market 
crisis became a global financial crisis.8  Since banks are the main channel through which 
the US subprime mortgage crisis transformed into a global financial market meltdown, 
some researchers refer the second phase of the financial crisis as a global “banking crisis” 9.   
For empirical studies which do cover the entire crisis period, they fail to investigate 
the impact of the crisis across the global financial markets.  For instance, Longstaff (2010) 
examine the spillover effects from the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) market to the 
bond and equity markets from late 2006 to the end of 2008.  However, he restricted his 
                                                          
7 In Brunnermeier (2009), the subprime mortgage crisis is defined as the increasing default rate of the 
subprime mortgage loans, and the massive credit rating downgrades of the mortgage backed securities since 
early 2007.  The full blown global financial crisis refers to the sudden liquidity dry up in the wholesale and 
interbank funding market follows the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother on 15 September 2008.  Eling and 
Schmeiser (2010) divide the crisis period into two phases in a similar fashion.  The first phase is from 
September 2007 till August 2008, and the second phase is from September 2008 till early 2009. 
8 Eichengreen et al (2009) suggest that the total value of subprime mortgage related securities is only 3% of 
the US financial assets.  Adrian and Shin (2008) further argue that the total value of US subprime mortgage 
lending in 2006 and 2007 is only equivalent to 1% of the US equity market value, and it is less than 0.2% of 
the US household net wealth. 
9 See, for instance, Eichengreen et al (2009), De Grauwe (2008) and Honohan (2008).  Since the consequence of 
the recent financial crisis is a sudden liquidity dried up in the global financial market, Adrian and Shin (2008) 
also refer the crisis as a “credit crisis”.  
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study solely on the US market.  Similarly, the empirical study by Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Yorulmazer (2010) only captured the contagion effect within the UK banking industry.   
To our knowledge, the only exception comes from a working paper by Eichengreen 
et al (2009) which provide an empirical study on the contagion effect across the global 
financial market which covers most of the crisis period.  Their sample finishes at the 28 
November 2008.  However, they only focus on the contagion of the bank’s default risk as 
the study is based on weekly credit default swap (CDS) spreads of the 45 world largest 
banks.  The study does not provide any information on the return interdependence among 
the banking sectors across the financial markets, and ignore the impact of the crisis on the 
risk and return of small banks and other type of financial institutions. 
In this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature in four different ways.  First, 
we examine the return and risk interdependence among financial institutions over the full 
extent of the recent financial crisis.10  The sample period used in this empirical chapter 
starts from the January 1, 2003 till 9 March 9, 2009, which includes both the first and the 
second phase of the recent financial crisis.  Second, the current study investigates the 
contagion effect for more than one type of financial institutions across major financial 
markets.  Existing literatures often emphasis on the one type of financial intermediaries 
(banking sector by Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003, insurance companies by Carson et al, 2008), 
or one single economy (financial sectors within US market by Elyasiani et al, 2007).  Our 
sample covers both banks and insurers from the world’s major economies.  Finally, the 
study sheds light on the different impact of current crisis on the spillover effects of 
banking and insurance institutions.  It is commonly believed that the recent financial crisis 
has a far greater impact on the banking industry compare to the insurance sector.  
Harrington (2009) and Eling and Schmeiser (2010) argue that the insurance companies 
                                                          
10 Please find further discussion in Section 2.3. 
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perform relatively well during the recent financial crisis compare to banks.  The reports 
from CEA and The Geneva Association support the argument, as they both suggest that 
insurers have gone through the crisis in a better shape due to the nature of their business 
model.11  According to the report from CEA, most insurance companies, especially the 
European ones, are affected by the recent financial crisis through mark-to-market losses of 
their financial assets due to the depressed financial market and liquidity shortage, but not 
because their direct involvement in the subprime mortgage lending.  Banks are the main 
driving force for the collapse of asset prices and the liquidity dried up across the global 
financial markets.  Therefore, one would expect the performance of the banking industry 
can influence the performance of the insurers, but not vice versa.  The enriched sample set 
also enables us to explore the difference in the interdependence among different type of 
financial intermediaries across the global markets, especially during the recent financial 
crisis.     
Third, the current study contributes to the existing literature by proposing a new 
model structure for the examination of return and volatility interdependence among 
multiple assets, which named VAR-BEKK model.  The models used by early empirical 
studies only focuses on the linkage within the returns of the financial assets but not their 
volatilities (Karolyi and Stulz, 1996).  Later, the estimation framework has been improved 
to examine both the return and volatility linkages at the same time (Elyasiani and Mansur, 
2003).  However, the bivariate GARCH employed by Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) can 
only investigate the return and volatility spillover effects between two assets at one time.  
Elyasiani et al (2007) proposed the multivariate GARCH framework to estimate the return 
                                                          
11 The report from Geneva Association is under the title Systemic Risk in Insurance, An analysis of insurance and 
financial stability (2010), see: www.genevaassociation.org.  The report from CEA is under the title Eight Key 
Messages on the Financial Turmoil(2008), see: www.cea.eu.  They claim that insurance companies are less 
exposed to the credit risk and liquidity risk compares to banks, and the insurance industry is less involved in 
the mortgage related security market. 
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and volatility spillover effects across more than two assets.  However, the model used by 
Elyasiani et al (2007) assumes the conditional correlations among the involving assets are 
constant over the estimation period.  This assumption is in contrary to the existing 
literature on conditional correlation, which shows that the correlations among financial 
assets are actually time-varying.12 
In comparison to the models used in the previous studies, our model has three 
improvements.  The first improvement is that our model is multivariate, which enables us 
to evaluate the interdependence across multiple assets at the same time instead of only 
two assets such as the bilateral estimation framework.  Secondly, our model enables us to 
investigate the return as well as the volatility spillover effects among the financial 
institutions simultaneously.  The above two improvements help to increase the estimation 
efficiency of the model as we can use less estimations and less parameters to increase the 
degree of freedom of the model.  Finally, the proposed VAR-BEKK model is more flexible 
in terms of the parameterization for conditional variance-covariance equations.  In our 
model we do not impose restriction on the time-varying dynamics of the conditional 
correlations among the financial institutions.  Therefore, our model should fit the return 
series of involved financial institutions better and provide higher estimation accuracy 
compares to the one proposed by Elyasiani et al (2007).  We provide a detail explanation of 
our model in the methodology section. 
Our empirical findings bear important implications in terms of improving the 
resilience of financial institutions during volatile market conditions.  The significant rise in 
cross-market dependence across banking sectors shows the importance to embed the 
systemic risk into the risk assessment and management regulation framework for banking 
                                                          
12 Please refer to Ramchand and Susmel (1998), Ang and Bekaert (1999), Longin and Solnik (2001), and 
Cappiello et al (2006) for further discussion on time-varying conditional correlations.  
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institutions.  Besides, enhanced interdependence between global bank and insurance 
portfolios during the recent financial crisis also indicates the need of regulatory initiatives 
for enhanced risk coverage and reduction of systemic risk.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow.  The following section provides a brief 
literature review on contagion and spillover effects. Section 2.3 describes the dataset we 
used in the current study.  Section 2.4 outlines the new model structure we proposed in 
detail and discuss the estimation procedure used.  Section 2.5 presents the discussion on 
the result of our empirical study.  Finally, section 2.6 concludes the study. 
 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents a brief overview of the literature with no intention to lessen the 
importance of any excluded studies.  The cross-border linkage among financial markets 
can be measured by the transmission of return and volatility across these markets (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2001).  Early studies of return and volatility transmissions primarily focus on 
the contagious spillovers across advanced financial markets during crises periods.  For 
instance, Hamao et al (1990) and King and Wadhwani (1990) demonstrate the volatility 
spillover effects from the US to Japan and the UK during the 1987 stock market crash.  
However, these studies focus on return and volatility spillover separately, rendering their 
results unreliable and inaccurate.  Subsequently, Koutmos and Booth (1995) and Karolyi 
(1995) examine both the return and volatility spillovers across major financial markets 
with simultaneous equation system during the 1987 market crash.  Recently, Dungey and 
Martin (2007) look into the price transmission among Asian financial markets during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  The rapid transmission of the price and risk information across 
financial markets during economic downturn is also known as contagion effect (Kodres 
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and Prisker, 2002; Kyle and Xiong, 2001).  Since the return and volatility spillover could 
have a catastrophic impact on the stability of global financial market, the information 
about the spillover mechanism is highly valuable to regulators, hedging strategists and 
investment advisors interested in accurate asset pricing models as better understanding 
the transmission mechanism can be helpful in designing regulatory restrictions to prevent 
intensification of financial crises, in risk management practices, and for formulation of 
successful investment strategies (Karolyi, 1995; Summers, 2000).  In the current study, we 
define the spillover effect as the transmission of first and second moment of price 
information from one sector/market to another. 
The spillover effect is not only sensitive to market conditions/business cycles, but 
also sensitive to the size of the involved economies and the changes in regulatory 
frameworks.  Eun and Shim (1989) provide the first empirical study on the size effect of 
spillovers.  They show that the price information generated from the US stock market – the 
largest in the world - plays a dominate role in return spillovers among the world’s nine 
major stock markets in the early 1980s.13  The finding is later supported by Koutmos and 
Booth (1995), Karolyi (1995) and Bekaert et al (2005).  Changes in regulatory frameworks 
also have a significant impact on the spillover effect across financial markets.  The 
empirical studies by Bartram et al (2007) and Asgharian and Nossman (2011) indicate that 
the spillover effect among the European countries has increased since the introduction of 
Euro in 1999.14  However, Bekaert et al (2005), Bartram et al (2007) and Asgharian and 
Nossman (2011) all use regionally syndicated indices to evaluate the spillover effects 
                                                          
13  The remaining eight stock markets are Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, the UK, Switzerland, France, 
Germany and Canada. 
14 Please refer to Hartmann et al (2003) for further discussion on how the introduction of European Monetary 
Union increases the financial system integration among the Euro zone countries.  
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among the regional markets.  Therefore, they fail to identify the direction and magnitude 
of spillovers across each individual markets. 
The return and volatility transmissions not only exist at market level, but also at 
sector/firm level.  Financial institutions play an important role in the modern financial 
system as they act as the collector and distributor of public financial resource (Saunders 
and Cornett, 2010).  Therefore, studies on sector/firm level spillover effects primarily 
focus on the financial institutions like banks and insurers.  Lang and Stulz (1992) shows 
that bankruptcy announcement of a bank can have a negative spillover effect on the rest of 
the banks in the same financial system.  This finding is reinforced by Kaufman (1994), who 
shows that the failure of one bank can spread to the rest of the banking system through 
banks runs in a contagious manner.  Furthermore, Slovin et al (1992) and Bessler and 
Nohel (2000) claim that the liquidity (secondary equity offering) and profit (dividend cut) 
related announcement issued by a bank also can influence the equity value of other banks 
in a contagious manner.  Elyasiani et al. (2007) and Carson et al. (2008) focus, respectively, 
on the return and volatility spillover among banks, insurers and investment bankers and 
among different types of insurers (accident and health, life, property and casualty) within 
the US market during 1991-2001.  The former study finds that return (volatility) spillovers 
among the small institutions are stronger (weaker) compared to large ones; while the latter 
shows strong (weak) return (volatility) spillover among insurers.  However, after the 
sample has been categorized according to size and degree of diversification (in terms of 
product and geographic), the volatility spillover effect becomes significant. 
The financial crisis in 2007-2009 provides a unique opportunity for researchers to 
investigate the spillover effect across financial industries.  To investigate how a relative 
small fragment of the financial market (the US sub-prime mortgage market) can bring 
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down the entire global financial system provides valuable insight for regulators and 
investors to prevent and hedge for future crises.15  Blackburn (2008) and Frank et al (2008) 
suggest that the crisis is transmitted from the US banking sector to the rest of the global 
financial markets through liquidity and credit channels and amplified by the sudden dry-
up in the interbank loan market.  Eichengreen et al (2009) examine the contagious spillover 
of default probability among the world’s largest 45 banks during the recent financial crisis.  
The default probability is measured by the spread of credit default swap contracts.  The 
empirical result suggests that the risk profile of these large international banks is closely 
related especially after the collapse of Lehman Brother.  Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Yorulmazer (2010) investigate the bank run in the UK during the failure of Northern 
Rock16 and reinforce Kaufman’s (1994) theory of transmission of bank failures to other 
banks through liquidity shortage.   
It is worth noticing that the negative shocks generated by one sector/firm can 
transmit to the other sectors/firms in a positive manner instead of negative as discussed 
above.  In other words, firms can benefit from the adverse shocks experienced by the other 
players in the same market/industry.  This positive spillover effect is also known as 
competitive effect (Lang and Stulz, 1992).17  Slovin et al (1999) show that profit related 
announcement (dividend cut) by the US regional banks has positive competitive effect on 
their geographic rivals from 1975 to 1992.  The finding indicates that regional competitors 
                                                          
15 Eichengreen et al (2009) suggest that the total value of subprime mortgage related securities is only 3% of 
the US financial assets.  Adrian and Shin (2008) further argue that the total value of US subprime mortgage 
lending in 2006 and 2007 is only equivalent to 1% of the US equity market value, and it is less than 0.2% of 
the US household net wealth. Brunnermeier (2009) shows that the losses in the US stock market alone is 
around 8 trillion US Dollar from October 2007 to October 2008. 
16 In September 2007, Northern Rock - the fifth largest mortgage lender in the U.K. - experienced an old-
fashioned bank run, the first bank run in the U.K. since the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank in 1878.  The 
run had been contained by the government’s announcement that it would guarantee all deposits in Northern 
Rock. 
17 Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that the distress or bankruptcy of one firm can improve the competitive 
position of the other firm in the same industry since the distressed or bankrupted firm will offer profitable 
opportunities to other competitors.   
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benefit from their rival’s profit loss or deterioration in cash flows/loan values.  Elyasiani et 
al (2011) also find positive competitive effect among the US financial institutions during 
the recent financial crisis.  Their result indicates that the financial institution who accepted 
the government rescue funding has a positive impact on the ones who did not.18  Instead 
of examining spillovers of financial institutions within the same market, Elyasiani and 
Mansur (2003) investigate the return and volatility transmission across banking sectors of 
Japanese, German and the US market from 1986 to 1995.  Their result also confirms the 
existence of competitive effects by showing that an adverse shock to the US banking sector 
will benefit banks in the other two markets in terms of lower unsystematic risk. 
Overall, the existing literature has identified a number of interdependencies, but at 
the same time, some studies have failed to investigate the return and volatility 
interdependencies simultaneously; some have employed modified regional indices (rather 
than country/sector portfolios) to investigate the integration among equity markets;19 and 
those focusing on financial intermediaries have concentrated on a single market and/or 
industry. 
  
                                                          
18 In their study, the government rescue funding refers to the injection of government capital under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TRAP). 
19 Several empirical studies examining the spillover effects among a regional market (e.g. the Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia regional markets in Bekaert et al., 2005) by investigate the influence of regional market on 
the individual national market.  However, the conventional regional market indices usually contain all the 
national market indices within the region, which will introduce biasness to the analysis of spillover effects.  
Therefore, modified regional market indices are employed where the country under examination is excluded 
from the index.  Asgharian and Nossman (2011) and Bartram et al. (2007) also adopt similar approach for 
their empirical studies.    
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2.3. DATE COLLECTION 
2.3.1. Equity Portfolios And Explanatory Variable 
In the current study, we investigate the interdependence among the banking and 
insurance (both life and non-life) sectors from the US, Japanese and seven Western 
European countries.  The seven EU countries are UK, France, German, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece.  Despite the rapid expansion of the financial sectors in emerging 
markets in past two decades, the major developed economies are still the dominate force 
of the global financial market.  The report from International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows 
that the combined bank assets of the US, UK, Japan, and European Union (EU) countries 
take over more 60% of the asset of global banking sectors in total.20  The study by Swiss Re 
also claims that more than 75% of the insurance premiums is generated by the insurers 
come from North America, Western Europe and Japan in 2009.21 
In order to eliminate the cross-sectional spillover due to the multiple-listed 
companies across different markets,22 we only select the financial institutions which are 
listed in the market where they are basesd.  For each of the markets, we collect the daily 
price information for all the domestic listed companies within the banking, life and non-
life insurance sectors.23  All the price information is in the local currency units.24  We use 
local currency price in this study to avoid the potential biasness in the interdependence 
across different markets due to the fluctuations of relative currency value of these markets.  
The idea can be better illustrated with a simplified scenario.  Assuming that the stock price 
                                                          
20 The report from IMF is under the title Global Financial Stability Report (2010), see: www.imf.org.  
21The data is collected from the SIGMA Report (2010) by Swiss Re, see: www.swissre.com.  
22 Eun and Shim (1989) and Karolyi (1995) suggest one should exclude the multiple- and/or double-listed 
stocks from the sample to prevent interdependence due to stocks which are double counted across the 
financial markets. 
23  We use the sector category provided by DataStream International to ensure consistency across the 
financial markets. 
24 Studies like Eun and Shim (1989), Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and Karolyi (1995) also use price information 
in local currency terms in their studies. 
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of a US bank is one dollar, and the price of a Japanese bank is one Yen, and both remain 
constant over the sample period.  Assuming that the stock price of the two banks is 
represented in local currency terms, then there will not be any relative movements 
between the two stocks regardless of the changes in the exchange rates between the two 
currencies.  However, assuming that the value of US Dollar increases against Japanese Yen, 
and both stock prices are represented in a common currency terms, say US Dollar.  In this 
case, the relative movement between the two stock prices will be negative even though the 
stock prices in local currency terms remain constant.  The reason is because the stock price 
for Japanese bank has decreased relative to the US bank in terms of US Dollar.  Therefore, 
if the stock prices of financial institutions are all dominated in one currency across 
different countries, the returns of these institutions may be related even without 
fundamental linkages. In order to eliminate the issue of survivorship bias while 
maximizing the sample size, the dataset for each day contains all the listed institutions 
whose stocks are actively traded on that particular day.   
The daily information of the equity market price index, long-term benchmark bond 
yield, and the trade-weighted foreign exchange rate index have also been collected for 
each financial market.25  All the information is obtained from DataStream International.  In 
order to eliminate the potential influence from the Dot-Com Bubble which has a lasting 
impact on global financial market till late 2002, we start our sample period from the 
January 1, 2003 and finishes on the March 9, 2009.  To ensure the same number of daily 
return observations across all the markets, we exclude the days when any of the markets is 
                                                          
25 For the European market, we collect the syndicate long-term benchmark bond yield for European markets 
constructed by DataStream International.  We collect the trade-weighted foreign exchange rate index for the 
Euro, Japanese Yen, British Pound and US Dollar.  The trade-weighted foreign exchange rate index is 
provided by Bank of England. 
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closed.26  In other words, we drop the daily return observation if there is no trading 
activity on any of the markets.  The total number of daily return observations for each 
price series is 1437 after the non-trading adjustment. 
 
2.3.2. Define the Crisis Period 
In order to investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis on the risk and return 
interdependence among the financial sectors across the major economies, we need to 
specify the crisis period for the empirical study.  In this chapter, we define the crisis period 
from the April 2, 2007 to the March 9, 2009.  The recent financial crisis starts to show its 
sign in early 2007, when the US housing market begins to decline with a number of small 
sub-prime lenders suffered huge losses in February and March.  On the April 2, 2007, the 
crisis claimed its first major victim as the largest US sub-prime lender, New Century 
Financial, filed for bankruptcy.  The event is followed by a series credit rating downgrades 
on structured financial products (mainly asset backed securities backed by subprime 
loans).27  Although the asset backed security markets are still expending in the first half of 
2007, the pace of the expansion slowed since April and eventually collapsed in August 
2007.28   
The bankruptcy of New Century Financial put serious doubt on the “originate and 
distribute” business model of banks, which shaken the investor’s confidence in the 
banking sector (Blackburn, 2008).29  The banking sector from the major economies started 
                                                          
26 The structure of the VAR-BEKK model requires the return series of involved assets have the same number 
of observations.  
27 Moody’s has downgraded 131 asset backed securities which are backed by subprime mortgage loans in 
June 2007.  For detail timeline of the events during the recent financial crisis, please refer to Guillén (2009). 
28 Please find the diagram represents the monthly outstanding volume of the asset backed security markets 
in the Appendix A.1.   
29 Banks with “originate and distribute” business model do not hold the loans they generated but sale it to 
other investors once these loans are generated.  Since the banks pass the credit risk to other parties through 
securitizing the loans into structured financial assets, they on longer care about the quality of the loans.  The 
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to collapse following the event.30   The value of banks decreased because the structured 
financial products they were holding is highly sensitive to market conditions. 
It is worth mentioning that structured products are hard to value as they are complex 
in nature and traded over-the-counter (OTC).  Under the fair value accounting standard, 
the structured products are categorized as “Level 3” assets.31  That means, the fair value of 
structured products is based purely on models, and has no directly tradable elements.  
Therefore, during extreme market conditions (economic downturn, or collapse of the 
housing market), the value of these OTC structured products is simply “a wish and a 
prayer” (Blackburn, 2008).  Banks are the most active investors in the structured financial 
products (Duffie, 2008), and they need to mark the financial assets on their balance sheet 
to the market price/fair value of the assets according to the fair value accounting standard.  
Therefore, the dramatic price drop in structured financial products forces banks to write-
off large amount of value on their balance sheet, and makes the liquidity situation within 
the banking sector even worse.  In order to ease the liquidity shortage, banks forced to sell 
their liquid assets which driven the asset price down further.  This vicious circle is also 
known as liquidity and/or loss spiral (Blackburn, 2008).  The insurance sectors were also 
suffered during the crisis due to the fair value accounting standard.   Eling and Schmeiser 
(2010) claim that the negative impact on the value of insurance companies was 
“unavoidable” since insurers are the largest institutional investors on the financial market.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
structured financial assets are off-balance sheet items, which means banks can create a “shadow banking 
system” and take on as much credit risk as they want.  
30 Please find the diagram for daily movement of the equity value for different sector portfolios in the 
Appendix A.2. 
31 The fair value accounting standard is according to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
157: Fair Value Measurement (FAS 157), which is issued by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB).  For further discussion on the fair value accounting rule and its impact on the current financial crisis, 
please refer to the Global Financial Stability Report (2008) issued by the IMF.  The GFSR is issued on an 
annually basis and available from IMF’s website: www.imf.org. 
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Some researchers suggest alternative starting dates for the recent crisis.  For instance, 
Brunnermeier (2009) argues the event that BNP Paribas ceases the redemptions for three of 
its investment funds on the August 9, 2007 should be the starting date of the crisis, as it 
triggered the collapse of the wholesale funding market.  He suggests that the event 
indicates that even large financial institutions cannot value the structured products 
properly, which severely damaged the investor’s confidence in the structured financial 
products.  However, we do not fully agree with this argument.  The BNP Paribas event is 
just the last straw since which the whole global economy started to crumble due to credit 
and liquidity shortage.  However, it is the bankruptcy of New Century Financial that 
triggered the chain reaction which eventually led to the melt down of the global financial 
market. 
We specify the end of the recent financial crisis at the March 9, 2009.  On this day, the 
equity markets of the selected markets reach their lowest point during the recent financial 
crisis.32  After that, these stock markets experience the biggest single rally since the start of 
the crisis, which shows a strong recovery of the global financial market.33  
  
2.3.3. Equity Portfolios And Explanatory Variable 
There is one issue for using the daily frequency data to investigate the interdependences 
among financial sectors across different markets, which is the nonsynchronous trading 
time.  Stock markets in different countries are operating in diverse time zones with 
different opening and closing times.  In order to better illustrate the idea, we draw the 
following diagram which presents the nature of nonsynchronous trading periods for the 
stock markets in our sample. 
                                                          
32 Please find the diagram for daily movements of the stock market indices represented in the Appendix A.3. 
33 The S&P 500 Financials index is increased by 16% on the March 10, 2009 alone. 
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Figure 2.1  Nonsynchronous Trading Time across Stock Markets34 
 
From the above diagram (Figure 2.1), one can see that simply using the lagged price 
information to investigate the cross-sectional spillover effects could be misleading.  For 
instance, one should use the same day price information instead of the price information 
of previous trading day from the Japanese market to evaluate its spillover effect towards 
the US market.  Since the Japanese market finishes trading before the US market opens, the 
price information generates from the Japanese market is fully disclosed to the US investors 
on the same trading day. 
In order to overcome this issue, some researchers use low frequency data such as 
weekly (Baele, 2005, Bekaert et al, 2005) or monthly (Peek and Rosengren, 1997) price 
information.  However, using low frequency data may fail to capture the spillover effects 
as they usually last for a short period of time (Eun and Shim, 1989).  In the current study, 
we fix the nonsynchronous trading time by adjusting the time lag for different markets.   
Our approach is similar to the one used by Eun and Shim (1989) and Hamao et al 
(1990).  Given the trading sequence of the different stock markets, it is reasonable to 
assume that the return and volatility information from a market that finishes its trading 
activity earlier in the calendar day is likely to transmit to other markets that operate later 
                                                          
34 The GMT refers to the Greenwich Mean Time.  The figure illustrates the opening and closing time of the 
major stock exchange in each region.  Tokyo Stock Exchange in the Japanese market opens at GMT 0:00 and 
closes at GMT 6:00.  The London Stock Exchange in UK shares almost the same trading period with most of 
the European stock exchanges, which operates between GMT 8:00 till 16:30.  The New York Stock Exchange 
in the US market opens the latest at GMT 14:30 and finishes at GMT 21:00. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24GMT
Nonsynchronous Trading Time
     Japan    European Countries                            US 
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in the same trading day, but not vice versa.  For instance, it is very likely that the trading 
information from the Japanese market will transmit to the markets in the European 
countries and US on the same trading day.  However, the Japanese market would only 
respond to the price information generated from the European and US markets over the 
previous trading day. 
 
2.3.4. Financial Sector Portfolio 
We construct equally weighted sector portfolios for different types of financial institutions 
within a market.35  For each market, two financial sector portfolios are constructed, namely 
the banking and the insurance portfolio.  The insurance portfolio contains both life and 
non-life insurance companies.  We also group the six Western European countries as one 
market.  The six Western European countries are France, German, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece.  We treat the six countries as one market due to the fact that these countries 
are all members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and they are highly integrated in 
terms of financial market movements.36  We exclude UK from the group as it is the only 
major European country which is not belongs to the EMU.  We label the group of six 
Western European countries as EU market in the current study. 
We focus on the interdependence among financial sectors instead of individual 
financial institutions across the global financial markets.  Therefore, we would like the 
firm specific information to be removed from the financial sector portfolio through 
diversification.  It is well-known that the portfolio size has a significant impact on the 
diversification effectiveness.  Previous studies suggested that a portfolio with 28 to 60 
                                                          
35 The size weighted portfolio will represent the performance of the large institutions, while the equally 
weighted portfolio will provide a more general performance measure across all institutions involved.  We 
focus on the return performance of a financial sector rather than a group of individual institutions.  
Therefore, we employ equally weighted portfolios in this chapter.  
36 For further discussion on the impact of the introduction of Euro on the EMU member states, and their 
market integration, please refer to Bartram et al (2007), and Christiansen (2007) among others. 
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securities is only 20% to 10% higher than the universal minimum risk portfolio, which 
indicates that most of the diversification benefits can be achieved when the portfolio size is 
above 20 (Evans and Archer, 1968, Elton and Gruber, 1977, Shawky and Smith, 2005) .  In 
order to illustrate the diversification effectiveness of the financial sector portfolios we 
constructed for the current study, the number of financial institutions in each market is 
presented in Table 2.1 as follow. 
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Table 2.1  Time-Varying Size of the Financial Sector Portfolios 
The following table contains the size of the financial sector portfolios over the sample period on an annually basis. 
The sample period used in the current study is from the 1 January 2003 till 9 March 2009. 
  EU   Japan 
Date Small Banks Large Banks Bank  Insurance   Small Banks Large Banks Bank  Insurance 
2003 52 17 69 24 59 20 79 3 
2004 53 17 70 25 60 20 80 3 
2005 53 18 71 25 61 20 81 3 
2006 55 18 73 26 62 21 83 3 
2007 57 19 76 26 63 21 84 3 
2008 58 19 77 26 63 21 84 3 
2009 58 19 77 26 65 21 86 3 
   UK   US 
Date Bank  Insurance   Small Banks Large Banks Bank  Insurance 
2003 6 19 65 21 86 61 
2004 7 22 74 24 98 66 
2005 7 26 76 25 101 67 
2006 8 27 79 26 105 69 
2007 8 33 83 28 111 73 
2008 8 34 83 28 111 75 
2009 8 34 84 28 112 75 
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The above table illustrates the number of institutions for different financial sectors within 
each market.  The number of institutions in the all the insurance sectors, as well as the 
banking sector in the UK market is comparatively small over the sample period.  In order 
to obtain the maximum diversification benefits, we only construct one portfolio for each of 
these financial sectors.  We named these portfolios which contain all the financial 
institutions within the same industry as all size financial sector portfolios. 
The number of institutions in the EU, Japanese and US banking sector is more than 
70 during the sample period.  Existing literature shows that financial institutions with 
different sizes react differently to the market risk factors, especially for banks.37  In order 
to examine the potential size effect for the banks in our sample while maintain a 
reasonable level of diversification effectiveness, we construct two additional size portfolios 
for the EU, Japanese and US banking industries, namely the large and small size banking 
portfolios.   
In order to categorize banks into different size groups, we collect the market 
capitalization for banks in these three markets on a monthly basis.  The size of the financial 
institution fluctuates as time elapses, which might cause the change of the firm’s size 
category over the sample period.  To ensure the institutions in the large size portfolio 
consistently have a higher market capitalization compares to ones from the small size 
portfolio, we rebalance our size portfolio on a monthly basis.  At the start of each calendar 
month, we rank financial institutions within the same financial sector for each market 
from large to small according to their average market capitalization over the year.  The 
institution within the top 25% region will be picked as the large banks for that month, 
                                                          
37 For further discussion on the size effect of the banking industry, please refer to Demsetz and Strahan 
(1997), De Nicoló et al (2004), and Elyasiani et al (2007). 
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while the remaining ones will be treated as small banks.  The number of institutions in 
each size portfolios is also illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
2.3.5. Descriptive Statistics and Diagnostic Analysis  
Table 2.2 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the portfolio return series.  In order to 
investigate the impact of the recent crisis on the return performance of these sector 
portfolios, we provide three panels in Table 2.2.  Panel A summarizes the distributional 
statistics of the sector portfolio returns over the entire sample period, while Panel B and C 
contains the distributional statistics of the sector portfolio returns over the pre-crisis and 
crisis period, respectively.  The result indicates that the mean returns for all the sector 
portfolios are negative over the entire sample period.  The result is well expected as the 
financial markets across the global experienced a tough time during the last three years of 
our sample period.38  In fact, as one can see in Panel B, the mean returns of all the sector 
portfolios are positive over the pre-crisis period.  In addition, the mean returns of the 
banking sector portfolios are lower than the mean return of the insurance sectors over the 
entire sample period.  The finding is consistent with the previous studies suggesting that 
the current financial crisis has a much significant impact on the banks compares to 
insurers (Eling and Schmeiser, 2010).   
Furthermore, the result indicates that large size banks are outperformed by their 
smaller counterparts over the entire sample period, as the mean returns of the small size 
banking sector portfolios are higher than the large size ones, especially for the US market.    
By examining the result in Panel B and C, one can see that the relative poor return 
                                                          
38 From the figures illustrate of the daily movement of the financial sector portfolio values in Appendix A.2, 
one can see that the value of all the value of financial sector portfolios increased steadily before the crisis.  
However, the value of these financial sector portfolios dropped dramatically during the crisis period, which 
wiped out all the gains they previous earned.  None of the portfolios recover back to its original level at the 
end of the sample period. 
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performances of large size banking portfolios is mainly due to the huge losses they 
suffered during the crisis period.  In Panel B, one can see that large banks enjoy higher 
mean return compare to small banks before the crisis.  The reason is because large banks 
are more likely to enhance their return performance by diversifying their business across 
regional markets and/or take on more risk (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; De Nicoló et al, 
2004).  However, during the crisis period, the losses suffered by large banks are much 
higher than the small ones.  From Panel C, the mean returns of large size banking 
portfolios are much lower than the ones of small size banking portfolios.  One possible 
explanation of this phenomenon is that large size banks are more aggressive in terms of 
risk appetite and financial leveraging (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).  Since liquidity is low 
during the crisis period, so a bank with higher leverage is more risky.  Therefore, one can 
see that the standard deviation of the large bank returns is also higher than the small ones 
in all the three panels, which is similar to the findings by Elyasiani et al (2007).  In addition, 
De Nicoló et al (2004) argued that large banks are more likely involve in 
internationalization and consolidation, which makes large banks vulnerable to contagion 
effects during the financial crisis since they are well integrated across the global markets.   
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Table 2.2  Distributional Statistics of the Financial Sector Portfolio Returns. 
The sample period used in the current study is from the January 1, 2003 till March 9, 2009. 
Panel A: Distributional statistics over the entire sample period. 
Bank EU   Japan   UK US   
Raw Return (%) All   Small   Large   All   Small   Large   All   All   Small   Large   
 Mean -0.048   -0.037   -0.088   -0.024   -0.024   -0.029   -0.083   -0.093 -0.086 -0.105   
 Maximum 6.615 4.864 13.289   13.467 13.207 15.026   15.174 10.811 9.770 14.029   
 Minimum -6.627 -5.694 -10.825   -8.665 -8.006 -12.262   -11.634 -13.951 -12.675 -18.092   
 Std. Dev. 0.872   0.723   1.642   1.571   1.504   1.970   1.768   1.434   1.278   2.197   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.940   -1.350   -0.215   0.193   0.270   0.069   0.038   -1.469   -1.959   -0.765   
 Kurtosis 13.237 14.097 13.514   9.559 9.828 9.181   17.499 28.416 34.583 19.062   
Normality Test 6486 *** 7810 *** 6630 *** 2585 *** 2809 *** 2289 *** 12588 *** 39196 *** 60643 *** 15587 *** 
ADF Test -21.738 *** -20.431 *** -35.468 *** -39.144 *** -39.645 *** -37.782 *** -24.010 *** -12.089 *** -7.449 *** -9.632 *** 
 
Insurance EU Japan UK US 
Raw Return (%) All   All   All   All   
 Mean -0.041   -0.021   -0.010   -0.075   
 Maximum 6.009 12.328 5.202 8.781   
 Minimum -7.770 -17.581 -5.054 -16.563   
 Std. Dev. 1.108   2.487   0.876   1.727   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.695   -0.382   -0.188   -1.729   
 Kurtosis 9.305 9.863 7.272 21.164   
Normality Test 2496 *** 2855 *** 1101 *** 20469 *** 
ADF Test -22.648 *** -37.749 *** -36.653 *** -9.330 *** 
 Note: The normality Test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test. The ADF Test refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test. The test statistics under 
the serial correlation test is conducted from the Ljung-Box serial correlation test.  Q(n) represents the n-lagged serial correlation of the return series, Q(n)^2 represents 
the n-lagged serial correlation of the squared return series. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Distributional statistics over the pre-crisis period, January 1, 2003 to April 1, 2007. 
Bank EU   Japan   UK US   
Raw Return (%) All   Small   Large   All   Small   Large   All   All   Small   Large   
 Mean 0.060   0.065   0.043   0.040   0.032   0.060   0.003   0.009 0.008 0.017   
 Maximum 2.150 1.972 5.112   4.607 4.741 5.384   5.123 1.624 1.704 2.939   
 Minimum -3.811 -3.618 -4.557   -6.476 -6.036 -8.110   -9.298 -2.726 -2.582 -3.017   
 Std. Dev. 0.532   0.459   0.968   1.197   1.155   1.493   1.056   0.426   0.336   0.805   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.845   -0.899   -0.491   -0.054   0.000   -0.039   -0.272   -0.717   -1.217   -0.097   
 Kurtosis 7.945 9.340 6.205   4.962 4.973 5.072   11.266 6.690 11.849 3.918   
Normality Test 1127 *** 1793 *** 464 *** 159 *** 161 *** 177 *** 2833 *** 647 *** 3478 *** 36 *** 
ADF Test -18.928 *** -18.517 *** -29.806 *** -29.896 *** -30.535 *** -29.123 *** -30.874 *** -29.842 *** -28.063 *** -33.026 *** 
 
Insurance EU Japan UK US 
Raw Return (%) All   All   All   All   
 Mean 0.055   0.101   0.048   0.039   
 Maximum 4.553 12.238 3.313 3.322   
 Minimum -3.854 -9.060 -3.336 -3.312   
 Std. Dev. 0.824   1.839   0.687   0.744   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.332   0.269   -0.381   -0.147   
 Kurtosis 6.489 5.620 5.874 4.944   
Normality Test 521 *** 295 *** 365 *** 160 *** 
ADF Test -28.105 *** -30.864 *** -19.553 *** -30.916 *** 
 Note: The normality Test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test. The ADF Test refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test. The test statistics under 
the serial correlation test is conducted from the Ljung-Box serial correlation test.  Q(n) represents the n-lagged serial correlation of the return series, Q(n)^2 represents 
the n-lagged serial correlation of the squared return series. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel C: Distributional statistics over the crisis period, April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009. 
Bank EU   Japan   UK US   
Raw Return (%) All   Small   Large   All   Small   Large   All   All   Small   Large   
 Mean -0.288   -0.263   -0.378   -0.166   -0.150   -0.229   -0.275   -0.321 -0.295 -0.375   
 Maximum 6.615 4.864 13.289   13.467 13.207 15.026   15.174 10.811 9.770 14.029   
 Minimum -6.627 -5.694 -10.825   -8.665 -8.006 -12.262   -11.634 -13.951 -12.675 -18.092   
 Std. Dev. 1.319   1.071   2.547   2.178   2.075   2.741   2.748   2.481   2.227   3.745   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.292   -0.663   0.168   0.391   0.457   0.251   0.246   -0.639   -0.912   -0.290   
 Kurtosis 7.315 7.997 7.252   7.417 7.786 6.969   9.184 9.949 11.728 7.161   
Normality Test 352 *** 497 *** 338 *** 374 *** 441 *** 297 *** 715 *** 928 *** 1477 *** 328 *** 
ADF Test -12.595 *** -11.807 *** -20.007 *** -23.187 *** -23.367 *** -22.246 *** -20.191 *** -19.424 *** -18.010 *** -22.341 *** 
 
Insurance EU Japan UK US 
Raw Return (%) All   All   All   All   
 Mean -0.254   -0.294   -0.139   -0.328   
 Maximum 6.009 12.328 5.202 8.781   
 Minimum -7.770 -17.581 -5.054 -16.563   
 Std. Dev. 1.545   3.511   1.185   2.880   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.418   -0.355   0.138   -0.950   
 Kurtosis 6.461 6.918 5.563 8.403   
Normality Test 236 *** 295 *** 124 *** 610 *** 
ADF Test -12.952 *** -21.386 *** -20.954 *** -24.396 *** 
 Note: The normality Test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test. The ADF Test refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test. The test statistics under 
the serial correlation test is conducted from the Ljung-Box serial correlation test.  Q(n) represents the n-lagged serial correlation of the return series, Q(n)^2 represents 
the n-lagged serial correlation of the squared return series. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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For all portfolios, the unconditional distributions of returns are non-normal.  The non-
normality is supported by the high kurtosis figures as well as the noticeable deviation of 
the skewness statistics from zero.  The result is reinforced by the Jarque-Bera normality 
test, where the statistics for all the portfolios are significantly above the critical value at 1% 
confidence level.  In order to identify whether the portfolio returns series are stationary, 
we perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test.  For all portfolios, the test 
statistics reject the null hypothesis that the portfolio return has a unit root at 1% 
confidence level.  The result of the Ljung-Box serial correlation test indicates that the 
return and squared return series are highly autocorrelated for all portfolios.  This finding 
suggests that a dynamic variance-covariance estimation framework (see Section 3) is 
indeed appropriate for modeling the returns of financial sector portfolios across the four 
markets.  
In order to investigate the potential multicolinearity issue within our sample, we 
estimate the unconditional correlation among the  sector portfolios.  In the current study, 
we examine the return and risk spillover effect across the financial sectors over the entire 
sample period, and the changes in spillover magnitude during the crisis period.  Previous 
empirical studies suggest that correlation among financial assets will increase during the 
crisis periods (Koutmas and Booth, 1995, Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Bekaert et al, 2005).  In 
order to ensure the multicolinearity issue will not arise over the sample period, we 
generate the correlation matrix across the financial sector portfolios over the pre-crisis 
period (January 1, 2003 to April 1, 2007) as well as the crisis period (April 2, 2007 to March 9, 
2009).  The correlation matrix across the portfolios is illustrated in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3  Unconditional Correlation of the Financial Sector Portfolio Returns. 
The following table contains the unconditional correlation coefficients between the financial sector portfolio return across the national markets.  In 
order to adjust the non-synchronize trading time issue, we adjusted the time lag of the return series before the correlation estimation.  
The sample period is from the January 1, 2003 to the March 9, 2009. 
Panel A: Unconditional correlation before the financial crisis from January 1, 2003 to April 1, 2007. 
Bank Insurance 
EU Japan UK US EU Japan UK US 
EU   0.277 0.013 0.216   0.208 0.039 0.275 
Japan 0.149   0.061 0.260 0.147   0.115 0.272 
UK 0.050 0.186   0.139 0.110 0.221   0.269 
US 0.309 0.083 0.209   0.421 0.053 0.296   
Large Banks Small Banks 
EU Japan US EU Japan US 
EU   0.242 0.168   0.242 0.185 
Japan -0.024   0.245 0.117   0.222 
US 0.426 0.066   0.180 0.089   
 
Panel B: Unconditional correlation during the financial crisis from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009. 
Bank Insurance 
EU Japan UK US EU Japan UK US 
EU   0.451 0.141 0.367   0.412 0.041 0.338 
Japan 0.188   0.205 0.337 0.252   0.244 0.570 
UK 0.013 0.320   0.282 -0.045 0.400   0.323 
US 0.487 0.154 0.489   0.332 0.049 0.328   
Large Banks Small Banks 
EU Japan US EU Japan US 
EU   0.447 0.328   0.432 0.365 
Japan 0.134   0.244 -0.068   0.461 
US 0.469 0.190   0.414 0.026   
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From Panel A Table 2.3, one can see that most correlations across the financial sectors are 
positive during the entire sample period.  The only exception comes from the correlation 
between the large size banking sector portfolios from Japanese and the EU market (-2.4%).  
During the crisis period, the correlation correlations across the financial sector portfolios 
have increased.39  The result is consistent with the previous literature on contagion effects, 
as the linkage across financial assets increased during the crisis period (Kaufman, 1994; 
Dornbusch et al, 2000; Kaminsky et al, 2003).  However, none of the correlation coefficient 
is above the 80% level.40   
 
2.4. METHODOLOGY  
2.4.1. VAR-BEKK Estimation Framework  
In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by proposing a new model structure 
for examining the cross-sectional return and volatility spillover across multiple assets.  In 
the proposed model, the mean returns and variance-covariance matrices of the involved 
financial sector portfolios are represented by a modified VAR-BEKK(1,1) process.41  We 
modify the original diagonal BEKK model to capture the volatility spillover effects in the 
conditional variance equation.  We employ the BEKK parameterization in the current 
study due to its less restrictive nature compared to the framework used by previous 
empirical studies.  For instance, Elyasiani et al (2007) pose a constant correlation restriction 
on their empirical framework.  However, empirical studies on dynamics of correlation 
                                                          
39 The two exceptions are the correlation between UK and EU insurance portfolios, and the correlation 
between small Japanese and EU banking portfolios. 
40  The 80% threshold is derived from the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, which suggests the 
multicolinearity issue will only arise if the R squared of the regression among the independent variables is 
higher than 80%.  Since the R squared of a regression with one independent and one dependent variable is 
equal to the square of correlation coefficient between the two variables, we use 80% as the threshold for 
correlation coefficient among the variables as critical value to detect the existence of multicolinearity. 
41 For more information on the technical detail of the BEKK model, please refer to the work by Baba et al 
(1989) which first introduced the parameterization. 
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show that correlation among the financial asset returns do vary as time elapses.42  The 
BEKK parameterization used in our model poses no restriction on correlation dynamics.  
Therefore, it should fit the data in a better way and provides higher efficiency.  In addition, 
the VAR-BEKK model enables us to estimate the return and volatility spillover effects 
among multiple financial sector portfolios simultaneously, which also increase the 
estimation efficiency.  
The proposed VAR-BEKK model has two components: a VAR system of conditional 
mean equations and conditional variance-covariance equations with BEKK 
parameterizations.  We specify the mean equation in the VAR system as a multi-factor 
model similar to the previous studies on asset pricing of financial institutions (Prasad and 
Rajan, 1995, Chamberlain et al, 1997, Elyasiani et al, 2007).  The factors include the changes 
in interest rate, changes in foreign exchange rate, as well as the equity market portfolio 
return.43  However, the movements in market return, foreign exchange rate and interest 
rate are usually highly related.44  Therefore, it is not suitable to estimate the multi-factor 
model with these three macroeconomic factors without any adjustment as they may 
introduce multicolinearity into the mean equation.  In the current study, we avoid this 
issue by constructing the unexpected changes of the foreign exchange rates and interest 
rate index from autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models.45  Given the fact that the 
errors generated from the ARMA process are independent and uncorrelated within 
                                                          
42 For discussions on time-varying conditional correlation among financial assets, please refer to Ang and 
Bekaert (1999) and Cappiello et al (2006) among others. 
43 For discussions on the influence of interest rate changes on the performances of financial institutions, 
please refer to the survey paper by Staikouras (2003 and 2006a).  For discussions on the relationship between 
currency value changes and the equity value of financial institutions, please refer to the empirical studies by 
Adler and Dumas (1985), Eun and Resnick (1988), and Wetmore and Brick (1994 and 1998) among others. 
44 Please refer to Choi et al (1992) among others. 
45 The orthogonalization method used by Stone (1974) and Flannery and James (1984) can also remove the 
linear dependence among the three variables.  However, the orthogonalized risk factors may introduce bias 
into the model estimation (Giliberto, 1985). 
37 
 
themselves and with the original series,46 the estimated unexpected changes of the foreign 
exchange rate and interest rate index are, therefore, independent from each other, as well 
as from the market return.   
In order to capture the return spillover effects among the financial sector portfolios, 
we also include the returns of involved financial sector portfolios into the mean equation.  
For instance, the mean equation for US banking portfolio will include the return of US 
market portfolio, the changes in US interest and exchanges rates, and the returns of 
banking portfolios from the remaining three markets.  In order to examine the influence of 
the current financial crisis on the interdependence among the global financial markets, we 
also introduce a dummy variable into the estimation framework.  The dummy variable 
takes value 1 from April 2, 2007 till March 9, 2009, which represents the crisis period, and 
zeros elsewhere.  The dummy variable helps us to capture the potential changes in the 
return and volatility spillover effects across the sector portfolios.  The VAR system of 
conditional mean equations can be demonstrated in matrix form as follow.47 
 =  ∘  ∙ 1 +  ∙ [ ∙ ∗] +  ∙  ∙ [ ∙ ∗] +      
,~0, ℎ,		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
with: 
° is the Hadamard product,48 1 is a vertical vector of ones which matches the 
vertical dimension of β 
  ∗ = *
+,-, +./,01+2.,01 +./,01 +./,01+.3,01+2.,01 +,-,+2., +,-, +.3,01+./, 4 
                                                          
46 For further discussion about the property of the ARMA estimation, please refer to Greene (2008). 
47 The system demonstrated is a four equation scenario, with financial sector portfolios from EU, Japanese, 
UK and US market, respectively. 
48 The Hadamard product is a special operator for matrix multiplication.  It refers to the element-by-element 
multiplication of two matrices with the same dimension. 
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 = 566
6782.,,- 82.,./8,-,2. 8,-,./ 82.,.38,-,.38./,2. 8./,,-8.3,2. 8.3,,- 8./,.38.3,./9::
:; 
 = *<2.,,- <2.,./<,-,2. <,-,./ <2.,.3<,-,.3<./,2. <./,,-<.3,2. <.3,,- <./,.3<.3,./4 
I = >1 00 1 0 00 00 00 0 1 00 1? 
where: 
Rt = a [k x 1] matrix represents the return of financial sector portfolios over day t.  
k is equal to the number of financial sector portfolios involved in the VAR-
BEKK system. 
β = a [k x 4] parameter matrix where the first column represents the constants, the 
second to fourth column represent market, foreign exchange rate and interest 
rate betas for the corresponding financial sector portfolios, respectively. 
MFt = a [k x 4] matrix contains ones for the first column which represent the 
constants for conditional mean equations.  The second to fourth column of 
the matrix contains the market, foreign exchange rate and interest rate risk 
factors for the corresponding financial sector portfolios over day t, 
respectively.  The market risk factor is represented by the return of  stock 
market index, the foreign exchange rate risk factor is represented by the 
unexpected changes in trade weighted currency price index, and the interest 
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rate risk factor is represented by the unexpected changes in long-term 
benchmark bond yields.49 
Rt* = a [k x k-1] return matrix for the involved financial sector portfolios which 
has been adjusted for nonsynchronous trading time.  
I = a [k x k] identity matrix. 
Θ = a [k x k-1] parameter matrix represents the return spillover effects among the 
financial sector portfolios.  θi,j represents the return spillover effect from 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i over the entire sample period, 
with i, j ∈ [EU, JP, UK, US].  JP represents the Japanese market. 
Γ = a [k x k-1] parameter matrix represents the changes in the return spillover 
effects over the crisis period.  γi,j represents the changes in return spillover 
effect from portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i over the crisis period. 
DUM = a dummy variable represents the potential structural break for the crisis 
period. DUM = 0 before the April 2, 2007, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
The estimated residuals εi,t from each mean equation are assumed to have a multi-
normal distribution, which has zeros mean and conditional variance represented by hii,t.  
We further assume the hii,t is derived from a conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht, 
whose time-varying dynamic follows a modified BEKK framework. 
We employ a diagonal BEKK multivariate GARCH model as the base setting for our 
conditional variance-covariance matrix among the financial sector portfolios (Ht).  In the 
current study, we extend the conventional diagonal BEKK model of Engle and Kroner 
                                                          
49 Follows the previous empirical studies on the effects of interest rate, the interest rate index employed in 
the current study is the yield relative –[(Yt-Yt-1)/Yt-1], Yt is the yield of long-term benchmark bond of the 
corresponding markets over day t.  For further detail please refers to Flannery and James (1984). 
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(1995) to incorporate the volatility spillover effects into the conditional variance 
equation.50  The modified BEKK MGARCH model can be described as follow:51 
@ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C + D ∙ [E ∙ @∗′] +  ∙ D ∙ [F ∙ @∗′] 
with: 
@∗ = 566
67 ℎ,-, ℎ./,01 ℎ.3,01ℎ2.,01 ℎ./,01 ℎ.3,01ℎ2.,01 ℎ,-, ℎ.3,01ℎ2., ℎ,-, ℎ./, 9::
:; 
E = *G2.,,- G2.,./ G2.,.3G,-,2. G,-,./ G,-,.3G./,2. G./,,- G./,.3G.3,2. G.3,,- G.3,./ 4 
F = *H2.,,- H2.,./ H2.,.3H,-,2. H,-,./ H,-,.3H./,2. H./,,- H./,.3H.3,2. H.3,,- H.3,./ 4 
I = >1 00 1 0 00 00 00 0 1 00 1? 
where: 
Ht = a [k x k] conditional variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals at 
day t; k is equal to the number of financial sector portfolios involved in the 
VAR-BEKK system. 
εt = a [1 x k] vector contains the estimated residuals from the mean equation of the 
VAR system for day t. 
C = a [k x k] lower triangle matrix.  The product of CC’ represents the unconditional 
part of the time-varying variance-covariance matrices; 
A and B = [k x k] diagonal parameter matrices represents the multivariate ARCH 
and GARCH effect of the conditional variance-covariance matrices.  The 
                                                          
50 The technical details of the BEKK model are available in the Appendix A.4. 
51 The system demonstrated is a four equation scenario, with size portfolios from EU, Japanese, UK and US 
market, respectively. 
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parameters represent the ARCH and GARCH effects are on the main 
diagonal of the matrix A and B, respectively. 
Ht* = a [k x k-1] modified conditional variance matrix for the involved financial 
sector portfolios which has been adjusted for nonsynchronous trading time.  
I = a [k x k] identity matrix. 
G = a [k x k-1] vector parameter matrix represents the volatility spillover effect 
among the financial sector portfolios. The parameter gij represents the 
volatility spillover effects from portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i 
over the entire sample period, with i, j ∈ [EU, JP, UK, US].  JP represents the 
Japanese  market. 
Z = a [k x k-1] vector parameter matrix represents the changes in volatility spillover 
effect among financial sector portfolios during the crisis period. The 
parameter zij represents the changes in the volatility spillover effects from 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i during the financial crisis. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. DUM = 0 before the April 2, 
2007, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
In the proposed model, the parameter for volatility spillover is not a full matrix.  In 
other words, the volatility oriented from financial sector portfolio in one market can only 
influence the volatility of portfolios in the other markets but not the covariance or 
correlation between these portfolios.  The reason that we do not use full matrix is twofold.  
First, the empirical study by Bekaert et al (2005) argued that change in correlations among 
the financial markets is the result of common risk factor but not of volatility spillovers.  
Therefore, it is unnecessary to introduce full matrix parameter to incorporate volatility 
spillover effect for correlation.  Second, the main purpose of the current study is to 
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investigate the cross-sectional return and volatility spillovers across the financial markets, 
not changes in correlations due to volatility spillover effects.  By employing a vector 
matrix parameter for volatility spillovers instead of a full matrix can reduce the number of 
parameters, which increases the efficiency of the estimation.   
In order to better illustrate the conditional mean and the variance of each individual 
portfolio return under the VAR-BEKK system, we also represent the conditional mean and 
variance equation for each financial sector portfolio in a multi-equation format as follow.  
In the following demonstration, we assume there are four portfolios in the system, one 
from each of the four markets. 
Conditional Mean Equation: 
+2., = 2. +	2.,I/J&K2., + 2.,LMN2., + 2.,OPD2., + <2.,,-+,-,
+ <2.,./+./,01 + <2.,.3+.3,01
+ Qθ2.,,-+,-, + θ2.,./+./,01 + θ2.,.3+.3,01R + 2., 
+,-, = ,- +	,-,I/J&K,-, + ,-,LMN,-, + ,-,OPD,-, + <,-,2.+2.,01 + <,-,./+./,01
+ <,-,.3+∗.3,01 + Qθ,-,2.+2.,01 + θ,-,./+./,01 + θ,-,.3+.3,01R + ,-, 
+./, = ./ +	./,I/J&K./, + ./,LMN./, + ./,OPD./, + <./,2.+∗2.,01
+ <./,,-+,-, + <./,.3+.3,01
+ Qθ./,2.+2.,01 + θ./,,-+,-, + θ./,.3+.3,01R + ./, 
+.3, = .3 +	.3,I/J&K.3, + .3,LMN.3, + .3,OPD.3, + <.3,2.+2., + <.3,,-+,-,
+ <.3,./+./, + Qθ.3,2.+2., + θ.3,,-+,-, + θ.3,./+./,R + .3, 
,~0, ℎ,	 with, 	and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !.  JP represents the Japanese 
market.  
where: 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio in market i over day t. 
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MKTi,t = the market portfolio return for market i, over day t; 
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of the foreign exchange rate for market i, over day t. 
IRi,t = the unexpected changes of the long-term benchmark bond yield for market i 
over day t.  
<,S= the coefficient for return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio in 
market j to portfolio in market i over the entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in return spillover effect from financial sector 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i during the crisis period.  
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio in  market i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio in market i 
over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. DUM = 0 before the April 2, 
2007, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
ℎ2., = T2. + U1VV2.,01 + W1Vℎ2.,01 + G2.,,-ℎ,-, + G2.,./ℎ./,01 + G2.,.3ℎ.3,01
+ H2.,,-ℎSX, + H2.,./ℎ./,01 + H2.,.3ℎ.3,01 
ℎ,-, = T,- + UVVV,-,01 + WVVℎ,-,01 + G,-,2.ℎ2.,01 + G,-,./ℎ./,01 + G,-,.3ℎ.3,01
+ H,-,2.ℎ2.,01 + H,-,./ℎ./,01 + H,-,.3ℎ.3,01 
ℎ./, = T./ + UYVV./,01 + WYVℎ./,01 + G./,2.ℎ2.,01 + G./,,-ℎ,-, + G./,.3ℎ.3,01
+ H./,2.ℎ2.,01 + H./,,-ℎ,-, + H./,.3ℎ.3,01 
ℎ.3, = T.3 + UZVV.3,01 + WZVℎ.3,01 + G.3,2.ℎ2., + G.3,,-ℎ,-, + G.3,./ℎ./,
+ H.3,2.ℎ2., + H.3,,-ℎ,-, + H.3,./ℎ./, 
ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS  
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with, 	and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. JP represents the Japanese  market.  
where: 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio in market i over day t. 
hi,i,t = the conditional covariance between the financial sector portfolio in market i 
and market j over day t. 
εi,t = the estimated residuals from the conditional mean equation of financial sector 
portfolio in market i from the VAR system for day t. 
ci,j = the [i, j]th element of the CC’ matrix, which is the unconditional part of the 
time-varying variance-covariance matrices.  
ai and bi = the ith element on the main diagonal of the ARCH and GARCH effect 
parameter matrix A and B, respectively. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the volatility spillover effects from financial sector 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in spillover effects from financial sector 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i during the financial crises. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. DUM = 0 before the April 2, 
2007, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
2.4.2. Model Estimation  
We estimate the models for the first moment simultaneously with those for the second 
moment.  Despite the large amount of parameters involved in the modified VAR-BEKK 
system,52 the simultaneous estimation process will increase the accuracy and efficiency of 
the model (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003). 
                                                          
52 The total number of parameters needs to be estimated for a k-portfolio system is 3k2+3k+k(k+1)/2. 
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We follow the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) process developed by 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) for the parameter estimation of the proposed modified 
VAR-BEKK MGARCH model. 53   We assume the residuals generated from the mean 
equations follow a multi-normal distribution with zero mean and a variance-covariance 
matrix equals to Ω.  We further assume that for every observation point t ∈ [0, T] the 
estimated residual vector εt is also a multi-normal distribution N(0, Ht).  Due to the fact 
that Ω is unobservable, we will use Ht to estimate Ω as for every t, where the estimated 
residual vector εt can be observed.  Under the multi-normality assumption of εt, we can 
specify the quasi-conditional log-likelihood as follow. 
[ = −12 [^ln`2ab + ln|@| + ′@] 
where: 
k = the number of portfolios in the VAR-BEKK system. 
Ht = a [k x k] variance-covariance matrix for portfolio returns at day t. 
εt = a [1 x k] vector contains the estimated residuals from the mean equation of the 
VAR system for day t. 
We use numerical maximization techniques to estimate the model. The parameter is 
estimated via maximizing the sum of lt over the normal period. 
One major challenge of estimating a system of non-linear equations with substantial 
amount of parameters is the initial value setting of the parameters before the estimation.  
Given the non-linear nature of the VAR-BEKK system, a sub-optimal initial parameter 
setting might lead the log-likelihood maximization process to a local maximum instead of 
                                                          
53 We generate the QML standard errors for the estimated parameters based on the VAR-BEKK model.  The 
QML standard error is generated based on the quasi-maximum likelihood function instead of variance of the 
estimated residuals.  The QML standard error is also known as the robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard 
error. 
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a global one.  In the current study, we propose to estimate the initial value setting of the 
parameters in a two-step framework. 
In the first step, we separate the mean equations from the VAR-BEKK system, and 
estimate the parameters for each mean equation separately via OLS.  The estimated 
parameters are later been used as the initial value setting for the mean equations in the 
VAR-BEKK system.  In the second step, we generate the residual series εi,t from each 
individual mean equations we estimated in the first step.  Then, we model the time-
varying variance-covariance dynamics of the estimated residuals with a diagonal BEKK 
framework.  The estimated parameters from the variance-covariance model are deployed 
as the initial value setting for the parameter C, A and B in the VAR-BEKK system.   
In case the value of the ARCH and GARCH effect parameters (represented by A and 
B) change dramatically after introducing the volatility spillovers across the markets, we 
introduce two more initial value settings for parameter A and B of the proposed VAR-
BEKK system.  We assume the unconditional part (represented by the product of CC’) of 
the variance-covariance matrix among portfolio return residuals will not be affected by the 
introduction of cross-sectional volatility spillover, and only the time-varying dynamic (the 
ARCH and GARCH effect represented by parameter A and B) will be influenced.  Under 
the first additional initial value setting, we restrict all the elements in parameter A and B to 
be equal to (0.05)1/2 and (0.95)1/2, respectively.  For the second additional setting, we set 
the value of parameter A and B as the estimated ARCH and GARCH effect from the scalar 
BEKK model over the residuals generated from the individual mean equations. 
In the current study, we estimate the proposed VAR-BEKK models with all the three 
initial parameter value settings for parameter A and B, and select the one that provides the 
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highest log-likelihood value.  All the estimation result presented in the empirical section is 
based on the model that enjoys the highest estimated log-likelihood figure. 
 
2.5. EMPIRICAL RESULT  
In the current study, we focus on the return and volatility interdependence among the 
financial sector portfolios across four markets, namely EU, Japan, UK and US markets.  We 
perform three tests to investigate the linkages among these portfolios based on the 
proposed VAR-BEKK model.  The first test (Test 1) evaluates the return and volatility 
spillovers among the same type of financial sector portfolios across the markets.  We 
estimate the VAR-BEKK model for each of the two types of financial sectors, namely the 
banking and insurance sector portfolios from the four markets.   
The recent financial crisis is originated from the US subprime mortgage lending crisis, 
and it spreads to the rest of the world through the US banking industry.  Therefore, we 
focus on the interdependence between the US banking portfolio and the insurance 
portfolios from the remaining markets in Test 2.54  We only focus on the insurance sectors 
from the other markets in the second test because the relationship between US banks and 
the banks from other markets is already evaluated in the first test.   
The final test (Test 3) examines the interdependence between the global banking 
portfolio and the global insurance portfolio.  Since insurance companies perform relatively 
well during the recent financial crisis compare to banks (Eling and Schmeiser, 2010, and 
Harrington, 2009), it is reasonable to argue that the insurers should enjoy a competitive 
advantage against banks in terms of portfolio returns over the crisis period.  The global 
                                                          
54 We select the US banking sector as it is the most important channel through which the US subprime 
mortgage lending crisis transforms into a global financial crisis. For further discussion on the issue, please 
refer to Blackburn (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) and Dymski (2007).  
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banking and insurance portfolio used in the present study are also equally weighted 
portfolios. 
We discuss the estimation output of the three tests from a US point of view because 
US financial market plays an important role in the development of the crisis.  Thus, it is 
more valuable to focus on the return and volatility spillovers between the US financial 
sectors and the sectors from the rest of the markets.  Because the first two tests are based 
on VAR-BEKK model with all the available financial sector portfolios across the markets, 
the number of estimated parameters is large.55  In order to illustrate the estimation result 
from Test 1 and 2 in a clear manner, we spilt the result into three sub-tables, namely i) 
macroeconomic factors and GARCH effects, ii) return spillover effects, and iii) volatility 
spillover effects. 
In the first sub-table, we summarize the estimated coefficients for market, interest 
rate and foreign exchange rate betas of the financial sector portfolios in the mean 
equations, as well as the parameters for ARCH and GARCH effects in the conditional 
variance equations.56   The levels of volatility persistence for each individual variance 
equations, and the value of log-likelihood function of the estimation are also presented.  
The other two sub-tables summarize the estimated coefficients for return and volatility 
spillovers among the financial sector portfolios, respectively.  For each spillover effects, the 
coefficient estimated over the entire sample period and its potential changes during the 
crisis period are reported separately.   
 
 
                                                          
55 For a four-asset case, the total number of estimated coefficients is 82, while the number of coefficients for 
risk and return spillover effects is 48. 
56 We skip the coefficients for the constants from the summary table to save space as they are non-significant 
and/or very close to zero. 
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2.5.1. Impact of Macro Economic Factor 
Before we discuss the cross-sectional spillover effects among the financial sector portfolios, 
we first examine the impact of macroeconomic risk factors on the performances of these 
financial sector portfolios.  We discuss the impact of market, interest rate and foreign 
exchange rate risk factors based on the estimation results generated from Test 1.57  Three 
VAR-BEKK models have been estimated under Test 1 for the all, large and small size 
financial sector portfolios, respectively.58  The result of these three models is presented in 
Table 2.4 – 2.6.  Table 2.4 contains the estimated coefficients of VAR-BEKK model based on 
all size financial sector portfolios, while Table 2.5 and 2.6 summarize the estimation output 
based on the large and small size banking sector portfolios, respectively. 
  
                                                          
57 We based our discussion on the estimation result from Test 1 as it is the only test investigates the 
macroeconomic risk factors for all the financial sector portfolios across the markets.  In addition, the 
estimated coefficients for the macroeconomic risk factors from Test 1 are consistent with the ones from Test 2 
for all size banking and insurance portfolios across markets. 
58 As mentioned in Section 2, the large and small size portfolios only applicable to banking sectors. 
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Table 2.4  VAR-BEKK Model based on All Size Financial Sector Portfolios. 
The following tables summarize the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK models based on all size financial 
sector portfolios across the markets.  The all size financial sector portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio 
with all the corresponding financial institutions from a given market.  The estimated coefficients from the 
model have been categorized into three sub-tables: i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH Effects, ii) Return 
Spillover Effects and iii) Volatility Spillover Effects.   
i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH Effects 
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the βi,x, ai, and bi in the mean and variance 
equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation:  +, =  +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑<,S+S, + ∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],			 ≠ !.	 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !.  JP 
represents the Japanese market. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for national market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] 
which represents the market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial 
sector portfolio i. 
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance 
equation for financial sector portfolio i. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D= the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from 2 April 2007 to 9 March 2009, and D = 0 
for elsewhere. 
Markets EU Japan UK US 
Bank - All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Market (βi,MKT) 0.523 34.223 *** 0.799 36.454 *** 0.956 16.218 *** 0.451 39.264 *** 
FX (βi,FX) 0.199 6.095 *** -0.004 -0.094 0.235 3.697 *** -0.017 -1.084   
IR (βi,IR) -0.025 -2.342 ** 0.011 1.101 -0.006 -0.166 0.049 6.088 *** 
GARCH Effects 
 ARCH (aii2) 0.034 4.833 *** 0.051 8.330 *** 0.133 8.422 *** 0.096 9.132 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.933 145.150 *** 0.934 180.810 *** 0.774 60.324 *** 0.756 73.566 *** 
Persistence 0.968 0.985 0.907 0.852 
Log-Likelihood 21733.0 
Insurance – All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
Market (βi,MKT) 0.726 42.232 *** 0.970 28.916 *** 0.562 34.753 *** 0.857 41.942 *** 
FX (βi,FX) 0.248 5.438 *** -0.020 -0.279   0.126 3.683 *** 0.005 0.173   
IR (βi,IR) 0.010 0.615   -0.022 -1.557   -0.019 -1.239   -0.002 -0.202   
GARCH Effects 
 ARCH (aii2) 0.004 2.695 *** 0.058 6.822 *** 0.001 2.750 *** 0.110 7.759 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.982 688.230 *** 0.897 108.990 *** 0.997 2582.000 *** 0.600 37.212 *** 
Persistence 0.987     0.955     0.998     0.710 
Log-Likelihood 20688.0 
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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ii) Return Spillover Effects 
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the γi,j and θi,j in the mean equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation:  +, =  +	∑,ej^UTkl+`Nb, + ∑<,S+S, + ∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,, with		, ! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],			 ≠ !.	 JP represents the Japanese market. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to the portfolio i during the 
crisis period.  
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for elsewhere. 
Markets EU Japan UK US 
Bank - All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.024 2.203 ** 0.031 0.560 0.151 2.459 ** -0.069 -2.972 *** 
Cross-Return 2 (γi2) 0.033 2.514 ** -0.066 -2.515 ** 0.005 0.150 0.002 0.224   
Cross-Return 3 (γi3) -0.021 -0.815   0.046 0.717   -0.161 -2.556 ** 0.015 1.124   
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) 0.014 0.630 -0.075 -0.905 -0.090 -0.890 0.298 2.698 *** 
Change in Cross-Return 2 (θi2) -0.024 -1.233 0.075 2.097 ** -0.027 -0.542 -0.042 -1.132   
Change in Cross-Return 3 (θi3) 0.115 3.668 *** -0.031 -0.465   0.273 2.776 *** 0.136 2.314 ** 
Insurance – All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.022 2.360 ** 0.109 1.781 * 0.072 2.978 *** 0.056 2.399 ** 
Cross-Return 2 (γi2) 0.073 2.712 *** -0.146 -1.815 * 0.036 3.744 *** 0.008 0.957   
Cross-Return 3 (γi3) 0.043 1.956 * 0.110 1.604   0.048 1.985 ** -0.036 -1.371   
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) -0.018 -1.052   0.000 0.009   -0.045 -1.256   -0.009 -0.116   
Change in Cross-Return 2 (θi2) -0.034 -0.874   0.025 0.225   -0.059 -1.602 -0.024 -1.114   
Change in Cross-Return 3 (θi3) 0.005 0.155   0.092 1.158   0.013 0.420   0.033 0.412   
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect 
over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (represented by γi,j) and the change in spillover effect over the 
crisis period (represented by θi,j). 
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iii) Volatility Spillover Effects 
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the gi,j, and zi,j in the variance equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01 
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. JP represents the Japanese national market. 
where, 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to the portfolio i over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the 
financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for elsewhere. 
Markets EU Japan UK US 
Bank – All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) -0.002 -1.265 0.008 1.848 * 0.050 1.844 * 0.039 1.610   
Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.005 1.977 ** 0.012 1.203 0.038 1.088 0.006 2.885 *** 
Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.013 3.225 *** 0.062 3.019 *** 0.089 3.467 *** 0.002 0.725   
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) 0.008 1.927 * -0.019 -4.258 *** 0.044 1.443 0.013 0.534   
Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) -0.007 -2.315 ** 0.000 0.729 0.005 0.929 0.040 0.561   
Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) -0.006 -1.023   0.016 0.768   0.027 1.777 * 0.057 1.681 * 
Insurance – All Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) 0.000 0.830   0.168 0.916   0.007 1.123   0.096 2.233 ** 
Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) -0.011 -2.276 ** 0.067 0.831   0.001 0.397   0.003 0.574   
Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.024 4.824 *** 0.183 1.111   -0.001 -0.649 0.094 2.510 ** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) -0.006 -2.656 *** 0.003 0.575   0.004 1.130   0.113 2.535 ** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) 0.042 1.954 * -0.038 -0.597   -0.014 -1.724 * 0.022 2.368 ** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) -0.001 -0.575   0.036 0.539   0.000 0.732   0.015 0.541   
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The magnitude of the cross-sectional volatility spillover effect 
over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (represented by g i,j) and the change in spillover effect over the 
crisis period (represented by z i,j). 
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Table 2.5  VAR-BEKK Model based on Large Banking Sector Portfolios 
The following tables summarize the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK models based on large size banking portfolios 
across the markets.  The large size banking portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio with banks above the top 25 
percent market size threshold from a given market.  The estimated coefficients from the model have been categorized 
into three sub-tables: i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH Effects, ii) Return Spillover Effects and iii) Volatility 
Spillover Effects.   
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the estimated parameters in the mean and variance 
equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation: +, =  +	∑,e`Nb, +∑<,S+S, +∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, '],			 ≠ !.	 JP represents the Japanese national market. 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] which represents the 
market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial sector portfolio i. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the 
entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the crisis period.  
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation for 
financial sector portfolio i. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to 
portfolio i over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for 
elsewhere. 
Markets EU Japan US 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Macroeconomic Factors                   
Market (βi,MKT) 1.006 60.275 *** 0.961 42.068 *** 0.956 47.135 *** 
FX (βi,FX) 0.374 9.124 *** 0.027 0.569 -0.001 -0.042   
IR (βi,IR) -0.017 -1.244 -0.016 -1.068 0.051 3.967 *** 
GARCH Effects 
 ARCH (aii2) 0.012 2.065 ** 0.075 9.441 *** 0.056 6.144 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.934 149.070 *** 0.897 128.640 *** 0.822 100.260 *** 
Persistence 0.946 0.971 0.877 
Log-Likelihood 15401.0 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
Return Spillover 
Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.021 2.181 ** -0.029 -0.767 -0.037 -1.987 ** 
Cross-Return 2 (γi2) -0.062 -3.630 *** 0.023 0.560   -0.015 -1.350   
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) -0.025 -1.089 0.077 1.478 0.147 2.452 ** 
Change in Cross-Return 2 (θi2) 0.140 5.611 *** 0.021 0.467   -0.020 -0.416   
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
Volatility Spillover 
Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) -0.005 -1.972 ** -0.020 -0.220 0.060 2.551 ** 
Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.064 4.475 *** 0.074 0.738   0.010 2.639 *** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) 0.006 1.186 0.025 0.273 0.299 3.777 *** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) -0.045 -3.097 *** -0.065 -0.556   -0.004 -0.102   
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Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The shadings in the above table 
means the corresponding size portfolio is not available within the national group for the given financial sector. The 
magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the 
entire sample period (represented by γi,j) and the change in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented by θi,j).The 
magnitude of the cross-sectional volatility spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the 
entire sample period (represented by g i,j) and the change in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented by z i,j). 
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Table 2.6  VAR-BEKK Model based on Small Banking Sector Portfolios 
The following tables summarize the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK models based on small size banking portfolios 
across the markets.  The large size banking portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio with banks below the top 25 
percent market size threshold from a given market.  The estimated coefficients from the model have been categorized 
into three sub-tables: i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH Effects, ii) Return Spillover Effects and iii) Volatility 
Spillover Effects.   
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the estimated parameters in the mean and variance 
equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation: +, =  +	∑,e`Nb, +∑<,S+S, +∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, '],			 ≠ !.	 JP represents the Japanese national market. 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] which represents the 
market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial sector portfolio i. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the 
entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the crisis period.  
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation for 
financial sector portfolio i. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to 
portfolio i over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for 
elsewhere. 
Markets EU Japan US 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Macroeconomic Factors                   
Market (βi,MKT) 0.340 15.387 *** 0.773 35.546 *** 0.292 18.871 *** 
FX (βi,FX) 0.112 3.014 *** -0.016 -0.377 -0.032 -2.203 ** 
IR (βi,IR) -0.010 -0.841 0.042 3.559 *** 0.041 5.402 *** 
GARCH Effects 
 ARCH (aii2) 0.123 7.434 *** 0.042 9.077 *** 0.254 10.273 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.766 69.241 *** 0.901 170.860 *** 0.687 36.617 *** 
Persistence 0.889 0.943 0.940 
Log-Likelihood 16922 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
Return Spillover 
Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.061 5.475 *** 0.000 -0.047 -0.005 -0.191   
Cross-Return 2 (γi2) -0.002 -0.042   0.035 0.414   0.017 2.012 ** 
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) 0.015 0.684 -0.070 -1.149 0.506 1.926 * 
Change in Cross-Return 2 (θi2) 0.096 2.080 ** -0.053 -0.604   -0.054 -0.791   
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
Volatility Spillover 
Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) 0.013 3.669 *** -0.009 -0.814 0.006 1.260   
Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.029 4.184 *** 0.160 2.958 *** 0.002 1.848  * 
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) -0.001 -1.517 -0.009 -1.226 0.127 3.453 *** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) -0.009 -1.299   0.063 0.687   0.032 5.741 *** 
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Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The shadings in the above table 
means the corresponding size portfolio is not available within the national group for the given financial sector. The 
magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the 
entire sample period (represented by γi,j) and the change in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented by θi,j).The 
magnitude of the cross-sectional volatility spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the 
entire sample period (represented by g i,j) and the change in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented by z i,j). 
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As mentioned above, we spilt the estimation output for Test 1 into three sub-tables. From 
Table 2.4, one can see that the market beta is always positive and statistically significant 
for all the financial sectors portfolios.  However, by comparing the market beta across 
different size portfolios in Table 2.5 and 2.6, one can see that the market beta for large size 
banking portfolios is noticeably higher than the small size ones across the markets.  The 
estimated coefficient for market risk is 1.006, 0.961 and 0.956 for large banks from EU, 
Japan and US market, respectively.  In contrast, the market betas of small banks in these 
three markets are 0.340, 0.773 and 0.292, respectively.  The size effect on market beta is 
mainly due to the different risk appetite of the large and small banks.  Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997) suggest that large banks tend to be better diversified than the small banks, 
but it not necessarily translate into risk reduction.  They claim that large banks or bank 
holding companies tend to use their diversification advantage to increase risky lending 
and to operate with lower capital ratio instead of operating at lower levels of overall risk.  
Their argument is later reinforced by the empirical study of De Nicoló et al (2004).  
Elyasiani et al (2007) further argued that large banks is likely to have higher market beta 
due to their “assumption of greater credit risk, higher financial leverage, more extensive 
engagement in risky off balance sheet activities, and more aggressive attitudes of their 
managers towards risk”.   
The impact of the foreign exchange rate on the equity value of financial institutions 
has been well explored in the previous literature. 59   Financial institutions play an 
important role in the foreign exchange rate market, as they conduct a large proportion of 
the total foreign currency trading volume (Saunders and Cornett, 2010).  Since most 
financial institutions involved in the foreign currency transactions, the foreign exchange 
                                                          
59 For foreign exchange rate risk on banks, please refer to Choi et al (1992), Chamberlain et al (1997) and Tai 
(2000) among others. For foreign exchange rate risk on insurance companies, please refer to Mange (2000) 
and Elyasiani et al (2007).  
58 
 
rate fluctuation can be regarded as a translation of risk for financial institutions that 
process non-zero net foreign lending/borrowing (Choi et al, 1992).  In the case of increase 
of foreign exchange rate where the relative value of domestic currency increases against 
foreign currencies, the financial institution with net foreign currency borrowing will 
benefit from the relative value decrease of its foreign debts, and vice versa. 
The sign of the exchange rate coefficient of the financial sector portfolio depends on 
the net foreign currency position of each individual financial institution within the 
portfolio.  Positive sign indicates that the financial sector portfolio benefits from home 
currency appreciation.  In other words, the financial institutions within the portfolio are on 
average net foreign asset borrowers since the appreciation of home currency value will 
benefit the net foreign asset borrower by decreasing the value of foreign obligation in 
home currency terms.  In contrast, negative sign shows the financial institutions within the 
portfolio are on average net foreign asset lenders.   
From Table 2.4, one can see that the foreign exchange rate beta is positive and 
statistically significant for both banking and insurance sector portfolios in EU and UK 
markets.  One possible explanation could be that banks and insurers in these two markets 
are on average net foreign asset borrowers.  For EU market, the estimated foreign 
exchange rate betas are 0.199 and 0.248 for the banking and insurance sector portfolios, 
respectively.  The foreign exchange rate bates for the banking and insurance portfolios in 
UK market are 0.235 and 0.126, respectively.  However, none of the financial sector 
portfolios in Japanese and US market is influenced by the fluctuation of home currency 
value.   
Previous empirical studies have shown that there is a relationship between the 
interest rate variation and the value of financial institutions.  The changes in interest rate 
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affect the profitability of the banks and insurers through two channels. i) Mismatch of the 
asset and liability’s maturity within the institution.  Flannery and James (1984) showed 
that interest rate risk of the financial institution is linked to the maturity composition of 
the firm’s net asset holding.  Similarly, Elyasiani et al (2007) showed that US life insurance 
companies exposed to interest rate risk due to the longer duration of their bond 
investments relative to their liabilities.  ii) Leverage ratio of the institution and its 
sensitivity to changes in interest rate.  Staking and Babbel (1995) showed that for non-life 
insurance companies, the interest rate fluctuation has a negative impact on firm’s value 
when the leverage of the firm is low.60  
In the current study, the interest rate risk is represented by the unexpected changes 
in the yield relative calculated based on the long-term benchmark bond yield.  Previous 
empirical studies show that the unexpected changes in the yield relative have a positive 
impact on the financial institutions’ performance (Flannery and James, 1984, and Carson et 
al, 2008).61  Since a positive yield relative indicates a decrease in the long-term bond yield, 
which means a decrease in long-term bond yield will benefit the financial institution.  
However, from Table 2.4 sub-table i), one can see that the estimated interest rate beta 
shows mixed result.  The interest rate beta of US banking sector portfolios is positive and 
statistically significant, which equals to 0.049.  The positive interest rate beta may due to 
the long-term assets hold by the US banks.  Therefore, a decrease in long-term bond yield 
                                                          
60 The authors argue that leveraged insurer is concentrated in long-term, fixed-income securities.  Interest 
rate changes, therefore, will have a negative impact on the market value of insurers as the discount factor of 
future cash flows generated from their long-term assets will increase.  However, limited evidence has been 
found by the authors indicating that at high levels of leverage, market value of insurers begins to increase. 
They argue the phenomenon could be interpreted as stemming from the put option value of increasing 
volatility associated with insurers who are able to expropriate value from policyholders and/or their 
competitors through state guarantee programs. 
61 Carson et al (2008) use the simple difference of long-term benchmark bond yield as interest rate risk factor 
instead of yield relative.  By taking into account the difference in the sign of simple difference of bond yield 
and the yield relative, the empirical result by Carson et al (2008) is consistent with the one by Flannery and 
James (1984). 
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will increase the value of long-term asset and benefit the value of these financial 
institutions.  However, the interest rate betas of EU banking portfolio is negative and 
statistically significant, which equals -0.025.  The result suggests that the banking sector in 
EU market seems to put most of their asset into short term investments.  In addition, the 
result indicates that the financial institutions in Japanese market seem to hedge their 
foreign exchange and interest rate exposures effectively, as none of the two financial 
sectors has a significant coefficient for the two risk factors.     
From Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, one can see that the size effects also exist for the foreign 
exchange and interest rate risk factors.  For instance, large banking portfolios are more 
likely to benefit from the domestic currency appreciation than the small ones.  The foreign 
exchange rate betas of the large EU and US banks are 0.374 and zero compares to 0.112 
and -0.032 for the small banks in these two markets, respectively.  Since positive currency 
exposure shows the financial institutions in the portfolio are net foreign asset borrowers, 
the result indicates that large EU and US banks are more likely to require financial 
resources from foreign markets compare to the small ones.  The finding is consistent with 
the study by Chamberlain et al (1997) which suggests that large size financial institutions 
are indeed more likely to be involved in foreign activities relative to small institutions.  
However, the result for interest rate beta is less decisive.  The only notable difference 
comes from the banking sector in Japanese market, where small banks suffer from interest 
rate changes but not the large ones.  The interest rate beta is 0.042 for the small Japanese 
banks, but is no significant for the large ones.  We argue the difference in interest rate 
exposure between the large and small Japanese banks is mainly due to the fact that 
financial institutions with different sizes have different incentives to hedge their risk 
exposures.  The cost efficiency of the hedging activity is positively related to the size of the 
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risk exposure (Nance et al, 1993).  Therefore, large size firms enjoy higher cost efficiency 
compare to small size firms when they hedge their risk exposures.  Thus, large size firms 
have higher motivation to hedge their risk exposures compare to small size ones.  The 
argument is supported by Mian (1996) based on the annual reports of 3022 firms in the US 
market.  He shows that the economics of scale also exists for hedging activities where large 
size firms are indeed more likely to be involved into the hedging activities against foreign 
exchange and interest rate risk factors against the small ones.  Although the finding of two 
papers mentioned above is based on non-financial multi-national corporations (MNC) 
instead of financial institutions, the concept about economics of scale for hedging activity 
still holds regardless of the nature of the business.62   Furthermore, Crabb (2002) claims 
that hedging activity reduces the risk exposure of MNC, which makes the risk beta of the 
company insignificant.  Therefore, it is reasonable for one to assume that the lower interest 
rate beta of the large size Japanese banks is due to their higher incentive to hedge against 
the fluctuation of long-term interest rates. 
  
2.5.2. Joint-Hypotheses Test 
Before we move into the detail discussion of the return and volatility spillover effects 
among financial sectors, we first investigate the overall significance of the risk and return 
interdependence among these portfolios.  Previous empirical studies show that the linkage 
among the global financial markets has increased over the last two decades.63  Financial 
sectors across markets are no longer isolated from each other.  Previous empirical studies 
provide several stylized factors on the interdependence among global financial markets.  
                                                          
62 Nance et al (1993) suggests that a risk exposure with market value less than 5 to 10 million US Dollar is not 
cost efficient for a firm to hedge against it.  Therefore, regardless of the business model of the firm, it will not 
hedge against a risk exposure if the market value of the exposure is smaller than a certain amount.   
63 For further discussion on integration and globalization of the world financial markets, and its implication 
on risk and return spillover effects, please refer to Agenor (2003), Bekaert et al (2005), Berger et al (1999), and 
De Nicoló and Kwast (2002) among others. 
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For instance, Eun and Shim (1989) show the return of US financial market has a significant 
impact on the other major financial markets.  Other studies suggest that the return and 
volatility spillovers among closely related financial markets are significant and positive 
(Jeong, 1999, Karloyi, 1995).  Recently, researchers find the interdependences among the 
financial markets tend to be higher during the economic downturns, which is also known 
as “contagion” effects (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Tai, 2007).  In addition, Bekaert et al 
(2005) and Baele (2005) suggest the linkages among the developed financial markets have 
increased over time.   
The linkages across financial markets can be established through various channels.  
Dornbusch et al (2000) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002) claim that markets move together 
because they share the similar macroeconomic and financial risk factors.  Glick and Rose 
(1999) suggest the interdependences are mainly due to the trade linkages across the 
involved countries.  Other studies focus on the financial linkages across the markets.  De 
Nicoló et al (2004) argue that the connections among major financial markets are caused by 
the consolidation of global banking industry.  Dornbusch et al (2000) argue that the 
interdependence among global financial markets is mainly due to the fact that they have a 
common creditor, known as global investors.64  They claim that the dynamic movements 
among financial markets are simply because global investors shift their investments across 
these markets.65   
We design four hypotheses tests (H1 – H4) in the current study to investigate the 
existence of return and volatility interdependence among the financial sector portfolios.  
The first two hypotheses tests, H1 and H2, focus on the overall return and volatility 
                                                          
64 The global investor can be an individual investor who hold a diversified portfolio with assets from 
different national market, or an institutional investor (banks, or investment funds) who invest in multiple 
countries. 
65 The global investor may shift their investments across national financial markets as they want to seek for 
assets with higher liquidity (Vayanos, 2004) or higher credit quality (Eichengreen et al, 2009). 
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spillover effect among the financial sector portfolios over the entire sample period, 
respectively.     
In addition, theory on contagion effects argues that the return and volatility spillover 
across the financial markets will increase during financial crises (Allen and Gale, 2000; 
Elyasiani et al, 2007).  Therefore, we design another two hypotheses test, H3 and H4, to 
investigate whether the return and risk spillover effects across the financial sector 
portfolios have changed during the recent financial crisis from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 
2009.  The description of the four null hypotheses tests are listed as follow: 
 
 Return and volatility spillovers over the entire sample period: 
H1: No return spillovers exist across financial sector portfolios. 
H2: No volatility spillovers exist across financial sector portfolios. 
 Changes in return and volatility spillovers over the crisis period:  
H3: No changes in return spillover during financial crisis. 
H4: No changes in volatility spillover during financial crisis. 
 
The hypothesis test is based on log-likelihood (LLR) ratio test, which evaluates the 
difference between the log-likelihood statistics of the restricted and non-restricted VAR-
BEKK models.66  The null hypothesis assumes that the corresponding spillover parameters 
are all equal to zero, so no spillover effects during the entire sample period (H1 and H2), 
or no changes in the spillover effects during the crisis period (H3 and H4).  Therefore, we 
force the corresponding parameters for return/volatility spillover effect to be zeros in the 
restricted model.  If the LLR test result rejects the null hypothesis, we claim the 
corresponding cross-sectional return/volatility spillover effect is statistically significant 
                                                          
66 For detail explanation of the LLR ratio test, please refer to Appendix A.5. 
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over the corresponding period.  Table 2.7 summarizes the result of the four joint 
hypotheses tests.   
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Table 2.7  Joint-Hypotheses Test Result for Return and Volatility Interdependence among Financial Sector Portfolios 
The following table summarizes the test statistics of the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) test for the four hypotheses on the interdependence among financial sector portfolio. 
The VAR-BEKK Model is estimated as follow: 
Mean Equation: +, =  +	∑,e`Nb, +∑<,S+S, +∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],			 ≠ !.	 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
Where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] which represents the market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, 
respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial sector portfolio i. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the crisis period.  
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation for financial sector portfolio i. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for elsewhere. 
Joint Hypotheses: 
        
Log-likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (LLR) and Degrees of 
Freedom (DF) 
Interdependence over entire sample period:     All Large Small 
H1: No return spillovers exist across sector portfolios.     DF LLR DF LLR DF LLR 
γi,j = 0 and θi,j = 0, with i≠j. x∈[1,2].     Bank 24 990 *** 12 66 *** 12 74 *** 
    Insurance 24 108 *** 
H2: No volatility spillovers across sector portfolios.  Banks 24 144 *** 12 106 *** 12 26 ** 
g(i,j) = 0 and z(i,j) = 0, with i≠j.     Insurance 24 208 *** 
Change in the interdependence over the crisis period.     
H3: No change in return spillovers over the crisis period.     DF LLR DF LLR DF LLR 
γ(i,j,2) = 0, with i≠j.     Banks 12 914 *** 6 100 *** 6 12 * 
    Insurance 12 12 
H4: No change in volatility spillovers over the crisis period. Banks 12 338 *** 6 42 *** 6 16 ** 
z(i,j) = 0, with i≠j.       Insurance 12 36 *** 
 
Note: the LLR represents the test statistics of the log-likelihood ratio test. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The unrestricted 
model for H1-H4 is the original VAR-BEKK model proposed in the methodology section, which without restrictions on any of the parameters. 
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The test statistics for H1 and H2 are highly significant at 1% confidence level for all the 
financial sector portfolios, which suggests that the return and volatility spillovers do 
exist among these portfolios over the entire sample period.   
From the test result of H1, one can see the return spillovers effects among the small 
size banking sector portfolios is higher compares to the large ones.  Given the same 
degrees of freedom, the statistics of the LLR test for small size portfolios (74) is higher 
than the large portfolios (66).  The result suggests the return linkages among the small 
size banks across the financial markets are higher compares to the large size banks.  One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the “herding” effect introduced by Calvo 
and Mendoza (2000).  They argue that investors’ incentive to collect price information to 
form their own trading strategy will decrease as the cost of collecting the information 
increases.  When the cost of collecting price information is higher than the potential 
return one can earn from forming his/her own trading strategy, the investor will have a 
high incentive following other traders to save cost.  Small banks have more firm-specific 
risk compare to large banks, which make their price information hard to collect.  
Therefore, investors have higher incentive to follow the decisions made by investors in 
the other markets when they trade the stock of small banks than large ones.  Thus, the 
returns of small banks across the financial markets are more likely to be connected 
compared to large banks.  Similar finding have been documented by Elyasiani et al (2007) 
for the small US banks.  However, it is worth mentioning that since Elyasiani et al (2007) 
only focused on financial institutions within US market, their explanation on the 
phenomenon is not suitable for the current study.67           
                                                          
67 Elyasiani et al (2007) provide three possible explanations for the higher interdependence among small 
size financial institutions.  First, the competition among small financial institutions is higher as their 
products are substitutable with each other.  Second, small financial institutions are more likely to be 
influenced by national economic factor.  Thus, small financial institutions are more likely to be correlated 
within the same region.  Third, small financial institutions are less able to bypass regulations and earn 
differential returns compare to large ones.  
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The test result for H2 also indicates that volatility spillover effects are different for 
different size portfolios.  The LLR test statistics for the large and small banking portfolio 
is 106 and 26, respectively.  The empirical evidence suggests that the risk linkage among 
the large banks is stronger compares to small banks, which is consistent with the 
previous studies.  The integration among global financial market is mainly due to the 
consolidation and globalization of large financial institutions (De Nicoló et al, 2004, 
DeYoung et al, 2009).  So, the large financial institutions should be share more common 
risk factors compare to the small ones.  Therefore, one would expect higher risk 
interdependence across large banks than small banks.  
The remaining two hypotheses, H3 and H4, test whether the magnitude of return 
and volatility spillover effects has changed during the recent financial crisis.  The 
hypothesis test rejects the null hypothesis that “no changes in return/volatility the 
spillovers during financial crisis” at 1% confidence level for most of the financial sector 
portfolios.68  The result shows that the return and volatility spillover effects among the 
financial sector portfolios have changed significantly during the crisis period.  This 
finding is in line with the pervious empirical studies on contagion effect during the crisis 
period.69   
We believe the reason behind the changes in return and volatility spillover effects 
during the crisis period is threefold.   First, the increased market integration reinforced 
the contagion effect during the crisis period.  According to the Group of Ten report by 
IMF and De Nicoló et al (2004), the integration among global financial market has 
increased over the last two decades due to the consolidation and globalization of the 
                                                          
68 The only exceptions are come from the insurance sector for H3.  
69 Empirical studies like Koutmos and Booth (1995) on the 1987 US crisis, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) on the 
1987 US crisis, 1994 Mexico crisis and 1997 Asian crisis, and Bekaert et al (2005) on the 1994 Mexico and 
1997 Asian crisis also find significant increase in return and volatility spillover effects during the crisis 
periods.  
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financial institutions.70  This increase in the level of concentration among large global 
financial institutions significantly increases their risk similarities (Carey and Stulz, 2006).  
The test result of H3 and H4 bases on the large and small banking portfolios also support 
the argument.  From Table 2.7, one can see that the LLR test statistics of the large 
banking portfolio is consistently higher than the ones of the small banking portfolios for 
both H3 and H4.  That means the changes in risk and return spillover effects of the large 
banking portfolios are more significant compare to the small banks.   
Second, according to the theory of “flight-to-quality” proposed by Lang and 
Nakamura (1995), the changes in the return and volatility spillovers might be due to 
changes in investor’s preference towards risk during the crisis period.  The quality of 
sub-prime mortgage related structured financial products are poor and very risky during 
the crisis period (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009).  Financial institutions, especially banks, 
are the major investors in these structured financial products (Duffie, 2008).  In addition, 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (2008) shows the risk appetite of the global investor decreased 
dramatically during the crisis period.  Since investors are no longer willing to assume 
risk, it is reasonable for investors to sell off their holdings in these financial sectors 
during the crisis period and increase the interdependence among these financial 
institutions across the markets.  
The final reason for the increased risk and return interdependence among financial 
sectors during the crisis is the fair value accounting standard.  The fair value accounting 
standard is procyclical.  As the financial assets across the global markets deteriorated 
during the crisis period, the financial institutions are forced to write-down massive value 
from their balance sheet which led to a dramatic decrease in the value of these 
institutions over the crisis period (De Grauwe, 2008).  Since all the financial institutions 
                                                          
70 The full title of the report is: Group of Ten - Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector (2001), which is 
available to general public via IMF’s website: www.imf.org. 
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suffer from the decrease in financial asset value simultaneously as the global financial 
market deteriorates, this synchronized decrease in the value of financial institutions 
increases the return interdependence among the financial sectors during the crisis period. 
 
2.5.3. Test 1: Interdependence among Financial Sectors Portfolios  
In this section, we discuss the return and volatility spillover effects across the financial 
sector portfolios.  In order to demonstrate the spillover effects in a clear manner, we 
select the estimated coefficients for the return and risk spillover effects from Table 2.4 – 
2.6 which are statistically significant and summarize them into Table 2.8.71  Table 2.8 is 
divided into three panels, Panel A – C.  The first two panels (Panel A and B) present the 
selected coefficients estimated based on the all size banking and insurance portfolios, 
while the final one (Panel C) contains the parameters for the significant return and 
volatility spillover effects among the large and small size banking portfolios.  Each panel 
splits into two sub-tables which contains the selected coefficients for the return and 
volatility spillover effects, respectively.  The spillover effects estimated over the entire 
sample period are represented by the coefficient γi,j and gi,j for return and volatility 
spillovers, respectively.  The spillover effects over the crisis period are combinations of 
the spillover effects estimated over the entire sample period and the changes in spillover 
effects over the crisis period.  The latter is represented by coefficients θi,j and zi,j for the 
return and volatility spillover effects, respectively. 
  
                                                          
71 The selected coefficient is statistically significant at 10% significance level or lower. 
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Table 2.8  Summary of the Significant Spillover Effects based on Table 2.4 – 2.6. 
The table below summarizes the selected estimated return and volatility spillover effects which are statistically 
significant above 10 percent significance level.  The estimated coefficients for return and volatility spillovers are 
selected from Table 2.4 – 2.6.  The table is divided into four panels.  Panel A – B represent the significant return and 
volatility spillover effects among the all size banking and insurance sector portfolios, respectively.  Panel C represents 
the significant return and volatility spillover effects among the large and small size banking portfolios across the 
markets.  Both the estimated coefficients of the statistically significant spillover effects and their z-Statistics is 
presented in the following table. 
 
Panel A: Return Spillover Effects among All Size Banking Portfolios 
Entire sample period (γi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (θi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks  -0.161 0.115 0.273 
z-Stat. -2.556 3.668 2.776 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks  -0.069 0.298 0.136 
z-Stat. -2.972 2.698 2.314 
Volatility Spillover Effects among All Size Banking Portfolios 
Entire sample period (gi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (zi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.013 0.062 0.089 0.027 
z-Stat. 3.225 3.019 3.467 1.777 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.006 0.057 
z-Stat. 2.885 1.681 
 
Panel B: Return Spillover Effects among All Size Insurance Portfolios 
Entire sample period (γi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (θi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Insurers 0.043 0.048 
z-Stat. 1.956 1.985 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Insurers 0.056 
z-Stat. 2.399 
Cross-Sectional Volatility Spillover Effects among All Size Life Insurance Sector Portfolios 
Entire sample period (gi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (zi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Insurers 0.024 
z-Stat. 4.824 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Insurers 0.096 0.094 0.113 0.022 
z-Stat. 2.233 2.510 2.535 2.368 
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Panel C: Return Spillover Effects among Large and Small Banking Portfolios 
Entire sample period (γi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (θi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Large Size Banks -0.062 0.140 
z-Stat. -3.630 5.611 
Small Size Banks 0.096 
z-Stat. 2.080 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Large Size Banks -0.037 0.147 
z-Stat. -1.987 2.452 
Small Size Banks 0.017 0.506 
z-Stat. 2.012   1.926 
Volatility Spillover Effects among Large and Small Banking Portfolios 
Entire sample period (gi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (zi,j) 
  To To   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Large Size Banks 0.064 -0.045 
z-Stat. 4.475 -3.097 
Small Size Banks 0.029 0.160 
z-Stat. 4.184 2.958 
  From From   
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Large Size Banks 0.060 0.010 0.299 
z-Stat. 2.551 2.639 3.777 
Small Size Banks 0.002 0.127 0.032 
z-Stat. 1.848 3.453 5.741 
 
Note: The shadings in the above table means the financial sector portfolio is not available within the corresponding national 
market.  The magnitude of spillover effect over the entire sample period is represented by the estimated parameter γi,j and gi,j 
for the return and volatility spillovers, respectively.  The changes in spillover effect during the crisis period is represented by 
the estimated parameter θi,j and zi.j for the return and volatility spillovers, respectively.  The magnitude of spillover effect 
during the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (γi,j or g i,j) and the changes in spillover 
effect during the crisis period (θi,j or z i,j). 
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Panel A summarizes the significant spillover effects across the all size banking portfolios.  
Generally, the empirical result indicates that the return and volatility interdependence 
between the US banks and banks from EU and UK market increased dramatically during 
the crisis period.  
The result for return spillover effects over the entire sample period indicates the 
existence of competitive effects between the banks in EU and US market, as well as the 
banks in US and UK market.  The return spillover from US banks to UK ones is -0.161, 
while the return spillover from EU banks to US ones is -0.069 over the entire sample 
period.  The spillover effect estimated over the entire sample period is mainly 
representing the spillover effect over the pre-crisis period, as the spillover effect over the 
crisis period is the sum of the former and the changes in spillover effect during the crisis 
period.  Therefore, the finding indicates that EU banks perform better compare to US 
banks, and latter performs better compare to the UK banks.  The finding is consistent 
with the result from Panel B Table 2.2.  The mean return of EU banking portfolio (0.060%) 
is indeed higher than the one of US banks (0.009%).  UK banks also perform poorly 
compare to US ones.  The average daily return of UK banking portfolio is only 0.003% 
during the pre-crisis period from January 1, 2003 to April 1, 2007.  The low mean return of 
UK banking sector is mainly due to the sudden stock price decrease of one UK banks, 
named the European Islamic Investment Banks.  On the May 17, 2006, the company’s 
stock price experienced a 47.8% drop, which led to a 9.3% decrease in the UK banking 
portfolio on that day. 
The volatility spillovers estimated over the entire sample period show that US 
banks are the main information provider in terms of volatility innovations.  The volatility 
innovation generated from US banking portfolio has a significant and positive impact on 
the volatility of the banking sectors from the remaining three markets.  However, the 
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volatility spillover towards the US banking portfolio from the other market is 
negligible.72  The finding is consistent with the empirical studies by Eun and Shim (1989) 
and Hamao et al (1990), which also show that US financial market is the main 
information provider in terms of volatility innovations.   
During the crisis period, the return interdependence between US banking portfolio 
and the banking portfolio from EU and UK markets has increased dramatically.  The 
changes in return spillover from US banking portfolio towards EU and UK banking 
portfolios are 0.115 and 0.273 during the crisis period, respectively.  And the return 
spillovers from the banking sector in EU and UK market towards US market have also 
increased by 0.298 and 0.136, respectively.  The enhanced return interdependence among 
these three banking portfolios has transformed the competition effects among them 
during the pre-crisis period into contagion effects over the crisis period.73  The finding is 
consistent with the previous empirical studies on contagion effects, which showed that 
linkages among financial markets increased during the crisis period (Koutmos and Booth, 
1995; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Bekaert et al, 2005).     
In addition, the volatility spillover effects between the banking portfolios from US 
and UK markets have also enhanced during the crisis period.  The volatility spillover 
effects from the US banks towards UK banks have increased from 0.089 before the crisis 
to 0.116 during the crisis, while the spillovers from UK to US have increased from zero to 
0.057.74  In other words, both the return and volatility linkages between US and UK 
banking sectors have increased during the recent financial crisis.   
                                                          
72 The only significant volatility spillover towards US banking sector portfolio is oriented from Japanese 
banks, but the magnitude of the spillover effect is very small at 0.006. 
73 The spillover effect during the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect estimated over the entire 
sample period plus the changes in spillover effect during the crisis period.  Therefore, the return spillover 
effect from US to UK banking portfolio has changed from -0.161 during the pre-crisis period to 0.112 over 
the crisis period.  And the return spillover effect from EU to US banks has changed from -0.069 during the 
pre-crisis period to 0.229 over the crisis period. 
74 The spillover effect during the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect estimated over the entire 
sample period plus the changes in spillover effect during the crisis period.  Therefore, the volatility 
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The reason behind the strong return and volatility interdependence between the 
two banking sector portfolios is twofold.  First, banks from both UK and US markets are 
severally damaged during the crisis period as they suffered from massive value write-
offs as the global financial market deteriorates and the liquidity shortage in the interbank 
funding markets (Blackburn, 2008, Brunnermeier, 2009, De Grauwe, 2008). 75   The 
massive write-offs during the crisis period by US and UK banking sectors would lead to 
a synchronized drop in the value of both banking portfolios, which will increase the 
return interdependence bewteen the returns of the two portfolios.  Second, the UK 
banking sector was heavily involved in the US sub-prime mortgage market.  According 
to the Financial Stability Report (FSR) issued by Bank of England, the UK banks had USD 
192 billion investments in the US structured financial products which was under threat 
during the crisis period, while the exposure of US banks towards the structured financial 
products is USD 195 billion.76  In other words, UK and US banking sectors share the 
same risk factors during the crisis period.  Besides, since the size of the risk exposure is 
also similar for both banking sectors, the riskiness of the two banking sector should also 
similar to each other.  The FSR shows that the spreads of credit default swap (CDS) of 
UK and US banking sectors were indeed closely related during the crisis period.77  
Therefore, one should expect strong risk interdependence between the two banking 
portfolios during the crisis period.    
                                                                                                                                                                                             
spillover effect from US banks to UK banks during the crisis period is equal to 0.089 plus 0.027, while the 
spillover from UK banks to US banks is equal to zero plus 0.057. 
75 The current financial crisis has forced a number of UK banks into nationalization due to liquidity 
shortage, such as Northern Rock, Lloyds TSB, and Royal Bank of Scotland.  HSBC and Barclay have also 
forced to enhance their liquidity by conducting emergency right issue during the current financial crisis.  
In the US, a series bankruptcies and government bailouts among the banking industry happened during 
the crisis period, which includes the Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and JPMorgan.  For 
detail information on these events, please refer to Guillén (2009). 
76  The Financial Stability Report (FSR) is issued by Bank of England on a bi-annually basis, see: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/index.htm.  The information used in the present 
study is provided by the FSR issued in April 2008. 
77 Please refer to FSR issued in October 2008.  The asset-weighted CDS spreads for the UK and US banking 
sector is illustrated in Chart 3.1 on Page 17. 
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In contrast to the previous empirical studies, 78  the result shows no return 
transmissions between US and Japanese banking portfolios over the estimation period.  
In addition, the volatility spillover effect between the two banking sectors is also low.  
The volatility spillover effect between the two is 0.062 from US banks to Japanese banks 
and only 0.006 for the opposite direction over the entire sample period, and both 
spillover effects have not increased during the crisis.  We believe the lack of 
interdependence between the two banking sectors is due to the structural differences of 
the financial system in these two markets.  As discussed in the previous literature, the 
financial system in the US market is commonly regarded as market-oriented, while the 
Japanese financial system is bank-oriented.79  Thakor (1996) showed that the type of 
financial system is distinguished by the way the financial resources is been collected and 
distributed.  In a market-oriented financial system, the demand for capital investments is 
most likely to be fulfilled by the supply of money market instruments and/or by the 
investments in equity market directly.  In contrast, under a bank-oriented financial 
system, banks play a dominate role in collecting and re-distributing the financial 
recourses in the capital market.  Empirically, Hartmann et al (2003) claim the main 
source of financing for financial institutions is also different in markets with different 
financial systems based on accounting data from EU, Japanese and US markets.  They 
show that financial institutions in Japanese market are mainly financed through loans 
and deposits and, therefore, heavily relied on banks.  However, the main funding 
channel in the US financial market is market-based securities, such as bonds and equities.  
In other words, the funding sources for banks in a bank-oriented system are more 
                                                          
78 Karolyi and Stulz (1996) show positive return interdependence between the returns of Japanese stocks 
which traded on the US market through American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and the returns of a 
matched peer group with US stocks from 1988 to 1992.  Peek and Rosengren (1997) show that Japanese 
banks which operate in the US market can significantly influence the return and risk performances of the 
US banks through interbank loan market.  Their sample period is from 1988 to 1995.  
79 For further discussion on the types of financial systems, and the classifications across major economies, 
please refer to Beck and Levine (2002), and Wang and Ma (2009).  
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secured as they act as the main finding channel for the whole financial system.  In 
comparison, investors in a market-oriented system have more investment options apart 
from bank deposits, such as market-based securities.  Therefore, banks in a market-
oriented financial system need to compete for funding with other participants in the 
markets, while banks in a bank-oriented financial system hold most of the funding in the 
market.  In other words, banks in a bank-oriented financial system enjoy a better 
liquidity position compare to the ones in a market-oriented system.  Therefore, the 
liquidity shortage should have a larger impact on banks in a market-oriented financial 
system than the ones in a bank-oriented financial system.  Thus, return and volatility 
performances of the banks in the Japanese and US markets should not be closely related. 
The significant spillover effects for insurance portfolios are represented in Table 2.8 
Panel B.  From the table one can see strong return spillover effects from US insurers to 
insurers in EU and UK markets over the entire sample period.  The estimated parameter 
for return spillover from US insurers to EU and UK ones is 0.043 and 0.048, respectively. 
The return spillover effects between the US insurance industry and insurance sectors 
from the rest of the markets have not experienced any significant changes during the 
crisis period.  The finding is consistent with the result from hypotheses test H3, where 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for insurance portfolios.80   
We argue that the unchanged return spillovers among the insurance sector portfolios 
during the crisis period are mainly due to the fact that the nature of the common risk 
factor shared by the insurance companies has not changed during the crisis period.  The 
common risk factor shared by the insurance companies from different markets is the 
deterioration in financial asset value across the global financial markets.  Insurance 
companies do not invest heavily into the structured financial products; they suffer from 
the current financial crisis by value write-offs due to the sharp decrease in financial asset 
                                                          
80 The null hypothesis for H3 is “no changes in the return spillover during the crisis period”. 
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value around the global (Harrington, 2009).  However, the nature of this risk factor does 
not change for insurers during the crisis period, which means the decrease in financial 
asset prices has the same effect on the equity value of insurers before and during the 
crisis period.  Thus, the return interdependence among these insurance portfolios is 
likely to remain constant during the crisis period. 
For volatility spillover effects, the result shows that US insurance sector has a 
strong linkage with the insurance sectors from EU and UK markets.  There is a 
significant volatility spillover from US to EU insurance portfolio over the entire sample 
period, which equals to 0.024.  The volatility of US insurance sector is also influenced by 
the volatility from EU and UK insurance sectors.  The volatility spillover effect from EU 
and UK insurance portfolio towards US market is 0.096 and 0.094 over the entire sample 
period, respectively.  During the crisis period, the volatility spillover effect from EU and 
Japan insurance portfolio towards US insurance portfolio has increased.  The changes in 
the spillover effect towards US insurance sector are 0.113 and 0.022 for EU and Japanese 
insurance portfolios, respectively.   
The fair value accounting standard may be the main reason behind the stronger risk 
interdependence among the insurance portfolios during the crisis period.  As mentioned 
in the previous section, the fair value accounting standard requires financial institutions 
to mark the value of financial assets on their balance sheet to the market price/fair value 
of the assets.  Since insurance companies are the major investors on capital market, the 
insurers across the markets have similar risk exposures as global financial markets 
deteriorated during the crisis period.81  Decreasing in asset value increases the default 
risk of the firm, and the volatility of a firm’s equity return can be used as a proxy for its 
                                                          
81  For further discussion on the influence of fair value accounting standard on the performances of 
insurance companies during the crisis period, please refer to Eling and Schmeiser (2010), and Harrington 
(2009). 
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default risk (Zhang et al, 2009).82  Therefore, stronger volatility spillover from one to 
another represents higher linkages in default probabilities between the two.  In other 
words, the volatility innovation generated from EU and Japanese insurance sectors can 
be treated as a risk indicator for insurers in US market as they all expose to similar risk 
factors during the crisis period.  In addition, EU and Japanese equity markets open early 
in each calendar day compare to US market.  Therefore, it is reasonable that the volatility 
innovations of EU and Japanese insurance portfolios can transmit to US insurers in a 
positive manner during the crisis period.  
Panel C represents the return and risk spillovers across the large and small size 
banking portfolios.  From the table, one can see that the competitive effects between EU 
and US all size banking portfolios which we find in Table 2.8 Panel A is mainly coming 
from the large size banks.   The return spillover from large US banking portfolio towards 
large EU banks is -0.062 over the entire sample period while the spillover effect for the 
opposite direction is -0.037.   
The volatility interdependence among the large banking portfolios is stronger 
compare to small ones.  The volatility spillover from large US banks to EU ones is 0.064, 
while for small banks the figure is 0.029 over the entire sample period.  Similarly, the 
volatility spillovers from large EU and Japanese banking portfolios to large US banks are 
0.060 and 0.010 over the entire sample period, respectively.  However, for small banks, 
the volatility spillover is not significant from EU to US market, and 0.002 from Japanese 
to US market.  We believe the main reason behind the phenomenon is the higher level of 
integration and globalization among the large size banks compares to the small ones.  
According to the special report by IMF, the integration among global financial market is 
                                                          
82 Zhang et al (2009) claim that the volatility of equity return can explain around 50% of the default risk of 
the firm measured by the spread of CDS. 
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mainly due to the consolidation and globalization of large financial institutions.83  This 
finding is reinforced by the survey paper conducted by DeYoung et al (2009).  This 
increase in the level of concentration among global large financial institutions 
significantly increases their risk similarities.  As discussed in the Carey and Stulz (2006), 
these trends have led to common sources of underlying risk, as well as adoption of 
similar models for risk assessment and management.  As a result, the possibility of risk 
spillovers across global large financial institutions increased, especially during the crisis 
period.  However, the small size banks are more likely to operate within the markets.  
Therefore, the linkages among the small size banking sector portfolios from different 
markets are weak.  
During the crisis period, the return and volatility spillover effects between large 
and small EU and US banking portfolios increased significantly.  Since the large banks 
are more internationally integrated and more involved in the global financial markets, 
the changes in return and volatility spillover effects for large banks are higher compare 
to small ones84.  The only exception comes from the volatility transmission from the US 
large banking sector portfolio towards large EU banking portfolio during the crisis 
period.  The volatility spillover effect has decreased by 0.045 from 0.064 to -0.01985.  The 
result indicates that the risk linkage between the two financial sectors has decreased 
during the crisis period.  We argue that the main reason for this phenomenon is due to 
the different financial structures of the two financial markets. As a major player in the 
EU market, German is also regarded as a market with bank-oriented financial system. So, 
                                                          
83 The report is conducted by IMF under the title: Group of Ten - Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector 
(2001), which is available to general public via IMF’s website: www.imf.org. 
84 The return spillover from small EU banks to US ones has increased by 0.506 during the crisis period, 
which seems higher than the changes in return spillover from large EU banks to large US banks (0.147) in 
numerical terms.  However, the changes in return spillover for the small banks is only statistically 
significant at 10% level, while the changes in return spillover for the large banks is statistically significant 
at 1% level.  In other words, if we choose a more conservative significance level, the increase in the return 
spillover among small banks during the crisis period will not be statistically significant. 
85 The volatility spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of spillover effect overt the entire sample 
period (0.064) and the changes in spillover effect during the crisis period (-0.045). 
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we are able to find an argument for decrease volatility spillover from large US banks to 
large EU banks just like the one we made for Japanese banks.  However, it will be hard to 
justify the increase in volatility spillover effect from large EU banks to large US banks 
(0.299) during the crisis period along the same line.  
 
2.5.4. Test 2: Interdependence Between US Banking Portfolio and Insurance Portfolios 
From Other Markets  
Apart from examining the interdependence among the same type of financial sectors 
across the markets, we investigate the interdependence between different financial 
sectors in the second test.  As mentioned in the previous section, the current financial 
crisis is oriented from the US financial market, where banks play an important role in the 
build-up and spread of the crisis to the rest of the world (Kollmann and Malherbe, 2011).  
In addition, insurance companies are influenced by the current financial crisis as they are 
the main institutional investor in the financial markets.  During the crisis period, the 
sharp decrease in the value of financial assets forces insurers to write-down large 
amount of their asset holding. Although insurers are not directly involved in the recent 
financial crisis, their values are still damaged during the crisis period.  Since the US 
banking sector is the main driver of the sharp decrease in the value of financial asset 
through liquidity and loss spiral (Blackburn, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009), we would like to 
investigate the return and risk interdependence between the US banking portfolio and 
the insurance portfolios from the rest of the markets.  To our knowledge, the current 
study is the first one to investigate the relative performance of the US banking sector and 
insurance sectors of the major financial markets.  The estimated result is represented in 
Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9  Interdependence between US Banking Portfolio and the Insurance 
Portfolios from the rest of the Markets 
The following tables summarize the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK models based on US banking portfolios and the 
insurance sector portfolios of the remaining three markets, namely EU, Japanese and UK market.  The insurance portfolio 
used in this test is an equally weighted portfolio with both life and non-life insurance companies from a given market. The 
estimated coefficients from the model have been categorized into three sub-tables: i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH 
Effects, ii) Return Spillover Effects and iii) Volatility Spillover Effects.   
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the estimated parameters in the mean and variance equations 
of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation: +, =  +	∑,e`Nb, +∑<,S+S, +∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],			 ≠ !.	 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] which represents the 
market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial sector portfolio i. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the 
entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector 
portfolio j to portfolio i during the crisis period.  
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation for 
financial sector portfolio i. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i 
over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial sector 
portfolio j to portfolio i during the financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for elsewhere. 
 
Markets EU-Insurance Japan-Insurance UK-Insurance US-Bank 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-   
Macroeconomic Factors                         
Market (βi,MKT) 0.726 42.326 *** 0.989 32.246 *** 0.562 34.526 *** 0.468 41.014 *** 
FX (βi,FX) 0.199 4.464 *** -0.033 -0.481   0.112 3.400 *** -0.042 -2.736 *** 
IR (βi,IR) 0.011 0.675   -0.024 -1.693 * -0.012 -0.787   0.054 7.270 *** 
GARCH Effects 
 ARCH (aii2) 0.033 9.192 *** 0.030 8.672 *** 0.014 9.318 *** 0.162 13.021 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.927 284.680 *** 0.948 325.250 *** 0.978 1012.800 *** 0.754 91.219 *** 
Persistence 0.960     0.977     0.992     0.916 
Log-Likelihood 21116.0 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-
Return Spillover 
Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.040 3.468 *** 0.100 1.445   0.082 3.629 *** -0.005 -0.271   
Cross-Return 2 (γi2) 0.089 3.433 *** -0.154 -1.868 * 0.036 3.399 *** -0.001 -0.230   
Cross-Return 3 (γi3) 0.039 0.961   0.221 1.834 * 0.080 1.895 * -0.013 -0.659   
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) -0.003 -0.141   -0.009 -0.077   -0.074 -2.154 ** 0.075 1.047   
Change in Cross-Return 2 (θi2) -0.087 -2.245 ** -0.040 -0.273   -0.032 -1.757 * 0.008 0.340   
Change in Cross-Return 3 (θi3) 0.036 0.784   0.056 0.434   -0.030 -0.637   0.259 3.094 *** 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-
Volatility Spillover 
Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) -0.001 -0.466   0.084 0.125   0.009 2.349 ** 0.020 1.610   
Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.047 1.738 * 0.027 0.755   0.001 1.134   0.000 0.980   
Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.004 0.552   0.104 0.167   0.000 -0.282   0.005 0.415   
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) -0.002 -0.609   0.000 -0.362   -0.005 -1.224   -0.001 -0.469   
Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) 0.001 0.201   -0.005 -0.487   -0.028 -0.585   0.017 2.474 ** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) 0.006 2.045 ** 0.017 0.230   0.003 0.440   -0.001 -0.681   
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Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The magnitude of the cross-sectional return 
spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (represented by γi,j) and the change 
in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented by θi,j).The magnitude of the cross-sectional volatility spillover effect over the 
crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (represented by g i,j) and the change in spillover effect over 
the crisis period (represented by z i,j). 
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Table 2.9 summarizes the estimated coefficients from the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  In 
this model, US banking portfolio and the insurance portfolios from EU, Japanese and UK 
markets are the four portfolios involved in the model. Similar to Table 2.8, we summarize 
the parameters for spillover effects which are statistically significant into Table 2.10 to 
better illustrate the return and volatility interdependence across these portfolios.   
From Table 2.10, one can see that the return innovation from US banking portfolio 
has a significant impact on the return of Japanese and UK insurance portfolios.  The return 
spillover effect from US banks towards Japanese and UK insurance sectors are 0.221 and 
0.080 over the entire sample period, respectively.  However, none of the insurance 
portfolios can influence the return of US banking portfolio over the entire sample period.  
Furthermore, there is not volatility interdependence between the US banking portfolio and 
the insurance portfolios from the rest of the markets as none of the estimated volatility 
spillover effects is significant over the entire sample period.   
During the crisis period, the volatility spillover from US banks to insurers in EU 
market has only increased by 0.006, and there is no increase in return spillover effects from 
US banks to other insurance portfolios.  The volatility spillover from insurers to US banks 
is also minimal during the crisis period, with the spillover oriented from Japanese 
insurance portfolio the only significant one which is equals to 0.017.  Similarly, apart from 
the insurers in UK market, there is no return spillover towards the US banks from the 
insurance sectors during the crisis period.  The return spillover from UK insurance 
portfolio to US banking portfolio has increased from zero to 0.259 during the crisis period.  
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Table 2.10  Summary of the Significant Spillover Effect based on Table 2.9. 
The table below summarizes the selected estimated return and volatility spillover effects which are 
statistically significant above 10 percent significance level.  The estimated coefficients for return and 
volatility spillovers are selected from Table 2.9.  The table is divided into two panels.  Panel A represents the 
significant return spillover effects between US banking sector portfolio and the insurance sector portfolios of 
the remaining three markets, while Panel B summarizes the significant volatility spillover effects between 
the two. 
 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Return Spillover Effects 
Entire sample period (γi,j)   Changes during the crisis period (θi,j) 
  To Insurers in To Insurers in   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.221 0.080   
z-Stat. 1.834 1.895   
  From Insurers in  From Insurers in    
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.259 
z-Stat. 3.094 
 
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Volatility Spillover Effects 
Entire sample period (gi,j)   Changes during the crisis (zi,j) 
  To Insurers in To Insurers in   
From US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.006 
z-Stat. 2.045 
  From Insurers in  From Insurers in    
To US EU Japan UK EU Japan UK 
Banks 0.017 
z-Stat. 2.474 
 
Note: The shadings in the above table means the financial sector portfolio is not available within the corresponding national 
market.  The magnitude of spillover effect over the entire sample period is represented by the estimated parameter γi,j and gi,j 
for the return and volatility spillovers, respectively.  The changes in spillover effect during the crisis period is represented by 
the estimated parameter θi,j and zi.j for the return and volatility spillovers, respectively.  The magnitude of spillover effect 
during the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample period (γi,j or g i,j) and the changes in spillover 
effect during the crisis period (θi,j or z i,j). 
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The finding provides some interesting insights about the interactions between US banks 
and insurers from other markets.  First, the result suggests that insurers from other 
markets and US banking sector share similar risk factor as the return of US banks do have 
influential power over the return of insurance companies in the other markets.  The risk is 
the fluctuation of financial asset price.  Both banks and insurers are major institutional 
investors in the financial markets.  Therefore, they will both be influenced by the changes 
in financial asset price due to fair accounting standard.  Since US financial market is the 
main information provider in terms of price innovations (Eun and Shim, 1989), the return 
performance of US financial institutions should have a positive impact on the financial 
institutions in other markets.  In addition, as discussed in the above section, the nature of 
this risk factor does not change during the crisis period.  Therefore, there is no change in 
return spillover effects from US banks towards insurers in other markets during the crisis 
period. 
Second, the return and risk performances of US banks are only influenced by 
insurers from other markets during the crisis period but not before.  That means these 
insurance companies also share some kind of risk factor with US banks which is only 
observable during the financial crisis.  We argue this risk factor is the sharp decrease in the 
demand and value of the structured financial products.  Insurance companies also issue 
insurance related structured financial products such as insurance-linked securities (ILS).86  
Cummins and Trainar (2009) argue that insurance related structured products helps 
insurer to reduce insurance risk exposure by passing the risk to boarder capital markets.  
Therefore, the cost of capital will be more economical.  Since late 1990s, the insurance 
securitization market grows rapidly from less than USD 2 billion in 1998 to nearly USD 23 
                                                          
86 For further discussion on the development of structured products issued by the insurance companies, 
please refer to the Securitization – New Opportunity for Insurers and Investors (2006) by Swiss Re, which is 
available to general public via Swiss Re’s website: http://www.swissre.com/r/sigma7_2006_en.pdf. 
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billion in 2006.87  The structured financial product market credit risk starts to during the 
crisis period and takes its toll on financial institutions which generate profits from 
producing and distributing these products.  That is why US banks are barely influenced by 
the return or volatility innovations generated from these insurance sectors before the 
financial crisis.   
Finally, the volatility spillover effect from US banks to insurers in other markets is 
negligible over the sample period.  The empirical result is well expected as banks and 
insurers have totally different business models and core risk factors.  Insurance companies 
mainly expose to insurance risk within their home country as they mainly operate in their 
home market, while banks have no insurance risk exposure embedded in its business 
model.  Furthermore, insurance companies mainly rely on insurance premiums for 
liquidity instead of interbank funding market (Eling and Schmeiser, 2010), which makes 
them less risky over the crisis period compare to banks.  Therefore, it is reasonable that the 
volatility innovation of US banking portfolio have no influential power over the volatility 
of insurance portfolios from other markets.   
 
2.5.5. Test 3: Interdependence between Global Banking and Insurance Portfolios 
In order to investigate the return and risk interdependence between the global banking 
and global insurance industry during the current financial crisis, we perform another test 
based on global banking and global insurance portfolios.  Our motivation comes from the 
studies examining the performance of insurance companies during the recent financial 
crisis (Eling and Schmeiser, 2010; Harrington, 2009).  These studies show that insurance 
companies perform relative well compare to banks during the recent financial crisis as 
                                                          
87 The data for insurance securitization market is collected from the report named The Essential Guide to 
Reinsurance (2010) by Swiss Re, which is available on Swiss Re’s website: www.swissre.com. 
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they were well funded, and less involved in the risky structured financial products 
compare to banks.  The report from The Geneva Association88 also confirms that most of 
the insurers were able to absorb the losses within their own balance sheets during the 
crisis, but banks struggled with funding.  This argument is further supported by the report 
from the US treasury,89 which shows that around US 600 banks have been rescued by the 
TARP90 program while only three insurance companies need the funding from the central 
government.  Therefore, according to “flight-to-quality”, investors should prefer insurance 
sector over banking sector during the crisis period.  In other words, insurers should 
benefit from the bad return performance of banks during the crisis period. 
The idea of “flight-to-quality” is first proposed by Lang and Nakamura (1995).  They 
argued that investors’ risk aversion increased dramatically during the crisis period.  
Instead of following the “rumor” to adjust their portfolios irrationally, investors sell off 
risky assets and invest the proceedings into high quality asset.  Caramazza et al (2004) 
provide the empirical evidence for the existence of “flight-to-quality” during the three 
previous crises episodes.91 
Due to the lack of direct information on the investment flows between the two global 
financial sectors, we investigate the existence of “flight-to-quality” though the return 
spillover effects between the two sectors.92  The global sector portfolios used in this test 
                                                          
88 The report is under the title of Systemic Risk in Insurance, An analysis of insurance and financial stability, 
which is available to general public via its website:  www.genevaassociation.org. 
89 A series of special reports is been conducted by the US Department of Treasury under the title of Financial 
Stability Transactions Report. The article quoted here is for the period ending July 2009, which is available to 
general public via its website: http://www.financialstability.gov.  
90 TRAP refers to the Troubled Asset Relief Program provided by the US central government. 
91 The three crises episodes are the 1987 US crisis, 1994 Mexican crisis and 1997 Asian crisis. 
92 “Flight-to-quality” refers to the phenomenon that investors prefer high risk quality asset over low risk 
quality asset by shifting their investments from the latter to the former.  Therefore, the ideal dataset for the 
investigation of “flight-to-quality” would be the information about the investment flow going in and out of 
the two assets.  
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include the corresponding financial institutions from all the markets.  The estimation 
result is represented in Table 2.11. 
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Table 2.11  Return and Volatility Spillovers between the Global Banking Sector 
and the Global Insurance Sector. 
The following tables summarize the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK models. The estimated coefficients from the 
model have been categorized into three sub-tables: i) Macroeconomic Factors and GARCH Effects, ii) Return Spillover 
Effects and iii) Volatility Spillover Effects.   
 
The following table summarizes the estimated coefficients for all the estimated parameters in the mean and variance 
equations of the VAR-BEKK model: 
Mean Equation: +, =  +	∑,ej^UTkl+`Nb, +∑<,S+S, +∑ θ,S,+S, + S,   
    ,~0, ℎ,,			with	, ! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],			 ≠ !.	 
Variance Equation: ℎ, = T + UVV,01 + WVℎ,01 + ∑G,SℎS,01 ℎ + ∑H,SℎS,01   
    ℎ,S, = T,S + U,01S,01US + Wℎ,S,01WS , with		and	! ∈ [#, $%, &, '],  ≠ !. 
where, 
ri,t = the return for financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
RF(X) = the three macroeconomic risk factors for market i over the day t.  X ∈ [MKT, FX, IR] which represents the 
market, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate risk factor, respectively. 
βi,x = the coefficient that represents the sensitivity of corresponding risk factor RF(X) for financial sector portfolio i. <,S= the coefficient for cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial sector portfolio j to portfolio i over the 
entire sample period.  
θ,S= the coefficient for the changes in the magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the crisis period.  
ai and bi = the coefficients that represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation for 
financial sector portfolio i. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the cross-sectional volatility spillover effects from financial sector portfolio j to 
portfolio i over the entire sample period.    
zi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the magnitude of cross-sectional spillover effects from financial 
sector portfolio j to portfolio i during the financial crises. 
hii,t = the conditional variance of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
εi,t = the residuals from the mean equation of financial sector portfolio i over day t. 
D = the dummy variable represents the crisis period. D = 1 from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, and D = 0 for 
elsewhere. 
National Markets Global-Bank Global-Insurance 
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Macroeconomic Factors 
      
Market (βi,MKT) 0.605 36.863 *** 0.725 38.780 *** 
FX (βi,FX) -0.017 -0.171 
 
0.090 0.684 
 
IR (βi,IR) 0.015 1.635 
 
0.039 3.319 *** 
GARCH Effects 
      
ARCH (aii2) 0.097 9.758 *** 0.069 8.751 *** 
GARCH (bii2) 0.886 106.810 *** 0.916 135.070 *** 
Persistence 0.983 
  
0.985 
  
Log-Likelihood 11642.0 
     
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Cross-Sectional Return Spillover 
      
Cross-Return 1 (γi1) 0.038 1.825 * -0.001 -0.043 
 
Change in Cross-Return 1 (θi1) 0.103 3.240 *** -0.126 -3.242 *** 
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Coeff. Z-stat. 
 
Cross-Sectional Volatility Spillover 
      
Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) 0.015 4.484 *** 0.019 3.368 *** 
Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) 0.000 -0.891 
 
0.015 1.361 
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
magnitude of the cross-sectional return spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the 
spillover effect over the entire sample period (represented by γi,j) and the change in spillover 
effect over the crisis period (represented by θi,j).The magnitude of the cross-sectional volatility 
spillover effect over the crisis period is the sum of the spillover effect over the entire sample 
period (represented by g i,j) and the change in spillover effect over the crisis period (represented 
by z i,j). 
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From the above table, one can see that during the crisis period, the return transmission 
from the global banking sector portfolio towards the global insurance sector portfolio is 
significant but negative.  The return spillover from global banking portfolio to global 
insurance portfolio has decreased from zero to -0.126 over the crisis period, while the 
return spillover effect from global insurance portfolio to global banking portfolio have 
increased from 0.038 to 0.141 during the crisis period.93       
Since the mean returns of both the banking and insurance sectors are negative during 
the crisis period from Table 2.2 Panel C, the negative return spillover from global banking 
portfolio to global insurance portfolio indicates the insurers enjoy a competitive advantage 
over the banks on a global level.  Therefore, the empirical evidence proves the existence of 
“flight-to-quality” between the global banking and insurance portfolios during the recent 
financial crisis.  In other words, the investors did shift their investments away from the 
risky banking sectors into the insurance sectors which were less risky in terms of liquidity 
and funding risk during the crisis period.    
However, from Test 2, we find no competitive effect between US banks and insurers 
from other markets.  That means the competitive effect is not because of the relative better 
return performances of insurance portfolios from other markets against banks in US 
market.  Combining the result from Test 2 and Test 3, we argue that the competitive effect 
between the global banking and insurance portfolios during the crisis period is mainly 
coming from the relative higher return of insurers against banks within each market, but 
not against banks from another market.   
                                                          
93 The return spillover effect from global insurance to global banking portfolio over the crisis period is equal 
to the sum of return spillover during the entire sample period (0.038) plus the changes in spillover effect 
over the crisis period (0.103), which is 0.141.  However, it is worth mentioning that the return spillover from 
global insurance portfolio to global banking portfolio is only statistically significant at 10% confidence level.  
In other words, if one choose a more conservative confidence level, there will be no return spillover from 
global insurance portfolio to global banking portfolio, which is consistent with the finding from Test 2. 
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In addition, there is a bidirectional volatility spillover effect between the global 
banking and global insurance portfolio over the entire sample period.  The magnitude of 
the volatility spillover effect from global banking to global insurance portfolio is 0.019, 
while the spillover effect for the opposite direction is 0.015.  Since we do not find any 
significant volatility spillover effects estimated over the entire sample period in Test 2, 
once again we argue this bidirectional volatility spillovers is mainly coming from the risk 
interdependence between banks and insurers within the sample market.  The magnitude 
of this bidirectional volatility spillover effect has not increased during the crisis period.   
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The current study investigates the interdependencies among the banking and insurance 
industries by examining the interactions among banks/insurers between the EU, Japanese, 
U.K. and U.S. markets.  Transmissions of shocks in returns and in volatility are both 
considered.  We also look at the potential changes in the magnitude of these cross-
sectional return and volatility transmissions during the recent financial market turmoil 
(2007-2009), to shed some light on the impact of the crisis on global financial dynamics. 
In general, the empirical evidence shows return contagion among the banking 
industries of the EU, U.K. and U.S. markets, especially during the crisis period.  This calls 
for regulatory attention in designing a coordinated regulatory landscape as well as the 
need for co-ordination of monetary policy across the industrialized world. As an exception, 
the connections between the banking sectors in the Japanese and the U.S. markets seem to 
be weak as no return spillover is recorded between these two markets even during the 
crisis period. One source of dissimilarity in effects across different regional banking 
markets is their structural differences. To elaborate, since U.S. is a market-oriented 
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economy while Japan is a bank-oriented economy, banks in these two countries are 
operating in different environments and consequently have different attitudes towards 
competition and risk taking. Our findings also document the prominence of the U.S. 
banking sector as the main origin of volatility information to its EU, Japanese and U.K. 
counterparts demonstrating its continuing leadership role in global financial markets. 
For the insurance sectors, once again the EU, U.K. and U.S. markets show a strong 
linkage with one another.  Positive and significant return spillovers are registered on the 
EU and U.K. markets while the effects on U.S. and Japan are more limited. Unlike banks, 
the magnitudes of the return spillovers across insurance markets remain unaltered during 
the crisis period, perhaps because the risk factors faced by the insurers were not affected 
by the turmoil. However, volatility spillovers to the U.S. and EU insurance sectors do 
intensify during the crisis period raising concerns about contribution of the insurance 
sector to systemic risk. The U.S. insurance sector receives contagion type volatility 
spillovers from the U.K. and the EU insurance markets with the former intensifying 
during the crisis. The increase in default probability due to the sharp decrease in asset 
values could be the reason behind the stronger volatility linkage across the insurance 
portfolios during the crisis. As an exception, Japanese insurers appear to be mostly 
insulated from shocks originating in other markets even during the crisis, reflecting the 
segmented nature of the Japanese markets. 
In regards to interdependence among banks and insurers at a global level, we show 
risk and return interdependence between the U.S. banking sector and insurers within the 
EU and U.K. markets during the crisis period.  The same phenomenon is registered for the 
aggregated banking and insurance portfolios.  This finding is in line with the current trend 
of integration between the two financial intermediary types over the last two decades.  
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There is also evidence of contagious volatility transmission between the two industries. 
The spillover in returns, mostly evident during the crisis, is of a competitive nature and 
favors the insurance industry in the sense that when banks suffer, insurers benefit by 
attracting their customers (‘flight-to-quality’ effect). Industrial reports and empirical 
studies on the general performance of the global banking and insurance sectors also 
confirm our empirical results.94  Our findings highlight the importance of monitoring and 
managing the contagion effects at the international level and the need to design an 
appropriate regulatory framework to curb it. Further globalization of financial markets, 
advancement of technology and the consolidation trend among “Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions” intensify this necessity. 
  
                                                          
94 For industrial reports, please refer to report Systemic Risk in Insurance, An analysis of insurance and financial 
stability (2010) by from Geneva Association, and the report Eight Key Messages on the Financial Turmoil (2008) 
by CEA among others.  Both reports claim that insurance companies are less exposed to the credit risk and 
liquidity risk compares to banks, and the insurance industry is less involved in the mortgage related security 
market.  For empirical studies, please refer to Cummins and Phillips (2008), Harrington (2009) and Eling and 
Schmeiser (2010) among others. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. THE EVOLUTION OF TERM STRUCTURE AND THE RETURN SENSITIVITY OF 
FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between changes in the term structure and 
the equity value of financial (banks and insurers) and non-financial institutions across 
major economies from 2003 to 2010.  The sensitivity of equity value for financial and non-
financial institutions upon changes in the term structure has been scrutinized by both 
academics and practitioners since early 1970s, when Merton (1973) and Long (1974) 
provide the first insight about the potential relationship between the two.  Comparatively, 
the interest rate risk of financial institutions has received more attention, especially from a 
regulatory perspective.  The capital adequacy of financial institutions plays a vital role in 
the stability of the financial system (Basel Committee, 2004) since the failure of financial 
institutions (e.g. banks) has a significant negative impact on the economic development 
(Staikouras, 2006b).  IFRI-CRO (2007) classifies interest rate risk as the most significant 
source of market risks for banks; while Drehmann et al (2010) show that the interaction 
between interest rate risk and credit risk is important for the overall assessment of the 
bank’s capital adequacy.  Despite the less economic significance and smaller impact 
(Saunders and Yourougou, 1990),95  the interest rate fluctuation can still influence the 
equity value of industrial firms through its impact on the inflation expectations and real 
interest rates (Sweeney and Warga, 1986). 
                                                          
95 Saunders and Yourougou (1990) argue that securities which are claim on real assets (e.g. non-financial 
institution stocks) have lower sensitivity upon changes in nominal interest rates.  
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The current study contributes to the existing literature in four ways.  First, we shed 
light on how the recent financial turmoil influences the yield curve exposure of financial 
intermediaries.96   Second, we use the first order difference in the Nelson-Siegel (1987) 
(hereafter NS) level, slope and curvature factor to measure changes in the yield curve.97  
Third, we propose a different empirical framework, namely the VAR-BEKK multivariate-
GARCH (hereafter MGARCH) model, to investigate whether the financial intermediaries 
are rewarded by exposing to yield curve changes.  The proposed VAR-BEKK model not 
only resolves the issue of heteroskedasticity, while maintain the desire feature of 
investigating multiple assets simultaneously, but also takes into account the time-varying 
conditional correlations among assets (Engle and Kroner, 1995).  The latter is often ignored 
by previous studies (i.e. the constant conditional correlation MGARCH model in Elaysiani 
et al., 2007), which reduces estimation efficiency.  Finally, previous studies on the interest 
rate risk of financial intermediaries focus either on one type of institution (Flannery and 
James, 1984; Viale et al., 2009) or on a single market (Dinenis and Sotiris, 1998; Elyasiani et 
al., 2007).  The current study fills this gap by using a global dataset with both banking and 
insurance (life/non-life) firms across major market-oriented (the U.S./UK) and bank-
oriented (Japan) financial systems. 
There are five main findings in this empirical chapter.  First, the equity value of 
banks is positively related to changes in long-term interest rates while negatively related 
to short-term rate fluctuations over the pre-crisis period.  This finding suggests that 
changes in term structure influence the equity value of banks through their impact on the 
profitability of the banking sector.  Second, the relationship between long-term rates and 
                                                          
96 The most recent empirical study on interest rate risk of financial institutions (English et al., 2012) employs 
a sample period from July 1997 to June 2007, which failed to cover the recent economic downturn (i.e. the 
2007-08 financial crisis) which started in the late 2007. 
97 We will discuss the technical aspects of the NS model in the methodology section. 
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the equity value of banks has increased during the crisis period, which may attribute to 
the “flight to quality” hypothesis.  Third, insurance firms show similar interest rate risk 
patterns as banks suggesting that the two financial intermediary share similar risk 
exposures over the sample period.  Fourth, industrial firms’ exposure to yield curve 
changes in a similar fashion as banks.  Finally, the results show that market interventions 
(e.g. government bailouts and stimulus packages) have a significant impact on the equity 
value of both financial and non-financial institutions during the recent financial turmoil.          
The empirical findings of this chapter could potentially have important implications 
on the asset pricing, risk management and regulation.  First, banks/insurers hold 
asset/liability across various maturities.  Therefore, the asset pricing model for financial 
intermediaries should take changes in the entire yield curve into account, instead of 
changes in interest rate/term spread with fixed maturity (Flannery and James, 1984; Bae, 
1990; Viale et al., 2009).  Second, being able to precisely identify yield curve exposures is 
crucial for any interest rate hedging/mitigating strategies, which in turn can improve the 
effectiveness of financial institutions’ risk management.  Finally, Adrian and Shin (2008) 
show that monetary policy is an important determinant of financial intermediaries’ 
balance sheet size.  The latter is further signalling the future real activity.  Thus, the 
monetary policy and financial stability policy are closely related.  A better understanding 
of the relationship between the shape of yield curve and financial intermediaries’ equity 
value/profitability is, therefore, vital for designing effective monetary/financial stability 
policies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow.  The following section provides 
a brief literature review on the interest rate risk of financial and non-financial institutions.  
Section 3.3 presents the dataset employed in the current study.  Section 3.4 illustrates the 
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technical detail of the proposed VAR-BEKK empirical framework.  Section 3.5 discusses 
the result of our empirical study. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the study. 
 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a brief review on the interest rate risk of financial and non-financial 
institutions with no intention to lessen the importance of any excluded studies.  The 
literature is categorized based on whether it focuses on the importance of interest rate risk 
for financial institutions, the interest rate exposure of industrial firms, and the estimation 
framework for interest rate risk.    
 
3.2.1. Interest Rate Risk of Financial Institutions and its Importance  
Interest rate risk is the most significant source of market risk for banks (IFRI-CRO, 2007).  
Furthermore, Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) suggest that credit risk exposure and interest 
rate risk exposure is intrinsically related.  That means changes in interest rate can also 
influence the bank’s exposure on credit risk.  Based on the result of a hypothetical stress 
test on banks, Drehmann et al (2010) show that the interaction between interest rate risk 
and credit risk is important for the overall assessment of the bank’s capital adequacy.  
They reveal that interest rates are an important determinant of defaults which will further 
influence the net interest income of the bank.   
In addition, the liquidity condition in the financial market is also driven by the 
perceptions of credit and interest rate risks (Basel Committee, 2009).  The fluctuation of 
interest rates will influence the credit risk of financial assets, which has an impact on 
investor’s appetite for these assets.98  An increase in asset’s credit risk will reduce its 
                                                          
98 For further discussion on changes in investors’ risk appetite during the recent financial turmoil, please 
refer to Gonzalez-Hermosillo (2008). 
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market liquidity and value as investors pull their investments away and demand higher 
premiums.  Therefore, financial products with higher credit risk (e.g. CDOs), inters alia, 
suffer from greater losses when market liquidity deteriorates.  Furthermore, for 
institutional investors (e.g. banks) the perceived losses due to credit risk will be rapidly 
priced in through the fair-value accounting, which has an instant impact on the equity 
value and the capital adequacy of these institutions.  
Based on the aforementioned studies, the credit, interest rate and liquidity risks are 
three highly integrated and important sources of risk for the capital adequacy of banks.  
Besides, both the credit and liquidity risk exposures seem to be driven by the fluctuation 
of interest rates.  Therefore, the relationship between changes in the interest rate or its 
term structure and performances of financial institutions has great importance from a 
regulatory perspective (Drehmann et al, 2010).99   
According to the maturity model, changes in term structure (e.g. parallel shifts or 
“twists”) can influence the economic value of financial institution’s assets and liabilities, 
which will have an further impact on its equity value (Saunders and Cornett, 2010).  The 
maturity model (also known as duration mismatch/gap) was first proposed by Grove 
(1974) based on the Hicks-Samuelson Duration Theorem (Hicks, 1946; Samuelson, 1945).  
The maturity model argues that due to the maturity (or duration) mismatch of asset and 
liability, changes in interest rates have different impact on financial institution’s asset and 
liability position.  According to the duration theory, securities with longer duration have 
higher sensitivity upon changes in interest rates.   A financial institution with positive 
duration mismatch (i.e. the average duration of asset is longer than the one of liability), 
therefore, has a negative relationship with changes in the yield curve.   
                                                          
99 According to regulators, the capital adequacy of financial institutions matters most (Basel Committee, 
2004).   
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Alternatively, changes in the term structure can also influence the equity value of a 
financial institution by affecting its profitability.  For instance, the net profit margin of 
banks is sensitive to interest rate fluctuations as they increasingly rely on short-term 
liabilities and long-term investments (Ho and Saunders, 1981).  The changes in the long-
term and short-term interest rate (i.e. fluctuations in the term structure), therefore, will 
directly influence the profitability of bank through altering its net interest margin.  
According to the profitability argument, increase (decrease) in long-term (short-term) 
interest rate will benefit banks in terms of enhancing their profitability (i.e. higher net 
interest margin).  This earning perspective is a traditional approach for interest rate risk 
analysis for many banks, as fluctuations in earnings can threaten the stability of an 
institution by reduces capital adequacy and market confidence (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2003). 
Empirically, Flannery (1983) is among the first empirical studies to investigate the net 
interest rate margin of the U.S. commercial banks from 1960 through 1978, and finds no 
significant relationship between the interest rate changes and the profitability of banks.  
The following study by Flannery and James (1984), however, find significant and negative 
relationship between the equity value of U.S. banking institutions and changes in interest 
rates over the period from 1976 to 1981.100  Recently, Elyasiani et al (2007), Carson et al 
(2008) and Viale et al (2009) have examined the interest rate risk factors of financial 
institutions within the U.S. market with updated sample sets.  Elyasinai et al (2007) show 
that apart from large insurance companies, the equity value of U.S. financial institutions is 
not sensitive to changes in the long-term (i.e. the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond) yield from 
                                                          
100 In interest rate risk factor used in Flannery and James (1984) is the holding period return of a bond index 
with certain maturity.  The empirical result indicates that holding period return of a bond index is positively 
related to changes in bank equity return, which indicates that the equity value of banks has a negative 
relationship with interest rate changes. 
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1991 to 2001.  They argue that result is mainly due to the duration mismatch of the asset 
and liability hold by the large U.S. insurers.  This finding is supported by Carson et al 
(2008), which focus solely on the U.S. insurance industry with a sample period span from 
1991 to 2001.   They also find negative relationship between the insurance firms (life, 
accident & health, and property & casualty) and changes in long-term (10-year) 
government bond yields.  Viale et al (2009) investigate the bank stock return and changes 
in the term spread (i.e. the yield difference between the government bond with 
maturity >25 years and one-month) from 1986 through 2003.  The empirical findings 
suggest that fluctuations in term spread significantly influence the bank’s equity value but 
the impact is different for banks with different sizes.  They argue that large (small) banks 
are negatively (positively) related to changes in the term spread due to positive (negative) 
duration mismatch.   
The interest rate exposure of German and Japanese financial institutions have been 
covered by Czaja et al (2009) and Oyama and Shiratori (2001), respectively.  The former 
shows that the equity return of German banks are negatively related to changes in long-
term and medium-term rates while the short-term rate changes have a minimal impact 
from 1974 to 2002.  The latter shows that changes in the short-term rate have no impact on 
the profitability of Japanese banking sector in the 1980s and 1990s.   
On a global scale, Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) and English (2002) investigate the 
interest rate risk of large banking portfolios across different markets.  Elyasiani and 
Mansur (2003) assess the equity return sensitivity of the U.S., German and Japanese banks 
upon changes in long-term bond yields from 1986 to 1995, and find no significant 
relationship between the two.  English (2002) shows that profitability of banks from the G-
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8 countries is not strongly related to changes in the yield curve from 1979 to 1999101 apart 
from the U.S. market, where net interest margin of banks is positively related to 
steepening yield curve (i.e. widening term spread).  He argues that the lack of relationship 
in the European countries is mainly due to the increasing competition within the European 
banking sector during the sample period.     
 
3.2.2. Interest Rate Risk of Non-Financial Institutions  
Previous empirical studies suggest that non-financial institutions also expose to interest 
rate fluctuations.  Financial theory suggests that changes in macroeconomic factors should 
have a systemic influence on the return of stock market.  Among various macroeconomic 
factors, Chen et al (1986) show that changes in the term structure (e.g. “twist” in the yield 
curve) and unexpected changes in inflation will have a significant impact on the stock 
market return.  They argue that changes in term structure affect the discount rate for 
financial assets, which have a direct impact on the valuation of these assets.  The 
unexpected change in inflation (usually represented by changes in long-term interest 
rate102), on the other hand, will affect the performance of the stock market through its 
influence on the nominal expected cash flows.   
Early studies on industrial firms, however, show mixed result.  For instance, 
Sweeney and Warga (1986) investigate the interest rate risk of the U.S. sector portfolio 
from 1960 to 1979.  They find the sensitivity of utility firm’s equity value on changes in 
interest rate is much higher than the average.103  They claim that the negative relationship 
                                                          
101 The G-8 refers to U.S., Canada, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Italy and 
Norway. 
102 Please see Sweeney and Wara (1986) and Bartram (2002), among others, also argue that changes in long-
term interest rates are a measure of unexpected changes in inflation.  
103 There are three alternative interest rate measures used in Sweeney and Warga (1986), which are the 20-
year government bond yield, 3-month Treasury bill yield and a set of indices approximating the shape of 
yield curve. 
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between the interest rate changes and utility firms is mainly through three channels: a) 
inflation channel, b) real interest-rate changes, and c) mismeasurement in the market index.  
The first channel mainly refers to the “regulatory lag” effect, which means the regulated 
industries (i.e. utility firms) cannot adjust the price of their services in a quick manner 
under sudden increase in inflation.  The second channel suggests that the value of stock 
will change given fluctuations in interest rates based on the dividend discount model.  The 
final channel claims that the significant interest rate risk of utility firms might due to their 
sensitivity to the lack of an interest rate component in the market return used in their 
model.  Contrary to the previous findings, Yourougou (1990), however, finds no interest 
rate sensitivity for industrial firms in the U.S. market from 1977 to 1981.  He argues that 
the lack of significant interest rate beta is mainly due to the low sensitivity of interest rate 
risk for the industrial firms.  This finding is supported by Bae (1990).     
Recently, Bartram (2002) examines the interest rate exposure for German non-
financial institutions from 1987 to 1995.  The empirical findings suggest that German 
industrial firms expose to changes in long-term rates, short-term rates as well as the term 
spread.  The author argues that the liquidity condition of the firms is the main driving 
force behind the interest rate risk.  Besides, a large number of firms show non-linear 
relationship with the interest rate changes (i.e. positive and negative interest rate shocks 
have different impact), which the author claims is attributed to the non-linear payout of 
hedging activities.  The interest rate risk exposure of the UK institutions has been revealed 
by Staikouras (2005).  By investigating the equity return sensitivity of both financial and 
non-financial institutions upon changes in the short-term interest rate from 1989 to 2000, 
the finding shows that the non-financial institutions are significantly influenced by 
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changes in interest rates.  Additionally, the author claims that the impact of interest rate 
fluctuation on the equity value is opposite for financial and non-financial institutions.   
With a multinational dataset covering financial and non-financial institutions across 
major European countries (i.e. France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K.) from 1982 
through 1995, Oertmann et al (2000) claim that industrial as well as financial firms are 
negatively related to changes in domestic long-term interest rates.  The magnitude of the 
interest rate effect of financial institutions, however, is comparatively higher than 
industrial ones.  However, given the orthogonalization process of the explanatory 
variables used in their study,104 the authors claim that the significant impact of interest 
rate changes on industrial firm value is mainly due to its influence through market return.  
In order words, interest rate changes first affect the stock market, while the changes in the 
stock market further influence the equity value of industrial firms.  
 
3.2.3. Estimation Framework of Interest Rate Risk  
Conventional studies (e.g. Lloyd and Shick, 1977; Flannery and James, 1984; Choi et al, 
1992; Tai, 2000) usually use the unexpected changes in a given bond index or interest rates 
based on a given maturity to evaluate the interest rate sensitivity of financial institutions.  
However, by measuring yield effects through interest rates with certain maturity cannot 
reveal the changes in the slope of the term structure or the effect of “twist” (Staikouras, 
2003).  Other studies try to involve interest rates with multiple maturities (e.g. Lynge and 
Zumwalt, 1980), or short-term rates plus term spreads (e.g. English, 2002; Viale et al, 2009) 
into the asset pricing model to tickle the issue of twist in the yield curve105.  However, they 
                                                          
104 The finding is based on the following orthogonalization ordering: domestic interest rate changes are 
defined as the prime risk factor prior to the international interest rate and domestic market return.   
105 In English (2002), the term spread is defined as the difference between the yield on 10-year government 
securities and three-month government bills.  In Viale et al (2009), the term spread is defined as the 
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failed to recognize the potential relationship between interest rates with different 
maturities and the term spread.  Bliss (1997) shows the long-term and short-term interest 
rates are highly related.106  Therefore, by involving these interest rate measures into the 
pricing model without orthogonalization may introduce biasness into the parameter 
estimation due to multicollinearity.   
Czaja et al (2009), to our knowledge, is the only existing study investigates the 
interest rate exposure of financial institutions based on the three factors estimated from 
the NS model.  However, since their study is solely focused on the German financial 
market from 1974 to 2002, they failed to capture the interest rate sensitivity of financial 
institutions during the recent financial turmoil.  The latest study by English et al (2011) 
investigates the relationship between “slope surprise” of the yield curve and the banks 
equity value from July 1997 till June 2007.107  But their sample period fails to capture the 
full impact of the recent financial turmoil.  McAndrews (2009) shows that the deterioration 
of liquidity condition in major financial markets (e.g. the UK, the U.S. and European 
countries) accelerated after the freeze of redemptions for three investment funds by BNP 
Paribas on the August 9, 2007 as the level and volatility of overnight interbank borrowing 
rates within these markets increased dramatically.  The sudden increase in short-term 
interest rate following the BNP Paribas event and its impact on financial institutions’ 
interest risk exposure, therefore, is ignored by Czaja et al (2009).  In the current study we 
extend the sample period to early 2010, which allow us to investigate the full impact of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
difference between the yield on a portfolio of long-term government bonds with more than 25 years 
maturity and the one-month Treasury bill. 
106 In his study, he claims that the level, slope and curvature factor in the three factor model proposed by 
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) are highly interdependent.  Since the level, slope and curvature factor 
represents the yield with long-term, short-term and medium-term maturity, the result indicates that the 
changes of yields with different maturities are related.  
107 The slope surprise is defined as the difference between a medium (e.g. 2- and 5-year) or long-term (e.g. 10-
year) Treasury yield and the federal fund rates.  
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recent financial turmoil on the interest rate risk exposure of financial and non-financial 
institutions.   
Additionally, early studies on interest rate risk usually base their empirical 
framework on simple regression (e.g. OLS) model.108  The simple OLS model is easy to 
implement but can only estimate the risk exposure of an individual or a group of similar 
assets/firms at a time.  Recently, Scott and Peterson (1986), Yourougou (1990) and 
Staikouras (2005) adopt a multivariate estimation framework based on seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation (SURE) model to investigate the interest rate risk of 
financial institutions.  The SURE model not only can evaluate the risk exposure of multiple 
firms/groups of firms simultaneously to increase the estimation efficiency but also takes 
the potential correlation across the firms/groups of firms into account.  However, the 
SURE model ignores the time-varying nature of the variance-covariance information 
across the firms/groups of firms, which could reduce the estimation efficiency of the 
model.  In the current study, we propose our own VAR-BEKK model to resolve the issue 
of heteroscedasticity while maintain the desired feature of a multivariate framework that 
enables us to estimate the interest rate risk of multiple asset series simultaneously. 
 
3.3. DATA 
The current study investigates the relationship between the changes in the term structure 
of interest rates and the equity value of financial (banks and insurers) and non-financial 
institutions across the U.S., the UK and Japanese markets.  We focus on these three 
countries as they are the dominate force in the global financial market.  According to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 69% of the total global financial assets are managed 
                                                          
108 Please refer to Staikouras (2003) for a detailed review of empirical studies on interest rate risk of financial 
institutions. 
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by financial institutions from these three countries in 2009.109  Besides, the three countries 
contribute more than 36% of the global GDP and total bank assets, and around 45% of the 
total stock market capitalization in 2009.110  The following table summarizes the number of 
institutions selected under each category across the three markets. 
 
Table 3.1  Number of Financial and Non-Financial Institutions across Markets 
The table below summarizes the number of institutions within the sector portfolios across the three markets.  
Size portfolios have been formed for financial and non-financial sector according to their capital value 
(financial institutions) and market capitalization (non-financial institutions).  
Institutions U.S. UK Japan 
Systemic Important Financial Institutions 8 4 3 
Medium Banks (U.S.)/Regional Bank (Japan) 28 - 54 
Small Banks (U.S.) /Secondary Bank (Japan) 29 - 26 
Large Insurers 11 6 5 
Small Insurers 64 25 4 
Large Industrial Firms 26 26 24 
Small Industrial Firms 96 65 175 
From Table 3.1, one can see that the financial and non-financial institutions have been 
divided into sub-groups according to their size.  The size effect of risk factors among 
financial and non-financial institutions due to difference in hedge incentive and/or 
operation structure has been discussed extensively in the previous literatures (Graddy and 
Karna, 1984; Jorion, 1990; Nance et al, 1993).  Therefore, by categorizing institutions into 
size groups enables us to investigate the potential size effect in interest rate risk across 
different types of institutions.   
For the banking sector, institutions categorized as SIFI (i.e. systemically important 
financial institutions) are selected according to the announcement made by Financial 
                                                          
109 The information is collected from the IMF report “Global Financial Stability Report” (hereafter GFSR) issued 
in September 2011.  The data on assets of institutional investors by country is obtained from the Figure 2.2 
within the GFSR 2011, see: http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2011/02/c2/figure2_2.csv.  
110 The information is collected from the GFSR issued in October 2010.  The data presented in the current 
study is obtained from the Table 3. Selected Indicators on the Size of the Capital Markets within the GFSR 2010, 
see: http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2010/02/pdf/statappx.pdf. 
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Stability Board (FSB).111  We isolate the SIFIs as one sub-group as they are important to the 
stability of the financial markets.  According to FSB, the failure of these SIFIs will incur 
significant disruption into the wider financial system and economic activities, which has 
deleterious consequences for both private and public interests.  Therefore, a better 
understanding of the equity return sensitivity of these SIFIs to changes in yield curves has 
great value from a regulative perspective.  In the FSB announcement 29 bank holding 
companies have been identified as global SIFIs due to their importance to the stability of 
the global financial market, out of which 15 are based in the U.S., the UK and Japanese 
markets.112  It is worth mentioning that since all the four listed banks in the UK market are 
identified as SIFIs, there is only one sub-group for the UK banking sector. 
The medium and small banks for the U.S. market are selected according to their asset 
value.  We define medium banks according to the bank holding corporations (BHC) 
ranking provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).113  The top 50 
BHCs which are not identified as SIFI are categorized as medium banks in the current 
study.114  We use the remaining banks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (i.e. the ones 
are not identified as SIFI and/or medium banks) as small banks.  The medium and small 
banks in Japanese market are selected according to the according to the institution 
classification provided by the Japanese Bankers Association (JBA).  According to JBA, 
Japanese banks are categorized into three groups according to their business functions, 
                                                          
111 The list of SIFIs is reported in the FSB announcement “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions” on November 4, 2011, see: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.  The FSB was established in April 
2009 as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).  The FSF was founded in 1999 by the G7 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors following recommendations by Hans Tietmeyer, President of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
112 The selected SIFIs are listed in Appendix B.1. 
113 The ranking of the U.S. BHCs is based on the bank’s total assets.  The ranking is available from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, which can be found as follow: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/.  The 
ranking used in the current study is updated on the 31 December 2010.   
114 The selected banks have to be listed on stock exchange within the U.S. market.   
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namely the city banks, regional banks and secondary banks.115  We specify the regional 
and secondary banks which are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as medium and small 
banks for Japanese market, respectively.  It is worth noticing that banks under the city 
bank classification of JBA are also SIFIs according to FSB.116   
Given the comparatively small sample size of the insurance firms across the three 
markets, only two size groups have been specified for insurance companies, namely large 
and small size insurers.  It is worth noticing that the insurance sector SIFIs have not been 
officially identified yet.117  In the current study, we try to match the systemic importance 
of large insurers and banking sector SIFIs by matching their relative size.  We define large 
and small insurers in a three-step process.  First, we collect all the insurance companies 
listed on the respective main stock exchange for each market.118   Second, we choose 
institutions whose asset value is greater than $100 billion as large insurers in the respective 
market.119  We set the entry level for large insurers at $100 billion based on the relative size 
of the large insurance companies compared to banking sector SIFIs.  For instance, the asset 
value of the largest U.S. insurer MetLife is only one third of the size of the largest U.S. 
banking sector SIFI Bank of America.120  Therefore, given that the lowest entry level on total 
                                                          
115 According to JBA, city banks are large in size, with headquarters in major cities and branches in Tokyo, 
Osaka, other major cities, and their immediate suburbs. Regional banks are usually based in the principal 
city of a prefecture and they conduct the majority of their operations within that prefecture and have strong 
ties with local enterprises and local governments. Secondary banks usually serve smaller companies and 
individuals within their immediate geographical regions. 
116 Due to space limits, the name of the selected medium (regional) and small (secondary) banks from the U.S. 
(Japanese) market is not reported.  Further information is available from the author upon request. 
117 According to FSB, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is expected to complete its 
assessment methodology for identifying global systemically important insurers in June 2012.   
118 In the current study, we specify the New York Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange as the main stock exchange for the U.S., the UK and Japanese market, respectively. 
119  The asset value of insurers is collected from Thomson Routers DataStream®.  The latest available 
information on financial institution’s total asset is updated on the December 31, 2010.  For insurance 
companies from the UK and Japanese market we convert their total asset value figure from local currency 
(e.g. British Pound and Japanese Yen) into the U.S. dollar based on the corresponding bilateral exchange 
rates observed on the 31 December 2010. 
120 The asset value of MetLife and Bank of America is $730.906 billion and 2,264.909 billion on the December 31, 
2010, respectively. 
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asset for the banking sector SIFIs is around $300 billion, the $100 billion entry level for 
insurance firms seems consistent and reasonable.121  The selection criterion yields 22 large 
insurers across the three markets.122   Finally, we categorize the remaining insurance 
companies from each market as small insurers.  
For non-financial institutions, we define large firms as the non-financial components 
from the TOPIX Core 30, Financial Times 30 (FT 30), and Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) index for the Japanese, the UK and the U.S. market, respectively.123  We choose the 
non-financial components from the three aforementioned indices as large non-financial 
institutions for two reasons.  First, these indices are commonly regarded as the measure of 
overall performance of their respective markets124, the non-financial institutions from these 
indices should reflect the general performance of the industrial sector of these markets.  
Therefore, we can match the systemic importance of large non-financial institutions with 
their large financial counterparts in the current study.  Second, the components of these 
indices are usually firms with the highest market value.   
Given the large number of non-financial institutions listed across the three markets, 
the small non-financial institutions are selected via a two-step process.  First, we collect all 
the firms from non-financial industries listed on the respective main stock exchange for 
each market.  The number of non-financial institutions for the U.S., the UK and Japanese 
market is 1212, 682 and 1750, respectively.  In the second step, we rank non-financial 
institutions according to their market value from each market and pick up the firms within 
                                                          
121 In our sample, U.S. Bancorp and Bank of New York Mellon, ate the two banking sector SIFIs with the lowest 
asset value, which is $307.786 billion and $247.259 billion on the December 31, 2010, respectively. 
122 The selected large across the three markets are listed in Appendix B.2.  Due to space limits, the name of 
the small insurers is not reported.  Further information is available from the author upon request. 
123 The selected large industrial firms are listed in Appendix B.3. 
124 For further detail of the three indices please refer to the description provided by their providers. For 
TOPIC Core 30, see: http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/topix/; for FT 30, see: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/78c12166-0773-11db-9067-0000779e2340.html; and for DJIA, see: 
http://www.djaverages.com/?go=industrial-overview.  
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the bottom 20% to bottom 10% threshold.125  We eliminate the firms within the bottom 10% 
threshold as firms very low market value/price (i.e. micro-cap firms) usually suffer from 
non-frequent trading and market-microstructure problems (e.g. Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud, 2002; Gray and Johnson, 2011) which might produce 
unsmooth return series.  Therefore, we skip the micro-cap firms by eliminating the bottom 
10% of the sample and select firms within the bottom 10% to 20% range as small non-
financial institutions for each market.126 
The daily price information of the selected financial and non-financial institutions 
along with the equity market index is collected in local currency terms from Thomson 
Routers DataStream® for each market.127  The daily term structure of interest rates of the 
three countries is represented by the zero-yield curve with 15 maturities from 3-month to 
30-year128, which are collected from the Bloomberg®.  The sample period starts from the 
March 31, 2003 due to the availability of the yield curve data on Japanese market, while 
stops at the January 31, 2010.  We stop the sample period at the end of January 2010 for two 
reasons.  First, the sample period covers the full extent of the recent financial crisis which 
started in 2007 and had a lasting impact through 2008 and early 2009.129  Second, by 
stopping the sample period at the end of January 2010 we avoid the potential influence of 
the recent European sovereign debt crisis on the equity return of financial and non-
                                                          
125 The market value is represented by the non-financial institution’s market capitalization which is collected 
from Thomson Routers DataStream®.  In order to match the selection criterion for financial institutions, we 
use the market capitalization information updated on the 31 December 2010.    
126 Due to space limits, the name of the selected small non-financial institutions is not reported.  Further 
information is available upon request from the author. 
127 The equity market indices used in the current study are NIKKEI 225, FTSE 100 and S&P 500 for Japanese, 
the UK and the U.S. market, respectively. 
128 The 15 maturities are: 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-month, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, 8-, 9-, 10-, 15-, 20-, 25-, and 30-year.  Please find 
the daily term structures of interest rates over the sample period plotted in a 3-demtional manner for the 
three markets in Appendix B.4.   
129 Please refer to Batram and Bodnar (2009) for further discussion on the general performance of global 
financial markets during the crisis period.   
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financial institutions.130  Although no consensus has been reached on the starting date of 
the recent sovereign crisis, a series sovereign debt warnings issued by the Standard and 
Poor’s to Spain, Greece and Portugal in December 2009 and/or the austerity program 
announced by the Greece government on the February 2, 2010 to cut government debt 
should be treated as clear indications for the crisis.  
Equally weighted portfolios are constructed for financial and non-financial 
institutions within each sub-group across the three markets.131  For each market, the non-
trading days are eliminated from the dataset, which ends up with 1761, 1770 and 1719 
daily observations for the U.S., the UK and Japanese market, respectively.  In order 
compare the return sensitivity of sector portfolios upon changes in yield curve before and 
after the financial crisis, we divide the sample into two parts, namely the pre- and post-
crisis periods.  We define the starting date of the recent financial crisis on the August 9, 
2007 when BNP Paribas stopped the redemption of its investment funds as this event has a 
significant impact on the borrowing cost of banks across the global markets.  The BNP 
Paribas event signalled the inability to correctly evaluate toxic sub-prime related assets by 
large financial institutions and intensified the credit and liquidity risk within the financial 
market.  Bartram and Bodnar (2009) show that the borrowing cost between financial 
institutions increased dramatically following this liquidity squeeze in August 2007.  The 
two sub-sample periods contain 1138/1143/1115 and 624/627/604 daily observations for 
the U.S./UK/Japanese market before and after the crisis, respectively.  Table 3.2 illustrates 
                                                          
130 The sovereign debt crisis influences the financial market through its negative impact on the economy 
growth of certain regions instead of the liquidity shortage within the financial markets.  Therefore, the 
negative shocks on financial and non-financial institutions’ equity value may not due to changes in interest 
rates. 
131 The size weighted portfolio will represent the performance of the large institutions, while the equally 
weighted portfolio will provide a more general performance measure across all institutions involved.  We 
focus on the return performance of a sector rather than a group of individual institutions.  Therefore, we 
employ equally weighted portfolios in this chapter. The time series of sector portfolios’ value over the 
sample period is presented in Appendix B.5. 
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the statistical and distributional properties of the returns of these financial and non-
financial sector portfolios over the sample period. 
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Table 3.2  Summary Statistics of Sector Portfolio Returns. 
The table below summarizes the distributional statistics of sector portfolio returns from the three 
markets.  The pre-crisis period represents the 6-year period from October 1, 2002 to August 8, 2007 
and the post-crisis period represents the remaining of the sample from August 9, 2007 to January 31, 
2010. 
Panel A: The U.S. Sector Portfolios 
 
Banks Insurers Industrial Firms 
 Raw Return (%) SIFIs Money-Center Small Large Small Large Small 
Mean -0.010 -0.026 -0.037 -0.015 0.009 0.017 0.004 
Std. Dev. 2.846 2.451 2.127 2.896 1.751 1.253 1.855 
Skewness 0.302 -0.053 -0.136 -0.229 -0.575 0.193 -0.490 
Kurtosis 20.2 15.4 13.6 19.0 18.9 15.0 11.2 
Normality -0.010 -0.026 -0.037 -0.015 0.009 0.017 0.004 
Pre-Crisis 
       
Mean 0.051 0.027 0.013 0.056 0.047 0.048 0.052 
Std. Dev. 0.969 0.811 0.821 0.883 0.736 0.760 0.929 
Post-Crisis 
       
Mean -0.121 -0.121 -0.127 -0.144 -0.060 -0.040 -0.084 
Std. Dev. 4.602 3.972 3.399 4.721 2.771 1.838 2.854 
ADF -44.8 -46.4 -45.8 -43.4 -33.6 -24.9 -43.4 
ARCH 381.3 440.8 436.7 539.9 534.1 685.6 611.1 
Note: Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera normality test statistics. ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit root test statistics. ARCH refers to the ARCH-LM test statistics with 21 lags.  Std. Dev. stands 
for the daily standard deviation of the sector portfolio.  All reported test statistics are significant at the 
99% confidence level.  
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Table 3.2  Summary Statistics of Sector Portfolio Returns. (CON’T) 
Panel B: The UK Sector Portfolios 
 
Banks Insurers Industrial Firms 
 Raw Return (%) SIFIs Large Small Large Small 
Mean -0.054  0.007  0.015  0.020  -0.060  
Std. Dev. 2.859  2.385  0.725  1.302  0.661  
Skewness -1.345  -0.076  0.067  -0.269  -0.287  
Kurtosis 44.0  14.8  6.1  9.0  6.0  
Normality 124621.0  10210.4  711.9  2650.8  709.9  
Pre-Crisis      
Mean 0.038 0.059 0.046 0.061 -0.013 
Std. Dev. 1.043 1.436 0.662 0.895 0.605 
Post-Crisis      
Mean -0.221 -0.089 -0.041 -0.053 -0.147 
Std. Dev. 4.591 3.506 0.825 1.821 0.745 
ADF -18.8  -19.8  -39.4  -43.0  -12.4  
ARCH 327.3  414.2  129.5  512.1  175.8  
Note: Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera normality test statistics. ADF 
refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistics. ARCH refers 
to the ARCH-LM test statistics with 21 lags.  Std. Dev. stands for the daily 
standard deviation of the sector portfolio.  All reported test statistics are 
significant at the 99% confidence level.  
 
Panel C: Japanese Sector Portfolios 
 
Banks Insurers Industrial Firms 
 Raw Return 
(%) 
SIFIs Regional Secondary Large Small Large Small 
Mean 0.010  -0.009  -0.032  0.001  0.012  0.017  0.001  
Std. Dev. 2.700  1.520  1.190  1.946  3.522  1.474  1.145  
Skewness 0.245  0.199  0.439  -0.196  0.368  -0.326  -0.806  
Kurtosis 6.1  8.7  11.0  7.2  6.3  10.4  19.3  
Normality 720.2  2319.5  4682.2  1265.9  839.4  3950.5  19295.5  
Pre-Crisis 
       
Mean 0.114 0.033 0.009 0.065 0.030 0.074 0.063 
Std. Dev. 2.252 1.164 0.951 1.486 4.024 1.047 0.993 
Post-Crisis        
Mean -0.183 -0.088 -0.109 -0.117 -0.022 -0.089 -0.114 
Std. Dev. 3.368 2.016 1.535 2.585 2.327 2.037 1.377 
ADF -38.4  -43.5  -42.9  -26.4  -38.3  -42.9  -33.2  
ARCH 298.4  519.5  338.3  478.8  230.1  643.9  322.7  
Note: Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera normality test statistics. ADF refers to the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistics. ARCH refers to the ARCH-LM test statistics with 21 lags.  Std. 
Dev. stands for the daily standard deviation of the sector portfolio.  All reported test statistics are 
significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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The summary statistics indicate that the average daily returns of these financial and non-
financial sector portfolios typically range between 1.7 to -6.0 bps per day over the whole 
sample period.  The riskiness of financial institutions is much higher than those of non-
financial ones across the three markets.132  For instance, the standard deviation of the U.S. 
banking and insurance portfolio is between 1.751% and 2.896%, while the standard 
deviation of the industrial portfolio is between 1.253% and 1.855%.  The daily return series 
for all the sector portfolios are stationary according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test.   
 Based on the result of the Normality Test, the unconditional distribution of all the 
daily return series is non-normal as the skewness and kurtosis of the sector portfolio 
return are noticeably deviated from their mean.  Finally, all the return series reject the null 
hypothesis of the ARCH Test.  Given the variance of the return series is not constant over 
time, the result suggests the estimation framework for portfolio returns should take the 
non-linear return generating process and time-varying conditional variance into account. 
 In order to investigate the impact of the credit crunch on the equity return of these 
sector portfolios during the recent financial crisis, we further investigate the performance 
of these sector portfolios before and after the August 9, 2007.  The result shows that before 
the crisis (i.e. pre-crisis period), all the sector portfolios enjoy a positive average return.133  
The liquidity squeeze triggered by the BNP Paribas event dramatically increased the 
riskiness of these sector portfolios as their standard deviation increased noticeably during 
the post-crisis period.  Besides, all sector portfolios experienced negative averages daily 
                                                          
132 The only exception comes from the UK market, where the portfolio of small insurance companies has the 
lowest standard deviation over the sample period. 
133 The only exception comes from the small industrial portfolio in the UK market, where the average daily 
return over the pre-crisis period is -0.9 bps. 
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return during the crisis.  Furthermore, compared to non-financial institutions, the equity 
value of financial sector portfolios suffered bigger losses during the crisis.      
Finally, we collect all the major announcements by the central 
bank/government/Treasury department of each market to evaluate the potential 
influence of market interventions on the equity returns of financial and non-financial 
institutions during the crisis period.  It is worth noting that some market interventions 
have a lasting impact on the global financial market until the early 2010.  For instance, the 
Foreign-Currency Liquidity Swap Lines proposed by the Federal Reserve and other major 
central banks in the late 2007 were effective until the end of January 2010.  Similarly, the 
Quantitative Easing program introduced by Bank of England in early 2009 had a lasting 
impact until early 2010 through a series of extension announcements.134  Therefore, by 
employing a sample period from early 2003 to early 2010 we are able to show a more 
general picture of how the equity value of financial and non-financial institutions reacts to 
market interventions, which is valuable from a regulatory perspective.  We classify these 
announcements into different categories according to their characteristics.  The number of 
announcements made under each category is illustrated in Table 3.3 for each market. 
  
                                                          
134 The Quantitative Easing program had been extended for three times with the latest one on November 5, 
2009.  The Bank of England issued an announcement on the February 4, 2010 to signal the program will no 
longer be extended.  For further information of the Quantitative Easing program, please refer to Joyce et al 
(2011).  
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Table 3.3  Summary of Market Intervention Announcements 
The table below summarizes the number of market intervention announcements made by the 
central bank/government/Treasury department of the three markets considered.  The counting of 
announcements starts in August 2007, when the recent financial turmoil begins to impact the 
global financial market.  These market intervention announcements have been categorized into 
different types according to their main function and property.  In general, five main categories 
have been identified in the current study, namely rate cuts, liquidity injection, joint market 
intervention, government bailouts, and special measures.  The categorization of announcements 
might be different across markets. 
 
 
Rate Cuts 
Liquidity 
Injection 
Joint Market 
Intervention 
Government 
Bailouts 
Special Measure 
 
Fed Funds Discount 
   
TARP† Stimulus 
U.S. 10 12 9 8 5 1 3 
      
QE†† 
UK 9 19 8 4 4 
      
ORP††† Stimulus 
Japan 2 19 8 - 3 1 
† TARP refers to the Trouble Asset Relief Program introduced by the U.S. government in September 2009. 
†† QE refers to the quantitative easing program introduced by the Bank of England since early 2009. 
††† ORP refers to the outright purchase of government/corporate bonds by the Bank of Japan since early 
2009. 
 
Note: The announcement for rate cuts refers to decisions made by central banks to reduce the short-term 
borrowing rate for financial institutions.  There are two different types of rate cut announcements for the 
U.S> market, namely Fed Funds and Discount rate cuts.  The former refers to deductions in federal fund 
rates, while the latter refers to deductions in discount window rate.   
Liquidity injection related announcements refer to actions taken by central banks to enhance liquidity 
condition of the financial system. 
Joint market intervention refers to coordinated actions taken by more than one major central bank to 
stabilize the financial market on a global scale. 
The government bailouts refer to the government rescue of financial institutions (i.e. nationalization or 
direct capital injection) during the crisis period. 
Special measure refers to the additional market interventions apart from rate cuts, liquidity injections and 
government bailouts (i.e. quantitative easing, TRAP, out-right purchase, and stimulus)   
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In general, there are five categories of announcements, namely rate cuts, liquidity 
injections, joint market interventions, government bailouts and special measures.  The 
announcement for rate cuts refers to decisions made by central banks to reduce the short-
term borrowing rate for financial institutions.  For the U.S. market, there are two different 
types of rate cut announcements namely Fed Fund rate cuts and Discount rate cuts.  The 
former refers to deductions in federal fund rates, while the latter refers to deductions in 
discount window rate.135   
For liquidity injections, we select announcements which are related to liquidity 
enhancement of the financial system.136  For instance, the asset backed commercial paper 
money market mutual fund liquidity facility (AMLF) introduced by the Federal Reserve 
on the September 19, 2008, and the special liquidity scheme launched by the Bank of 
England on the April 21, 2008 which allows banks swap their high quality securities for 
government bonds on a temporary basis.   
The third category is announcements regarding the joint market interventions.  Since 
late 2007, major central banks around the world started to coordinate their intervention 
actions in order to better stabilize the global financial market.  For instance, on the 12 
December 2007, the Federal Reserve initiated the Foreign-Currency Liquidity Swap Lines 
with the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss 
National Bank to provide liquidity for the U.S. dollar across the global financial market.137  
                                                          
135 Both rates are tools of monetary policy used by the Federal Reserve to influence the supply and demand 
of funding in the U.S. financial market.  For further information of the federal rate, please refer to 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm; for further information of the discount 
window rate, please refer to http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm.  In the 
current study, we only select the announcement date for primary discount rates. 
136 The related announcements include unscheduled auctions of overnight funds injecting liquidity into the 
financial market, and special liquidity scheme for financial institutions aiming to improve their liquidity 
situations.   
137 For further information about the liquidity swap lines, see: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm, and, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm. 
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We isolate these joint market interventions from the ones carried out by individual 
markets to investigate whether financial and non-financial institutions react differently to 
these two types of actions during the crisis period. 
In the current study, the government bailouts refer to the government rescue of 
financial institutions (i.e. nationalization or direct capital injection) during the crisis period.  
The nationalization of AIG by the U.S. government in September 2008 and the capital 
injection by the UK government into three major banks in October 2008 are two vivid 
examples of government bailouts during the recent financial turmoil.  It is worth noticing 
that there is no major bailout on financial institutions by Japanese government during the 
recent crisis.  
The final category is special measures.  We refer special measures as additional 
market interventions apart from rate cuts, liquidity injections and government bailouts.  
During the crisis period, governments may take extreme measures to restore the stability 
of financial system and/or prevent economic recession.  From Table 3.3, one can see that 
different markets have implemented different special measures during the crisis period.  
For instance, the U.S. government has introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in September 2009 in order to rescue the entire financial system.  Similar actions 
like Quantitative Easing (QE) and outright purchase of government/corporate bonds have 
been taken by the Bank of England and Bank of Japan in early 2009, respectively.  
Furthermore, in order to stop the economy contraction, the U.S. and Japanese government 
have introduced a series of stimulus packages aiming to revival their economy in 2009.138   
In the current study, we create one intercept dummy variable for each 
announcement category within a market.  For instance, there will be 7 announcement 
                                                          
138 The U.K. government did not propose additional stimulus package but extended the magnitude of QE for 
three times following the initial introduction in March 2009.  
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dummies for the U.S. market, while 5 announcement dummies for Japanese market.  We 
incorporate these intercept dummies into the estimation framework to evaluate the impact 
of different types of market interventions on financial and non-financial institutions across 
markets.   
 
3.4. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 
3.4.1. Nelson-Siegel Term Structure Model 
In the current study, we investigate the equity return sensitivities of large financial and 
non-financial institutions upon the changes in the term structure of interest rates.  Inspired 
by Czaja et al (2009), we also use the estimated factor loadings from NS model to represent 
fluctuations in the term structure.  In the following section, we briefly introduce the NS 
model and its estimation method. 
In the NS model developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987), the term structure of interest 
rate is decomposed into three factors, namely the level, slope and curvature factors.  The 
NS three-factor model is popular among practitioners and policy makers as it uses a 
flexible and smooth parametric function to replicate the term structure at any given time 
(Svensson, 1995; Bank for International Settlements, 2005; Gurkaynak et al, 2007; 
Christensen et al, 2011; Sekkel, 2011).  Although the NS model lacks of theoretical backup 
compares to affine class models, they provides an excellent fit to the term structure of 
interest rate.139  Empirically, Diebold and Li (2006), De Pooter (2007) and Yu and Zivot 
(2011) all show that NS class models fit the real term structure well in both in-sample and 
out-of-sample period.  Despite the desirable arbitrage-free property enjoyed by the affine 
                                                          
139 The NS model has no restrictions to eliminate opportunities for riskless arbitrage.  As the technical detail 
is beyond the discussion of current paper, we refer interested readers to studies by Filipovic (1999), Diebold 
et al (2005) and Christensen et al (2011) among others.  Recently, Christensen et al (2011) propose a new set 
of NS models with an additional “yield-adjustment” term which will ensure the arbitrage-free property. 
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class models introduced by Vasicek (1977) and Cox et al (1985), Duffee (2002) argues that 
they perform poorly with real yield curve data.  However, based on US Treasury yield 
curves, Coroneo et al (2011) show that the NS model is compatible with the arbitrage-free 
constraints on the US market.  In other words, even without the arbitrage-free setting 
build-in, the NS class models are capable to provide a yield curve estimation which is free 
from arbitrage.140  
The NS model is based on Laguerre functions which consist of product between a 
polynomial and an exponential decay terms.  The basic three-factor NS model can be 
treated as the solution to a second order differential equation with equal roots for spot 
rates.  The spot rate curve can be illustrated as follow: 
m`nb = 1, + V, o10pqrs0 tuvws tuvw x + Y, o10pqrs0
tuvws tuvw − exp |− }~vx   (1) 
where yt(τ) is the spot rate with maturity τ at time t; β1,t , β1,t and β1,t are the three factor 
loadings141 estimated from NS model at time t; λt is the decay factor which optimize the 
model fitting at time t.  There are three reasons for the NS class model’s popularity.  First, 
it provides a parsimonious approximation of the yield curve using only four parameters to 
estimate the shape of yield curve.  The three components {1, [1 – exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt), [1 – 
exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt) – exp (-τ/λt)} provide the model enough flexibility to capture a range of 
monotonic, humped and S-type shapes commonly observed in the yield curve data.  
Second, the model enjoys a desirable property of starting off from an easily computed 
                                                          
140 Svensson (1995) propose an extended four-factor model based on the original NS three-factor model by 
adding an additional curvature factor.  In this study, we choose to use the NS three-factor model to avoid the 
potential difficulties of interpreting the two curvature factors.  In addition, Diebold et al (2008) show that 
even adopting a NS model with only level and slope factor could well explain the dynamic in the term 
structure of interest rates.   
141  A graphical presentation of the three loading factors and their changes upon time to maturity is 
illustrated in Appendix B.6. 
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instantaneous short rate value of [β1,t + β2,t], and levelling off at a finite infinite-maturity 
value of [β1,t], which is constant: 
lim}→ m`nb = 1, + V,;     lim}→∞ m`nb = 1, 
There are two different approaches can be employed to estimate the NS model.  The 
first one is a simple OLS approach, while the second one is a nonlinear least square (NLS) 
approach.  The OLS approach estimates the term structure of interest rate for any given 
time t while fixing the decay factor λt to a pre-specified figure which is constant for every t.  
In this way, the non-linear exponential measurement equation reduces to a linear 
framework (Diebold and Li, 2006).  Therefore the NS model can be estimated using 
standard cross-sectional OLS approach over the estimation period.   
The decay factor λt determines the maturity at which the curvature factor loading 
reaches its maximum.  The pre-specified value used in their study is λt = 16.42, which 
means that the curvature factor loading reaches its peak at a 30-month maturity.  A 
smaller value for λt produces faster decaying factor loadings with the curvature factor 
reaching its maximum at a shorter maturity and vice versa.     
The NLS approach estimates the decay parameters alongside the other factors makes 
the estimation procedure more challenging and therefore requires for NLS.  However, it 
also increases the flexibility of the model since the assumption on constant decay 
parameter over time is dismissed.  In the current study, we use the NLS approach to 
estimate the parameters from NS model. 
However, the nonlinear estimation procedure can sometimes produce extreme results 
(Gimeno and Nave, 2006; Bolder and Streliski, 1999).  The nonlinear structure of the model 
seems to pose serious difficulties for optimization procedure to arrive at reasonable 
estimates.  De Pooter (2007) showed that when the decay parameters take on extreme 
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values the behavior of the factor loadings will introduce multicolinearity problems.  
Therefore, some of the factors are no longer uniquely identified.  The demonstration of this 
extreme decay parameter problem is showed as below: 
lim~→ o10pqrs0 tu,vws tu,vw x = 0;     lim~→ o
10pqrs0 tu,vws tu,vw − exp s− }~,vwx = 0 
lim~→∞ o10pqrs0 tu,vws tu,vw x = 1;     lim~→∞ o
10pqrs0 tu,vws tu,vw − exp s− }~,vwx = 0 
The above results imply that for very small value of λt the slope and curvature factors 
will be near non-identifiable which can result in extreme estimation results.  While for 
large values of λt the curvature factors are nearly non-identified.  In addition, this means 
the level and slope factors can only be estimated jointly, but no longer individually. 
In order to prevent these unfavourable extreme estimates, we follow the idea of De 
Pooter (2007) to impose restrictions on the estimation of decay parameters.  By assuming 
the curvature factor loading will reach its peak for a maturity between 1 and 5 years, the 
decay parameter for NS three-factor model are restricted to within the domain of [6.69, 
33.46].   
The three components provide a clear interpretation as long, short, and medium-term 
components, which also can be named as level (β1,t), slope (β2,t) and curvature (β3,t) factor 
loadings, respectively. 142  The level effect represents the level of entire yield curve and/or 
the long-term interest rate as β1,t is constant for all maturities and the last two components 
of the NS model, [1 – exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt) and [1 – exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt) – exp (-τ/λt), become 
zero when maturity τ approaches infinity.  The slope effect indicates the level of short-term 
interest rate as the second component, [1 – exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt), gradually decays to zero 
from one as the maturity τ increases.  Finally, the curvature effect, the loading attached to 
the third component [1 – exp (-τ/λt)] / (τ/λt) – exp (-τ/λt), reflects the magnitude of the 
                                                          
142 See Diebold and Li (2006) for further discussion. 
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hump above the slope effect as the maturity τ grows from zero to infinity.143 
 
3.4.2. VAR-BEKK Model for Interest Rate Risk 
As discussed in the introduction, conventional approach on interest rate risk exposure is to 
measure the interest rate sensitivity of stock returns based on on the changes in interest 
rates with a constant maturity, or the spread of a pair of long-short interest rates.144  The 
most common approach to quantify interest rate risk is the two-factor model proposed by 
Stone (1974).  In his paper, Stone suggested extending the basic Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to a two-factor model by including a debt or interest rate factor.  The basic 
two-factor model can be described as follow: 
+ =  + I ∙ +I, +  ∙ +, + ;     (2)  
where rt is the return of an asset/portfolio in period t; β0 is a constant; rM,t is the return on 
the market portfolio on time t; rD,t is the return of a bond index or changes in interest rate 
with a constant maturity on time t; the βM and βD is the sensitivities of the stock returns 
upon changes in the market return and bond index, respectively.  However, the return on 
equity and interest rates are not independent.  Hirtle (1997) claimed that the interest rate 
coefficient βD can only partially gauge the interest rate risk exposure of the asset/portfolio 
return since the changes in interest rates affect the market factor as well. 
Recently, Czaja et al (2009) proposed a new interest rate risk pricing model by 
integrating Willner’s (1996) bond pricing framework into the Stone (1974) model.  They 
used the estimated level, slope and curvature factors from the NS model as interest rate risk 
                                                          
143 Given the constant decay factor employed in our OLS estimation framework, the maximum hump occurs 
at the same maturity for all the daily yield curves.  The fixed decay factor for the U.S. (20.44), UK (42.33), and 
Japanese (39.07) indicates that the maximum hump will occur at the maturity τ equals to 36, 72 and 70 
months, respectively. Therefore, we claim the curvature effect in our study can be treated as an indicator for 
medium-term rates as the maximum hump always occurs within the 3 to 6 year-maturity range across the 
three markets.   
144 Please refer to Staikouras (2003 and 2006a) for excellent review for empirical studies on the interest rate 
risk exposure of financial institutions. 
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factors.  This approach can capture the changes in the whole term structure instead of 
changes on one part of the yield curve (e.g. a bond index with a given maturity).   In the 
current study, we also include intercept dummies representing the market intervention 
announcements to capture the potential influences of these intervention events on the 
equity value of financial and non-financial institutions under consideration. 145   The 
proposed pricing model can be presented as follow: 
+ = β + βI+I, + ∆ + 3∆' + ∆A + ∑,.I +    (3) 
where rt is the sector portfolio return over period t; rM,t is the market risk factor over 
period t; ∆Lt, ∆St and ∆Ct is the first difference of the estimated level (β1,t), slope (β2,t) and 
curvature (β3,t) factor from NS model (Eq.1) over period t; DUMi is the intercept dummy 
variable represents the announcement of market intervention under announcement 
category i; and  
In the estimation framework proposed by Czaja et al (2009), a pricing model similar 
to Eq.3 is estimated for all the financial sector portfolios simultaneously based on a SURE 
model.146   However, their model ignores the fact that variances and interdependence 
among these sector portfolio returns may not be consistent over time (Ang and Bekaert, 
1999; Cappiello et al, 2006).  Failed to incorporate these stylized factors into the model may 
lead to inefficient estimation results.  In order to solve this issue, we estimate the interest 
rate risk of the sector portfolio returns simultaneously with their time-varying variance-
covariance with a diagonal BEKK model based on a modified VAR-BEKK framework.147  
By estimating the interest rate risk of all the sector portfolios within the same country with 
                                                          
145 The interdependence among the market risk factors, interest rate (i.e. level, slope and curvature) risk factors, 
and intervention announcement dummies, as well as the interdependence among interest rate risk factors 
(Bliss, 1997) has been removed through a set of auxiliary regressions.  
146 In Czaja et al (2009), the market and interest rate risk factor is orthogonalized in a different order.  Besides, 
their model does not contain any intercept dummy variable. 
147 For more information on the technical detail of the BEKK model, please refer to the work by Baba et al 
(1989) which first introduced the parameterization. 
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a system of Eq.6 in a VAR framework, we are able to increase the accuracy and efficiency 
of the model (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003).  We follow the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimation (QMLE) process developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) to estimate the 
coefficients for the modified VAR-BEKK MGARCH model.148 
In order to compare the interest rate risk exposure of financial and non-financial 
institutions before and during the recent financial turmoil, we split the sample period into 
two parts and estimate the VAR-BEKK model over the two estimation periods separately.  
The first part, namely the pre-crisis period, starts from the beginning of the sample period 
till the 8 August 2007.  The remaining sample period is defined as the second part, namely 
the post-crisis period.  Since all the market intervention announcements are made during 
the post-crisis period, we exclude announcement dummies in Eq.3 for the pre-crisis 
period.149  In addition, previous studies show that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother’s has 
a significant impact on the financial markets and might alter the interest rate sensitivity of 
the institution’s equity return.  Therefore, it is important to take this special event into 
account as failed to capture potential structural changes in the risk factor could lead to 
biasness in the estimated coefficient (Levi, 1994).150  In the current study, we introduce an 
interactive dummy (D) to capture the potential structural break introduced by the collapse 
of Lehman Brother’s on the September 15, 2008.  The proposed VAR-BEKK model can be 
illustrated in a matrix form as follow: 
 = β + β ∙ j^UTkl+ +  ;          
for t ∈ [January 31, 2003 : August 8, 2007] 
                                                          
148 We generate the standard errors for the estimated parameters based on the quasi-maximum likelihood 
function instead of variance of the estimated residuals.  These standard errors are also known as the robust 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard error, which adjust for the time-varying variance-covariance nature among 
the estimated residuals. 
149 During the pre-crisis period, the value of announcement dummies (Di) is equal to zero. 
150 Despite introducing multiple interaction dummies will increase the complexity of the model and the 
difficulty of interpretation we still prefer the former over splitting the sample into sub-periods as the latter 
suffers from lower estimation efficiency by reducing the number of observations in the model. 
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 = β + β ∙ j^UTkl++< ∙ j^UTkl+ ∙  + .I ∙  +  ;   
for t ∈ [August 9, 2007 : January 31, 2010] 
               @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C   with, ~`0, ℎb   (4)                    
where:  
Rt = a [k × 1] matrix represents the return of portfolios from a given market over day 
t.  k is equal to the number of portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system.151 
β0 = a [k × 1] parameter matrix represents the constants for the involved sector 
portfolios in a market. 
RiskFactort = a [4 × 1] matrix contains the market (rM,t), level (∆Lt), slope (∆St), and 
curvature (∆Ct) risk factors over day t for the corresponding market. 
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort 
over the entire sample period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within 
β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the market, level, slope and curvature effect of 
the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
γ = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the changes in return sensitivity upon the 
RiskFactort after the collapse of Lehman Brother on the September 15, 2008 (DUM) 
for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within γ, namely γM, γL, γS, and γC 
represent the changes in market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector 
portfolio return after the collapse of Lehman, respectively. 
D = a dummy variable with 0 before the September 15, 2008, and 1 afterwards. 
βDUM = a [k × n] parameter matrix represents the impact of different types of market 
intervention announcements on the portfolio returns Rt.   
                                                          
151 In the current study, k = 3 as we have three sector portfolios for each market, namely the banking, 
insurance and industrial sector portfolios. 
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DUM = a [n × 1] intercept dummy variable matrix represents the announcement of 
market intervention under different category for the corresponding market; n is 
the number of announcement categories in the corresponding market.  
Ht = a [k × k] conditional variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals at day 
t; k equals to the number of sector portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
εt = a [1 × k] vector contains the estimated residuals from the mean equation of the 
VAR system for day t. 
C = a [k × k] lower triangle matrix.  The product of CC’ represents the unconditional 
part of the time-varying variance-covariance matrices; 
A and B = [k × k] diagonal parameter matrices represents the multivariate ARCH and 
GARCH effect of the conditional variance-covariance matrices.  The parameters 
represent the ARCH and GARCH effects are the elements on the main diagonal of 
the matrix A and B, respectively. 
 
 
3.5. EMPIRICAL RESULT 
As discussion in the above section, interest rate risks of the banking, insurance and 
industrial portfolios are estimated for each country with a modified VAR-BEKK 
framework (Eq.4).  In the following section, we discuss the relationship between the return 
of these sector portfolios and fluctuations in the term structure of interest rate before and 
during the recent financial turmoil in detail for each market. 
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3.5.1. Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Banking Institutions 
The estimation result for the banking portfolios across the three markets is represented in 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 for pre- and post-crisis period, respectively.  Each table has three 
panels (i.e. Panel A, B and C), which contain the estimation output for institutions from the 
U.S., UK and Japan markets, respectively. 
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Table 3.4  The Return Sensitivities of Banking Sector Portfolios upon Changes in 
Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors before the Crisis. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the banking sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are represented 
by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel term structure 
models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the potential 
multicollinarity issue.  The pre-crisis period is from January 31, 2003 till August 8, 2007.   
 
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl+ +                   @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[ January 31, 2003, August 8, 2007]        
Rt = a [k × 1] matrix represents the return of portfolios from a given market over day t.  k is equal to the 
number of portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
β0 = a [k × 1] parameter matrix represents the constants for the involved sector portfolios in a market. 
RiskFactort = a [4 × 1] matrix contains the orthogonalized market (rM,t*), orthogonalized level (∆Lt*), slope (∆St*), 
and orthogonalized curvature (∆Ct*) risk factors over day t for the corresponding market. 
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort over the entire sample 
period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the 
market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
Ht = a [k × k] conditional variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals at day t; k equals to the 
number of sector portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
A and B = [k × k] diagonal parameter matrices represents the multivariate ARCH and GARCH effect of the 
conditional variance-covariance matrices.  The parameters represent the ARCH and GARCH effects are 
the elements on the main diagonal of the matrix A and B, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The U.S. Banking Portfolios                                                                                        
 
SIFIs Medium Banks Small Banks 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 -0.32 
 
0.000 -1.26 
 
0.000 -1.41 
 βM 1.102 50.77 *** 0.891 43.37 *** 0.859 32.57 *** 
βL 0.094 17.53 *** 0.073 11.19 *** 0.071 11.82 *** 
βS -0.007 -2.42 *** -0.002 -0.79  -0.003 -0.96  βC 0.014 12.24 *** 0.012 10.23 *** 0.010 7.64 *** 
Cond. Variance 
         
A 0.011 2.83 *** 0.027 4.80 *** 0.017 4.21 *** 
B 0.978 101.49 *** 0.928 68.51 *** 0.956 68.67 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents the constant 
of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics 
generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of 
the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as 
*/**/***. 
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Panel B: The UK Banking Portfolios                                                                                        
 
SIFIs 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 0.14   
βM 1.039 48.11 *** 
βL 0.084 19.14 *** 
βS -0.005 -1.58 
 βC 0.002 2.55 *** 
Cond. Variance 
   
A 0.108 3.13 *** 
B 0.783 12.32 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  
The “Cons” represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” 
represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated 
based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH 
and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
 
Panel C: Japanese Banking Portfolios                                                                                        
 
SIFIs Regional Banks Secondary Banks 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 -0.88   0.000 -1.71 * 0.000 -2.06 ** 
βM 0.979 25.30 *** 0.745 30.29 *** 0.542 24.01 *** 
βL -0.024 -0.63 
 
-0.059 -1.92 * -0.059 -2.07 ** 
βS -0.103 -9.07 *** -0.061 -9.04 *** -0.049 -7.42 *** 
βC 0.037 7.15 *** 0.034 8.38 *** 0.026 6.16 *** 
Cond. Variance 
        
  
A 0.061 10.19 *** 0.082 6.57 *** 0.096 5.55 *** 
B 0.934 175.14 *** 0.857 47.77 *** 0.832 39.62 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents the constant 
of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics 
generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of 
the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as 
*/**/***. 
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From Panel A Table 3.4, one can see that the market effect of the U.S. banking portfolio is, 
as expected, positive and highly significant over the pre-crisis period.  In addition, the 
result on market risk factor shows size effect as large size banks have a higher market effect 
compared to small ones.  For instance, the market effect of SIFIs is 1.102 over the pre-crisis 
period, while the one of medium and small banks is 0.891 and 0.859, respectively.  The 
finding is consistent with previous studies which suggest that large banks usually have 
higher market risk than the small ones due to their higher incentive to risky investment 
strategies (e.g. De Nicolo et al, 2004; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).   
The estimated coefficient for level and curvature factor is also positively significant for 
all the size portfolios showing that the U.S. banks benefit from increasing long- and 
medium-term interest rates over the pre-crisis period.  The negative slope effect (-0.007) of 
the SIFIs indicates that increase in the short-term interest rate will reduce the equity value 
of large banks.  Our result is in contrary to the finding by Czaja et al (2009) who find the 
return of German financial institutions is related to the level and curvature factor in a 
negative way from 1974 to 2002.  Their argument rests on the duration mismatch of banks’ 
asset and liability.  By assuming a positive duration gap, they claim that bank’s value 
drops as long- and medium-term rate increase because the latter has a higher impact on 
asset value compare to liability.152   
We based our argument on the relationship between term structure fluctuation and 
the profitability of banks (Ho and Saunders, 1981).  The return on bank’s assets is closely 
tied to longer-term rates and the return of bank’s borrowing cost is closely related to short-
term rates (English, 2002).  Since banks increasingly rely on short-term interbank/money 
market for funding and liquidity in the recent year (Blackburn, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009), 
                                                          
152 A positive duration gap refers to the average duration of bank’s asset is longer than the one of bank’s 
liability.  For further discussion on the duration gap and its implication on bank’s interest rate risk please 
refer to Staikouras (2003 and 2006a), and Saunders and Cornett (2010). 
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the close relationship between short-term rates and banks’ borrowing cost enhanced.  
Therefore, an increase in the long- and medium-term rates (e.g. positive level and curvature 
effect) will boost bank’s interest related income and its value, while an increase in short-
term rate (e.g. negative slope effect) pushes up bank’s borrowing cost which has a negative 
impact on its profitability and value.  In other words, the return of the banking portfolio is 
expected to be positively related to the level and curvature factor while negatively 
depended on the slope factor.  Furthermore, Banking Supervision Committee (2000) argues 
that given nominal rates cannot fall below zero, if market rates are already on a low level, 
further decrease in market rates (e.g. downward parallel shift in the yield curve) will 
reduce bank’s profitability as they cannot cut the deposit rate further to reduce their 
borrowing costs.  Given that parallel shift of the yield curve is governing by the level factor 
in NS model, the positive relationship between the value of banking portfolio return and 
level factor is reinforced. 
The result on interest rate related risk factors also indicates size effects.  From Panel 
A, one can see that the level and curvature effect of large U.S. banks (i.e. the SIFIs) are 
comparatively higher than the ones of medium and small banks.  For instance, the level 
effect of SIFIs is 0.094 during the pre-crisis period, while the ones of medium and small 
banks are 0.073 and 0.071, respectively.  In addition, the parameter of slope risk factor is 
only significant for the U.S. SIFIs but not smaller banks.   This finding suggests that large 
banking institutions expose to higher interest rate risk compared to small banks, which is 
similar to the size effect observed for the market effect.  Our result is supported by Graddy 
and Karna (1984), who argue that large banks accept considerably more spread risk than 
smaller banks.  In other words, large banks should be more sensitive to the interactions 
between long- and short-term rates (i.e. the changes in level, curvature and slope factor).  
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However, Hanweck and Ryu (2005) claim that large banks are less sensitive to interest rate 
and term-structure shocks in terms of net interest income due to diversification.  We argue 
that the difference between the current finding and Hanweck and Ryu (2005) may due to 
the different definitions of interest rate and term-structure shocks.  In Hanweck and Ryu 
(2005), the interest rate and term-structure shock is defined as the volatility of one-year 
interest rate and the difference between one- and five-year interest rate, respectively.  
However, in the current study, the interest rate risk is represented by the fluctuation of the 
entire yield curve (i.e. the maturity is from one-month to thirty-year).  Besides, Hanweck 
and Kilcollin (1984) suggest that small banks can benefit from rising interest rates (i.e. 
increase in slope factor) compared to large ones, which may be the reason of non-
significant slope effects for the medium and small banking portfolios.   
Panel B and C in Table 3.4 represent the estimation result for banking portfolios from 
the UK and Japanese market over the pre-crisis period, respectively.  For the table, one can 
see that the findings on banks in both the UK and Japanese markets are similar to the U.S. 
banks.  For instance, banks in these two markets also positively related to the difference 
between short- and long-term rates (i.e. negative slope effects, and positive level and 
curvature effects).  Despite the similarity in interest rate risk, SIFIs in the UK market are, 
however, not sensitive to changes in the slope factor.  In other words, the changes in short-
term interest rate will not influence the equity value of these SIFIs, which is different from 
their counterparts in the U.S. and Japanese market.  Previous study finds that shocks in 
short-term interest rates were priced into the equity return for both financial and non-
financial institutions in the UK (e.g. banks, insurers and utility firms) in a negative manner 
(e.g. Staikouras, 2005).153  We argue that the difference results between the current and 
                                                          
153 The shocks in short-term interest rates used in Staikouras (2005) are represented by the unexpected 
changes in the one- and three-month Treasury bill discount rates.  The author claims that the negative 
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previous studies may due to the different sample period employed in the two papers.  The 
sample period covered by Staikouras (2005) is between 1989 and 2000, while the sample 
period in this chapter spans from 2003 till 2010.  One notable difference between the two 
periods is that the short-term rate is more volatile in the former than the latter. 154  
Therefore, the insignificant return sensitivity of the UK financial institutions on changes in 
the slope factor may due to the stable short-term rates observed during the sample period. 
The significant slope effect for Japanese banks is in conflict with Oyama and Shiratori 
(2001) who find Japanese banks are not sensitive to short-term rates.155  We argue that the 
different results may due to the different specifications of short-term rate risk factors 
employed in the two studies.  In our study, the short-term rate risk factor is represented by 
the changes in slope loading factor from NS model, which is a direct measure of the interest 
rates with a short maturity (3-month in our study).  However, the short-term rate variable 
employed in Oyama and Shiratori (2001) is orthogonalized short-term interest rates based 
on term spread.156  Thus, the insignificant short-term rate risk factor may simply due to the 
orthogonalization, as the valuable information of short-term interest rates has already 
been captured by the term spread.  Besides, similar size effects for both market and interest 
rate related factors have been observed for Japanese banking portfolios.  For instance, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
exposure to short-term rates of the financial institutions shows that stock market perceives these stocks as 
insurance against high yield surprise.   
154 The short-term rates in the UK market are presented in Appendix B.7 on a monthly basis from 1978 to 
2011.  From the graph, one can see the short-term rates, especially the 3-month Treasury bill rates, are much 
volatile in the late 1980s and late 1990s, but they are almost constant after 2003 until the sudden drop to near 
zero level in late 2007. 
155 Oyama and Shiratori (2001) argue that the profitability of Japanese financial institutions is not sensitive to 
short-term rate changes in the 1980s and 1990s.  They argue that the absence of short-term rate risk factor is 
due to the near zero market rates since the middle 1980s.  Since banks cannot reduce the deposit rate below 
zero, the fluctuation in the near zero short-term rates should not influence the financial institution’s 
profitability. 
156 The short-term interest rate variable used in Oyama and Shiratori (2001) is the residual of the regression 
of short-term interest rate by long and short-term interest rate spread.  The long and short-term interest rate 
is represented by the 5-year bank debenture yield and 3-month certificate deposit (CD) rate. 
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market effect of Japanese SIFIs is 0.979 over the pre-crisis period, while the one of regional 
and secondary banks is 0.745 and 0.542, respectively.   
Besides, banks in Japanese market react to changes in level factor in a different 
manner (Panel C) compared to their counterparts in the other two markets.  For SIFIs, 
changes in long-term rates (i.e. the level risk factor) have not influential power on their 
equity value before the crisis period.  We argue that the insignificant level effect is mainly 
due to the relative low level and volatility of long-term rates in Japanese market compared 
to the U.S. and the UK.157  The level effect for regional and secondary banks in Japanese 
market is negative and significant (both are -0.059) over the pre-crisis period which 
suggests increase in long-term interest rate will reduce the equity value of these banks.  
There are two possible explanations behind this size effect: a) SIFIs are more likely to 
diversify away the inverse impact of unfavorable long-term interest rate movements than 
regional and secondary banks, and b) large banks (i.e. SIFIs) are more likely to pass the 
increase in interest rate to borrowers given their competitive advantage and stronger 
bargaining power compared to small banks. 
Table 3.5 summarizes the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK model for banking 
portfolios across the three markets during the recent financial turmoil. 
  
                                                          
157 From figures in Appendix B.4, one can see that the average long-term rate (e.g. level factor) in Japanese 
market is around 2.5% compared to 5%/4.6% in the U.S./UK market. 
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Table 3.5  The Return Sensitivities of Banking Sector Portfolios upon Changes in 
Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors during the Crisis 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the banking sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are represented 
by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel term structure 
models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the potential 
multicollinarity issue.  The post-crisis period is from August 9, 2007 till January 31, 2010.   
 
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl++< ∙ j^UTkl+ ∙  + .I ∙  +   ;  @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
     with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[August 9, 2007, January 31, 2010]        
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort over the entire sample 
period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the 
market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
γ = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the changes in return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort after the 
collapse of Lehman Brother on the September 15, 2008 for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within 
γ, namely γM, γL, γS, and γC represent the changes in market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector 
portfolio return after the collapse of Lehman, respectively. 
D = a dummy variable with 0 before the September 15, 2008, and 1 afterwards. 
βDUM = a [k × n] parameter matrix represents the impact of different types of market intervention 
announcements on the portfolio returns Rt.   
DUM = a [n × 1] intercept dummy variable matrix represents the announcement of market intervention 
under different category for the corresponding market; n is the number of announcement categories in 
the corresponding market.  
 
Due to space limits, the explanation of variables above is not complete.  For further detail please refer to Eq.4 in Page 
126. 
 
Panel A: The U.S. Banking Portfolios 
 
SIFIs Medium Banks Small Banks 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 Cons -0.001 -1.24 
 
-0.001 -1.54 
 
-0.001 -1.43 
 βM 1.615 19.68 *** 1.435 16.71 *** 1.243 16.71 *** 
βL 0.142 9.05 *** 0.130 7.86 *** 0.121 9.13 *** 
βS -0.010 -1.30  -0.011 -1.04  -0.014 -1.68 * βC 0.022 8.07 *** 0.018 6.24 *** 0.015 6.11 *** 
γM 0.010 0.09  0.004 0.03  0.059 0.58  γL 0.013 0.34  -0.041 -1.29  -0.067 -2.53 *** γS 0.024 1.73 * 0.007 0.41  -0.003 -0.19  γC 0.006 0.87  0.006 0.84  0.001 0.25  
DUM1 (Fed Fund) 0.010 2.23 ** 0.003 0.73 
 
0.004 0.97 
 DUM2 (Discount) 0.014 2.96 *** 0.009 1.34 
 
0.008 1.46 
 
DUM3 (Liquidity) -0.047 -5.33 *** -0.030 -2.95 *** -0.033 -2.98 *** 
DUM4 (JMI†) 0.021 2.66 *** 0.017 1.36 
 
0.025 2.30 *** 
DUM5 (Bailouts) 0.047 3.02 *** 0.030 2.53 *** 0.017 1.55 
 
DUM6 (TARP) 0.186 7.81 *** 0.099 3.38 *** 0.092 4.95 *** 
DUM7 (Stimulus) 0.144 6.78 *** 0.110 7.73 *** 0.079 5.01 *** 
Cond. Variance 
         
A 0.291 10.82 *** 0.091 13.78 *** 0.081 11.98 *** 
B 0.691 38.21 *** 0.878 119.72 *** 0.896 121.18 *** 
†  JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents the constant of 
the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics 
generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of 
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the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
 
Panel B: The UK Banking Portfolios 
 
SIFIs 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  Cons -0.002 -3.08 *** 
βM 1.380 20.13 *** 
βL 0.094 4.63 *** 
βS -0.008 -0.89  βC 0.014 3.16 *** 
γM 0.082 0.70   
γL 0.031 0.82  γS -0.025 -1.12  γC -0.005 -0.87   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) -0.025 -5.45 *** 
DUM2 (Liquidity) -0.012 -0.96 
 
DUM3 (JMI†) -0.002 -0.25 
 
DUM4 (Bailouts) 0.044 5.73 *** 
DUM5 (QE††) 0.020 2.74 *** 
Cond. Variance 
   A 0.378 4.48 *** 
B 0.668 13.53 *** 
†   JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
††   QE refers the quantitative easing program introduced by the Bank of England. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard 
errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in 
the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
 
 
Panel C: Japanese Banking Portfolios 
 
SIFIs Medium Banks Small Banks 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 Cons -0.001 -0.64   0.000 -0.47   -0.001 -2.03 ** 
βM 1.464 18.24 *** 0.910 18.14 *** 0.641 16.98 *** 
βL -0.027 -0.43  -0.025 -0.60  -0.012 -0.39   βS -0.178 -7.03 *** -0.108 -6.55 *** -0.088 -6.59 *** 
βC 0.049 4.29 *** 0.026 4.42 *** 0.017 3.50 *** 
γM -0.402 -4.05 *** -0.227 -3.71 *** -0.116 -2.35 *** 
γL -0.042 -0.47  -0.011 -0.22  0.003 0.08   γS 0.043 1.03  0.031 1.37  0.034 1.75 * γC 0.009 0.39   0.004 0.42   0.002 0.27   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) 0.000 -0.01   -0.025 -2.85 *** -0.019 -1.74 * 
DUM2 (Liquidity) -0.002 -0.22 
 
0.008 1.38 
 
0.009 1.55   
DUM3 (JMI†) 0.020 3.45 *** 0.013 1.73 * 0.014 2.42 *** 
DUM4 (ORP††) 0.004 0.45 
 
0.010 3.20 *** 0.009 2.66 *** 
DUM5 (Stimulus) 0.062 71.60 *** 0.018 42.28 *** 0.013 38.14 *** 
Cond. Variance 
        
  
A 0.131 4.61 *** 0.070 8.30 *** 0.029 6.52 *** 
B 0.521 5.69 *** 0.884 47.86 *** 0.938 99.47 *** 
† JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
†† ORP refers to the outright purchase of government/corporate bonds introduced by the Bank of Japan. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents the constant of 
the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics 
generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of 
the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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From Panel A Table 3.5, one can see that the market risk factor of the U.S. banking sector 
has increased following the freeze of redemption by BNP Paribas on August 9, 2007.  For 
instance, the market effect of SIFIs has increased from 0.979 during the pre-crisis period to 
1.464 over the post-crisis period, while for medium/small banks the market risk has raised 
from 0.891/0.859 to 1.435/1.243.  The raise in market risk indicates that the turmoil in the 
banking sector starts to influence the economy since August 2007, which enhances the 
interdependence between the two.  Previous studies claim that banking crises will 
decelerate real economy, as decrease in credit supply and aggregated demand leading 
firms to cut investment and working capital, which will decelerate the real economy 
further in a vicious circle.158  Similar to pre-crisis period, the market risk factor during the 
crisis period also shows size asymmetry (i.e. large banks suffer from higher market effect 
compared to small ones) indicating that the recent financial turmoil had a stronger impact 
on large banks than the small ones.    
By comparing Table 3.4 and 3.5, one can see that the level and curvature effect (i.e. 
sensitivity upon changes in long-term rates) of the U.S. banking sector has also increased 
during the crisis period, while the slope effect was almost unobserved.  We argue the 
increase in the impact of long-term rate related risk factors (i.e. level and curvature effects) 
is mainly due to changes in investors’ sentiment during the crisis period.  Chari et al (2008) 
claim that “flight to quality” usually observed in financial crises as investors seeking for 
safe securities (e.g. Treasury bonds).159  In addition, Li et al (2009) show that the demand 
for Treasury bond is closely related to the liquidity conditional in the stock market.160  
                                                          
158 For further discussion on the relationship between banking crises and real economy, please refer to 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Kroszner et al (2007) and Dell’Ariccia et al (2008) among others. 
159 The “flight to quality” refers to the phenomenon that investors move away from high credit risk assets to 
lower ones.  For further discussion on the topic, please refer to Vayanos (2004) among others. 
160 They claim that when there is high selling pressure in the stock market, liquidity drops in the stock 
market but increases in the Treasury bond market as the buying pressure in the latter will also be high. 
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Given that the return of U.S. financial sector suffered a notable drop combined with a 
huge increase in volatility during the August 2007 credit/liquidity squeeze (Bartram and 
Bodnar, 2009),161 investors are likely to substitute their holdings in the banking portfolio 
into safe securities (e.g. Treasury bonds).  This “flight to quality” effect will push down the 
equity value of banking portfolio as well as the interest rate of Treasury bonds (e.g. long-
term rates).  Therefore, the linkage between banking portfolio return and level factor 
increased following the BNP Paribas event in August 2007.  Moreover, the slope (level) 
effect of the U.S. SIFIs (small banks) has increased (decreased) by 2.4% (6.7%) points after 
the collapse of Lehman in September 2008. 
In addition, the collapse of Lehman significantly alters the slope effect of the U.S. 
banking portfolio by 2.4% points.  We believe the sharp decrease in the magnitude of 
banks’ return sensitivity upon changes in the short-term rate (e.g. slope effect) is due to the 
change in their investment strategy following the Lehman event.  According to the Flow of 
Funds data from Federal Reserve, the net lending for mortgages has changed from positive 
to negative following the third quarter of 2008 and remain negative till the end of the 
sample period.162  Since mortgage is usually provided through banks, the negative net 
mortgage lending means banks were actively reducing their reliance on mortgage related 
long-term assets after the Lehman collapse.  In addition, Afonso et al (2011) show that 
large U.S. banks reduce their daily borrowing from the interbank market after the Lehman 
event and their borrowing cost goes down.  Combining the reduced reliance on long-term 
assets and reduced short-term funding with a lower borrowing cost, banks should be less 
                                                          
161 In addition, Bartram and Bodnar (2009) argue that the credit/liquidity squeeze is mainly due to the crisis 
in quantitative hedge funds, which force them to liquidize their assets and squeeze the market liquidity. 
162 The net mortgage lending in the U.S. is illustrated in Appendix B.8.  The relevant data is collected from 
the two Flow of Funds reports issued by Federal Reserve on the June 11, 2009 and June 10, 2010, see: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20090611/ for the June 11, 2009 issue and 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20100610/ for the June 10, 2010 issue.  
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sensitive to the slope of the yield curve.  Therefore, the magnitude of the slope effect for the 
U.S. banking portfolio decreased following the bankruptcy of Lehman. 
The market interventions carried out by the U.S. government/Federal Reserve has a 
huge impact on the equity performance of the U.S. banking industry.  From Panel A Table 
3.5, one can see that, announcements regarding Fed Fund and Discount rate reduction have 
a significant and positive impact (0.010 and 0.014, respectively) on the U.S. SIFIs equity 
returns during the crisis period.  The Federal and Discount Window rate represents the 
benchmark lending rate in the short-term wholesale and interbank funding markets.  That 
means the SIFIs benefit from the decrease in Fed Fund and Discount rates as the latter 
reduces the borrowing cost of these institutions.  The borrowing rate reduction by the 
central bank, however, does not have a positive impact on medium and small banks in the 
U.S. market given the insignificant coefficient for DUM1 and DUM2.  We argue that this 
size effect is mainly due to the funding characteristic of banks with different size.  Craig 
and von Peter (2010) show that the structure of interbank funding market has multiple 
tiers, where small banks require interbank funding from large (money centre) banks.  
During the crisis period, large (money centre) banks are reluctant to provide funding for 
smaller banks due to counterparty risk and liquidity hoarding (e.g. Heider et al, 2009; 
Acharya and Merrouche, 2010).  Thus, the benefit of reduced borrowing cost is only 
enjoyed by large (money centre) banks but not the small ones. 
       The joint market intervention, government bailout, TRAP rescue plan and economy 
stimulus plan announcements all have a positive and significant impact on the equity 
return of the U.S. banking sector.  Especially the TRAP rescue plan and the economy 
stimulus plan announced by the U.S. government in late 2008 and early 2009.163  The 
equity return of SIFIs/Medium/Small banks had increased by 18.6%/9.9%/9.2% upon the 
                                                          
163 Due to space limits, the exact dates of these announcements are available from the author upon request. 
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announcement of TRAP rescue plan (DUM6), while the economy stimulus plan (DUM7) 
boots the equity return of SIFIs/Medium/Small banks by 14.4%/11.0%/7.9% during the 
crisis period.  The only exception is the liquidity related announcements (DUM3), which 
have a negative and significant impact on the U.S. banking industry.  The possible 
explanation behind this phenomenon could be that these announcements (i.e. liquidity 
related) signalling the lack of funding liquidity within the U.S. banking system.  Given the 
funding liquidity is the main driving force behind the recent financial turmoil (e.g. 
Blackburn, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009), it is reasonable for investors to be sensitivity about 
the funding liquidity situation of the banking system.     
The return sensitivity of the U.K. and Japanese banking sector during the crisis 
period is reported in Panel B and C in Table 3.5.  Similar to the finding observed from the 
U.S. banking sector, the market effect during the crisis period (Table 3.5) for both UK and 
Japanese banking portfolios is higher compared to the pre-crisis period (Table 3.4).  For the 
UK banking sector, one possible explanation of the enhanced market sensitivity could be 
the bailout on Northern Rock in early 2008.  The British government nationalized 
Northern Rock on February 17, 2008 as a temporary measure to prevent a bank run 
spreading to other financial institutions (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010).  This 
event is likely to strike uncertainty into the UK banking sector and may have a further 
impact on the whole economy, which is likely to increase the interdependence between the 
two during the crisis period.  In addition, the size effect of market effect (i.e. large banks 
have higher market effect than small ones) has also been registered for the Japanese 
banking portfolios (Panel C).  This size effect might attribute to the difference between the 
risk characteristic of the large and small Japanese banks as well as the currency value 
movements during the crisis period.  Melvin and Taylor (2009) show that the Japanese Yen 
143 
 
had appreciated dramatically since the collapse of Lehman due to unwinding of currency 
carry trade and the “safe-haven” status enjoyed by the Japanese Yen.  Given that large 
banks (e.g. banking SIFIs in our sample) are more likely to invest into foreign markets 
Chamberlain et al (1997), the further losses suffered by Japanese banks in our sample may 
be caused by the decrease in their foreign asset value due to the appreciation in Yen.  
Moreover, the collapse of Lehman in late 2008 seems to have significantly reduced the 
market effect of Japanese banking portfolios but not the UK ones.164  We claim the reason 
for this “roller coaster” movement of the market effect for Japanese banking sectors is 
twofold.  First, despite the sharp fall following the Lehman collapse in late 2008, the equity 
market in Japan has gradually recovered since early 2009.  Second, banks from Japanese 
banking sector suffer further losses in the second half of 2009.  For instance, from Panel C 
Table 3.2, one can see that the average daily return of Japanese SIFIs over Sub-Period 3 (i.e. 
post-Lehman) is -22.4 bps, which is lower than the -13.3 bps average return over Sub-Period 
2 (i.e. pre-Lehman).  The reduced market effect over the post-Lehman period, therefore, 
may attribute to the divergence in performances between the two.165 
The return sensitivity of the UK banking sector upon changes in the term structure 
shows similar pattern as their U.S. counterpart during the crisis period.  From Panel B, 
Table 3.5, one can see that the level (9.4%) and curvature (1.4%) effect of the UK SIFIs are 
positive and significant during the crisis period, and are considerably higher than their 
pre-crisis level (i.e. 8.4% and 0.2% for level and curvature effect, respectively).  We argue the 
increase in long-term rates related risk factors (i.e. level and curvature effect) is mainly due 
                                                          
164 It is worth noting that the market effect after the collapse of Lehman Brother is equal to the market effect 
over the crisis plus the change in market effect after the Lehman event (i.e. the parameter attached to the 
interactive dummy for market risk factor).  For instance, the market effect of Japanese SIFIs after the Lehman 
collapse is equal to the sum of 1.464 (i.e. market effect over the crisis period) and -0.402 (i.e. the change in 
market effect after the Lehman event), which is 1.062. 
165 Please find the daily value changes of the equity market (e.g. NIKKEI 225) and SIFI portfolio of Japanese 
market in Appendix B.9. 
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to the “flight to quality” phenomenon during the crisis period.  As discussed in the 
previous sections, investors prefer Treasury bonds than equity of banks during the crisis, 
which pushes down the equity value of banking portfolio and the interest rate of Treasury 
bonds (e.g. long-term rates).  Therefore, the linkage between banking portfolio return and 
level/curvature factors increased following the BNP Paribas event in August 2007.  
However, the collapse of Lehman seems to have no influence on the sensitivity of SIFIs 
regarding the term structure related risk factors.    
The market interventions carried out by the UK and Japanese governments and 
central banks also have a significant impact on the equity return of their banking sectors.  
From Panel B and C Table 3.5, one can see that interest rate related (DUM1) and special 
measure related (DUM 4-5) announcements are statistically significant for most banking 
portfolios across the two markets.  In specific, the interest rate related announcements 
have a negative impact on the equity return of the UK SIFIs and Japanese 
regional/secondary banks, while the special measures (i.e. the bailouts and QE in the UK, 
and out-right purchase and stimulus in Japan) have a strong and positive impact on all 
banks in the two markets.  The negative and significant coefficients for interest rate related 
announcements (DUM1) suggest that investors treat short-term interest rate cuts by the 
central bank as unfavorable signals for the UK and Japanese banking sector.  This finding 
is supported by Taylor (2009), who argues that rapid interest rate reduction by central 
banks might prolong the crisis through currency depreciation and surge in commodity 
prices. 
Similar to the findings on U.S. banking portfolios, the larger Japanese banks benefits 
more from stimulus packages (i.e. larger coefficient for DUM5) than small banks.  The 
announcements regarding the joint market intervention (DUM3), however, only influence 
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the performances of Japanese banks but not the U.K. ones.  In other words, the Japanese 
banks treat joint market interventions as positive signals for potential market recovery.  In 
general, our finding is supported by Ait-Sahalia et al (2010), who also show that market 
interventions (i.e. liquidity supports, liability guarantees, and recapitalization) by the U.S., 
UK and Japanese governments have a positive impact on their respective banking sector.    
 
3.5.2. Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Insurance Institutions 
The estimated parameters based on insurance portfolios across the three markets during 
the pre- and post-crisis period are presented in Table 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.  Once again, 
we separate the estimation output for the three markets into three panels (i.e. Panel A, B 
and C for the U.S., UK and Japan, respectively).  
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Table 3.6  The Return Sensitivities of Insurance Sector Portfolios upon Changes in 
Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors before the Crisis. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the insurance sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are 
represented by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel 
term structure models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the 
potential multicollinarity issue.  The pre-crisis period is from January 31, 2003 till August 8, 2007.   
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl+ +                   @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[ January 31, 2003, August 8, 2007]        
 
Rt = a [k × 1] matrix represents the return of portfolios from a given market over day t.  k is equal to the 
number of portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
β0 = a [k × 1] parameter matrix represents the constants for the involved sector portfolios in a market. 
RiskFactort = a [4 × 1] matrix contains the orthogonalized market (rM,t*), orthogonalized level (∆Lt*), slope (∆St*), 
and orthogonalized curvature (∆Ct*) risk factors over day t for the corresponding market. 
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort over the entire sample 
period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the 
market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
Ht = a [k × k] conditional variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals at day t; k equals to the 
number of sector portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
A and B = [k × k] diagonal parameter matrices represents the multivariate ARCH and GARCH effect of the 
conditional variance-covariance matrices.  The parameters represent the ARCH and GARCH effects are 
the elements on the main diagonal of the matrix A and B, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The U.S. Insurance Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 0.64   0.000 0.47   
βM 0.928 43.37 *** 0.797 44.32 *** 
βL 0.087 16.35 *** 0.075 15.56 *** 
βS -0.008 -3.20 *** -0.007 -3.14 *** 
βC 0.012 11.33 *** 0.011 11.70 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.115 7.43 *** 0.035 5.08 *** 
B 0.731 24.34 *** 0.919 66.26 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  
The “Cons” represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” 
represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated 
based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH 
and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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Panel B: The UK Insurance Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 0.76   0.000 1.98 ** 
βM 1.229 32.74 *** 0.430 14.04 *** 
βL 0.106 15.02 *** 0.038 7.18 *** 
βS -0.005 -0.90 
 
-0.001 -0.23   
βC 0.007 4.29 *** 0.001 1.05   
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.063 5.81 *** 0.020 3.00 *** 
B 0.920 87.58 *** 0.960 99.92 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  
The “Cons” represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” 
represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated 
based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH 
and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
 
Panel C: Japanese Insurance Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 0.10   -0.001 -1.37   
βM 0.749 23.27 *** 0.915 7.88 *** 
βL -0.016 -0.40 
 
0.012 0.13   
βS -0.076 -7.41 *** -0.111 -2.92 *** 
βC 0.028 5.83 *** 0.018 1.27   
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.067 6.97 *** 0.064 7.83 *** 
B 0.901 63.34 *** 0.920 82.62 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  
The “Cons” represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” 
represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated 
based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH 
and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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For the U.S. insurers (Panel A), both large and small size institutions are sensitive to the 
market as well as the interest rate related (i.e. the level, slope and curvature) risk factors.  
Regarding the sign of these interest rate risk factors, changes in long-term interest rates (i.e. 
the level and curvature risk factors) have a positive impact on the U.S. insurers, while 
changes in short-term interest rates (i.e. slope risk factor) have a negative one.  The findings 
are similar to the one observed from the U.S. banking portfolios.  We argue that the reason 
for this similarity is twofold.  First, the insurance companies have gone closer to the 
banking firms in terms of their products and services -and vice versa- under the umbrella 
of financial conglomerates in recent years (e.g. Saunders and Cornett, 2010).  Therefore, 
insurers should have similar risk characteristic to banks.  Second, previous studies claim 
that insurers are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations due to the longer duration of their 
investments relative to their liability (Elyasiani et al, 2007; Carson et al, 2008).166  In other 
words, insurers seem to operate with a balance sheet structure similar to banks with long-
term assets funded by short-term liabilities.  Therefore, from a cash-flow point of view, 
insurers should have a similar interest rate risk exposure as banks (e.g. an increase in long-
term/short-term rates will increase/decrease the profitability).   
For the UK insurance portfolios (Panel B), there are two noticeable findings worth 
further discussion.  First, the large insurance companies face much higher market effect 
(122.9%) during the pre-crisis period compared to small ones (43.0%).  The result may 
attribute to the fact that the size (i.e. market capitalization) of large insurers is much bigger 
than the smaller ones.167  Given that the market index (i.e. FTSE 100) employed in the 
current study for the UK is more focus on the performances of large firms, the index 
                                                          
166 The datasets of Elyasiani et al. (2007) and Carson et al (2008) are drawn from the U.S. financial market.  
The interest rate risk factor used in these two studies is represented by the first difference of the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury bond yield.   
167 The average size of the large UK insurers is around 92 times the average size of the small ones.  The detail 
information is available from the author upon request. 
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should be more representative for the large portfolio instead of the small one.  Second, the 
UK insurers are not sensitive to the slope risk factor (insignificant coefficients).  That means 
changes in short-term interest rates have no impact on the equity value of the UK insurers. 
Finally, the estimation output based on Japanese insurance sector is presented in 
Panel C.  As expected the coefficient of market risk factor is positive and statistically 
significant for both large (0.749) and small (0.915) insurance portfolios over the pre-crisis 
period.  Besides, the negative slope and positive curvature effect for Japanese insurers are 
similar to findings observed from the U.S. market, which indicate that Japanese insurance 
sector also benefit from steepening yield curve.  In addition, the coefficient for level risk 
factor is insignificant for both large and small insurers in Japanese market.  We argue the 
result is due to the flat term structure and low long-term interest rates experienced in the 
Japan.168 
The return sensitivity of insurance portfolios upon changes in the market and interest 
rate related risk factors (i.e. level, slope and curvature risk factors) over the crisis period is 
summarized in Table 3.7. 
  
                                                          
168 The term structure of Japanese market over the sample period is presented in Panel C Appendix B.4. 
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Table 3.7  The Return Sensitivities Of Insurance Sector Portfolios upon Changes 
in Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors during the Crisis. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the insurance sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are 
represented by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel 
term structure models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the 
potential multicollinarity issue.  The post-crisis period is from August 9, 2007 till January 31, 2010.   
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl++< ∙ j^UTkl+ ∙  + .I ∙  +   ;  @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
     with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[August 9, 2007, January 31, 2010]        
γ = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the changes in return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort after the 
collapse of Lehman Brother on the September 15, 2008 for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within 
γ, namely γM, γL, γS, and γC represent the changes in market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector 
portfolio return after the collapse of Lehman, respectively. 
D = a dummy variable with 0 before the September 15, 2008, and 1 afterwards. 
βDUM = a [k × n] parameter matrix represents the impact of different types of market intervention 
announcements on the portfolio returns Rt.   
DUM = a [n × 1] intercept dummy variable matrix represents the announcement of market intervention 
under different category for the corresponding market; n is the number of announcement categories in 
the corresponding market.  
Due to space limits, the explanation of variables above is not complete.  For further detail please refer to Eq.8 in Page 
126. 
Panel A: The U.S. Insurance Portfolios 
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 -0.84   0.000 -0.71   
βM 1.193 24.88 *** 0.888 20.66 *** 
βL 0.105 11.20 *** 0.081 10.25 *** 
βS 0.001 0.20 
 
-0.001 -0.25   
βC 0.018 12.33 *** 0.014 10.38 *** 
γM 0.899 9.34 *** 0.415 6.88 *** 
γL 0.068 1.82 * 0.006 0.34   
γS 0.003 0.17 
 
0.000 -0.04   
γC 0.017 2.38 *** 0.004 1.42   
DUM1 (Fed Fund) 0.002 0.84   0.002 0.97   
DUM2 (Discount) 0.008 2.03 ** 0.003 0.91   
DUM3 (Liquidity) -0.020 -2.96 *** -0.023 -2.97  *** 
DUM4 (JMI†) 0.014 2.80 *** 0.011 2.72  *** 
DUM5 (Bailouts) 0.024 1.61 
 
0.020 3.08 *** 
DUM6 (TARP) 0.141 21.78 *** 0.098 12.79 *** 
DUM7 (Stimulus) 0.121 6.78 *** 0.065 14.55 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.140 16.70 *** 0.145 9.85 *** 
B 0.873 110.28 *** 0.852 62.37 *** 
†  JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents 
the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” 
represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” 
represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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Panel B: The UK Insurance Portfolios 
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 -0.70   0.000 -0.80   
βM 1.439 24.80 *** 0.452 19.08 *** 
βL 0.084 4.86 *** 0.032 4.08 *** 
βS -0.005 -0.52 
 
-0.005 -1.31   
βC 0.010 2.75 *** 0.002 1.49   
γM -0.046 -0.52   -0.223 -6.91 *** 
γL 0.038 1.60 
 
-0.021 -2.08 ** 
γS -0.016 -1.03 
 
0.003 0.51   
γC -0.005 -1.20   -0.002 -0.97   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) -0.035 -4.84 *** -0.006 -2.72 *** 
DUM2 (Liquidity) 0.002 0.30 
 
-0.002 -0.54   
DUM3 (JMI†) 0.002 0.29 
 
-0.002 -0.75   
DUM4 (Bailouts) 0.036 2.10 ** 0.009 1.69 * 
DUM5 (QE††) -0.001 -0.31 
 
0.002 0.86   
Cond. Variance 
      
A 0.147 10.28 *** 0.025 4.42 *** 
B 0.844 54.08 *** 0.957 97.88 *** 
†   JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
††   QE refers the quantitative easing program introduced by the Bank of England. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents 
the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” 
represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” 
represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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Panel C: Japanese Insurance Portfolios 
 
Large Insurers Small Insurers 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons -0.001 -0.86   0.000 -0.01   
βM 0.760 12.05 *** 0.670 8.03 *** 
βL -0.043 -1.17 
 
-0.053 -0.84   
βS -0.122 -5.31 *** -0.050 -1.82 * 
βC 0.043 6.05 *** 0.012 1.20   
γM 0.110 1.47   -0.065 -0.70   
γL -0.067 -1.04 
 
-0.017 -0.20   
γS 0.013 0.39 
 
-0.049 -1.23   
γC 0.000 0.00   -0.003 -0.16   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) -0.018 -2.07 ** -0.031 -1.54   
DUM2 (Liquidity) 0.011 2.59 *** 0.021 3.22 *** 
DUM3 (JMI†) 0.004 1.63 
 
0.011 3.77 *** 
DUM4 (QRP††) 0.026 1.92 * 0.016 2.94 *** 
DUM5 (Stimulus) 0.066 110.38 *** 0.038 52.20 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.075 6.97 *** 0.089 7.83 *** 
B 0.911 63.34 *** 0.849 82.62 *** 
† JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
†† ORP refers to the outright purchase of government/corporate bonds introduced by the Bank 
of Japan. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents 
the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” 
represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” 
represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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By comparing the estimation output from Table 3.6 (i.e. pre-crisis) and 3.7 (i.e. during the 
crisis), one can see that the market risk factor for the U.S. insurers (Panel A) has increased 
during the crisis period.  For instance, the market effect of the large (small) U.S. insurance 
portfolio has gone up from 92.8% (79.7%) over the pre-crisis period (Table 3.6) to 119.3% 
(88.8%) during the financial turmoil (Table 3.7).  The result suggests that insurers suffer 
from higher systematic risk during the crisis.  The finding is supported by Harrington 
(2009), who argue that although insurance companies are not directly involved into the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis, they still suffer from the deterioration of global financial 
market due to mark to market.  However, the incremental value of the market effect for 
insurers is relatively low compared to the banking sector.  For instance, the market risk 
factor for the U.S. SIFIs has increased from 110.2% (Panel A Table 3.4) over the pre-crisis 
period to 161.5% during the crisis (Panel A Table 3.5), which is more than twice the 
amount of the large U.S. insurers (i.e. from 92.8% to 119.3%).  The empirical evidence 
shares the view with Harrington (2009) and Eling and Schmeiser (2010), which suggest 
that insurers are less influenced by the recent financial turmoil compared to banks.   
The return sensitivity of the U.S. insurers upon changes in the long-term interest rate 
related (i.e. level and curvature) risk factors has also increased.  For large/small insurers, 
the level and curvature effect has increased from 8.7%/7.5% and 1.2%/1.1% before the crisis 
(Table 3.6) to 10.5%/8.1% and 1.8%/1.4% over the crisis period, respectively.  The result is 
coincides with changes in return sensitivity of the U.S. banking sector, which also 
experiences enhanced long-term interest rate effect (i.e. higher level and curvature risk 
factors) during the crisis.  Once again, we argue that the “flight to quality” behavior of 
investors during the financial turmoil may be a reasonable explanation behind the 
empirical finding.  As investors prefer “safe haven” assets (i.e. long-term Treasury bills) 
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during the crisis period than the equity of financial institutions (i.e. banks and/or insurers), 
they push down the long-term interest rate as well as the equity value of these institutions.   
The collapse of Lehman has increased the systemic risk (i.e. higher market risk factor) 
of both large and small insurers in the U.S. market.  Comparatively, the large insurers 
suffer more from the event as the incremental value in the market risk factor of large 
insurers (89.9% points) is much higher than the smaller ones (41.5% points) during the 
post-Lehman period.169  The level and curvature effect of the large U.S. insurers have also 
increased due to the Lehman collapse but not for the smaller ones.  The empirical finding 
suggests that investors are more concern about large insurers, which may due to their 
higher involvement in the credit risk insurance market (e.g. Cummins and Traninar, 2009; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2009).   
By investigating the impact of market intervention related announcements on the 
equity value of the U.S. insurers, we document similar result as the one from U.S. banking 
sector.  The empirical findings suggest two possibilities.  On one hand, the similarity in the 
reaction to market interventions by the U.S. banking and insurance industry is due to the 
rapid convergence between the two financial intermediary types over the recent decades 
(Staikouras, 2006b; Saunders and Cornett, 2010).  On the other hand, this similarity could 
attribute to the fact that the equity value of both the U.S. insurers and banks are closely 
related to the general economy.   Thus, the market interventions influence the two sectors 
in similar fashion through their impact on the general economy. 
In specific, the liquidity related announcements have a negative impact (-2.0%/-2.3%) 
on the equity return of U.S. (large/small) insurers, while the announcements regarding the 
                                                          
169 It is worth noting that the total market effect during the post-Lehman period is the sum of the market 
coefficient before and after the Lehman event over the crisis period.  For instance, the total market effect for 
the large U.S. insurers after the Lehman collapse is the sum of 1.193 (pre-) and 0.889 (post-), which equal to 
2.089. 
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joint market intervention (1.4%/1.1%), TRAP rescue package (14.1%/9.8%) and economy 
stimulus package (12.1%/6.5%) have a positive one.  It is worth noting that only the equity 
return of large insurers is sensitive to interest rate related announcements (0.8%) and only 
small insurers are sensitive to bailouts (2.0%). 
The return sensitivity of the UK insurance portfolios during the crisis period is 
presented in Panel B.  Similar to the finding from the U.S. market, the UK insurers also 
experience higher systemic risk (i.e. stronger market effect) during the crisis period 
compared to its pre-crisis level.  Unlike the UK banking industry, the return sensitivity of 
the UK insurers upon changes in long-term interest rates (i.e. level risk factors) have 
decreased during the crisis period.170  The changes in long-term interest rates may reflect 
the “flight to quality” behavior of investors during the crisis period.   The decreased level 
risk factors for the UK insurers, therefore, could mean that investors do prefer the 
insurance companies compared to banks during the financial turmoil due to their 
relatively better performances.  The collapse of Lehman has no impact (insignificant 
coefficients) on the return sensitivity of the large UK insurers but it significantly influences 
the market and level effect of the small insurance portfolio. The magnitude of the market and 
level risk factor for small UK insurers has dropped by 22.3% points and 2.1% points in the 
post-Lehman period, respectively.  These findings reinforce our argument that small UK 
insurers perform relatively better than the large ones during the crisis period.171  
The UK insurers (Panel B Table 3.7) and banks (Panel B Table 3.5) have similar return 
sensitivity pattern upon market intervention announcements.  The announcement 
regarding interest rate cuts (DUM1) seem to have a negative impact on the insurance 
                                                          
170 By comparing the Panel B in Table 6 and 7, one can see that level risk factor for the large and small UK 
insurance portfolio has increased from 0.106 and 0.038 to 0.084 and 0.032, respectively. 
171 The finding is supported by the summary statistics of the daily portfolio return reported in Table 2.  The 
average daily return of the small UK insurance portfolio is higher than the large insurance portfolio over the 
crisis period (Sub-Period 2 and 3), especially after the collapse of Lehman (Sub-Period 3).    
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companies in the UK market, while the bailout related announcements (DUM4) have a 
positive one.  It is worth noting that large insurers are more sensitivity to intervention 
announcements than smaller ones.  For instance, the coefficients for interest rate (bailout) 
related announcements are -3.5% (3.6%) and -0.6 (0.9%) for large and small UK insurance 
portfolios, respectively.   
Panel C Table 3.7 summarizes the estimation output of the VAR-BEKK model based 
on Japanese insurance portfolios over the recent financial turmoil.  Unlike the result 
observed from the U.S. and UK markets, the market effect of Japanese insurers has almost 
unchanged during the crisis.  For small insurers, the market risk factor has even decreased 
from 91.5% before the crisis (Panel C Table 3.6) to 67.0% over the crisis period (Panel C 
Table 3.7).  The findings suggest that the systemic risk of the small Japanese insurers has 
decreased during the recent financial turmoil.  The market effect of large insurers has 
increased slightly by 1.1% points (i.e. from 74.9% to 76.0%).  However, it is worth noting 
that the magnitude of the incremental value for large Japanese insurance portfolio is 
negligible compared to its banking counterpart (i.e. Japanese SIFIs).172   
From Panel C, one can see that the return sensitivity of Japanese insurers upon 
changes in the term structure has also altered during the crisis period but in different 
manners.  Comparing to the pre-crisis period (Panel C Table 3.6), the magnitude of the 
slope (curvature) effect of large insurers has decreased (increased) from -7.6 (2.8) to -12.2 
(4.3).  For small insurers, however, the magnitude of its return sensitivity upon changes in 
short-term interest rates (i.e. slope effect) has dropped by 6.1% points (i.e. from -11.1% to -
5.0%).  The collapse of Lehman in the late 2008 does not seem to influence (insignificant 
                                                          
172 By comparing Panel C in Table 4 and 5, one can see that the market risk factor of Japanese SIFIs has 
increased from 0.979 before the crisis to 1.464 during the crisis period. 
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coefficients) the return sensitivity of Japanese insurers upon changes in the market and 
interest rate related risk factors. 
By investigating the impact of market intervention announcements on the equity 
performances of Japanese insurers, one can see that liquidity (DUM2), outright purchase 
(DUM4) and stimulus (DUM5) related announcements all influences the Japanese 
insurance industry in a positive manner.  It is worth noting, however, that liquidity related 
announcements have no impact on Japanese banking portfolios (Panel C Table 3.5), which 
suggests that the liquidity injection by the Japanese central banks seems to benefit insurers 
only but not banks.  The interest rate related announcements (DUM1) only affect the large 
insurers, but not the smaller ones, in a negative way (-1.8).  The result is consistent with 
the enhanced slope risk factor for large insurers during the crisis period.  In general, 
insurance companies across the three markets also benefit from market interventions, 
especially for the liquidity, bailout and special measure (i.e. stimulus packages) related 
announcements. The similarity between the banks and insurers upon their reaction to the 
market intervention could attribute to the rapid convergence of the two financial 
intermediary types (Staikouras, 2006b; Saunders and Cornett, 2010). 
 
3.5.3. Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Non-Financial Institutions 
Finally, the return sensitivities of non-financial institutions (or industrial firms) upon 
changes in market and interest rate related risk factors across the three markets are 
summarized in Table 3.8 and 3.9 for pre- and post-crisis period, respectively.   Similar to 
tables presented in the previous sections, the estimation results based on industrial firms 
from different markets is presented in separate panels.  
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Table 3.8  The Return Sensitivities of Industrial Sector Portfolios upon Changes in 
Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors before the Crisis. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the industrial sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are 
represented by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel 
term structure models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the 
potential multicollinarity issue.  The pre-crisis period is from January 31, 2003 till August 8, 2007.   
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl+ +                   @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[ 1 January 2003, 8 August 2007]        
 
Rt = a [k × 1] matrix represents the return of portfolios from a given market over day t.  k is equal to the 
number of portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
β0 = a [k × 1] parameter matrix represents the constants for the involved sector portfolios in a market. 
RiskFactort = a [4 × 1] matrix contains the orthogonalized market (rM,t*), orthogonalized level (∆Lt*), slope (∆St*), 
and orthogonalized curvature (∆Ct*) risk factors over day t for the corresponding market. 
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort over the entire sample 
period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the 
market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
Ht = a [k × k] conditional variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals at day t; k equals to the 
number of sector portfolios involved in the VAR-BEKK system. 
A and B = [k × k] diagonal parameter matrices represents the multivariate ARCH and GARCH effect of the 
conditional variance-covariance matrices.  The parameters represent the ARCH and GARCH effects are 
the elements on the main diagonal of the matrix A and B, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The U.S. Industrial Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 -0.70   0.000 0.15   
βM 0.945 110.29 *** 1.027 36.93 *** 
βL 0.093 43.19 *** 0.096 15.47 *** 
βS -0.008 -6.28 *** -0.008 -2.71 *** 
βC 0.015 32.93 *** 0.015 10.76 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.036 4.60 *** 0.068 5.96 *** 
B 0.890 27.90 *** 0.790 18.75 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.8 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional 
variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as 
*/**/***. 
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Panel B: The UK Industrial Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 3.64 *** 0.000 -1.51   
βM 0.968 71.73 *** 0.182 8.27 *** 
βL 0.075 27.61 *** 0.018 2.82 *** 
βS -0.002 -0.88 
 
0.002 0.35   
βC 0.004 5.80 *** 0.002 1.21   
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.042 4.10 *** 0.043 6.22 *** 
B 0.943 75.60 *** 0.936 93.87 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional 
variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as 
*/**/***. 
 
Panel C: Japanese Insurance Portfolios                                                                                        
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat 
 
Coeff t-Stat 
 
Cons 0.000 1.58   0.001 3.33 *** 
βM 0.830 74.16 *** 0.431 9.73 *** 
βL -0.027 -1.75 * -0.038 -1.51   
βS -0.093 -24.25 *** -0.049 -7.73 *** 
βC 0.029 16.26 *** 0.014 3.86 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.031 6.68 *** 0.407 8.06 *** 
B 0.956 129.77 *** 0.524 12.31 *** 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional 
variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as 
*/**/***. 
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Regarding the market risk factor, both large and small industrial firms in the U.S market 
(Panel A) is positively and significantly exposed to changes in equity market return over 
the pre-crisis period.  The magnitude of the systemic risk for large industrial firms (0.945), 
however, is lower compared to the smaller firms (1.027), which indicate that the large 
industrial firms are more resilient to systemic shocks.  This finding is opposite to the one 
based on the U.S. financial institutions, which indicates that large banks/insurers suffer 
from higher market risk compared to smaller ones.   We argue that the potential reason 
behind this phenomenon could be twofold.  First, the large firms are more likely to be 
diversified in terms of different business lines, which helps them to cope with 
unfavourable market conditions in a better manner through more steady income streams 
and enhanced competitive edge compared to the small firms.  Second, the large firms are 
more likely to be multi-national corporations, which are able to diversify domestic 
systemic risk through international operations.  Similarly, the small Japanese industrial 
firms (Panel C) also have higher (0.915) systemic risk (i.e. market risk factor) compared to 
the large ones.  However, the large UK industrial firms have a much higher systemic risk 
(0.968) compare to the small ones (0.182), which might due to the use of FTSE 100 as 
approximation of market index.173  
Regarding the return sensitivity upon changes in the term structure, the empirical 
finding indicates that the equity return of U.S. industrial sector is positively related to 
changes in long-term rates (i.e. positive level and curvature risk factors) and negatively 
related to short-term rate changes (i.e. negative slope risk factor) over the pre-crisis period.  
In other words, the U.S. non-financial institutions seem to have a similar interest rate 
exposure to financial institutions.  Similar findings are also observed from the UK and 
                                                          
173 FTSE 100 index is capitalization weighted equity market index where firms with large capitalization (i.e. 
large financial/industrial firms) will have a higher weighting in the index composition. 
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Japanese market, where industrial portfolios expose to yield curve changes in a parallel 
fashion compared to the financial institutions.  For instance, UK industrial portfolios 
(Panel B) are positively related to changes in long-term interest rates (i.e. positive level and 
curvature risk factors for large firms; positive level risk factor for small firms), while 
Japanese industrial portfolios are negatively related to changes in short-term interest rates 
(i.e. negative slope risk factor), while large firms also positively expose to the changes in 
curvature risk factor before the recent financial crisis. 
Previous studies suggest that the interest rate risk exposure of non-financial 
institutions is usually weak, and the impact is only found significant on utility firms (e.g. 
Sweeney and Warga, 1986; Staikouras, 2005).  Given that only four out of the 26 industrial 
firms from DJIA is categorized as utility firms174, arguments from previous studies seem 
unable to justify our result.  One potential explanation could be that the significant impact 
of interest rate changes on industrial firm equity value is due to the fact that interest rate 
changes also have a significant impact on the equity market itself.  Fluctuations in interest 
rates will have an impact on the value of entire equity market by changing the discount 
factor/require rate of return for all future cash flows derived from the equity assets.  
Given the explanatory variable transformation process employed in the current study, the 
equity value of non-financial institutions could expose to the yield changes through its 
exposure to the whole equity market.175  Another potential explanation could be the use of 
derivative instruments.  Non-financial institutions, especially large ones, are increasingly 
                                                          
174 The four utility firms in the DJIA index are AT&T, Chevron Corporation, Exxon Mobile and Verizon 
Communications. 
175 As discussed in the methodology section, we eliminate the interdependence between the market and yield 
curve variables by removing the overlapping information of yield curve changes from the market risk factor.  
This method is supported by previous studies, such as Flannery and James (1984) and Hirtle (1997).  Hirtle 
(1997) argues that by removing the interest rate effect from the market risk factor, the coefficient on interest 
rate risk factor will reflect both the direct influence of changes in interest rates on the equity value of 
institution under examination, as well as the indirect influences working through changes in the market rate 
of return. 
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using financial derivatives to reduce their exposures to a variety of risk (e.g. Geczy et al., 
1997; Bodnar et al., 1998; Guay and Kothari, 2003).  It is well known that the value of 
financial derivatives is sensitive to changes in interest rates.  Therefore, non-financial 
institutions might also expose to interest rate risk via their holdings of financial 
derivatives.  Finally, the significant interest rate risk of non-financial institutions might 
attribute to the international Fisher effect.  As exchange rates will be influenced by 
changes in interest rates (Fisher, 1930), the equity value of non-financial institutions might 
expose to yield curve fluctuations through their foreign currency exposures.176 
The return sensitivity of industrial portfolios upon changes in the market and interest 
rate related risk factors (i.e. level, slope and curvature risk factors) over the crisis period is 
summarized in Table 3.9.  
                                                          
176 It is worth noting that since we do not have any direct measure or empirical evidence on the foreign 
currency exposure of non-financial institutions in our sample, the argument based on international Fisher 
effect can only be regarded as one of the possible explanations. 
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Table 3.9  The Return Sensitivities of Industrial Sector Portfolios upon Changes in 
Market and Interest Rate Risk Factors during the Crisis. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficient for market and interest rate risk factors for 
the industrial sector portfolios across the three markets.  The interest rate risk factors are 
represented by the level (∆L*t), slope (∆S*t) and curvature (∆C*t) factors from the Nelson-Siegel 
term structure models. The risk factors used in the estimation are orthogonalized to eliminate the 
potential multicollinarity issue.  The post-crisis period is from August 9, 2007 till January 31, 2010.   
The coefficients reported in the table are estimated from a VAR-BEKK model with the following 
functional form.  = β + β ∙ j^UTkl++< ∙ j^UTkl+ ∙  + .I ∙  +   ;  @ = AA′ + B′01′01B + C′@01C 
     with, ~`0, ℎb; t ∈[August 9, 2007, January 31, 2010]        
β = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort over the entire sample 
period for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within β, namely βM, βL, βS, and βC represent the 
market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector portfolio return, respectively. 
γ = a [k × 4] parameter matrix represents the changes in return sensitivity upon the RiskFactort after the 
collapse of Lehman Brother on the September 15, 2008 for the k sector portfolios in Rt.  The elements within 
γ, namely γM, γL, γS, and γC represent the changes in market, level, slope and curvature effect of the sector 
portfolio return after the collapse of Lehman, respectively. 
D = a dummy variable with 0 before the September 15, 2008, and 1 afterwards. 
βDUM = a [k × n] parameter matrix represents the impact of different types of market intervention 
announcements on the portfolio returns Rt.   
DUM = a [n × 1] intercept dummy variable matrix represents the announcement of market intervention 
under different category for the corresponding market; n is the number of announcement categories in 
the corresponding market.  
Due to space limits, the explanation of variables above is not complete.  For further detail please refer to Eq.4 in Page 
126. 
Panel A: The U.S. Industrial Portfolios 
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  
Coeff t-Stat 
 Cons 0.000 0.25   0.000 -1.35   
βM 0.844 48.31 *** 1.092 27.25 *** 
βL 0.075 20.74 *** 0.117 13.26 *** 
βS -0.005 -3.17 *** -0.015 -3.69 *** 
βC 0.012 22.38 *** 0.016 12.97 *** 
γM 0.062 2.86 *** 0.252 3.71 *** 
γL -0.001 -0.14  -0.034 -2.21 ** γS -0.002 -0.81  -0.015 -1.83 * γC -0.001 -1.10   -0.003 -0.64   
DUM1 (Fed Fund) 0.004 2.73 *** 0.011 4.60 *** 
DUM2 (Discount) 0.001 0.81 
 
0.003 1.45   
DUM3 (Liquidity) -0.017 -8.70 *** -0.023 -4.22 *** 
DUM4 (JMI†) 0.018 11.01 *** 0.017 3.73 *** 
DUM5 (Bailouts) 0.006 1.16 
 
0.014 3.67 *** 
DUM6 (TARP) 0.039 19.55 *** 0.081 15.00 *** 
DUM7 (Stimulus) 0.029 13.33 *** 0.044 9.02 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.055 7.11 *** 0.145 7.57 *** 
B 0.937 104.85 *** 0.837 46.70 *** 
†  JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional 
variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked 
as */**/***. 
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Panel B: The UK Industrial Portfolios 
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  
Coeff t-Stat 
 Cons 0.000 0.55   -0.001 -4.44 *** 
βM 0.930 36.62 *** 0.109 3.10 *** 
βL 0.072 9.85 *** 0.006 0.77   
βS -0.008 -1.87 * 0.004 0.90   
βC 0.005 2.72 *** 0.001 0.56   
γM -0.074 -2.16 ** -0.063 -1.54   
γL 0.000 -0.02  0.018 1.80 * γS 0.003 0.64  -0.001 -0.21   γC -0.003 -1.41   0.000 0.00   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) -0.022 -12.14 *** 0.004 2.28 ** 
DUM2 (Liquidity) 0.004 2.02 ** -0.001 -0.86   
DUM3 (JMI†) 0.001 0.31 
 
0.005 0.89   
DUM4 (Bailouts) 0.020 5.60 *** -0.006 -3.19 *** 
DUM5 (QE††) 0.003 0.83 
 
0.002 0.57   
Cond. Variance 
      A 0.052 7.19 *** 0.195 6.40 *** 
B 0.944 119.22 *** 0.657 15.58 *** 
†   JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
††   QE refers the quantitative easing program introduced by the Bank of England. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” 
represents the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated 
coefficients; the “t-Stat” represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
standard errors; the “A” and “B” represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional 
variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked 
as */**/***. 
 
 
Panel C: Japanese Industrial Portfolios 
 
Large Industrial Firms Small Industrial Firms 
Cond. Mean Coeff t-Stat  
Coeff t-Stat 
 Cons 0.000 -0.59   -0.001 -2.55 *** 
βM 0.940 47.78 *** 0.616 16.18 *** 
βL -0.045 -1.81 * -0.006 -0.26   
βS -0.091 -13.38 *** -0.053 -4.73 *** 
βC 0.027 9.37 *** 0.012 3.44 *** 
γM -0.099 -3.94 *** -0.198 -4.40 *** 
γL -0.010 -0.32  -0.050 -1.07   γS -0.017 -1.54  -0.017 -0.93   γC 0.006 1.04   0.012 0.99   
DUM1 (Rate Cuts) -0.025 -5.09 *** -0.021 -2.24 ** 
DUM2 (Liquidity) 0.011 3.82 *** 0.018 4.18 *** 
DUM3 (JMI†) 0.010 4.42 *** 0.016 6.09 *** 
DUM4 (QRP††) 0.007 2.66 *** 0.002 0.64   
DUM5 (Stimulus) 0.029 136.08 *** 0.017 45.00 *** 
Cond. Variance 
     
  
A 0.070 5.11 *** 0.168 3.88 *** 
B 0.904 41.22 *** 0.714 13.95 *** 
† JMI refers to the announcements related to joint market intervention. 
†† ORP refers to the outright purchase of government/corporate bonds introduced by the Bank 
of Japan. 
 
Note: The estimated parameters are generated from Eq.4 over the pre-crisis period.  The “Cons” represents 
the constant of the conditional mean equation; the “Coeff” represents the estimated coefficients; the “t-Stat” 
represents the t-statistics generated based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors; the “A” and “B” 
represent the ARCH and GARCH effect of the conditional variance equation in the diagonal BEKK model.  
The 10%/5%/1% significance level is marked as */**/***. 
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From Panel A Table 3.9, one can see that the market effect (84.4%) of the large U.S. 
industrial firms has decreased during the crisis period compared to its pre-crisis level 
(94.5%, Panel A Table 3.8).  The reduced market effect indicates that the return of large 
industrial firms is less related to the equity market during the crisis period.  Bartram and 
Bodnar (2009) support our finding as they show the return movement of the U.S. non-
financial sector has deviated from the equity market since early 2007.   
The magnitude of the interest related risk factors has decreased (increased) for the 
large (small) U.S. industrial firms during the crisis period.  For instance, the level effect of 
large (small) firms has gone up (down) by 1.8% (1.1%) points from 9.3% (9.6%) during the 
pre-crisis period to 7.5% (11.7%) over the crisis period.  We argue that the potential 
explanation behind this phenomenon is twofold.  First, the reduced (increased) long-term 
interest rate (i.e. level and curvature) risk factors for large (small) industrial firms are due to 
their relative performances during the crisis period.   The large U.S. industrial firms 
perform better compared to their smaller counterparts during the crisis period (Panel A 
Table 3.2).  Investors, therefore, would prefer large firms compared to smaller ones due to 
“flight to quality”.  As aforementioned, the relationship between equity return and 
changes in long-term interest rates is able to reflect the potential “flight to quality” 
phenomenon, as stronger (i.e. more positive/less negative) relationship indicates “fly 
away” while weaker (i.e. less positive/more negative) relationship indicates “fly in”.  
Second, the reduced magnitude for large industrial firms could attribute to the fact that 
banks are reluctant to offer funding to the economy.  This argument is supported by 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Santos (2011).  The former study shows new loans to 
borrowers have dropped substantially since the third quarter of 2007, while the latter finds 
the U.S. banks charge higher loan spread during the crisis period than before and only 
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lend to large industrial firms.  Since only large firms are able to access to banks loans 
during the crisis period (Santos, 2011), the decrease in interest rate risk factors is only 
observed for large industrial firms. 
The collapse of Lehman significantly increases the systemic risk of the U.S. industrial 
sector, as the incremental value of market effect for both large (6.2% points) and small (25.2% 
points) industrial firms is positive and significant.  The empirical evidence suggests that 
the Lehman bankruptcy has a significant impact on the economic condition of the U.S. 
market, which indicates that the influence of the recent financial crisis has already gone 
beyond the financial market and penetrated into the real economy.  The interest rate 
related risk factors are less influenced by the Lehman event.  The only noticeable changes 
come from the small industrial firms, where the level (-3.4% points) and slope (-1.5% points) 
effect has decreased followed the Lehman bankruptcy.  
By investigating the impact of market intervention on the U.S. industrial portfolios, 
one can see that rate cuts (DUM1), joint market intervention (DUM4), TARP (DUM6) and 
stimulus (DUM7) related announcements all have strong and positive impacts on the 
equity return of the large and small U.S. industrial firms.  The TARP and stimulus 
announcements have the most significant influence among the various market 
interventions.  The finding is reasonable given the former enables financial institutions to 
offload most of their troubled assets to increase their lending ability, while the latter 
improve the short-term prospect of the economic condition.  Both of these two special 
measures (i.e. TARP and stimulus), therefore, benefit the industrial firms as they provide a 
better operating environment for the latter.  Similar to financial institutions in the U.S. 
market, the liquidity related announcement s has a negative impact on the U.S. industrial 
firms. 
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The return sensitivity of the UK industrial sector is presented in Panel B.  The 
empirical evidence from the UK market is similar to the one observed from the U.S. 
market.  For instance, the market effect of the large UK industrial portfolio has reduced 
from 96.8% over the pre-crisis period (Panel B Table 3.8) to 93.0% during the crisis, while 
its level effect has also dropped slightly from 7.5% to 7.2%.  The equity value of the small 
UK industrial firms seems not sensitive to changes in term structure during the crisis 
period, as none of the interest rate related risk factors are statistically significant.  The 
collapse of Lehman reduces the market effect of the large UK industrial firms further by an 
additional 7.4% points.  Given the dominate position of the financial sector in the UK 
economy (Haldane, 2010), the decrease in market effect for large industrial firms indicates 
the former performs relatively better compared to the financial institutions especially 
followed the collapse of Lehman.  The average daily return of the two sectors during the 
crisis period supports our argument.  From Table 3.2, one can see that the performance of 
the UK banking portfolio has worsened during the crisis period as the average daily 
return over Sub-Period 3 (-24.3 bps) is much lower than the one over Sub-Period 2 (-19.4 
bps).  For large industrial firms, however, the opposite is true. 
The market interventions carried out by the UK government/central bank have 
different impact on the large and small industrial firms during the crisis period.  To be 
specific, the rate cuts (DUM1) have a negative/positive (-2.2%/0.4%) relationship with the 
large/small industrial firms, while the influence of government bailout is 
positive/negative (2.0%/-0.6%) for the equity return of large/small firms.  This finding is 
contrary to the result observed by Giannetti and Simonov (2009), who claim that bailouts 
benefit industrial firms through more loan and increasing investments.177  We argue the 
size effect of the bailout announcement is mainly due to the structure of the UK banking 
                                                          
177 However, Giannetti and Simonov (2009) also claim that the bailout will not necessarily create more jobs. 
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system.  As discussed in the data section, the UK banking industry is dominated by large 
banking corporations.  Previous studies show that large banks are more likely to offer 
loans to large corporations than small ones (e.g. Berger et al, 1998; Strahan and Weston, 
1998; Berger and Udell, 2002).  Therefore, it is reasonable that the large UK industrial firms 
benefit more from financial institution bailouts than the small ones.  Interestingly, the QE 
program carried out by the Bank of England only benefits the banking portfolio (Panel B 
Table 3.5) but not industrial firms (insignificant parameters for DUM5).  That means the 
QE program has only provided benefits to banks but not to the real economy yet (Miles, 
2009). 
From Panel C, one can see that the market effect of industrial sector portfolios in the 
Japanese market has increased during the crisis period.  For instance, the coefficient of 
market risk factor for large Japanese industrial firms has enhanced by 11.0% points from 
83.0% over the pre-crisis period (Panel C Table 3.8) to 94.0% during the crisis.   This 
finding is contrary to what we observed from the U.S. and UK markets, where the market 
effect of industrial and financial institutions moves in the different directions during the 
crisis period.  We believe the difference is attributed to the different financial system 
adopted by the two markets.  The U.S. and Japanese financial market is commonly 
regarded as the classic example of a market- and bank-oriented system, respectively.178  
Since firms in bank-oriented system mainly seek external financing through banks, their 
linkage with the financial institutions is therefore tighter (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).  
The Flow of Funds data from Bank of Japan indicates that financial investment and fund 
raised by the non-financial corporation through shares and other securities is only 41.8% 
and 1.8% of the amount raised by banks or depository corporations through deposits and 
                                                          
178 For further discussion on the types of financial systems, and the classifications across major economies, 
please refer to Thakor (1996), Beck and Levine (2002), and Wang and Ma (2009) among others. 
169 
 
securities in 2009 and 2010, respectively.179   As non-financial institutions in Japanese 
market are more relied on funding through banks instead of other sources (e.g. equities 
and bonds), their relationship with banks should be closer than those in the U.S.180  
Therefore, the changes in market effect of the banking and industrial portfolio in Japanese 
market move in the same direction during the crisis period.  The interest rate risk of the 
industrial firms in Japanese market seems remain constant during the crisis period.  The 
only notable change comes from the level effect of large industrial portfolio, which has 
decreased by 1.8% points from -2.7% over the pre-crisis period (Panel C Table 3.8) to -4.5% 
over the crisis.   
This finding suggests that equities of large Japanese industrial firms suffer are 
treated as safe haven assets similar to long-term government bonds.  Given the “flight to 
quality” hypothesis discussed in the previous section, changes in long-term interest rate 
can reflect investors’ preference during the crisis period.  As investors prefer safe haven 
assets (i.e. long-term government bond) during the crisis period, the price of these assets 
will increase while their yields (i.e. long-term interest rate) drop.  The enhanced negative 
relationship between the long-term interest rate changes (i.e. level effect) and equity return 
of large industrial firms, therefore, signalling the similar characteristic of the large 
industrial firms and long-term government bonds (i.e. safe haven assets) during the recent 
financial turmoil.  Finally, the collapse of Lehman does significantly alter the systemic risk 
(i.e. market effect) of the Japanese non-financial institutions, but not their interest rate risks.  
                                                          
179 The data is collected from the Flow of Funds report issued by Bank of Japan on the 20 September 2011, see: 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/sj/sjlong.zip.  
180 The unconditional correlation between the value of banking and industrial portfolio is 94.7% for Japan 
over the entire sample period compared to 77.1% and 60.7% for the U.S. and UK market, respectively.  The 
information on unconditional correlations among the sector portfolios within a market is available upon 
request. 
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To be specific, the Lehman event reduces the market effect of both large and small Japanese 
industrial firms by 9.9% and 19.8% points, respectively.    
All the five types of market interventions have a significant impact on the equity 
return of Japanese industrial sector during the financial turmoil.  Apart from rate cut 
(DUM1) related announcements, which have a negative (-2.5% and -2.1%) relationship 
with the performances of (large and small) industrial sector portfolios, all other 
announcements have a positive and statistically significant influence.  For instance, the 
liquidity injection (DUM2)/joint market intervention (DUM3) announcements are related 
to the equity return of large (1.1%/1.0%) and small (1.8%/1.6%) industrial firms in a 
positive manner.  It is worth noting that the outright purchase (DUM4) program carried 
out by the Bank of Japan only influences the performances of large industrial firms (0.7%) 
but not the small ones (insignificant coefficient).  We argue that this size effect is attributed 
to the fact that the outright purchase program only covers the financial instruments issued 
by the large corporation but not the small ones.  Based on the statement issued by the 
Bank of Japan in early 2009181, the program only purchases commercial papers issued by 
the corporations.  Given the fact commercial papers are usually used by large corporation 
with high credit rating as an alternative for bank loans (Hahn, 1993; McKenzie, 1996), it is 
reasonable that only large firms are influenced by the program but not the small ones.  
Similarly, the stimulus package announcements (DUM5) also have stronger impacts on 
large (2.9%) industrial firms compared to the small ones (1.7%).  The different reaction 
between the two size portfolios may due to their different systemic risk characteristics.  
The stimulus package is aiming to improve the overall performances of the whole 
economy (or market).  The firms with higher market effect, therefore, will benefit more 
                                                          
181 The statement issued by the Bank of Japan is Outright Purchases of Corporate Financing Instruments (2009), 
see: http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/un0901b.pdf.   
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from the program as they are more sensitive to the market movements.  From Panel C, one 
can see that large industrial firms do have larger systemic risk (i.e. higher market effect) 
than small ones during the crisis period.            
 
3.6. CONCLUSION  
The current study uses a modified VAR-BEKK framework to evaluate the return 
sensitivity of financial and non-financial institutions from the U.S., the UK and Japanese 
market on changes in the term structure of interest rates before and during the recent 
financial turmoil.  Apart from employing bond indies or yields with a given maturity, we 
use the level, slope and curvature factor from NS model as interest rate risk factors.   
For the U.S. market, the result indicates that increase/decrease in long-/short-term 
interest rates have a positive/negative impact on the equity value of financial institutions.  
In other words, a steeper yield curve (e.g. higher level and curvature factor and lower slope 
factor) will increase the equity return of financial institutions.  In addition, we find the 
characteristics of interest rate risk exposure for industrial firms are similar to those for 
financial institutions.  The recent financial crisis had a significant impact on the level effect 
of banks indicating a potential “flight to quality” from banking stocks to safe-haven assets 
(e.g. long-term government bonds).  The result also suggests that banks were less willing 
to “pass on” favourable lending terms to industrial firms during the financial turmoil.  
Finally, the joint market intervention on funding liquidity in late 2007 temporarily relief 
the funding pressure on the banking sector SIFIs in the U.S. market until the collapse of 
Lehman in 2008. 
Similar to findings observed in the U.S. market, financial and non-financial 
institutions in the UK and Japanese market also benefit from a steeper yield curve over the 
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entire sample period.  However, the equity value of financial institutions from the UK 
(Japanese) market is not sensitive to changes in slope (level) effect, which may attribute to 
the low level and variance in the short-term (long-term) interest rates during the sample 
period.  Besides, the recent financial turmoil has similar impact on the market effect of 
industrial firms and banks in Japanese market, which indicates that non-financial 
institutions in a bank-oriented financial system have stronger bond with banks.  
Furthermore, the joint market interventions on funding liquidity have a much less impact 
on the interest rate risk exposure of banks in the UK and Japanese markets compared to 
those in the U.S.   
Finally, the market interventions carried out by central bank/government/Treasury 
have a significant impact on the financial and non-financial firms across the three markets.  
In general, the interest rate reduction actions have a positive influence in the U.S. market 
but a negative one in the UK and Japanese markets.  Joint market interventions led by the 
global major central banks seem to have a positive impact across the three markets.  
Among the various intervention programs, the special measures taken by the respective 
governments during the crisis period have the strongest influence on both financial and 
non-financial firms across the three markets.  For instance, the TARP program related 
announcements in the U.S. dramatically increase the equity value of U.S. sector portfolios, 
while the QE program related announcements in the UK have a similar effect.  However, 
due to the structure of financial system is different across each market, the impact of these 
market interventions does exhibit size effects for large and small corporations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. THE INFLUENCE OF CURRENCY VALUE FLUCTUATIONS ON  
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The influence of the currency value fluctuation on the global economy was largely ignored 
before 1970s because of the Bretton Woods system, which fixed the relative value of all 
major currencies.  Established by the world major economies towards the end of World 
War II, the Bretton Woods system was designed to help the reconstruction of the broken 
international economy in the post-war era.  The fixed global exchange rate regime helped 
the economies around the world to balance their foreign payments without worrying the 
relative appreciation or depreciation of their own currencies against other foreign 
currencies, which also encouraged the import/export trading across the countries.  This 
unique system also established the dominance position of the US Dollar as a global 
currency, with its value linked to gold as a benchmark (the Gold Standard). 
However, the growing trading deficit of the US economy in the 1960s has put 
enormous pressure for its currency value to remain stable, and the Gold Standard was 
under severe pressure.  Eventually, the US government was forced to give up the Gold 
Standard in 1971, which marked the end of the Bretton Woods system.  The collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system not only enabled the US Dollar to float freely against the gold, but 
also enabled other currencies to float freely against the US Dollar and among each other.  
Since 1973, most of the world major developed economies had their currencies floated 
freely on the foreign exchange market, and the value of these currencies is mainly 
determined by supply and demand. 
174 
 
On the one hand, the post-Bretton Woods era introduced flexibility to the foreign 
exchange market.  On the other hand, the floating currency value created uncertainties 
within the global financial market.  Before the termination of the Bretton Woods system, 
the currency traders did not concern about the future value of their foreign currency-
dominated assets, as their value is relatively stable given the fixed exchange rate regime.  
However, after the regime had collapsed, traders were exposed to the free floating 
currency value, which made the future value of their foreign assets or liabilities uncertain.  
In addition, the oil crisis in 1973, the stock market collapse in the world major financial 
markets in 1973 and 1974, and the Pound Sterling crisis in the 1976 magnified the impact 
of this uncertainty among the global financial markets.  The recent financial crisis 
originated from the US market also has a significant impact on the foreign exchange 
market.  Melvin and Taylor (2009) show that the recent financial crisis caused a major 
unwinding of the currency carry trade, which severely increased the volatility of the 
foreign exchange market.182  
Since 1970s, the relationship between the changes in home currency value and the 
performances of multinational firms started to draw attention from various researchers.183  
For firms based in a particular national market, the home currency refers to the currency 
that is issued by and widely used in this national market.184  The currency value is often 
represented as a bilateral exchange rate or a multivariate currency price index.185  The 
                                                          
182 The currency carry trade is a popular investment strategy for investors in the foreign currency market.  
The carry trade refers to borrowing in low interest rate currencies and investing in high interest rate ones to 
arbitrage the interest rate differences.  
183 We provide a brief summary of the recent studies on currency exposure of multinational firms in Section 
2.  
184 For example, Choi and Prasad (1995) evaluate the relationship between the changes in US Doller value 
and the return performance of the US firms.  Besides, alternative terms have been used by other studies to 
represent the home currency.  For instance, Shapiro (1975 and 1977) uses “local” currency, while De Santis 
and Gerard (1998) refers the home currency as “domestic” currency. 
185  The bilateral exchange rate is the conversation ratio between one currency and any other foreign 
currencies, while the multilateral currency price index is the relative value of one currency against a basket 
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impact of home currency value fluctuation on a firm’s equity value is also referred as the 
currency exposure or currency risk factor.186   
Recent studies have put more emphasis on the currency exposure of financial 
institutions, especially banks.187  As discussed in Saunders and Cornett (2010), financial 
institutions play an important role in the foreign exchange market.  Banks and insurers 
contribute most of the trading volume in the foreign exchange market, as they buy and sell 
foreign currency-dominated assets for their clients and themselves.  Therefore, it is likely 
for financial institutions to be exposed to currency risk.  Previous studies reveal that the 
changes in home currency value may influence the equity value of financial institutions in 
two ways.  First, the changes in home currency value have an impact on the value of 
foreign currency-dominated assets or liabilities in home currency terms.  For financial 
institutions have net long or short foreign position, the changes in home currency value 
relative to foreign currencies will influence their operating cash flows (Dufey, 1972; 
Shapiro, 1975 and 1977).  Second, the fluctuation in home currency value can influence the 
profitability of financial institutions through its impact on the market condition.  
Chamberlain et al. (1997) argue that the extent of foreign competition, the demand for 
loans in the home country can be influenced by the changes in home currency value.188  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of other foreign currencies.  In the present study, we refer the currency value as a multilateral currency price 
index. 
186 For instance, Adler and Dumas (1984) use “currency risk” to describe the influence of home currency 
value fluctuations on domestic firms, while Choi et al (1992) use “exchange rate risks” to describe the same 
phenomenon.  The phase “currency exposure” is employed by researchers such as Doukas et al (1999), and 
the “exchange (rate) exposure” is used by studies like Choi (1986), and Bodnar and Wong (2003).  However, 
Adler and Dumas (1984) argue that the definition of “risk” may be different from “exposure”, as “risk” 
refers to whether the fluctuation matters to a firm’s value and “exposure” is the amount of this risk. 
However, in the current study, we assume all the alternative phases contain the same meaning. 
187 The introduction of Basel I by Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1988 specifies currency 
risk as one of the important aspects of the bank’s risk management practise.  We provide a brief summary of 
recent studies on the currency exposure of financial institutions in section 4.2. 
188 Chamberlain et al (1997) argue that the changes in home currency value will affect the profitability of 
exporters.  If the exporters in the home country suffer from home currency value appreciation, the default 
probability of their borrowing will increase, which will affect the value of the loan and the profitability of the 
banks who lend the money to these exporters. 
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Therefore, a financial institution without any foreign activities can also be affected by the 
home currency value fluctuation. 
The contribution of the current study is threefold.  First, we examine the currency 
sensitivity of financial institutions across major geographical regions (UK, Japan and U.S.) 
and types of institutions (banks and insurers). Doukas et al. (1999) and Grant and Marshall 
(1997) among others, have focused on either different types of institutions within a 
country or the same type of institutions across countries, although (to our knowledge) no 
study to date does both.189  Second, we use an alternative estimation framework, namely 
the VAR-BEKK model, aiming to capture the time-varying conditional variance-
covariance among asset returns, while increasing estimation efficiency (simultaneous 
estimation of return and variance-covariance).  Finally, unlike previous studies focusing 
on home currency fluctuations, this paper looks at both home and foreign currency 
sensitivity of bank/insurance equity portfolio returns.  With regard to the latter, we test 
for both home and foreign currency effects.190  Changes in currency values across markets 
mirror investors’ preferences towards different currencies. Financial assets are usually 
traded in home currency terms and thus the need to obtain that currency is apparent.191  In 
addition, according to the “flight to quality” hypothesis (Lang and Nakamura, 1995; 
Eichengreen et al., 2001; Vayanos, 2004) investors are likely to reallocate their investments 
                                                          
189 See Doukas et al (1999) and Grant and Marshall (1997) using Japanese and U.K. institutions; Chamberlain 
et al. (1997) for banking firms in the U.S. and Japan; Martin (2000) for major banks in Japan, Switzerland, the 
U.S. and the U.K.; and Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) using banks from Japan, Germany and the U.S. 
190 Home (foreign) currency effect is defined as the relationship between the equity returns of a financial 
institution and its home (the foreign) currency value fluctuations measured as the return of a trade weighted 
currency price index.  The latter is a basket of currencies from 21 industrial countries constructed by the BoE. 
191 This is based on the “asset approach” hypothesis first introduced by Branson (1983) and Frankel (1983).  
Empirically, the studies by Kanas (2000) and Froot and Ramadorai (2005) support this argument.  Froot and 
Ramadorai (2005) refer to the relationship between supply/demand of a currency and the currency value as 
the “flow-centric” view.  The “flow” refers to the order flow for a currency from major currency traders.  The 
empirical evidence show the order flow information is significantly related to currency value.     
177 
 
from risky to safer ones.192  Therefore, changes in currency values can mirror investors’ 
preference across countries.  However, investor’s preferences represented by home 
currency effects may be difficult to detect.  Chow et al. (1997a) argue that due to effective 
hedging activity, the impact of home currency variations on firm’s equity value is weak or 
even undetectable, especially in the short-run.  Reichert and Shyu (2003) also argue that 
the currency swaps generally reduce the currency risk for the U.S., European and Japanese 
banks.  Thus, a model using only home currency fluctuations may fail to detect the 
existence of the “flight to quality” effect. 
A multivariate VAR-BEKK model comprising a VAR system of conditional mean 
equations for sector portfolio returns and a conditional variance-covariance estimation 
framework with a BEKK parameterization is employed.   The sample period is 2003-11 (1st 
quarter) and focuses on the U.S., U.K. and Japanese banking and insurance industries.  
Equally weighted portfolios are constructed for the banking and insurance firms. The 
conditional mean equation of portfolio returns is specified as a function of market, interest 
rate, home and foreign currency-related risk factors.  The latter includes both the changes 
and variability of currency values.  A structural break is introduced into the VAR-BEKK 
model in order to investigate the effects of the recent financial crisis on the relationship 
between fluctuating currency values and the returns of banks and insurance firms. 
The empirical analysis suggests that the impact of foreign currency on banking 
portfolios has changed after the recent financial turmoil.  Changes in the value of the U.S. 
Dollar (Japanese Yen) have a negative influence on large Japanese (U.S.) bank returns 
providing support for the “flight to quality” hypothesis.  Equity returns for U.K. and U.S. 
                                                          
192 Oetzel et al. (2001) show that the stability of a country’s currency value is related to the country’s 
economic risk level, which is represented by four different measures in their study: Institutional Investor Index, 
country risk rating from Euromoney, data from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and risk level from 
Political Risk Services (PRS).  Naes et al. (2011) test and support the flight to quality hypothesis across 
countries.  
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insurance firms are negatively related to changes in the Japanese Yen.  This relationship is 
accentuated during the recent financial crisis.  The returns of the insurance portfolios are 
unaffected by home currency exposure, but foreign currency exposure has a significant 
impact on U.K. and U.S. insurers. 
The empirical findings indicate that financial institutions are rewarded by bearing 
currency exposures, which is important from an asset pricing perspective.  More 
specifically, it provides insight into the structure of financial markets.  Our findings shed 
light on the explanatory role of domestic and foreign currency value in equity returns, the 
function of currency value fluctuation as a vehicle of conveying information.  More 
importantly, the current chapter shows the importance of including such variable in 
pricing financial institutions equity and the extent to which the price of risk is significant 
in modern capital markets. 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follow.  The following section provides a 
brief summary of the recent literature on currency exposure.  Section 4.3 illustrates the 
estimation framework of the empirical study, which contains detail information about the 
proposed VAR-BEKK model and the joint-hypotheses tests used in this chapter.  Section 
4.4 describes the data set used in the current study.  Section 4.5 presents the empirical 
evidence of the current study.  Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the study. 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we present a brief summary of recent studies on the relationship between 
home currency value fluctuations and the equity value of the firms.  We categorize the 
literature into four groups according to their common frameworks.  In the first group, we 
discuss the studies focus on the currency exposure of multinational companies (MNCs).  
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The second group contains papers that examine the currency exposure of financial 
institutions.  Empirical studies which investigate the size effect in currency exposures 
categorized in group three.  The final group collects the papers which inspire us to 
propose the VAR-BEKK model. 
 
4.2.1. Currency Exposure of Multinational Companies 
Early studies mainly focus on how the fluctuations in home currency value influence the 
performances of the multinational companies (MNCs).  The theoretical linkage between 
the home currency fluctuation and the performances of MNCs is first introduced by 
Shapiro (1975).  Shapiro suggests that the home currency value fluctuations influence 
MNCs due to competitive effect.  The depreciation in home currency value reduces a 
product’s price in foreign currency terms.  Therefore, export-oriented MNCs benefit from 
the decrease in home currency value against foreign currencies, because a weak home 
currency strengthens their competitive advantage in the foreign markets.  He also argues 
that the appreciation of home currency value will benefit pure domestic MNCs.  The pure 
domestic MNCs purchase materials from oversea markets and sale products domestically.  
Therefore, the increase in home currency value will reduce the production cost of pure 
domestic MNCs and increase their profit margin.  The idea is supported by Flood and 
Lessard (1986), who also suggest the competitive effect is the main reason behind the 
relationship between home currency value changes and the performances of MNCs.  In 
addition, they argue that since for different MNCs the competitive structure of the market 
is different from one to another, the relationship might not be straightforward.  The study 
by Choi (1986) yields similar conclusion, but is based on a different theoretical framework.  
He argues that a MNC’s home currency exposure can be positive, negative or zero.  He 
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rests his argument on the fact that a firm exposes to foreign currency value fluctuation also 
benefits from international diversification, which can offset the uncertainty associated 
with the foreign exchange rate market.  In addition, he argues that the currency exposure 
of a firm can be offset by hedging activities.  Therefore, the impact of a MNC’s home 
currency exposure on its return performance is uncertain. 
The first empirical framework for evaluating the relationship between home 
currency value fluctuation and the return performance of MNCs is proposed by Adler and 
Dumas (1984).  They suggest that currency exposure has a similar effect on the domestic 
firm as the market risk represented by the market portfolio.  The market risk exposure is 
usually evaluated through a regression coefficient (market beta) which represents the 
influence of the market risk.  Therefore, one should be able to evaluate the currency 
exposure by using the regression coefficient of the currency risk (currency beta).193  The 
framework enables researchers to investigate the currency exposure of the MNCs on an 
empirical basis.   
Empirical research on currency exposure yields mix results.  Jorion (1990) finds no 
significant relationship between the return of 287 US MNCs and the changes in the trade 
weighted USD price index from 1971 to 1978.  Similar result has been found by Jorion 
(1991) and Bodnar and Gentry (1993) based on US industry sector portfolios.  Jorion (1991) 
evaluates the impact of changes in trade weighted USD price index on the return of 20 US 
industry sector portfolios in the 1970s, while Bodnar and Gentry (1993) extends the sample 
set to 39 US industry sector portfolios in the 1980s.  However, only a small proportion of 
the examined industry sectors are influenced by the home currency value fluctuation.  In 
                                                          
193 Adler et al (1986) improve the model specification by using the changes in currency value as independent 
variable instead of the level of currency value.  The changes in (returns of) currency value ensure the 
variable representing the currency risk is stationary.  The model has been later extended by Jorion (1990) to 
incorporate the market risk factor into the regression model as well. 
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contrast, Choi and Prasad (1995) find around sixty percent of the 409 US MNCs are 
significantly exposed to currency risk from 1978 to 1989.   They also show that the 
proportion of foreign sales is the most important factor for a MNC’s currency exposure.  In 
other words, the MNCs with high foreign sales figure are more likely to expose to 
currency risk. 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) argue that the mixed empirical evidence on currency 
exposure is mainly due to the problematic sample selection process used in the previous 
studies.  They suggest the sample should only focuses on MNCs with sizable economic 
exposure to currency risk.194  In addition, due to the mispricing of currency exposure on 
firm’s value, they argue that market takes time to adjust the firm’s value upon the changes 
of currency value.195  Therefore, one should use the lagged currency value information 
instead of the contemporaneous one to evaluate a firm’s currency exposure.  By 
controlling the sample set, they show significant negative relationship between the returns 
of 38 US industry sector portfolios and the lagged changes in the trade weighted USD 
price index during 1978 to 1989.  The result is supported by Doukas et al (1999), who 
employ a similar empirical framework to investigate the currency exposure in the 
Japanese market from 1975 to 1995.  By controlling the sample according to firm’s export 
level, they show high-exporting Japanese MNCs benefit from the depreciation of the home 
                                                          
194 In their study, the economic exposure to currency risk refers to pre-tax income in foreign currency terms.  
Sizable economic exposure to currency risk means more than 5% pre-tax income is in foreign currency terms 
in three or more of the past five years.  They also control the sample by selecting firms with at least 75% of 
the foreign currency position is negatively related to the relative value changes in home currency (trade 
weighted USD price index). 
195 They argue that investors are unable to precisely evaluate the relationship between the changes in home 
currency value and firm value on a contemporaneous basis, which might introduce systematic mispricing of 
the currency exposure.  The systematic mispricing suggests that investors react to changes in home currency 
value with a time lag.  Therefore, there should be a relationship between the lagged changes in currency 
value and firm value. 
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currency value 196 , which is in line with the Shapiro’s (1975) theory.  However, 
contradicting results have been provided by He and Ng (1998) and Krishnamoorthy (2001).  
He and Ng (1998) investigate the currency exposure of 171 MNCs in the Japanese market 
from 1979 to 1993 with lagged currency value information, and found only around four 
percent of the firms significantly exposed to changes in the trade weighted JPY price index.  
Krishnamoorthy (2001) evaluates the currency exposure of 20 US industry sector indices 
from 1995 to 1997, and he also rejects the hypothesis that the currency exposure based on 
lagged currency value information is more significant than the contemporaneous ones. 
Other studies try to solve the puzzle of currency exposure by extending the 
estimation horizon.  Chow et al (1997a) claim that short term currency exposures are 
mainly transaction exposure, they are difficult to detect as firms can hedge them easily 
and effectively.197  However, as the horizon increases, the uncertainty about the currency 
exposure increases and makes effective hedging more difficult.  Therefore, they argue that 
the currency exposure is more likely to be detected with a long estimation horizon.198  
They investigate the currency exposure of 65 US industry sector portfolios from 1977 to 
1989 with a flexible estimation horizon.  The empirical evidence shows that the influence 
of changes in trade weighted USD price index on sector portfolio return is only significant 
for long estimation horizon (more than 6-month) but not the short ones.  Similar findings 
have been documented by Chow et al (1997b) and Bodnar and Wong (2003) with extended 
sample sets.  Chow et al (1997b) collect 213 US MNCs from 1977 to 1991, while Bodnar and 
Wong (2003) have a sample of 908 US MNCs from 1977 to 1996.  Both papers find the 
                                                          
196 The high-exporting MNCs refer to the firms with reported foreign sales to total sales in excess of 20%.  
The home currency value is represented by a bilateral exchange rate between JPY and USD, and a trade 
weighted JPY price index.  Both currency value measures yield similar result. 
197 Transaction exposure refers to the uncertainty when transfer a cash flow with fixed amount in foreign 
currency terms into home currency due to the uncertainty in exchange rate.  This kind of exposure is usually 
short term in nature, and can be easily hedged with currency derivatives.  
198 The argument made by the authors is not based on empirical evidence but rational speculation. 
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relationship between changes in trade weighted USD price index and the equity return of 
MNCs is only significant over long estimation horizons.  Consistent with Doukas et al 
(1999), Bodnar and Wong (2003) also show that the proportion of foreign sales is an 
important factor for the currency exposure of MNC.  The MNCs with high foreign sales 
are negatively related to changes in home currency value, which means they benefit from 
home currency depreciation.  The finding is in line with Shapiro’s (1975) competitive effect.  
However, Griffin and Stulz (2001) argue that competitive effect is not the main driving 
force of the currency exposure for MNCs.  By examining the relationship among the 
returns of sector indices from six world major economies from 1975 to 1997, they claim 
that industry effect dominates competitive effect.199  The empirical evidence also suggests 
that industry effect has a common rather than competitive effect across countries.  
Apart from estimation horizon, some researchers argue that the mixed result on 
currency exposure may due to the non-linear relationship between the firm’s equity value 
and the changes in currency value.  This argument is based on the fact that the payoff of 
hedging practice is usually non-linear.  In other words, positive shocks in currency value 
may have a different impact on firm’s value than negative ones.  For instance, based on 
industry sector indices from four major countries from 1992 to 1998, Koutmos and Martin 
(2003a) find that around forty percent of the industry sector indices have a non-linear 
relationship with the changes in currency value.200  They argue the reason behind this non-
linear currency exposure is three behaviors: asymmetric price-to-market behavior, 201 
                                                          
199 The industry effect for an industry sector in country A is represented by the regression coefficient on 
excess return of the same industry in a competition country B. 
200 The four countries are Germany, Japan, UK and US. 
201 The asymmetric price-to-market (PTM) behaviour refers to the phenomenon that firms do not adjust 
export price based on changes in relative currency value to the full extent.  For further discussion on 
condition of market competition and its influence on asymmetric PTM behaviour, please refer to Knetter 
(1994). 
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hysteretic behavior,202 and asymmetric hedging behavior.203  However, Krishnamoorthy 
(2001) shows that the non-linear feature of currency exposure is not statistically significant 
for US industry sector indices from 1995 to 1997. 
 
4.2.2. Currency Exposure of Financial Institutions 
The first empirical study on currency exposure of financial institutions is by Grammatikos 
et al (1986).  They suggest the linkage between home currency value fluctuations and the 
equity return of financial institutions is due to the mismatch of foreign currency-
dominated assets and liabilities.  Based on the net position of foreign currency-
dominated204 assets and liabilities of the US banks during 1976 to 1981, the empirical 
evidence suggests that banks are highly exposed to individual foreign currency exposure 
but not on an aggregated level.205  They argue the low aggregated currency exposure of US 
banks is due to the diversification effect, as the correlations between individual foreign 
currencies are low or even negative during the sample period.206  Instead of using USD 
against individual foreign currencies, Choi et al (1992) investigate how US banks react to 
changes in the trade weighted USD price index.  They only focus on the largest 48 banks 
over the period from 1975 to 1987.  They find that the currency exposure of these largest 
                                                          
202 Hysteretic behaviour refers the phenomenon that home currency depreciation encourages exporters enter 
the competition, but home currency appreciation will not drive them away from the market but reduce the 
overall profit margin of the whole sector. 
203 Asymmetric hedging occurs when firms take one-sided hedge (e.g. options).  Therefore, the payoff of the 
hedging practice is non-linear. 
204 Information on assets and liabilities dominated in five foreign currencies are collected.  The five foreign 
currencies are Canada Dollar, GBP, German Mark, Swiss France, and JPY. 
205 The study investigates the bank’s exposure towards 5 different foreign currencies, namely the Canadian 
Dollar, German Mark, French Franc, GBP and JPY.  The currency exposure is measured as the relationship 
between the bank wealth and the changes in net position for each of the five foreign currencies.  Individual 
currency exposure refers to the changes in bilateral exchange rates of USD against a single foreign currency.  
The aggregated currency exposure refers to the relative value changes of USD against all the five foreign 
currencies.   
206 Grammatikos et al (1986) find that the largest correlation is between the value of Canadian Dollar and 
German Mark which is around 30%, while the value of GBP and German Mark is negatively related at -29%. 
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US banks changed dramatically from negative to positive during this period207, especially 
after the introduction of International Bank Act in 1979.  They further prove that the 
finding is coincide with the accounting evidence that large banks have altered their 
position in foreign currency-dominated assets from net long to net short during the 
sample period. 
It seems that large banks have attracted more attention than the small ones, as most 
of the subsequent studies also focus on the currency exposure of large banks across global 
financial markets.208  Wetmore and Brick (1994 and 1998) have extended the sample size of 
the Choi et al (1992).  Their 1994 paper investigates the currency exposure of the 79 largest 
US banks from 1986 to 1991, while the 1998 paper extends the sample period further to 
1995.  Both empirical studies find significant relationship between the changes in trade 
weighted USD price index and the equity return of large US banks, and argue that 
currency exposure is mainly coming from unhedged foreign loan activities.  Their 
argument is supported by the Chamberlain et al (1997).  By evaluating the currency 
exposure of the 30 largest US banks and the 89 largest Japanese banks from 1986 to 1993, 
they also show that currency exposure is negatively related to the volume of hedging 
activities.209  However, this argument is dismissed by Choi and Elyasiani (1997) with 
empirical evidence based on the 59 largest US banks from 1975 to 1992.  They show that 
the hedging activities represent by the off-balance sheet items could increase the systemic 
risk of the banks instead of reducing it, especially when the hedging activity is for 
currency exposure through derivatives.  Martin (2000) produces the first empirical study 
                                                          
207  The negative/positive currency exposure means a positive shock in the relative value of domestic 
currency decrease/increase bank’s value. 
208 Chamberlain et al (1997) suggest that researchers should focus on large size banks for three reasons: 1) the 
large size banks are more likely to involve in the international activities; 2) large banks are closer to being 
comparable in size across the national markets; and 3) large banks are the most important contributors to 
systemic risk. 
209 The hedging activity is represented by off-balance sheet items (interest rate and foreign exchange rate 
derivates) in Wetmore and Brick (1994 and 1998) and Chamberlain et al (1997). 
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to cover the large banks across the global financial markets.210  He evaluates the currency 
exposure of the 30 world largest banks from 1994 to 1996.  The empirical evidence 
suggests that over forty percent of the sample significantly expose to changes in their 
home currency value.  However, the currency exposure of US banks is not significant 
during the sample period, which indicates that US banks are more risk averse.211  That 
means they are hedging their currency exposures with more care. 
In contrast to the enormous attention attracted by the banks, few studies examine the 
currency exposure of the insurance companies.  Mange (2000) is the first one to 
demonstrate how fluctuation in home currency value will influence the equity value of 
insurance companies in a theoretical framework.212   He shows that both life and non-life 
insurance companies may expose to currency risk through issuing insurance products into 
foreign markets, especially the long-term ones.  For firms which issue long-term insurance 
products in foreign currency terms, the appreciation of home currency value against 
foreign currencies may reduce the expected value of the payables in foreign currency 
terms.  In other words, the insurers should benefit from home currency appreciation.  
Elyasiani et al (2007) provide the first empirical study on currency exposure of US 
insurance firms from 1991 to 2001.213  The empirical evidence suggests that there is indeed 
a significant and positive relationship between the changes in trade weighted USD price 
index and the returns of US insurance portfolio.   
 
                                                          
210 The banks examined in his study come from 10 major developed countries/regions, which are US, UK, 
Japan, Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Australia and Hong Kong. 
211 Martin (2000) suggests that US financial institutions have more restrictive regulatory and supervisory 
requirements.  
212 In this theoretical framework, the insurance premiums are paid in home currency terms and benefits are 
payable in foreign currency terms. 
213 The study is mainly focused on return linkage among the US financial sector portfolios.  However, since 
they controlled for the changes in the broader stock market, interest rate and foreign exchange rate changes 
in the model specification, the exchange rate exposure of the financial sector portfolio is also been examined. 
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4.2.3. Size Effect in Currency Exposure  
The currency exposure of a firm seems relate to its own size.  Given that large size firms 
are more likely to involve in the global market, they should have a higher probability to 
expose to currency risk (Jorion, 1990).  Therefore, large size firms should have higher 
currency exposure compares to small ones in theory at least.  However, the theory of 
economies of scale of hedging activity provides a different opinion.  Nance et al (1993) 
argues that financial instruments used for hedging shows economies of scale due to the 
transaction cost involved.  They claim that it is not cost efficient for US firms to hedge a 
risk exposure which is less than five to ten million USD in market value.  Therefore, large 
firms have more economic incentive to hedge their exposures than small ones as they 
usually have larger risk exposures.  Based on the usage of financial instruments for 
hedging purpose of 169 of the Fortune 500 firms in 1986, they found that firms which use 
more hedging instruments are usually larger in terms of market size.  The finding is 
reinforced by Mian (1996).  Based on disclosed information of more than three thousand 
US firms for 1992, he also claims that firms which hedge their financial exposures are 
much larger than the non-hedgers.214  In addition, Crabb (2002) shows that the firms which 
hedge against currency risk should have a lower currency exposure.215  In other words, 
large size firms should have a smaller currency exposure instead of a bigger one compares 
to small firms.   
The empirical studies on the size effect of the currency exposure also show mixed 
results.  Chow et al (1997b) run a regression test with the magnitude of a firm’s currency 
exposure on the firm’s market capitalization.216  The result based on a sample of 213 US 
                                                          
214 The financial exposures include interest rate exposure and currency exposure.  The result is consistent for 
both financial exposures. 
215 Crabb’s (2002) finding is based on data of financial hedging activities of 276 US MNCs.  
216 The magnitude of a firm’s currency exposure is represented by the firm’s currency risk beta. 
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MNCs indicates that currency exposure has a negative relationship with the firm size 
regardless of the direction of the exposure.  In contrast, He and Ng (1998) indicates that 
currency exposure increases with firm size for Japanese MNCs.  They access the 
relationship between changes in trade weighted JPY price index and the equity return of 
171 Japanese MNCs from 1979 to 1993, and show that the return of firms with higher 
market value are more sensitive to  changes in home currency value, which is opposite to 
Chow et al’s (1997b) finding.   
Chow and Chen (1998) argue that the relationship between the currency exposure 
and firm size is sensitive to the estimation horizon.  They argue that since the short term 
transaction exposure is comparatively easy to hedge than the long term currency risk 
(Chow et al, 1997a), the large firms should have higher incentive to hedge the long term 
currency risk compare to the small firms due to the economies of scale of hedging activity.  
They investigate the currency exposure of more than one thousand Japanese firms from 
1975 to 1992 with different estimation horizons.  The empirical evidence suggests that 
small firms are less exposed to currency risk with a one-month estimation horizon 
compares to large firms, while large firms have less currency exposure with a estimation 
horizon above twelve-month.   
Bodnar and Wong (2003) suggest that the size effect in currency exposure is mainly 
due to the difference in characteristic between the large and small firms.  Based on 
empirical evidence from 910 US MNCs from 1977 to 1996, they claim that large firms are 
more likely to benefit from the depreciation of USD since they are more internationally 
oriented, while the opposite is true for small firms.  The finding is in line with the 
hypothesis by Shapiro (1975).  Shapiro suggests that export-oriented MNCs will benefit 
from home currency depreciation as it increases their competitive edge in the foreign 
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markets.  Small firms are more likely to operate pure domestically, therefore, they will 
benefit from home currency appreciation as it reduces the foreign product’s price in home 
currency terms.   
The size effect in currency exposure among financial institutions has not been 
extensively explored.  Tai (2000) evaluates the potential size effect among commercial 
banks in the US market from 1987 to 1998.  He divides the sample of 31 US banks into 
three size portfolios, and shows that the currency exposure is only significant for banks 
with the highest market values.  The finding supports the Chamberlain et al’s (1997) 
argument that large banks should have higher currency exposure as they are more likely 
to have international activities.  However, the argument is dismissed by Choi and Jiang 
(2009) who claim that currency exposure is actually smaller for internationally oriented 
firms than pure domestic firm.  They investigate the currency exposure of MNCs and non-
MNCs in the US market from 1983 to 2006, and show that the currency exposure of non-
MNCs is significantly higher than MNCs.  They argue that the main reason behind this 
phenomenon is that MNCs are more likely to hedge their foreign exposures compare to 
non-MNCs, which is consistent with the finding by Crabb (2002).  
 
 
4.2.4. Estimation Framework for Currency Exposure  
Early studies on currency exposure usually use simple linear models.  Inspired by Adler 
and Dumas (1984), most researchers use the regression coefficient from an ordinary least 
square (OLS) model to represent the currency exposure.  In Adler and Dumas (1984), the 
regression coefficient is generated by running a linear regression of a firm’s equity price 
on the level of currency value.  However, they ignore the fact that the time series data of 
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the firm’s equity price and the level of currency value are non-stationary, which is not 
suitable for linear regression model without adjustment.  The empirical framework has 
been improved by Adler et al (1986), who suggest the use of equity return of the firm and 
changes in currency value in the OLS model. 
Jorion (1990) argues that market risk factor should also be included into the model as 
it is commonly regarded as the most important risk factor for equity value.217  Prasad and 
Rajan (1995) further suggest that the changes in interest rate should also be included into 
the estimation framework, as previous empirical studies showed strong connection 
between interest rate fluctuation and firm value.218   In addition, they argue that the 
changes in currency value may be highly correlated with market and interest rate risk 
factors through common external shocks.  Therefore, the one should orthogonalize the 
changes in currency value with respect to market and interest rate risk factors before put 
them into the regression model to avoid multicolinearity.  On the other hand, Doukas et al 
(1999) suggest one could also orthogonalize the market and interest rate risk factors on 
currency risk factor instead of another way round.   
Other studies suggest that the value of a firm only reacts to the unexpected changes 
in currency value (Chow et al, 1997a and 1997b).  Therefore, one should use the 
unexpected changes in currency value in the regression model.219  Tai (2000) and Koutmos 
and Martin (2003b) suggest the use of estimated residual from an auto-regression model to 
represent the unexpected changes in the risk factor.  Kolari et al (2008) and Choi and Jiang 
(2009) use an alternative model specification to evaluate the currency exposure.  Instead of 
                                                          
217 For further discussion on the role of market risk factor, please refer to Sharpe (1964) on the introduction of 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) among others. 
218 For further discussion on the role of interest rate risk factor, please refer to Flannery and James (1984), and 
Sweeney and Warga (1986) among others.  Staikouras (2003 and 2006) also provide an extensive review for 
theoretical and empirical studies on interest rate risk factor. 
219 However, Jorion (1990) argues that the actual changes in currency value are largely unpredictable.  
Therefore, one could use the actual changes in currency value to represent its unexpected changes.  This 
argument is supported by other empirical studies such as Chamberlain et al (1997).  
191 
 
using market and interest risk factors, they use the three risk factors from Fama-French 
model for the regression model.220  
However, OLS model can only evaluate the currency exposure in a univariate 
framework, which means it can only examine the relationship between the currency value 
fluctuation and the equity return of a single firm.  The model efficiency may be low when 
apply the estimation framework to a sample with large number of firms, as one needs to 
run an OLS estimation for each individual firm.  In order to resolve this issue, researchers 
start to employ models with a multivariate framework.  Ferson and Harvey (1994) propose 
the first multivariate estimation framework.  They investigate the currency exposure of 
eighteen national stock market indices based on a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model.  The subsequent study by Choi and Prasad (1995) and Doukas et al (1999) also 
evaluate the currency exposure of MNCs in the US and Japanese market with a SUR 
model, respectively.  Choi and Elyasiani (1997) employ the SUR model to evaluate the 
currency exposure of financial institutions.  They examine the relationship between 
changes in home currency value and the largest US banks.  Their paper is followed by 
Martin (2000) who evaluates the currency exposure of the top banks across the global 
markets based on similar estimation framework. 
The SUR model overcomes the problem of evaluating the currency exposure for 
multiple assets simultaneously, but it only takes the conditional mean of the involved 
securities into account.  The conditional variances of these securities and the linkages 
among them have not been considered by the SUR model.  The empirical studies on 
conditional variance and correlation suggest that the variance-covariance matrices among 
                                                          
220 For further discussion of the Fama-French model, please refer to Fama and French (1993). 
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securities have a time-varying nature.221  Therefore, the estimation model should take this 
time-varying nature into account to avoid potential biasness and inefficiency.   
The number of empirical studies who incorporate the time-varying nature of 
conditional variance-covariance among financial asset returns is limited.  De Santis and 
Gerard (1998) propose the first empirical framework to investigate the currency exposure 
of firms by estimating the conditional mean and variance-covariance matrix of the firm 
returns simultaneously.  The model used in their study is a parsimonious diagonal 
multivariate GARCH process.  Their empirical framework has been extended by Tai (2000) 
by including the conditional variance of the risk factor into the mean equation.222     
Recently, Elyasiani et al (2007) propose another parsimonious multivariate GARCH 
estimation framework to estimate the currency exposure of financial sector portfolios in 
the US market.  However, their model poses a restriction on conditional variance-
covariance matrix among the portfolio returns, which assumes the correlations among 
financial sector portfolio returns are constant over the estimation period. 
 
4.3. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 
4.3.1. VAR-BEKK Estimation Model 
In the current study, we propose a multivariate VAR-BEKK model to evaluate the 
relationship between the home and foreign currency value fluctuation and the changes in 
equity value of different financial sector portfolios across national markets.  The changes 
in equity value are represented by the lognormal returns of the financial sector portfolios.  
                                                          
221 Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) show that the conditional variance of the financial asset return is time-
varying, while Bollerslev et al (1988) and Cappiello et al (2006) indicate the conditional covariance and 
correlation among the financial asset return is also time-varying. 
222 In Tai (2000), the main purpose for the introduction of conditional volatility of the currency value is to 
investigate whether the risk factors remain constant over the estimation period.   
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The proposed VAR-BEKK model has two components.  The first part is a VAR model, 
which contains a system of equations representing the conditional mean of the financial 
sector portfolio return.  The second part is a conditional variance-covariance estimation 
framework with a BEKK parameterization.   
The conditional mean of financial sector portfolio return is represented by an 
extended multifactor model.  We construct the model based on the conventional 
multifactor model used by previous empirical studies (Wetmore and Brick, 1994 and 1998; 
Prasad and Rajan, 1995; Chamberlain et al, 1997; Elyasiani et al, 2007).  Instead of using 
only the market, interest rate, and home currency risk factors as explanatory variables, we 
also incorporate the changes in foreign currency value into the estimation framework.  As 
discussed in the previous section, the changes in foreign currency value can be served as 
an alternative measure of shift in investors’ preference towards the global financial 
markets.  Therefore, by investigating the impact of foreign currency value fluctuation, we 
shed light on whether the shift in investors’ preference will have a significant impact on 
the return performances of financial sector portfolios across national markets.  In addition, 
the conditional variances of the currency value fluctuation are also included in the mean 
equation as explanatory variables.  Tai (2000) and Koutmos and Martin (2003b) show that 
the conditional variance of the home currency value fluctuation seems able to explain the 
firm’s return performances.  By including these conditional variances into the estimation 
framework helps us to eliminate the potential issue of inconsistency and biasness due to 
omitted variables. 
In the current chapter, the value of currency is represented by a trade weighted 
multilateral currency price index.  We prefer multilateral currency index over bilateral 
exchange rate for two reasons.  First, the multilateral currency index provides a more 
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general picture of a currency’s relative value compares to the bilateral exchange rate.  The 
bilateral exchange rate only refers to the conversation ratio of one currency against 
another currency, while the multilateral currency index represents the relative value of a 
currency against a basket of other currencies.  Second, the multilateral currency index 
helps us to introduce the relative value changes of all the three currencies into the 
conditional mean equation, which is not achievable by using the bilateral exchange rate.  
For instance, the three bilateral exchange rates, USD against GBP (USD/GBP), the JPY 
against USD (JPY/USD) and the JPY against GBP (JPY/GBP), can represent the relative 
values among these three currencies without introducing linear dependence among the 
variables.223  For financial institutions in the Japanese market, however, both JPY/USD 
and JPY/GBP are actually representing the relative value of the home currency (JPY).224  
Therefore, we have to use multilateral currency price index to introduce the value 
fluctuations of all the three currencies. 
The conditional variance-covariance of the financial sector portfolio returns is 
estimated based on a BEKK model.  We prefer the BEKK model as it provides a more 
flexible estimation framework with a parsimonious parameter setting.  As discussed in 
previous empirical studies (Kroner and Ng, 1998; Cappiello et al, 2006), the conditional 
correlation among financial asset returns is not constant over time.  Unlike the constant 
correlation assumption used in Elyasiani et al (2007), there is no restriction on the 
conditional correlations among financial sector portfolio returns in our model.  Therefore, 
our model is more flexible, and should provide higher estimation accuracy.  In addition, 
                                                          
223 For three currencies, we can only use a set of three bilateral exchange rates to represent the relative values 
among them.  If we use any four bilateral exchange rates among three currencies, we will introduce linear 
dependence into the system.   
224 Chamberlain et al (1997) suggest that the changes in home currency value can be represented by either a 
multilateral currency price index, or bilateral exchange rates between the home currency and other major 
currencies. 
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we employ the diagonal BEKK parameterization for the proposed VAR-BEKK model to 
increase the estimation efficiency by reducing the number of estimated coefficients.225  
However, the issue of nonsynchronous trading arises due to the fact that the equity 
markets in these countries operate in different time zones.  In order to better access the 
influence of foreign currency value fluctuation on the equity return of financial institutions, 
we need to first adjust for this nonsynchronous trading issue.  According to Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT), the Japanese market opens the earliest among the three national 
markets.  The Tokyo Stock Exchange opens at GMT 0:00 and closes at GMT 6:00.  It is 
followed by the UK market, which opens at GMT 8:00 and finishes at 16:30.  The New 
York Stock Exchange operates from GMT 14:30 till GMT 21:00.  Therefore, it is reasonable 
for us to assume that the information generated from the Japanese and UK market is likely 
to influence the performance of the US market on the same trading day.  However, for the 
US market, its daily price information can only affect the performance of Japanese and UK 
market for the following trading day.  For the UK market, we assume its daily price 
movement can affect the Japanese market on the following day. 
The foreign exchange market crumbled in the recent financial crisis (Melvin and 
Taylor, 2009).  In order to investigate the potential influence of the crisis on the 
relationship between currency value fluctuation and the equity return of financial sector 
portfolios, we introduce a structural break into the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  Failed to 
capture this potential variability of the currency exposure can be costly, as Levi (1994) 
argues that the estimated coefficient may be biased.  Previous empirical studies show that 
the currency exposure of financial institutions does change over time, especially when 
systemic important event happened.  For instance, Choi et al (1992) show that the currency 
                                                          
225 The number of estimated parameters is negatively related to the degree of freedom of the estimation 
model.  For technical detail of the diagonal BEKK parameterization, please refers to Appendix A.4 in the 
appendix section. 
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exposure of US banks changed dramatically after the establishment of the 1979 
International Bank Act.226  Similar to Choi et al’s (1992) approach, we also introduce a 
dummy variable into the model to capture the potential change in the currency exposure 
during the recent financial crisis.227   
According to Melvin and Taylor (2009), the bankruptcy announcement made by 
Lehman Brothers on the September 15, 2008 has a significant impact on the foreign 
exchange market.  In order to illustrate the influence of this event on the value and 
variation of currency price indices for the JPY, GBP and USD, we create two diagrams 
(Figure 4.1 and 4.2) to demonstrate the level and conditional variance of the three currency 
price indices over the sample period.  Figure 4.1 represents the time series of the three 
trade weighted currency price indices, while Figure 4.2 demonstrates the conditional 
variance of the three currency price indices over the sample period.   
  
                                                          
226 Choi et al (1992) show that the currency exposure of US banks had changed from negative before the 
introduction of International Bank Act in October 1979 to positive afterwards.   
227 The dummy variable is only introduced into the conditional mean equation but not the conditional 
variance-covariance equation.  The conditional variance-covariance equation of the proposed model is based 
on a BEKK parameterization, which contains a component representing the unconditional variance-
covariance matrix of the financial sector portfolio returns.  However, the unconditional variance-covariance 
matrix may not change in a linear way before and after the structural break.  Therefore, the introduction of a 
dummy variable may not be suitable for representing a structural break in the BEKK model.  In order to 
solve the issue, we separate the estimation for conditional variance-covariance equations into two sub-
periods, namely the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
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Figure 4.1  Time Series of the Trade Weighted Currency Price Index 
The following graph demonstrates the time series of the trade weighted currency price indices for Japanese 
Yen (JPY), British Pound (GBP), and US Dollar (USD) from the start of 2003 to the end of March 2011.  The 
value of the currencies has been recaled at the level of 100 at the beginning of the sample period.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Conditional Variance of the Trade Weighted Currency Price Index  
The following graph demonstrates the changes in conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price 
indices for Japanese Yen (JPY), British Pound (GBP), and US Dollar (USD) from the start of 2003 to the end of 
March 2011.   
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From the two diagrams, one can see that the relative value of both GBP and USD dropped 
since the collapse of the Lehman Brother.  In contrast, the JPY appreciated dramatically.  
Furthermore, the conditional variances of all the three currency price indices increased 
dramatically following the collapse of the Lehman Brother, and remained at a higher level 
since the event.  The empirical evidence suggests that the collapse of Lehman brother is 
indeed a significant and systemic important event for the foreign exchange market.  
Therefore, we set the September 15, 2008 as the start of the recent financial crisis. 
The proposed VAR-BEKK model can be illustrated in matrix form as follow:228 
 =  ∘  ∙ 1 + E ∙ NJ + F ∙ N_U+J + ∙ Γ ∙ NJ +  ∙Θ ∙ N_U+J +   
   (1) 
 @ = AX ∙ AXJ + BX0101JBXJ + CX@01CXJ ,																	with	k ∈ [0, τ]		           
 @ = AX ∙ AXJ + BX0101JBXJ + CX@01CXJ ,								with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]           
with ° is the Hadamard product,229 1 is a vertical vector of ones which matches the 
vertical dimension of β, superscript T is the transpose operator for the underlying 
matrix, and τ represents the date of September 15, 2008. 
where, 
Rt = a [n x 1] matrix represents the return of financial sector portfolios over day t.  
n depends on how many portfolios within the estimation framework. 
β = a [n x 3] parameter matrix where the first column represents the constants, 
the second and third column represent market and interest rate betas for the 
corresponding financial sector portfolios, respectively. 
                                                          
228 For detail explanation of the parameter matrices and the scalar form of the conditional mean equation, 
please refer to the Appendix C.1. 
229 The Hadamard product is a special operator for matrix multiplication.  It refers to the element-by-element 
multiplication of two matrices with the same dimension. 
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MFt = a [n x 3] matrix contains ones for the first column which represent the 
constants for conditional mean equations.  The second and third column of 
the matrix contains the market and interest rate risk factors for the 
corresponding financial sector portfolios over day t.  The market risk factor is 
represented by the return of national stock market index, and the interest 
rate risk factor is represented by the unexpected changes in long-term 
benchmark bond yields.230 
FXt = a [3 x 1] matrix contains the unexpected changes231 in the trade weighted 
currency price indices of the JPY, GBP and USD over day t.  The unexpected 
change is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model for the 
corresponding currency price index.232 
FX_Vart = a [3 x 1] matrix contains the conditional variances for the trade 
weighted currency price indices of the JPY, GBP and USD over day t.  The 
conditional variance is generated from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model for the 
corresponding currency price index. 
G = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the equity return sensitivity given 
changes in FX risk factors over the whole sample period.  The elements 
within G are gij which refer to the FX effect from currency in country j to 
portfolio in country i.  Home FX effect is represented by gi (i=j). 
Z = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the equity return sensitivity given 
changes in FXV risk factors over the whole sample period.  The elements 
                                                          
230 Follows the previous empirical studies on the effects of interest rate, the interest rate index employed in 
the current study is the yield relative –[(Yt-Yt-1)/Yt-1], Yt is the yield of long-term benchmark bond of the 
corresponding markets over day t.  For further detail please refers to Flannery and James (1984). 
231 Chamberlain et al (1997) argues that only the unexpected changes in the currency value can influence the 
performances of the financial institutions. 
232 We first fit the raw changes in the trade weighted currency price index into an ARMA-GARCH(1,1) 
model, then use the estimated residuals and conditional variances derived from the model as the unexpected 
changes in the currency value (i.e. FX) and conditional variance of the currency (i.e. FX_Var), respectively. 
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within Z are zij which refer to the FXV effect from currency in country j to 
portfolio in country i.  Home FXV effect is represented by zi (i=j). 
Γ = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the potential changes in equity return 
sensitivity given changes in FX risk factors over the crisis period. The 
elements within Γ are γij which refer to the changes in FX effect from 
currency in country j to portfolio in country i.  Changes in home FX effect is 
represented by γi (i=j). 
Θ = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the potential changes in equity 
return sensitivity given changes in FXV risk factors over the crisis period. 
The elements within Θ are θij which refer to the changes in FXV effect from 
currency in country j to portfolio in country i.  Changes in home FX effect is 
represented by θi (i=j). 
DUM = a dummy variable represents the potential structural break in the crisis 
period. DUM = 0 before the September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
Ht = a [n x n] three dimensional matrices represent the conditional variance-
covariance matrix among the returns of the financial sector portfolios over 
day t. 
εt = a [n x 1] matrix represents the estimated residual vector from the conditional 
mean equations for the returns of the financial sector portfolios over day t. 
Cpre/post = a [n x n] upper triangle parameter matrix represents the unconditional 
part of the variance-covariance matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
Apre/post = a [n x n] diagonal parameter matrix represents the ARCH effect of the 
conditional variance-covariance matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
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Bpre/post = a [n x n] diagonal parameter matrix represents the GARCH effect of the 
conditional variance-covariance matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
 
The unexpected changes in long-term benchmark bond yields are generated from a set of 
fitted ARMA model for each bond yield series.  A modified ARMA model with a 
GARCH(1,1) conditional variance process has been estimated for each of the three 
currency price indices.  The model enables us to generate the unexpected changes in the 
currency price index together with its conditional variances, which provides higher 
estimation efficiency then generate the two series with two separate models.  
In order to increase the estimation efficiency, the model is estimated simultaneously 
for both the conditional mean and variance-covariance equations for all the financial sector 
portfolios in the system (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003).  We adopt the estimation approach 
developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), which optimize the parameter estimation 
by maximizing the sum of the quasi-conditional log-likelihood ratio lt. 
 
[ = −12 [ln`2ab + ln|@| + J@] 
where,   
n = the number of conditional mean equations in the model, which depends on 
how many portfolios within the estimation framework. 
Ht = a [n x n] matrices represent the conditional variance-covariance matrix 
among the returns of the financial sector portfolios over day t. 
εt = a [n x 1] matrix represents the estimated residual vector from the conditional 
mean equations for the returns of the financial sector portfolios over day t. 
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Since we estimate the conditional mean equations simultaneously with the conditional 
variance-covariance equations, the models are no longer linear.  The non-linear nature of 
the estimation framework poses a big challenge for the parameter optimization process.  
The initial value of the parameter needs to be properly specified to ensure the sum of lt 
achieving a global maximum instead of a local one.  Therefore, a proper initial setting of 
the parameter value is crucial for the success of our estimation.  In the current study, we 
develop a two-step approach to generate the initial values for the parameters.  In the first 
step, the conditional mean equations in the model will be estimated separately with a 
simple OLS approach.  The estimated coefficients will be used as the initial values for the 
parameters in these mean equations.  In the second step, the residual series generated from 
these individual OLS estimations, εi,t, will be fitted with a diagonal BEKK model.  The 
estimated coefficients from the diagonal BEKK model will be employed as the initial 
values for the parameter in the variance equation. 
 
 
4.3.2. Joint-Hypotheses Test 
Six joint-hypotheses tests have been developed for the current study.  The purpose of these 
joint-hypotheses tests is to evaluate the overall significance of the relationship between 
currency value fluctuations on the return of the financial sector portfolios.  The hypothesis 
tests are designed to focus on the impact of currency value fluctuations over two different 
periods, namely the whole sample period and the crisis period.  The first set of hypotheses  
(H1 and H2) investigates the potential influence of currency value fluctuations on financial 
sector portfolios over the whole sample period, while the second set of hypotheses (H3 to 
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H6) evaluates whether the influence of currency value fluctuations has changed during the 
recent financial crisis through a set of interactive dummy variables (DUM).   
In order to save space, we refer the relative value changes in home (foreign) currency 
as home (foreign) FX, and the conditional variance of the relative changes in home 
(foreign) currency as home (foreign) FX_Var.  The six joint-hypotheses tests are presented 
as follow: 
H1: No influence of the foreign FX and FX_Var on the return performances of 
financial sector portfolios over the whole sample period. 
H2: No influence of the home and foreign FX_Var on the return performances of 
financial sector portfolios over the whole sample period. 
H3: No changes in the influence of the home FX on the return performances of 
financial sector portfolios during the financial crisis. 
H4: No changes in the influence of the home FX and FX_Var on the return 
performances of financial sector portfolios during the financial crisis.  
H5: No changes in the influence of the home and foreign FX on the return 
performances of financial sector portfolios during the financial crisis. 
H6: No changes in the influence of the home and foreign FX and FX_Var on the 
return performances of financial sector portfolios during the financial crisis. 
We evaluate the above six joint-hypotheses via log-likelihood (LLF) ratio test233, which 
examines whether the LLFs of the unrestricted and the restricted models are significantly 
different.  For each hypothesis test, the restricted model assumes the parameters attached 
to the corresponding FX and FX_Var variables are equal to zero.  For instance, the 
restricted model for H1 assumes the parameter for the foreign FX (Γ) and FX_Var (Θ) are 
                                                          
233 For detail explanation of the LLF ratio test, please refer to Appendix A.5. 
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all equal to zero.  One the other hand, the unrestricted model does not pose any restriction 
on these parameters.   
In order to perform these joint-hypotheses tests, we introduce seven alternative model 
specifications for conditional mean equation of the proposed VAR-BEKK estimation 
framework.  Since these alternative specifications only affect the parameter setting in the 
conditional mean equation, we only demonstrate the first part of the VAR-BEKK model to 
save space.  The seven alternative model specifications are illustrated as follow234: 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, + ,     (2) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + GN, + HN_U+, +  ∙ γN, +  ∙ θN_U+, + ,
 (3) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + GN, + HN_U+, + ,        (4) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +  ∙ ∑ γ,SNS, + ,       (5) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ,          (6) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + GN, +  ∙ γN, + ,      (7) 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, + GN, + ,           (8) 
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
where, 
ci  = the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector 
portfolio  i. 
βi,x  = the parameter for each of the two macroeconomic factors (Market 
and IR) for regional market i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D].  
                                                          
234 The model specification for conditional mean equation in Eq.1 will be referred as specification 1 (Spec.1), 
and the Eq.2 to Eq.8 will be referred as Spec.2 to Spec.8 for the rest of the paper, respectively.   
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MF(X)i,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: 1) the market 
risk factor represents by the return of domestic stock market index 
(Market), and 2) the interest rate risk factor represents by the 
unexpected changes of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for 
financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXj,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index 
for currency in country j over day t, which is the estimated 
residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Varj,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency 
price index for country j over day t, which is generated from a 
fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from 
currency in regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio 
in regional market i over the whole sample period. gi represents 
the FX effect of the home currency over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from 
currency in regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio 
in regional market i over the whole sample period. zi represents 
the FX_Var effect of the home currency over the whole sample 
period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from 
currency in regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio 
in regional market i during the crisis period. γi represents changes 
in the FX effect of the home currency during the crisis period. 
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θi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from 
currency in regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio 
in regional market i during the crisis period. θi represents changes 
in the FX_Var effect of the home currency during the crisis period. 
DUM = a dummy variable represents the potential structural break in 
the crisis period. DUM = 0 before the September 15, 2008, and DUM 
= 1 afterwards. 
The unrestricted and restricted model specifications for each of the six joint-
hypotheses tests are presented as follow: 
H1: The unrestricted model is Spec.1 and the restricted model is Spec.3. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of zij and θij in Spec.1.(i≠j) 
H2: The unrestricted model is Spec.1 and the restricted model is Spec.5. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of zij and θij in Spec.1. 
H3: The unrestricted model is Spec.7 and the restricted model is Spec.8. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of γi in Spec.7. 
H4: The unrestricted model is Spec.3 and the restricted model is Spec.4. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of γi and θi in Spec.3. 
H5: The unrestricted model is Spec.5 and the restricted model is Spec.6. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of θi,j and θi in Spec.5. 
H6: The unrestricted model is Spec.1 and the restricted model is Spec.2. 
To investigate the overall significance for the estimated parameters of γi,j, γi ,θi,j and θi in Spec.1. 
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4.4. DATA 
The portfolios used in the current chapter are composed of financial institutions from 
three national markets, namely the Japanese, UK and US markets.  Our sample includes 
the daily price information of banks, life insurers and non-life insurers from each of the 
national markets.  We only select companies which are listed on the major equity 
exchanges to eliminate the issue such as illiquidity and infrequent trading.235  The Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange have been chosen 
for the Japanese, UK and US market, respectively.   
From each national market, we only select the financial institutions that are based in 
this market.236  This approach eliminates the potential bias when evaluating the impact of 
foreign currency value fluctuation on the return of financial sector portfolios.  Assume that 
the US portfolio contains UK-based institutions with a strong relationship between the 
changes in GBP value and the returns of US portfolio.  In this case, it is hard to determine 
the cause of this strong linkage.  It could due to the fact that changes in GBP value have a 
significant impact on the return of US-based institutions, or it may simply because the UK-
based institutions within the US portfolio expose to home currency value fluctuation.   
For each market, the daily information of the equity market index and long-term 
benchmark bond yield has been collected.237  The trade weighted currency price indices 
have also been collected for the JPY, GBP and USD.  The trade weighted currency price 
indices used in the current study is constructed by Bank of England (BoE).  We employ the 
                                                          
235 The illiquid stocks usually have a higher expected return and volatility due to the additional illiquidity 
risk premium attached.  For further discussion on the illiquidity and its influence on stock return, please 
refer to Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002).  On the other hand, the infrequent trading 
activity will introduce spurious autocorrelations in stock return.  For further discussion on the infrequent 
trading and its influence on stock return, please refer to Roll (1981) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988). 
236 According to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the value of foreign currency-
dominated assets and liabilities of a firm needs to be converted into value represents in home currency terms.  
The home currency depends on where the firm is based. 
237 We choose long-term interest rates instead of short-terms ones as they have a stronger influence on 
insurance companies and banks (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003; and Elyasiani et al, 2007).   
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trade weighted currency price index because it is a multilateral currency index, which 
measures the relative value of a currency against a basket of other currencies.  It is 
calculated as a weighted geometric average of the bilateral exchange rates between the 
currency and other currencies, which presented in an index form.238  The trade weighted 
currency index constructed by BoE uses a basket of currencies from 21 industrial 
countries.239  All the price information is provided by DataStream International. 
We focus our attention on the recent financial crisis in the 2007/8, and its influence 
on the relationship between currency value fluctuation and the return of financial sector 
portfolios.  In order to eliminate the potential contamination effect from the previous stock 
market turmoil of 2000 - 2002, we start our sample period at the beginning of 2003 (i.e. 
January 1, 2003).240  To ensure equally number of daily observations across all the national 
markets, we eliminate the dates when any one of the three equity exchanges is closed.  The 
sample period finishes at the March 31, 2011, which covers a total of 1924 daily 
observations.   
The current study evaluates the impact of home and foreign currency value 
fluctuations on the return of different financial sector portfolios. 241   Therefore, we 
                                                          
238  The geometric average framework is proposed by IMF.  The geometric average is better than the 
arithmetic one for two reasons.  First, the arithmetic average will be influenced by way the bilateral exchange 
rate is constructed.  The magnitude of changes in the arithmetic average based on bilateral rates represented 
as units of home currency per foreign currency is different from the one based on bilateral rates constructed 
other way around.  Second, the arithmetic average will be distorted when the base period is changed.  
However, the geometric average overcomes these problematic issues (Brodsky, 1982; Rosenweig, 1987).  The 
weights are derived from the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM). Please refer to McGuirk (1987) on 
how the weights are derived for the trade weighted currency index.  
239 For detail information on the 21 industrial countries and the methodology for generating the trade 
weighted currency price index, please refer to Appendix C.2. 
240 The US stock market crashed in March 2000 due to the collapse of the Internet Bubble.  The NASDAQ 
Composite index, which represents the technology and growth companies in the US market, dropped from 
5048.62 in March 2000 to 1229.05 in July 2002.  Please find the time series of NASDAQ Composite Index in 
the Appendix C.3. 
241 The size weighted portfolio will represent the performance of the large institutions, while the equally 
weighted portfolio will provide a more general performance measure across all institutions involved.  We 
focus on the return performance of a financial sector rather than a group of individual institutions.  
Therefore, we employ equally weighted portfolios in this chapter.  
209 
 
construct equally-weighted portfolios for each financial sector and across the three 
markets.  In order to eliminate the influence of firm-specific risk, the equally-weighted 
financial sector portfolios need to be well diversified.  Several previous studies on 
portfolio construction have showed that the portfolio size has a significant impact on the 
diversification effectiveness.242  Empirical evidence suggests that a portfolio with more 
than 20 assets can obtain most of the diversification benefits.  We summarize the number 
of institutions in each financial sector in Table 4.1 to illustrate the diversification 
effectiveness of the financial sector portfolios used in the current study. 
 
Table 4.1  Number of Financial Institutions across Markets. 
  Bank Life Insurance Non-Life Insurance  
  Japan UK US UK US Japan UK US 
Date All All All All All All All All 
2003 79 6 86 5 17 3 14 44 
2004 80 7 98 6 19 3 16 47 
2005 81 7 101 6 19 3 20 48 
2006 83 8 105 7 19 3 20 50 
2007 84 8 111 7 21 3 26 52 
2008 84 8 111 8 21 3 26 54 
2009 86 8 112 8 21 3 26 54 
2010 87 8 113 8 23 4 26 56 
2011 87 8 114 8 23 4 26 56 
 
 
From Table 4.1, one can see that the life and non-life insurance sectors within the three 
markets, as well as the banking sector in the UK market all have small number of 
institutions during the sample period.  Therefore, in order to achieve the highest possible 
diversification effectiveness, we only construct one portfolio for each of the two insurance 
                                                          
242 Please refer to Evans and Archer (1968), Elton and Gruber (1977), and Shawky and Smith (2005) for 
further discussion on the issue of diversification effectiveness. 
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sectors (life and non-life) across the three markets, and the banking sector in the UK 
market.  In other words, we have six insurance portfolios, and one UK banking portfolio. 
In contrast, the Japanese and the US banking sectors have around 80 to 90 institutions 
during the sample period.  The large number of institutions enables us to split the 
institutions in these two sectors further without sacrificing much on the diversification 
effectiveness.  Previous empirical studies spilt the institutions in a financial sector further 
into size portfolios to investigate the potential size effect.243  Therefore, in the current study, 
we construct two additional equally weighted portfolios for large and small banks in the 
Japanese and US markets.   
For these size portfolios, the large and small banks are selected according to their 
market capitalizations.  To ensure the market capitalization of institutions in the large size 
portfolio consistently higher than the ones in the small size portfolio, we rebalance our 
size portfolios on an annually basis.  For each calendar year, the banks within these two 
national markets will be ranked according to their average market capitalization over the 
year.  The institutions within the top 25% region will be picked as the large banks, while 
the remaining ones will be categorized as small banks.   
Table 4.2 illustrates the number of institutions within these size portfolios over the 
sample period, while the distributional statistics of these equally weighted sector 
portfolios are represented in Table 4.3.   
  
                                                          
243 Please refer to Wetmore and Brick (1994 and 1998), Elyasiani et al (2007), and Carson et al (2008) among 
others. 
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Table 4.2  Number of Institutions for the Large and Small Size Portfolios within 
the Japanese and US Banking Sectors. 
Japan US 
Date Small Large Small Large 
2003 59 20 65 21 
2004 60 20 74 24 
2005 61 20 76 25 
2006 62 21 79 26 
2007 63 21 83 28 
2008 63 21 83 28 
2009 65 21 84 28 
2010 65 22 85 28 
2011 65 22 86 28 
 
Note: the size portfolio will be rebalanced at the beginning 
of each calendar year according to the average market 
capitalization of the company during that year. For each 
calendar year, we rank all the company from large to small 
according to their average market capitalization over the 
calendar year. The company which is above the 25% 
percentile will be categorized as Large Size portfolio, while 
the remaining will be the Small Size portfolio. 
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Table 4.3  Summary Statistics of the Financial Sector Portfolio Returns. 
The following table represents the distributional statistics of the financial sector portfolios.   
The sample period is from the beginning of 2003 till the end of March 2011. 
 
Panel A: Daily Returns of the Banking Portfolios. 
Japan   UK US   
Raw Return (%) All Large   Small   All All Large   Small   
 Mean -0.023   -0.022   -0.031   -0.051   -0.035 -0.027 -0.050   
 Maximum 13.467 13.207 15.026   15.174 13.294 13.056 15.337   
 Minimum -10.306 -10.547 -12.262   -15.341 -13.951 -12.675 -18.092   
 Std. Dev. 1.546   1.491   1.899   1.847   1.445   1.266   2.289   
Distribution Property   
 Skewness -0.081   -0.094   0.006   -0.207   -0.529   -0.821   -1.031   
 Kurtosis 10.019 10.630 9.089   14.881 27.178 35.090 16.976   
Normality Test 3958 *** 4677 *** 2977 *** 11348 *** 47028 *** 82898 *** 16024 *** 
ADF Test -44.617 *** -44.894 *** -43.812 *** -43.180 *** -22.343 *** -22.414 *** -22.835 *** 
 
Panel B: Daily Returns of the Insurance Portfolios. 
Life Insurance Portfolios  Non-Life Insurance Portfolios 
  UK US Japan UK US 
Raw Return (%) All All All All All   
 Mean -0.007 -0.027 -0.006 0.006 -0.011   
 Maximum 14.674 16.784 12.328 4.221 7.898   
 Minimum -16.423 -23.488 -17.581 -3.103 -13.871   
 Std. Dev. 1.955 2.478 2.435 0.653 1.533   
Distribution Property     
 Skewness 0.069 -1.031 -0.223 -0.207 -0.529 
 Kurtosis 5.894 16.976 9.301 14.881 27.178 
Normality Test 674 *** 16024 *** 3204 *** 11348 *** 47028 *** 
ADF Test -40.587 *** -50.016 *** -43.559 *** -43.18 *** -22.343 *** 
 
Note: The normality Test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test. The ADF Test refers to the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test. The test statistics under the serial correlation test is conducted from the Ljung-Box 
serial correlation test. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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From Table 4.2, one can see that the number of financial institutions in these size portfolios 
is consistently higher than 20 over the entire sample period.  In other words, the size 
portfolios for the Japanese and US banking sectors are well diversified in terms of firm-
specific risk.  By examining the statistical property of these sector portfolios in Table 4.3,  
one can see that the ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root) test result indicates that all 
the sector portfolio returns are stationary series, which will help us to avoid the estimation 
issues due to non-stationary associated with the empirical study by Adler and Dumas 
(1984).  In general, the mean returns are negative for all the banking portfolios across the 
global markets, including the two size portfolios from the Japanese and US markets.  
Comparatively, the Japanese banks suffer less than the banks in the UK and US markets.  
The average daily return of the Japanese banking sector is -0.023% over the sample period, 
compares to -0.051% and -0.035% for the UK and US banking sector, respectively.  This 
phenomenon is mainly due to the fact that banking sectors suffer significant loss during 
the 2007/8 financial crisis.244   
However, even though the insurance sectors in the Japanese and US markets have 
also been damaged by the recent financial crisis, the magnitude of its impact is smaller 
compare to the banking sector.245  The daily average returns are -0.027% and -0.011% for 
the US life and non-life insurance sector, respectively.  Meanwhile, the average return of 
the Japanese non-life insurance sector is only marginally below zero at -0.006%.  This 
asymmetric impact of the recent financial crisis on different financial sectors is mainly due 
                                                          
244 The time series of banking sector portfolio value from different markets are presented in Appendix C.4.  
All the banking sector portfolios had positive cumulative returns before the financial crisis.  However, the 
gain had been offset by the huge value drop during the crisis period. 
245 The time series of life and non-life insurance sector portfolio value from different national markets are 
presented in Appendix C.5. 
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the different characteristics of these financial institutions, and their risk exposures to the 
credit and liquidity risk.246   
As discussed in the methodology section, the conditional mean of the sector portfolio 
return is represented by a multifactor model.  Therefore, it is important to ensure the 
multicolinearity issue does not exist among the risk factors.  In order to investigate the 
potential issue of multicolinearity, we calculate the unconditional correlations of the 
involved risk factors.  Table 4.4 presents the unconditional correlations among the risk 
factors over the sample period.  In general, the correlations among the risk factors are low.  
The correlation between the conditional variance of the GBP and USD is the highest 
among all the related risk factors, which is 81.8% over the sample period.  However, the 
highest variance inflation factor (VIF) test statistic based on the three currencies’ 
conditional variances is 3.704, which is less the critical value.247  Therefore, the empirical 
evidence indicates that our model is free from multicolinearity.   
  
                                                          
246 For discussion on the difference in credit and liquidity risk for banks and insurers, please refer to the 
report by The Geneva Association under the title of Systemic Risk in Insurance, An analysis of insurance and 
financial stability. The article is available to general public via its website: www.genevaassociation.org. 
247 The VIF is a measure of multicolinearity among related explanatory variables.  The critical value of VIF 
test statistic is 5.  If the highest VIF test statistic based on the related explanatory variables is higher than 5, 
then the variables are highly correlated.  One should not include all these variables into the regression model 
as they will cause multicolinearity issue.  For technical detail of the VIF test, please refer to Appendix C.6.  
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Table 4.4  Unconditional Correlations of the Risk Factors. 
The following table represents the unconditional correlation among all the risk factors in the proposed VAR-BEKK model.   
The sample period is from the beginning of 2003 till the end of March 2011. 
 
 
MKT(Japan) MKT(UK) MKT(US) IR(Japan) IR(UK) IR(US) FX(Japan) FX(UK) FX(US) FX_Var(Japan) FX_Var(UK) 
MKT(UK) 0.351 
          
MKT(US) 0.119 0.534 
         
IR(Japan) -0.337 -0.091 -0.030 
        
IR(UK) -0.175 -0.339 -0.229 0.147 
       
IR(US) -0.081 -0.305 -0.324 0.102 0.516 
      
FX(Japan) -0.298 -0.448 -0.282 0.088 0.372 0.292 
     
FX(UK) 0.157 0.088 0.092 -0.026 -0.197 -0.089 -0.227 
    
FX(US) -0.079 -0.091 -0.046 -0.053 -0.131 -0.115 -0.205 -0.119 
   
FX_Var(Japan) -0.026 -0.038 -0.069 -0.004 0.036 0.014 0.033 -0.053 0.035 
  
FX_Var(UK) -0.009 -0.023 -0.022 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 0.016 0.016 0.632 
 
FX_Var(US) 0.012 -0.018 -0.024 -0.018 -0.032 -0.036 -0.007 0.021 0.038 0.503 0.818 
 
Note: the MKT(i) is the market portfolio return of the national stock market for country i; the IR(i) is the unexpected changes in the long-term benchmark bond yield for country i; 
the FX(i) is the unexpected changes in the trade weighted currency price index for country i; the FX_Var(i) is the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index 
for country i. 
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There are two interesting findings from Table 4.4 worth further discussions.  First, the 
pair-wised correlations among the three FX risk factors are all negative.  The 
unconditional correlations between the JPY and the GBP (USD) is -22.7% (-20.5%), while 
the correlation between the GBP and USD is -11.9%.  The result indicates that an 
unexpected increase in one FX risk factor will have a negative impact on the other two FX 
risk factors.  In other words, the unexpected appreciation of one currency is at the expense 
of depreciation for the other two currencies.  The finding is in line with our shift of 
funding hypothesis.  When investors reallocate their investments from other markets into 
one market, the shift of funding pushes the currency value in the latter to a higher level 
compares to the former ones.   
In addition, one can see that the returns of the three national market indices are all 
positively correlated.248   The US and the UK market have the highest unconditional 
correlation among the three national markets, which is 53.4% during the sample period.  
The correlation between the Japanese market and the other two national markets are 
comparatively lower, which is 35.1% and 11.9% for the UK and US markets, respectively.  
Chen and Zhang (1997) argue that the correlation between two national markets tend to be 
influenced by their bilateral trading activities.  Therefore, the positive correlation among 
the Japanese, UK and US market indices may due to the heavy bilateral trades across the 
three national markets.  The argument is supported by information from the national 
statistical bureau of the three markets.249  The data of annual external trade provided by 
the national statistical bureaus shows that US is the largest trading partner for both the 
                                                          
248 The time series of the three national market indices are presented in Appendix C.7. 
249 The external trade information is collected from the Statistical Hand Book of Japan 2010 by the Statistical 
Bureau, Japan; the Statistical Bulletin UK Trade 2011 by Office for National Statistics, UK; and the U.S. 
International Trade in Goods and Services January 2011 by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, US. 
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Japanese and UK markets, while the Japan and UK is the fourth and sixth largest trading 
partner for US market in 2010. 
 
4.5. ESTIMATION RESULT 
In the following section, we present and discuss the estimation result generated from the 
proposed VAR-BEKK model.  We divide this section into three parts.  In the first part, we 
discuss the result of the six joint-hypotheses tests.  In the second part, the impact of home 
and foreign currency value fluctuation on the return performances of different financial 
sector portfolios will be analysed.  The final part investigates the potential size effect of the 
currency exposure based on the estimation result for the large and small size banking 
portfolios in the Japanese and US markets.  
 
4.5.1. Joint-Hypotheses Test Result 
Table 4.5 summarizes the result of the six joint-hypotheses tests.  As discussed in Section 
4.3.2, the first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) investigate the relationship between home 
and/or foreign currency value fluctuation and the return performances of financial sector 
portfolios over the entire sample period.  The remaining four hypotheses (H3 to H6) 
examine on the potential change in this relationship during the recent financial crisis.  
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Table 4.5  Joint-Hypotheses Test Result for FX and FX_Var Risk Factors across 
Financial Sector Portfolios. 
The following table summarizes the test statistics of the log-likelihood restriction test for the VAR-BEKK model. 
The VAR-BEKK model used in the current study has eight different specifications for the mean equation:  
 
Mean Equation Spec.1:    +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, +∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, +∑ γ,S,NS, +∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.2: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, +∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.3: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, +⋅γNS, + ⋅θN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.4: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.5: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, +∑G,SNS, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.6: +, = α  +	∑,e`Nb, +∑G,SNS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.7: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + ⋅γNS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.8: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + S,   
 
Variance Equation: ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [0, τ]		           
 ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X, with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]            
                  with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US], and τ represents the September 15, 2008. 
where, 
ri,t  = the return for financial sector portfolio from country i over day t. 
αi  = represents the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector portfolio from country i. 
MF(X)j,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: i) the market risk factor represents by the stock market 
index return (Market), and ii) the interest rate risk factor represents by the unexpected changes of long-
term benchmark interest rate (IR) for financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for financial sector portfolio from 
country i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day t, 
which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, which 
is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial 
sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the 
financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards 
the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
εi,t  = the estimated residual for financial sector portfolio return in country i over day t. 
hi,j,t  = the conditional covariance between the returns of financial sector portfolios in country i and 
country j over day t, while hi,i,t represents the conditional variance of the financial sector portfolio return in 
country i over day t. 
aii,pre/post = the parameter represents the ARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
bii,pre/post = the parameter represents the GARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
DUM = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, and 
DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
 
  
        
  ALL Large Small 
  
   
DF Test Stat. DF Test Stat. DF Test Stat. 
H1. No Foreign FX and FX_Var effect 
  
Bank 24 64.00 *** 16 36.00 *** 16 70.00 *** 
Difference between Spec.1 and Spec.3 
  
Life 16 54.00 ***     
  
   
Non-Life 24 42.00 **         
H2. No Home and Foreign FX_Var effect 
 
Bank 18 0.00   12 0.00 12 0.00   
Difference between Spec.1 and Spec.5 
  
Life 12 8.00       
    
      
Non-Life 18 0.00             
H3. No Changes in Home FX effect factor during 
the financial crisis Bank 3 8.00 ** 2 6.00 ** 2 4.00 
Difference between Spec.7 and Spec.8 
  
Life 2 4.00     
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Non-Life 3 0.00       
H4. No Changes in Home FX and FX_Var effect 
during the financial crisis Bank 6 2.00 4 6.00 4 4.00 
Difference between Spec.3 and Spec.4 
  
Life 4 6.00         
  
    
Non-Life 6 10.00           
H5. No Changes in Home and Foreign FX effect 
during the financial crisis Bank 9 40.00 *** 6 24.00 *** 6 48.00 *** 
Difference between Spec.5and Spec.6 
  
Life 6 36.00 ***     
  
    
Non-Life 9 24.00 **             
H6. No Changes in Home and Foreign FX and 
FX_Var effect during the financial crisis  Bank 18 44.00 *** 12 26.00 *** 12 52.00 ***  
Difference between Spec.1 and Spec.2 
  
Life 12 72.00 ***     
  
        
Non-Life 18 64.00 ***             
 
Note: the DF is the degree of freedom of the long-likelihood test, and the Test Stats represents the test statistics of the 
log-likelihood ratio test. ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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From the test result, one can see that the null hypothesis for H1 is rejected for all the 
financial sector portfolios.  That means the parameters for foreign FX (Γ) and FX_Var (Θ) 
are statistically significant.  In other words, the changes in foreign FX and FX_Var do 
influence the return performances of financial sector portfolios across the national markets.  
The test result for H2 cannot reject the null hypothesis, which means that both the home 
and foreign FX_Var do not influence the return performance of these financial sector 
portfolios.  Therefore, the financial sector portfolios can only be influenced by the home 
and foreign FX, but not the home or foreign FX_Var.   
Our finding is in contrast to the empirical study by Koutmos and Martin (2003b), 
who found strong and positive relationship between the home FX_Var and the 
performances of US financial institutions from 1992 to 1998.  They argued that the positive 
relationship is due to the fact that higher variation in currency value induces greater 
volume of hedging.  Therefore, financial institutions can earn more revenues through sales 
of currency derivative to the hedgers.  We argue that there are two potential reasons why 
our finding is not consistent with the previous one.  First, the currency value in Koutmos 
and Martin (2003b) is represented by bilateral exchange rates, instead of multilateral 
currency price indices.  The significant impact of a bilateral exchange rate is likely to be 
smoothed out during the aggregation process to produce multilateral currency price index.  
By analyzing the information of banks’ balance sheet position, Grammatikos et al (1986) 
show that return of US banks is significantly related to the value changes in five different 
foreign currencies.250  However, the banks’ return is not influenced by the aggregated 
foreign currency exposure which contains the net position of all the five foreign currencies.  
                                                          
250 The authors find that the return of US banks have a positive relationship with value changes in German 
Mark, French Franc and JPY, while a negative relationship with Canada Dollar and GBP.  The value changes 
in a foreign currency are represented by the changes in a bilateral exchanges rate between the USD and the 
corresponding foreign currency. 
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The authors argue that the reason behind that low significance of the aggregated exposure 
is mainly due to the low correlation among these bilateral exchange rates.   
Second, the sample period of the two studies covers different time periods.  The 
sample period of Koutmos and Martin (2003b) is from 1992 to 1998, while ours is from 
2003 to 2011.  We argue that even though higher variation of currency value will increase 
the sales of currency derivative, its impact on the profitability of the financial sector could 
be weak during our sample period.  We believe the main concern for investors is credit 
risk instead of currency risk during our sample period, especially during the recent 
financial crisis. 251   Therefore, the trading volume of currency derivative should only 
represent a small proportion of the overall derivative market compares to the credit 
related instruments.  Our argument is supported by the report from the World Federation 
of Exchanges (WFE).252  During the 8-year period from 1998 to 2006, the trading volume of 
the currency derivative is almost unchanged.  However, the trading volume of credit 
related instruments has increased dramatically during the same period.253  As a result, the 
proportion of currency derivatives dropped from around a quarter of the world total 
derivative trading volume in 1998 to 8% at the end of 2008. 
The joint result of H3 – H6 suggests that only the impact of foreign FX on the return 
performances of financial sector portfolios has changed during the recent financial crisis.  
The test result for both H3 and H4 shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
which means the impact of home FX and FX_Var on the return of financial sector 
portfolios has not been affected by the recent financial crisis.  However, the result for H5 
                                                          
251  The recent financial crisis is also referred as a “credit crunch” around the global financial market 
(Brunnermeier, 2009).  Therefore, the global investors should more concern about the credit related risk.  The 
credit default swap (CDS) is one of the most popular hedging instrument for credit risk, as its volume has 
grew rapidly during the turn of the new century and picked at the end of 2007 (Vause, 2010). 
252 The report by WFE is under the title Derivative Trading: Trends since 1998, see: http://www.world-
exchanges.org.   
253 The credit risk related instrument is represented by the derivatives for equity indices, individual stocks, 
credit default swap (CDS) and interest rate.  
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and H6 argue that the impact of home and foreign FX and FX_Var has changed in the 
financial crisis.  Therefore, although no further hypothesis test is performed, it is 
reasonable to argue that the significant change in the impact of FX and FX_Var in H5 and 
H6 can only come from the ones in foreign currency terms.  In addition, the result from H1 
and H2 shows that the influence of home and foreign FX_Var on the return of financial 
sector portfolio is not significant over the whole estimation period, which reinforces the 
argument. 
In general, both the home and foreign FX_Var risk factors have no significant 
influence on the returns of the financial sector portfolios.  However, the estimated 
parameters for both the home and foreign FX are statistically significant in the proposed 
model.  In addition, the result suggests the impact of foreign FX has changed significantly 
for all the financial sector portfolios during the recent financial crisis.  We will present and 
discuss the impact of the home and foreign FX on the returns of the financial sector 
portfolios in the following sections. 
 
4.5.2. Currency Value Fluctuations and Return of Financial Sector Portfolios 
The estimation result of the proposed VAR-BEKK model for different financial sector 
portfolios across the three markets is presented in the following tables.  Table 4.6 
summarizes the estimated parameters for the banking portfolios, and the Table 4.7 and 4.8 
illustrate the output of the VAR-BEKK model for the life and non-life insurance portfolios, 
respectively.  In order to save space, we only report the estimation result for the VAR-
BEKK model with the first model specification (Spec.1) in this empirical chapter.254  We 
choose Spec.1 instead of the other seven alternative specifications (Spec.2 – 8) because the 
                                                          
254 The estimation result for the rest of the conditional mean equation specification (Spec.2 - 8) is available 
from the author upon request.  
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conditional mean equation of Spec.1 poses no restrictions on any of the risk factors.255  
Therefore, the output of Spec.1 provides the most general picture on how different risk 
factors will influence the returns of the financial sector portfolios, and the potential 
changes in the impact of the currency related risk factors (FX and FX_Var) during the 
crisis period. 
  
                                                          
255 The other model specifications put restrictions on either the FX and/or FX_Var related parameters (Spec.3, 
5, 7), or the dummy related variables (Spec.2, 4, 6, 8). 
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Table 4.6  Estimation Output of the VAR-BEKK Model for Banking Portfolios. 
Mean Equation:      +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Variance Equation:   ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [0, τ]		             
   	ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]   
                           with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US], and τ represents the September 15, 2008. 
where, 
ri,t  = the return for financial sector portfolio from country i over day t. 
αi  = represents the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector portfolio from 
country i. 
MF(X)j,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: i) the market risk factor represents by the stock 
market index return (Market), and ii) the interest rate risk factor represents by the unexpected changes 
of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈[	U+^k, D]. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for financial sector portfolio from 
country i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t  = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day 
t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, 
which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial 
sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the 
financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
εi,t  = the estimated residual for financial sector portfolio return in country i over day t. 
hi,j,t  = the conditional covariance between the returns of financial sector portfolios in country i and 
country j over day t, while hi,i,t represents the conditional variance of the financial sector portfolio 
return in country i over day t. 
aii,pre/post = the parameter represents the ARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
bii,pre/post = the parameter represents the GARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis 
period (post) for country i over day t. 
DUM  = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, 
and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country Japan UK U.S. 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-Stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation                   
Constant 0.000 -0.733   0.000 -0.430   0.000 -2.113 ** 
Market (βi,Market) 0.780 38.671 *** 0.931 19.733 *** 0.480 36.941 *** 
IR (βi,IR) 0.014 1.548   -0.026 -0.610   0.035 4.412 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) -0.013 -0.283   0.031 0.712   -0.021 -0.914   
FX (gi,UK) -0.009 -0.139   0.047 0.683   -0.005 -0.182   
FX (gi,US) -0.097 -1.782 * 0.111 1.688 * -0.041 -1.853 * 
FX-Var (zi,Japan) 0.002 0.038   -0.008 -0.020   0.001 0.031   
FX-Var(zi,UK) -0.002 -0.055   0.001 0.028   0.001 0.023   
FX-Var (zi,US) 0.001 0.025   0.001 0.005   0.003 0.045   
DUM*FX (γi,Japan) 0.130 1.643 † -0.172 -0.766   -0.200 -4.055 *** 
DUM*FX (γi,UK) 0.044 0.466   -0.002 -0.007   -0.044 -0.808   
DUM*FX (γi,US) 0.025 0.256   -0.221 -0.786   -0.029 -0.470   
DUM*FX-Var(θi,Japan) -0.002 -0.015   -0.007 -0.023   0.003 0.038   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,UK) -0.003 -0.006   -0.001 -0.022   0.001 0.031   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,US) -0.003 -0.014   -0.001 -0.034   0.001 0.017   
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Variance Equation                 
ARCH (aii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.190   0.315 5.402 *** 0.004 0.855   
GARCH (bii2, Pre-Crisis) 1.000 429.910 *** 0.747 20.432 *** 0.994 197.680 *** 
ARCH (aii2, Post-Crisis) 0.046 4.193 *** 0.040 2.702 *** 0.146 8.396 *** 
GARCH (bii2, Post-Crisis) 0.958 105.610 *** 0.969 92.074 *** 0.874 72.998 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.000     1.063     0.998     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.004     1.009     1.020     
Log-Likelihood 20264.0                 
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. † represents the test 
statistic is marginally insignificant at 10% level (critical value equals to 1.645).  In order to avoid Type-II 
error, in the current study, we define † is significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4.7  Estimation Output of the VAR-BEKK Model for Life Insurance 
Portfolios. 
Mean Equation:           +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, +∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Variance Equation:    ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [0, τ]		           
   	ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]   
               with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US], and τ represents the September 15, 2008. 
where, 
ri,t  = the return for financial sector portfolio from country i over day t. 
αi  = represents the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector portfolio from 
country i. 
MF(X)j,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: i) the market risk factor represents by the stock 
market index return (Market), and ii) the interest rate risk factor represents by the unexpected changes 
of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈[	U+^k, D]. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for financial sector portfolio from 
country i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t  = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day 
t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, 
which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial 
sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the 
financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
εi,t  = the estimated residual for financial sector portfolio return in country i over day t. 
hi,j,t  = the conditional covariance between the returns of financial sector portfolios in country i and 
country j over day t, while hi,i,t represents the conditional variance of the financial sector portfolio 
return in country i over day t. 
aii,pre/post = the parameter represents the ARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
bii,pre/post = the parameter represents the GARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis 
period (post) for country i over day t. 
DUM  = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, 
and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country UK U.S. 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation   
Constant 0.000 0.347 0.000 0.127   
Market (βi,Market) 1.156 45.131 *** 1.088 36.973 *** 
IR (βi,IR) -0.033 -1.482 -0.011 -1.002   
FX (gi,Japan) -0.121 -2.834 *** 0.020 0.492   
FX (gi,UK) 0.159 2.539 *** 0.042 0.805   
FX (gi,US) 0.016 0.309 0.027 0.628   
FX-Var (zi,Japan) -0.003 -0.026 0.003 0.016   
FX-Var(zi,UK) 0.001 0.033 -0.001 -0.020   
FX-Var (zi,US) 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.013   
DUM*FX (γi,Japan) 0.105 1.457 -0.346 -4.481 *** 
DUM*FX (γi,UK) 0.168 1.464 -0.102 -0.976   
DUM*FX (γi,US) -0.155 -1.457 -0.121 -1.296   
DUM*FX-Var(θi,Japan) 0.002 0.089 -0.002 -0.047   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,UK) 0.001 0.009 -0.001 -0.037   
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DUM*FX-Var (θi,US) 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.225   
Variance Equation             
ARCH (aii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.941 0.000 0.110   
GARCH (bii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.998 352.640 *** 0.997 230.340 *** 
ARCH (aii2, Post-Crisis) 0.041 7.250 *** 0.082 7.781 *** 
GARCH (bii2, Post-Crisis) 0.960 203.900 *** 0.925 111.420 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 0.998 0.997   
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.001 1.007   
Log-Likelihood 12973.0           
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.8  Estimation Output of the VAR-BEKK Model for Non-Life Insurance 
Portfolios. 
Mean Equation:           +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, +∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Variance Equation:    ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [0, τ]		           
   	ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]   
               with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US], and τ represents the September 15, 2008. 
where, 
ri,t  = the return for financial sector portfolio from country i over day t. 
αi  = represents the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector portfolio from 
country i. 
MF(X)j,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: i) the market risk factor represents by the stock 
market index return (Market), and ii) the interest rate risk factor represents by the unexpected changes 
of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈[	U+^k, D]. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for financial sector portfolio from 
country i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t  = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day 
t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, 
which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial 
sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the 
financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
εi,t  = the estimated residual for financial sector portfolio return in country i over day t. 
hi,j,t  = the conditional covariance between the returns of financial sector portfolios in country i and 
country j over day t, while hi,i,t represents the conditional variance of the financial sector portfolio 
return in country i over day t. 
aii,pre/post = the parameter represents the ARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
bii,pre/post = the parameter represents the GARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis 
period (post) for country i over day t. 
DUM  = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, 
and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country Japan UK US 
All Size Portfolio  Coeff. Z-stat. Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation   
Constant 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.713 0.000 -0.465   
Market (βi,Market) 0.989 23.264 *** 0.288 17.172 *** 0.837 40.816 *** 
IR (βi,IR) -0.018 -0.927 0.007 0.604 -0.014 -1.391   
FX (gi,Japan) 0.069 0.766 -0.106 -3.649 *** 0.011 0.348   
FX (gi,UK) -0.036 -0.268 0.053 1.314 0.110 2.680 *** 
FX (gi,US) -0.194 -1.744 * 0.007 0.193 0.011 0.312   
FX-Var (zi,Japan) -0.001 -0.046 0.001 0.016 0.000 -0.123   
FX-Var(zi,UK) -0.001 -0.023 0.000 -0.034 -0.001 -0.054   
FX-Var (zi,US) 0.000 -0.008 0.001 0.187 0.000 -0.007   
DUM*FX (γi,Japan) 0.064 0.449 0.112 2.579 *** -0.083 -1.648  * 
DUM*FX (γi,UK) 0.012 0.065 0.018 0.339 -0.161 -2.561 *** 
DUM*FX (γi,US) -0.066 -0.341 0.005 0.099 0.035 0.564   
DUM*FX-Var(θi,Japan) -0.002 -0.014 0.005 0.013 -0.001 -0.020   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,UK) -0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.028   
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DUM*FX-Var (θi,US) -0.001 -0.042 0.001 0.083 -0.001 -0.008   
Variance Equation                 
ARCH (aii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.025 0.629 0.000 0.305 0.002 0.431   
GARCH (bii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.975 25.079 *** 0.995 395.790 *** 1.000 198.560 *** 
ARCH (aii2, Post-Crisis) 0.038 3.182 *** 0.007 0.754 0.083 6.012 *** 
GARCH (bii2, Post-Crisis) 0.965 93.770 *** 0.991 114.400 *** 0.926 81.733 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.000 0.995 1.002   
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.004 0.998 1.009   
Log-Likelihood 19902.0                 
 
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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As discussed in the methodology section, we include the market and interest rate risk 
factors because pervious empirical studies show that they have the potential to influence 
the returns of the financial institutions.  Therefore, a model without these risk factors may 
suffer from inefficiency and biasness due to omitted variables.  However, in the current 
study, our main focus is on the relationship between the currency value fluctuation and 
the return performances of financial sector portfolios.  Therefore, we only discuss the 
estimated coefficients for the currency related risk factors in this chapter.256  However, it is 
worth noting that the estimated volatility persistence is higher than unity for most 
financial sector portfolios, especially during the post-crisis period (i.e. 1.020 for the U.S. 
banking portfolio).  The high persistence is mainly caused by the higher ARCH effect 
observed during the post-crisis period compared to its pre-crisis level.  This finding might 
due to the fact that the conditional volatility is more sensitive to current shocks when 
financial market is volatile.  The finding suggests that the impact of current shocks on 
volatility will not decline geometrically over time but enhanced instead (i.e. non-stationary 
GARCH process).  One possible explanation could be that the simple GARCH-type 
models can no-longer accurately evaluate the behavior of financial assets’ conditional 
volatility during the recent financial crisis as the distribution of returns might have fat tails 
(Carnero et al., 2004).257  
The currency related risk factors refer to the home and foreign FX and FX_Var.  In 
order to present these estimated coefficients in a clear fashion, we create another set of 
summary tables.258  Table 4.9 contains the estimated coefficient of the significant currency 
                                                          
256 For discussion on the market risk factor of the financial institutions and potential size effects please see 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997), De Nicoló et al (2004), and Elyasiani et al (2007) among others. For discussion 
on the interest rate risk factors, please see Staikouras (2003 and 2006). 
257  For instance, Exponential GARCH or Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle GARCH model might be good 
alternatives.   
258 In these summary tables, we only report the estimated coefficients from Spec.1, 3, 5, and 7 as they all have 
the structural break feature in their model specifications.   
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related risk factors for the banking portfolios, while Table 4.10 and 4.11 summarize the 
estimated coefficients of the significant currency related risk factors for the life and non-
life insurance portfolios, respectively.   
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Table 4.9  Significant Currency Related Risk Factors for the Banking Portfolios. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficients for significant FX and FX_Var effects from the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  For foreign FX and 
FX_Var effect, the origin country of the foreign currency will be specified. In order to illustrate the potential change in FX and FX_Var effect during the 
recent financial crisis, only the model specifications with the DUM variable (Spec.1, 3, 5, and 7) are reported in the following table.  The currency 
related parameters for Spec.1 are selected from Table 4.6.  The four model specifications are demonstrated as follow: 
 
Mean Equation Spec.1: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.3: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, + ⋅γNS, + ⋅θN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.5: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.7: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + ⋅γNS, + S,   
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
where,  
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted 
ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t  = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH 
model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
γi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
θi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
DUM       = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country Japan UK US 
Model Specification Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 
Home FX                 -0.041 -0.034 -0.040 -0.032 
 z-stat.       (-1.853) (-1.864) (-1.813) (-1.751) 
Home FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
DUM*Home FX 0.130 0.127       
 z-stat. (1.643) (1.685)       
DUM*Home FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
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Foreign FX USD: -0.097   USD: -0.099   USD: 0.111   USD: 0.109       
 z-stat. (-1.782)   (-1.816)   (1.688)   (1.673)       
Foreign FX_Var                       
 z-stat.                       
DUM*Foreign FX             JPY: -0.200   JPY: -0.200   
 z-stat.             (-4.055)   (-4.057)   
DUM*Foreign FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                         
 
Note: The estimated coefficient for Home FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency value in country i have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio in the same 
country, while the Foreign FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency j have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio from country i. For Foreign FX / FX_Var effects 
the name of currency j is specified before the estimated coefficient. The JPY, GBP and USD refer to Japanese Yen, British Pound, and US Dollar, respectively.  For instance, for financial 
sector portfolio from US, the JPY: -0.050 for the Foreign FX effect represents that for 1% appreciation in JPY the return will cause 0.05% decrease for financial sector portfolio from US.  The 
shadings in the above table means the corresponding FX and/or FX_Var effects are not available for the model specification. 
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From Table 4.9, one can see that the home and foreign FX_Var do not have a significant 
impact on the return performances of the banking portfolios.  In addition, the result shows 
that the relationship between changes in home currency value and the return 
performances of Japanese and UK banking portfolio is not significant over the estimation 
period.  Previous studies argue that the lack of significance of home currency exposure 
may due to the effective hedging practice carried out by the firms (Levi, 1994; Bartov et al, 
1996; Chow et al, 1997a).  Also, empirical studies by Cummins et al (1996) and Grant and 
Marshall (1997) both confirm the use of derivatives can be an effective way to hedge 
currency exposures.  The data provided by BoE suggests that foreign currency derivative 
was indeed one of the heavily used hedging instruments by UK banks over the last decade, 
especially during the crisis period.259  On average, the outstanding volume of foreign 
currency related derivatives occupied around 25 percent of the total volume of financial 
derivatives used by the UK banking industry.260  Therefore, we argue that the lack of home 
currency exposure for the UK banks is mainly due to the effective hedging activities.   
The only exception is the banks from the US market.  Empirical evidence shows that 
the home currency exposure of the US banking portfolio is significantly negative over the 
whole estimation period.  The estimated coefficients for home FX is varied from -0.041 in 
Spec.1 to -0.032 in Spec.7 for the US banking portfolio.  We believe the significant currency 
exposure of the US banking sector is mainly coming from the small banks, as they have 
less incentive to hedge their currency exposures due to the economics of scale for hedging 
                                                          
259 The data on outstanding volume of financial derivative is collected from the Financial Derivative Position of 
Banks at Market Values (F1.1) table provided by BoE, see: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/bankstats/current/tabf1.1.xls  
260 The most heavily used financial derivative was the interest rate related derivatives, which represents 
more than 50 percent of the total derivative usage in terms of market value.  The commodity and credit 
related derivatives only represented around 13 and 7 percent of the total derivative volume used by the UK 
banking industry, respectively. 
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activities.  We will discuss the phenomenon based on the estimation result of large and 
small size banking portfolios in the next section.   
The coefficient of foreign FX risk factor is significant for most banking portfolios 
during the pre-crisis period, and all banking portfolios are sensitive to foreign FX 
fluctuations during the post-crisis period.  The result indicates that the returns of all the 
banking portfolios are influenced by the changes in foreign currency value.  The estimated 
coefficient of foreign (USD) FX risk factor is -0.097 for the Japanese banking portfolio over 
the entire estimation period. 261   Similarly, the estimated coefficient of foreign (JPY) 
DUM*FX risk factor is -0.200 for the US banking portfolio during the crisis period.262  In 
other words, the empirical evidence suggests that the changes in JPY (USD) value have a 
negative impact on the return of US (Japanese) banking portfolio.   
In order to explain the meaning of the foreign FX risk factors and their influence on 
financial sector portfolios, we need to first examine the interactions among the three 
currencies.  According to our “shift of funding” hypothesis, the changes in currency value 
can be treated as an alternative measure of investors’ preference towards the global 
financial markets.  Since a country’s currency value is related to the willingness of holding 
financial asset in this country (Branson, 1983; and Frankel, 1983), as investors shift their 
investments from one market to another the currency value of these countries should 
change accordingly.  Melvin and Taylor (2009) support our hypothesis by showing the 
value of JPY is steadily increasing during the recent financial crisis because Japanese 
financial market did not suffer from the recent financial crisis as much as the European 
                                                          
261 The sign and value of the estimated coefficients for FX and FX_Var are similar across different model 
specifications, which reinforce the fact that there is no multicolinearity among these variables.  The 
consistence across these model specifications also indicates that the estimation process is unbiased.  In order 
to save space, we only present the estimation result from Spec.1 for the rest of the paper unless specified. 
262 The estimation coefficient of a currency risk factor during the crisis period is equal to the estimated 
coefficient over the entire estimation period (FX or FX_Var) plus the estimated dummy variable during the 
crisis period (DUM*FX or DUM*FX_Var). [-0.200 = 0 (FX) – 0.200 (DUM*FX)] 
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countries and the US.  In contrast, the value of GBP and USD is in a downward channel 
since the start of the crisis.263  Under our “shift of funding” hypothesis, the GBP and USD 
depreciated because the economic risk level in the UK and US markets increased 
dramatically during the crisis period.  Therefore, investors would “fly” away from these 
two markets, and “fly” into the Japanese market which was not been as severally damaged 
as the other two.  This “shift of funding” will increase the demand for JPY and drive up 
the JPY value, while reduce the value of the currencies as well as the financial assets in the 
other two markets. Therefore, the return of financial sectors in the UK and US markets 
should have an inverse relationship with the value of JPY.  In contrast, the Japanese 
financial market benefits from the depreciation of the GBP and USD.  As one can see from 
Table 4.9, the relationship between the changes in JPY (USD) and the return of US 
(Japanese) banking portfolio is indeed negative.   Therefore, the empirical evidence 
supports our “shift of funding” hypothesis between the two national markets.   
The equity value of the UK banking industry is positively related to the changes in 
the USD value, with the estimated coefficient of foreign (USD) FX risk factor is 0.111 over 
the whole estimation period.  This finding reinforces our “shift of funding” hypothesis.  
The UK and the US financial markets were highly connected over the sample period.264  
The empirical study by Chiang and Zheng (2010) also shows the UK and US financial 
markets are highly linked through herding effect.265  In other words, the investors who 
invest in the UK market are closely following the behavior of the investors who invest in 
the US market.  Therefore, when investors move away from the US financial market, the 
                                                          
263 We also illustrate the time series of the three currency price indices over the sample period in Figure 4.1. 
264 From Table 4, one can see the unconditional correlation between the UK and US markets is 53.4% over the 
entire sample period, which is the highest among the three. 
265 In their study, the herding effect is defined as the phenomenon that a group of investors trading in the 
same direction.  Their sample period is from 1989 till 2009 which covers most of the sample period used in 
the present study. 
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UK financial market is likely to suffer as well.  Since the value of USD will decrease when 
investors shift their investments away from the US financial market, the USD value should 
have a positive relationship with the performance of UK financial market.  In addition, the 
UK banking sector is highly exposed to the market risk.  The estimation result from Table 
4.6 shows the market beta of UK banking portfolio is 0.931 over the sample period.  That 
means the changes in USD value should be positively related to the return of UK banking 
sector. 
Another interesting finding from Table 4.9 is that the impact of home FX risk factor 
on Japanese banking portfolio has changed during the crisis period.  The estimated 
coefficient of home DUM*FX risk factor is 0.130 based on model Spec.1.  That means the 
changes in JPY value has a positive and significant impact on the return of Japanese banks 
over the crisis period.266  We argue the reason behind this change in home currency 
exposure is mainly due to the large amount of foreign losses for the Japanese banks over 
the crisis period.  Since foreign losses are recorded in foreign currency value, an increase 
in home currency value will reduce the amount of foreign losses in home currency terms.  
Therefore, banks with large amount of foreign losses should benefit from the appreciation 
of home currency.  Our argument is supported by the accounting data from Japanese 
Bankers Association (JBA).267  The annual amount of written-off of loans for the Japanese 
banking sector has ballooned from JPY 452,273 million in 2007 to JPY 1,409,363 million in 
2009, with the largest annual increase of JPY 750,036 million from 2008 to 2009.   
  
                                                          
266 The estimated coefficient 0.130 (from Table 6) is marginally insignificant (Z-stat.=1.643) at the 10% level 
(critical value 1.645).  In order to prevent Type II error, we treat this parameter is significant at the 10% level 
in the current study. 
267 The information of accounting data is collected from the aggregate annual banking sector financial 
statements (2006 – 2010) issued by the JBA.  The financial statements are available from JBA’s website, 
www.zenginkyo.org.jp. 
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Table 4.10  Significant Currency Related Risk Factors for the Life Insurance Portfolios. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficients for significant FX and FX_Var effects from the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  For foreign FX and 
FX_Var effect, the origin country of the foreign currency will be specified. In order to illustrate the potential change in FX and FX_Var effect during the 
recent financial crisis, only the model specifications with the DUM variable (Spec.1, 3, 5, and 7) are reported in the following table.  The currency 
related parameters for Spec.1 are selected from Table 4.7.  The four model specifications are demonstrated as follow: 
 
Mean Equation Spec.1: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.3: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, + ⋅γNS, + ⋅θN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.5: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.7: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + ⋅γNS, + S,   
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
 
where,  
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted 
ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t  = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH 
model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
γi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
θi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
DUM       = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country UK U.S. 
Model Specification Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 
Home FX 0.159 0.163 0.167 0.163         
 z-stat. (2.539) (2.570) (2.669) (2.572)     
Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
DUM*Home FX       
 z-stat.       
DUM*Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
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Foreign FX JPY: -0.121   JPY: -0.100         
 z-stat. (-2.834)   (-2.334)         
Foreign FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
DUM*Foreign FX       JPY: -0.346   JPY: -0.327   
 z-stat.       (-4.481)   (-4.251)   
DUM*Foreign FX_Var             
 z-stat.                 
 
Note: The estimated coefficient for Home FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency value in country i have an significant impact on 
financial sector portfolio in the same country, while the Foreign FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency j have an significant 
impact on financial sector portfolio from country i. For Foreign FX / FX_Var effects the name of currency j is specified before the estimated 
coefficient. The JPY, GBP and USD refer to Japanese Yen, British Pound, and US Dollar, respectively.  For instance, for financial sector portfolio 
from US, the JPY: -0.050 for the Foreign FX effect represents that for 1% appreciation in JPY the return will cause 0.05% decrease for financial 
sector portfolio from US.  The shadings in the above table means the corresponding FX and/or FX_Var effects are not available for the model 
specification. 
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Table 4.10 contains the estimated coefficient of the significant currency risk factors for the 
life insurance portfolios.  Similar to the findings from banking portfolios, the estimated 
coefficients of the home and foreign FX_Var are also not significant over the entire 
estimation period.  The reason behind the insignificant FX_Var is mainly because the 
insurers are not the main dealers for currency derivatives.  As discussed in the previous 
section, the conditional volatility of the currency value fluctuation influences the return of 
financial institutions through its impact on the sales volume of currency related 
derivatives (Koutmos and Martin, 2003b).  The main dealer of derivative is banks instead 
of insurers.  That means the changes in the sales volume of derivative should not have an 
impact on the profitability of the insurance companies.  Therefore, the return of insurance 
companies should not be affected by the home and foreign FX_Var.   
From Table 4.10, one can see that the life insurance sector in the UK market is 
exposure to the changes in home currency value.  The estimated coefficient of home FX 
risk factor is 0.159 for UK life insurance portfolio based on model Spec.1.  Mange (2000) 
argues that the return of the life insurers can be positively linked with the home currency 
value through issuing insurance products into oversea markets.  He shows that as the 
home currency value increases, the amount of payables in foreign currency terms will be 
reduced.  Therefore, the life insurance companies will benefit from the appreciation of the 
home currency.  Based on a theoretical framework, he further argues that the positive 
impact of home currency value fluctuation on the return of life insurers can be very strong 
if the products they issued are long-term ones.   
The data from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) confirms this argument.268  
According to the information provided by ABI, around twenty percent of the net premium 
                                                          
268 The information is collected from several documents issued by ABI.  The relevant documents include the 
UK Insurance – Key Facts, the Annual Invested Assets Overview Statistics, the Long-term Insurance Net Premium 
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income of UK insurance sector is coming from oversea, and more than seventy percent of 
that is coming from sales of long-term products.  Therefore, it is reasonable that the return 
of the UK life insurance portfolio will be influenced by the fluctuation of GBP value in a 
positive way. 
Based on the estimation result of foreign FX, one can see that the returns of both the 
UK and US life insurance portfolios are negatively related to the changes in JPY value.  
The estimated coefficient of foreign (JPY) FX risk factor for the UK life insurance portfolio 
is -0.121 over the entire estimation period, while the foreign (JPY) DUM*FX risk factor is 
negative and significant (-0.346) for the US life insurance portfolio over the crisis period.  
Once again, we show that the increase in JPY value is an indication that investors prefer 
the Japanese market over the other two national markets.  As investors shift their 
investments from the UK and US markets into the Japanese market, they drive up the JPY 
value and reduce the value of the other two financial markets.  Therefore, the changes in 
JPY value have a negative impact on the return of both the US life insurance sectors, 
especially during the crisis period.     
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Income Statistics, and the Annual General Insurance Overview Statistics, which are available on the ABI website, 
www.abi.org.uk. 
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Table 4.11  Significant Currency Related Risk Factors for the Non-Life Insurance Portfolios. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficients for significant FX and FX_Var effects from the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  For foreign FX and 
FX_Var effect, the origin country of the foreign currency will be specified. In order to illustrate the potential change in FX and FX_Var effect during the 
recent financial crisis, only the model specifications with the DUM variable (Spec.1, 3, 5, and 7) are reported in the following table.  The currency 
related parameters for Spec.1 are selected from Table 4.8.  The four model specifications are demonstrated as follow: 
 
Mean Equation Spec.1: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.3: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, + ⋅γNS, + ⋅θN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.5: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.7: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + ⋅γNS, + S,   
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
where,  
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted 
ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t  = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH 
model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
γi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
θi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
DUM       = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Country Japan UK US 
Model Specification Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 
Home FX                         
 z-stat.         
Home FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
DUM*Home FX         
 z-stat.         
DUM*Home FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
Foreign FX USD: -0.194   USD: -0.190   JPY: -0.106   JPY: -0.108   GBP: 0.110   GBP: 0.099   
 z-stat. (-1.744)   (-1.747)   (-3.649)   (-3.731)   (2.680)   (2.418)   
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Foreign FX_Var                       
 z-stat.                       
DUM*Foreign FX       JPY: 0.112   JPY: 0.129   JPY: -0.083 / GBP: -0.161   JPY: -0.092/GBP: -0.173   
 z-stat.       (2.579)   (2.966)   (-1.648)/(-2.561)    (-1.814)/(-2.778)   
DUM*Foreign FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                         
 
Note: The estimated coefficient for Home FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency value in country i have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio in the same country, 
while the Foreign FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency j have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio from country i. For Foreign FX / FX_Var effects the name of 
currency j is specified before the estimated coefficient. The JPY, GBP and USD refer to Japanese Yen, British Pound, and US Dollar, respectively.  For instance, for financial sector portfolio from US, 
the JPY: -0.050 for the Foreign FX effect represents that for 1% appreciation in JPY the return will cause 0.05% decrease for financial sector portfolio from US.  The shadings in the above table means 
the corresponding FX and/or FX_Var effects are not available for the model specification. 
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The significant currency risk factors for non-life insurance portfolios are presented in 
Table 4.11.  Consistent with the findings from banking and life insurance portfolios, the 
estimated coefficients of the home and foreign FX_Var risk factors are not significant over 
the sample period.  Furthermore, the non-life insurance portfolios are all free from home 
currency exposure, as none of the estimated coefficient of home FX is significant over the 
estimation period. 
By investigating the impact of foreign FX value fluctuations on the return of non-life 
insurance portfolios, we find the result is similar to the one for the banking sectors.  For 
the Japanese market, the changes in USD value have a negative and significant impact on 
the return of non-life insurance portfolios.  The estimated coefficient of foreign (USD) FX 
risk factor is -0.194 over the estimation period.  For US non-life insurance portfolio, 
estimated coefficient of foreign (JPY) DUM*FX risk factor is -0.083 during the crisis 
period.269   The empirical evidence is once again in line with our “shift of funding” 
hypothesis as foreign FX has a negative impact on the return of home institutions.  As 
investors shift their investments from one market to another, the currency value and the 
performances of the national financial markets move in opposite direction. 
The changes in GBP value are positively related with the return of the US non-life 
insurance portfolio before the financial crisis.  The estimated coefficient of foreign (GBP) 
FX risk factor is 0.110 for the US non-life insurers.  The finding is similar to the positive 
linkage between the USD value fluctuation and the return of the UK banks over the whole 
sample period.  The positive relationship between the currency value of one market and 
financial sector return of another market indicates that the two markets are highly 
connected.  However, this relationship has changed dramatically during the financial 
                                                          
269 It is worth noting that the t-statistics of the estimated coefficient is only marginally above the 10% 
significance level (1.645).  Therefore, the economic value of the JPY effect on US non-life insurance portfolios 
could be minimal if not negligible. 
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crisis.  The estimated coefficient of foreign (GBP) DUM*FX risk factor is -0.161 for the US 
non-life insurers.  That means the relationship between the changes in GBP value and the 
return of the US non-life insurance portfolio has dropped from 0.110 to -0.051 over the 
crisis period.270  One possible explanation for this could be that investors no longer treat 
the equities of non-life insurance sectors in these two markets as financial assets with 
similar characteristics.  Therefore, the currency value changes in one market can no long 
served as the indicator of investors’ preference for the financial assets in the other market.  
We believe the change is mainly due to the differences between the asset compositions of 
the two non-life insurance sectors.  The asset composition of a firm provides important 
information about the firm’s risk composition, and therefore, is a good indicator of its risk 
characteristic.  The data provided by Swiss Re indicates that during the financial crisis, the 
asset compositions of the two non-life insurance sectors are distinctively different.271  The 
UK non-life insurers invest more than fifteen percent of their asset into real estate and 
property-secured loans, while the non-life insurers in the US market have not property 
related assets in 2008.    
The empirical evidence on the relationship between changes in JPY value and the 
return performances of UK non-life insurance portfolio also provides some interesting 
result.  The estimated coefficient of foreign (JPY) FX risk factor is -0.106 for UK non-life 
insurance portfolio.  In order words, the changes in JPY value have a negative impact on 
the equity value of UK non-life insurers.  The finding is consistent with our “shift of 
funding” hypothesis, as investors move away from the UK financial market into Japanese 
                                                          
270 The influence of foreign (GBP) FX risk factor on the performances of US non-life insurance sector portfolio 
is -0.051 over the crisis period.  The value -0.051 is generated by summing up the estimated coefficients of 
both the foreign (GBP) FX risk factor and the foreign (GBP) DUM*FX risk factor.  The FX risk factor 
represents the impact of the changes in currency value over the entire sample period, while the DUM*FX 
risk factor represents the changes in the magnitude of the risk factor during the crisis period. [-0.051 = 0.110 
(FX) - 0.161 (DUM*FX)]  
271 The information is collected from the report by the Swiss Re under the title: SIGMA – Insurance Investment 
in a Challenging Global Environment (2010), which is available from Swiss Re’s website, www.swissre.com. 
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market, the value of the UK financial assets will drop while the JPY value will rise.  
However, the relationship has changed during the crisis period.  The estimated coefficient 
of foreign (JPY) DUM*FX risk factor is 0.112 for the UK non-life insurance portfolio, which 
means the relationship between the JPY value fluctuation and the return performances of 
UK non-life insurers has changed from negative (-0.106) to positive (0.006) during the 
recent financial crisis.272  
 
4.5.3. Currency Value and Size Effect 
The size effect in currency exposure has been documented in the previous empirical 
studies.  The relationship between the currency value fluctuation and the returns of firms 
with different market size may be different due to their incentive to hedge (Mian, 1996), or 
the risk characteristics associate with their size (He and Ng, 1998).  In the present study, 
we also investigate the potential size effect of the currency exposure for the large and 
small size banking portfolios from the Japanese and US market.  The estimation result of 
the proposed VAR-BEKK model for these size portfolios is represented in Table 4.12.  In 
order to present the estimated coefficients of the currency related risk factors in a clear 
fashion, we also create a summary table (Table 4.13) for the currency related risk factors 
which are statistically significant.  
  
                                                          
272 The value 0.006 is generated by summing up the estimated coefficients of both the foreign (JPY) FX risk 
factor and the foreign (JPY) DUM*FX risk factor.  The FX risk factor represents the impact of the changes in 
currency value over the entire sample period, while the DUM*FX risk factor represents the changes in the 
magnitude of the risk factor during the crisis period. [0.006 = -0.106 (FX) + 0.112 (DUM*FX)] 
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Table 4.12  Estimation Output of the VAR-BEKK Model for Large and Small Size 
Banking Portfolios. 
Mean Equation:          +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Variance Equation:    ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [0, τ]		           
   	ℎ,S, = T,S,X + U,X,01S,01US,X + W,Xℎ,S,01WS,X , with	k ∈ [τ + 1, K]   
               with i and j ∈ [Japan, US], and τ represents the September 15, 2008. 
 where, 
ri,t  = the return for financial sector portfolio from country i over day t. 
αi  = represents the constant of the conditional mean equation for financial sector portfolio from 
country i. 
MF(X)j,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: i) the market risk factor represents by the stock 
market index return (Market), and ii) the interest rate risk factor represents by the unexpected changes 
of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for financial sector portfolio i over day t, with X ∈[	U+^k, D]. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for financial sector portfolio from 
country i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t  = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day 
t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, 
which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial 
sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the 
financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j 
towards the financial sector portfolio in country i during the crisis period. 
εi,t  = the estimated residual for financial sector portfolio return in country i over day t. 
hi,j,t  = the conditional covariance between the returns of financial sector portfolios in country i and 
country j over day t, while hi,i,t represents the conditional variance of the financial sector portfolio 
return in country i over day t. 
aii,pre/post = the parameter represents the ARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis period 
(post) for country i over day t. 
bii,pre/post = the parameter represents the GARCH effect before the crisis period (pre) / during the crisis 
period (post) for country i over day t. 
DUM  = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, 
and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
 
Panel A: Large Size Banking Sector Portfolios 
Country Japan US 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation             
Constant 0.000 -0.860   0.000 -2.582 *** 
Market (βi,Market) 0.944 46.104 *** 0.980 47.184 *** 
IR (βi,IR) 0.004 0.311   0.035 2.731 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) 0.012 0.218   -0.035 -0.930   
FX (gi,UK) 0.033 0.393   0.013 0.317   
FX (gi,US) -0.159 -2.413 *** -0.054 -1.367   
FX-Var (zi,Japan) -0.003 -0.012   -0.005 -0.032   
FX-Var(zi,UK) -0.003 -0.029   -0.001 -0.030   
FX-Var (zi,US) 0.000 -0.032   0.000 0.060   
DUM*FX (γi,Japan) 0.130 1.640 † -0.270 -3.686 *** 
DUM*FX (γi,UK) 0.009 0.075   -0.171 -1.775 * 
DUM*FX (γi,US) 0.045 0.431   0.066 0.600   
DUM*FX-Var(θi,Japan) -0.009 -0.015   -0.003 -0.031   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,UK) -0.004 -0.009   -0.001 -0.020   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,US) -0.004 -0.016   0.000 -0.022   
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Variance Equation             
ARCH (aii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.068   0.099 0.689   
GARCH (bii2, Pre-Crisis) 1.004 234.180 *** 0.912 7.121 *** 
ARCH (aii2, Post-Crisis) 0.069 6.792 *** 0.065 6.720 *** 
GARCH (bii2, Post-Crisis) 0.936 114.730 *** 0.937 114.970 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.004     1.011     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.006     1.002     
Log-Likelihood 12791.0           
 
 
Panel B: Small Size Banking Sector Portfolios 
Country Japan US 
Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation             
Constant 0.000 -0.862   0.000 -1.235   
Market (βi,Market) 0.732 35.366 *** 0.309 31.239 *** 
IR (βi,IR) 0.019 1.859 * 0.031 5.172 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) -0.018 -0.383   -0.018 -1.061   
FX (gi,UK) -0.028 -0.417   0.004 0.211   
FX (gi,US) -0.072 -1.104   -0.044 -2.333 *** 
FX-Var (zi,Japan) 0.003 0.026   0.005 0.029   
FX-Var(zi,UK) -0.002 -0.062   0.004 0.042   
FX-Var (zi,US) 0.001 0.032   0.007 0.027   
DUM*FX (γi,Japan) 0.119 1.455   -0.195 -3.973 *** 
DUM*FX (γi,UK) 0.047 0.497   -0.026 -0.469   
DUM*FX (γi,US) -0.017 -0.167   -0.057 -0.931   
DUM*FX-Var(θi,Japan) 0.001 0.044   0.004 0.067   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,UK) -0.002 -0.040   0.001 0.050   
DUM*FX-Var (θi,US) -0.002 -0.038   0.000 0.028   
Variance Equation             
ARCH (aii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.004 -0.803   0.089 1.249   
GARCH (bii2, Pre-Crisis) 0.999 211.970 *** 0.950 16.609 *** 
ARCH (aii2, Post-Crisis) 0.053 4.873 *** 0.194 8.736 *** 
GARCH (bii2, Post-Crisis) 0.952 110.880 *** 0.831 58.155 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.004     1.040     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.004     1.025     
Log-Likelihood 14394.0           
       
Note: ***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
† represents the test statistic is marginally insignificant at 10% level (critical value 
equals to 1.645).  In order to avoid Type-II error, in the current study, we define † is 
significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4.13  Significant Currency Related Risk Factors for the Large and Small Banking Portfolios. 
The table below summarizes the estimated coefficients for significant FX and FX_Var effects from the proposed VAR-BEKK model.  For foreign FX and 
FX_Var effect, the origin country of the foreign currency will be specified. In order to illustrate the potential change in FX and FX_Var effect during the 
recent financial crisis, only the model specifications with the DUM variable (Spec.1, 3, 5, and 7) are reported in the following table.  The currency 
related parameters for Spec.1 are selected from Table 4.12.  The four model specifications are demonstrated as follow: 
 
Mean Equation Spec.1: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, +∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.3: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + HN_U+S, + ⋅γNS, + ⋅θN_U+S, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.5: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + ∑G,SNS, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + S,   
Mean Equation Spec.7: +, = α +	∑,e`Nb, + GNS, + ⋅γNS, + S,   
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
where,  
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in country j over day t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted 
ARMA-GARCH model. 
FX_Vari,t  = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for country j over day t, which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH 
model together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i over the whole 
sample period. 
γi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
θi,j = the parameter represents the changes in the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in country j towards the financial sector portfolio in country i 
during the crisis period. 
DUM       = the dummy variable represents the current financial crisis. DUM = 0 before September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
 
Panel A: Large Size Banking Sector Portfolios. 
Country Japan US 
Model Specification Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 
Home FX                 
 z-stat.       
Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
DUM*Home FX 0.130 0.136     
 z-stat. (1.640) (1.711)     
DUM*Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
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Foreign FX USD: -0.159   USD: -0.154         
 z-stat. (-2.413)   (-2.342)         
Foreign FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
DUM*Foreign FX       JPY: -0.270 / UK: -0.171   JPY: -0.265 / UK: -0.167   
 z-stat.       (-3.686) / (-1.775)    (-3.632) / (-1.734)   
DUM*Foreign FX_Var             
 z-stat.                 
 
 
Panel B:  Small Size Banking Sector Portfolios. 
Country Japan US 
Model Specification Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 Spec. 1 Spec. 3 Spec. 5 Spec. 7 
Home FX         -0.044 -0.039 -0.044 -0.039 
 z-stat.   (-2.333) (-2.452) (-2.304) (-2.464) 
Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
DUM*Home FX       
 z-stat.       
DUM*Home FX_Var             
 z-stat.             
Foreign FX             
 z-stat.             
Foreign FX_Var                 
 z-stat.                 
DUM*Foreign FX       JPY: -0.195   JPY: -0.194   
 z-stat.       (-3.973)   (-3.980)   
DUM*Foreign FX_Var             
 z-stat.                 
 
Note: The estimated coefficient for Home FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency value in country i have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio in 
the same country, while the Foreign FX / FX_Var effects indicate the fluctuation of currency j have an significant impact on financial sector portfolio from country i. For Foreign 
FX / FX_Var effects the name of currency j is specified before the estimated coefficient. The JPY, GBP and USD refer to Japanese Yen, British Pound, and US Dollar, 
respectively.  For instance, for financial sector portfolio from US, the JPY: -0.050 for the Foreign FX effect represents that for 1% appreciation in JPY the return will cause 0.05% 
decrease for financial sector portfolio from US.  The shadings in the above table means the corresponding FX and/or FX_Var effects are not available for the model 
specification. 
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From Table 4.13, one can see that only the small size US banking portfolio expose to home 
currency value fluctuation over the entire sample period.  The estimated coefficient of 
home FX for the US small banks is -0.044 based on model Spec.1.  In contrast, the large 
banks in the US market are free from the home currency exposure.  One potential 
explanation behind this size effect is the economics of scale for hedging activities.  As 
showed in Mian (1996), large size firms are more likely to involve into hedging activities 
compares to the smaller ones because the economic incentive for hedging is higher.273   
Opposite result has been found for Japanese banks over the crisis period.  The 
estimated coefficient of home DUM*FX risk factor (0.130) for large Japanese banks is 
significant.274  For small Japanese banks, however, no home FX risk factor is statistically 
significant.  In order words, the changes in JPY value is positively related with the equity 
value of large banks in the Japanese market over the crisis period, but not the small one.  
The reason behind the positive relationship between the JPY value fluctuation and the 
return of large size Japanese banking portfolio may due to that large banks have large 
amount of foreign losses during the recent financial crisis.   
Banks with large amount of write-offs should benefit more from the home currency 
appreciation than the one with less foreign losses, since the appreciation of home currency 
will reduce the value of foreign losses in home currency terms.  Chamberlain et al (1997) 
suggest that large size financial institutions are more likely to involve in the international 
activities.  Therefore, large banks are more likely to expose to foreign losses during the 
recent financial crisis than the small ones.  As a result, the large banks should enjoy more 
benefits as the home value appreciates.  The information provided by JBA supports our 
                                                          
273 Nance et al (1993) suggest that it is not cost efficient to hedge a risk exposure with a market value less 
than 5 to 10 million in USD. 
274 The estimated coefficient 0.130 (from Table 4.12) is marginally insignificant (Z-stat.=1.640) at the 10% level 
(critical value 1.645).  In order to prevent Type II error, we treat this parameter is significant at the 10% level 
in the current study. 
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arguments.275  The large banks indeed entitled to more foreign related write-offs during 
the crisis period.  The value of written-off loans for large Japanese banks is more than 
twice the amount for the rest of the Japanese banks in 2008 and 2009.276   
The estimated coefficient of foreign (JPY) DUM*FX risk factor is -0.270 and -0.195 
based on model Spec.1 for the large and small size US banking portfolio, respectively.  In 
order words, the changes in JPY value have a negative and significant impact on the 
equity value of the large and small size US banking portfolios over the crisis period.  The 
changes in USD value also have a negative and significant impact on the Japanese banks, 
but only the large ones.  The estimated coefficient of foreign (USD) FX risk factor for large 
size Japanese banking portfolio is -0.159 over the entire sample period.  This finding is 
consistent with the empirical evidence based on the all size banking portfolios in Table 4.9.  
In order words, the empirical evidence supports our “shift of funding” hypothesis.  
Therefore, the financial assets in the Japanese market benefit from the depreciation of USD, 
while the US financial market suffers from the JPY value appreciation.   
However, there is no significant foreign (USD) FX risk factor for small size Japanese 
banking portfolio, even during the crisis period.  That means the small size Japanese 
banking portfolio does not benefit from the depreciation of USD, which seems not 
consistent with our “shift of funding” hypothesis.  We argue that the reason behind this 
violation is mainly due to the low liquidity of the small firm.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, investors prefer assets with low risk and high liquidity, which is known 
as “flight-to-quality/liquidity”.  Hameed et al (2010) suggest that the market liquidity 
                                                          
275 The information of accounting data is collected from the aggregate annual banking sector financial 
statements (2006 – 2010) issued by the JBA.  The financial statements are available from JBA’s website, 
www.zenginkyo.org.jp. 
276 The JBA refers large size bank as “city bank”.  The number of city banks is only 5% of the total number of 
banks in the Japanese market (6 out of 120 in 2010), but occupies more than one-fifth of the market share in 
terms of funding-raising and loan-making.  The value of written-off loans is JPY 470,445 million and JPY 
1,002,194 million for city banks in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The value of written-off loans for the rest of 
the banks is JPY 188,882 million and JPY 407,169 million in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
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tends to decline during market downturn, which makes the investors even more concern 
about the liquidity of the asset during the crisis period.  Therefore, when investors 
reallocate their investments from the US market into the Japanese market during the crisis 
period, they would prefer the financial assets with higher liquidity over the lower ones.  
Previous empirical studies on liquidity premium suggest that small firms usually have 
lower liquidity compare to the large ones (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud, 
2002).  Therefore, small Japanese banks are less likely to benefit from the depreciation of 
USD compares to the big size banks, especially during the crisis period.  
 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
This empirical chapter uses the VAR-BEKK methodology to examine the relationship 
between the returns and currency exposure for a sample of U.S., U.K. and Japanese bank 
and insurance firms between January 2003 and March 2011.  We find little evidence that 
the portfolio returns of banks and insurance firms are related to the conditional variance of 
home or foreign currencies. 
Looking at the banking portfolios, we find that both home and foreign currency 
changes affect returns and the latter are more pervasive.  We also find that the impact of 
foreign currency on banking portfolios generally change after the recent financial crisis.  
Typically, the home currency effects on bank returns are found to be more important in 
the U.S. than in the U.K. or Japan – this is put down to the activities of relatively small 
banks who have less incentive to hedge or are otherwise limited in their currency hedging 
activities. 
Considering the results for insurance firms, we find that the portfolio returns of both 
U.K. and U.S. insurers are negatively related to changes in the JPY.  However, the impact 
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of the JPY on the U.K. insurers has changed from negative to positive during the crisis 
period.  For the Japanese insurers, changes in the USD have also a negative impact on their 
equity return over the entire sample period.  Furthermore, insurance portfolios are 
generally free from home currency exposure - apart from the U.K. insurers who have 
extensive operations in foreign markets.   
Finally, when size is taken into account, we find that only small U.S. banks are 
exposed to home currency value fluctuation over the entire sample period.  Furthermore, 
changes in the value of the USD (JPY) have a negative influence on large Japanese (U.S.) 
banks.    
We argue the negative relationship between the currency value of JPY (USD) and 
equity value of institutions in the U.S./UK (Japan) market is due to the  “shift of funding” 
phenomenon base on the “flight to quality” or “flight to liquidity” behaviour of investors.  
Investors shift their investments from sectors/countries with high uncertainty or low 
liquidity (i.e. the finaing sector in US/UK) into sectors/countries with high credit quality 
(i.e. the financial sector in Japan).  Therefore, the “flight to quality” or “flight to liquidity” 
behaviour will push the currency value of JPY (USD) and the equity value of US/UK 
(Japan) financial sector portfolio in an opposite direction.  Therefore, the “shift of funding” 
phenomenon will create an inverse relationship between the JPY and equity value of the 
US/UK financial sector portfolio.  Our results further indicate that there is a competitive 
effects exist between Japan and the U.K./U.S. in the sense of attracting investor’s funds, at 
least during our sample period.   
As a final point, the latest developments in financial markets (although credit-related) 
have cast doubt on the risk management attitude of financial institutions.  Governments 
and regulators across the world are currently working towards a safer financial system.  
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Future research should seek to investigate whether sector-specific features and/or 
regulatory frameworks of the markets under examination influence currency exposure 
relationships.  Appropriate modelling/methodologies attenuating the nature of market 
data could be of vital importance.  One should be very broad minded, however, when 
analysing both risk factors and regulatory/economic environments where financial 
institutions operate.  Any framework developed should bear in mind the dynamic market 
condition embracing financial intermediaries’ diverse activities and risk taking nature. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ON THE DYNAMIC OF ASSET CORRELATIONS: 
5. WHAT MATTERS TO PORTFOLIO MANAGERS? 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Apart from banks and insurers, non-banking financial service firms (e.g. mutual funds, 
pension funds and hedge funds) also play an increasingly important role in the modern 
financial market.  For instance, mutual funds are one of the fastest growing institution in 
the US since 1980 (Chen et al., 2004; Khorana et al., 2005), and now have become one of the 
primary investment vehicles for households with more than $21.4 trillion in assets under 
management worldwide (Cremers et al., 2011).  Similarly, the hedge fund industry has 
also has experienced a recent surge in popularity, with the number of funds and assets 
under management increasing at a much faster rate than in the mutual fund industry 
(Bollen and Pool, 2006).277   As a requirement for employers in most developed countries, 
pension fund is one of the biggest regulated financial service institutions in the world.  
The study conducted by Towers Watson shows that pension funds hold more than $27 
trillion assets in the world’s largest 13 developed countries/regions in 2011, which 
accounts for more than 72% of the GDP of these markets.278   
 The main functionality of these abovementioned non-banking financial institutions is 
to invest money for their clients.  According to recent study, different choices of asset 
allocation strategy account for above 90% of the difference in return for pension funds 
                                                          
277 The growth has generated a corresponding increase in aggregate managerial income. Incentive contracts 
are highly lucrative, usually including a guaranteed management fee between 1% and 2% of fund assets and 
a performance fee between 15% and 20% of fund profits. 
278 The report by Towers Watson is under the title “Global Pension Assets Study 2012”.  The largest 13 
developed countries/regions are Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherland, South Africa, Switzerland, UK and US. 
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(Bogle, 1994).   In other words, how to construct a portfolio with optimal combination of 
assets is the key to the success of any fund managers.   Besides, stability is also vital for 
fund management business from managers and regulators point of view.  Therefore, 
reduce risk while maintain a desirable level of return becomes increasingly important for 
the asset management industry, which could be achieved with the help of modern 
portfolio theory through diversification.   
Volatility and correlation among asset returns are central inputs of modern portfolio 
theory.  Over the last few decades, there has been a voluminous literature on time series 
models for the estimation of asset return volatility and their application in financial 
economics is abundant.  More recently, research focus has shifted to the estimation of the 
remainder of the covariance structure of asset returns, and many different multivariate 
models have been proposed for this purpose (Engle and Kroner, 1995; Engle, 2002; Engle 
and Sheppard, 2001).  As time-variation, asymmetry and structural breaks are fast 
becoming stylized facts of returns’ second moment (Cappiello et al, 2006), the evidence in 
favour of conditional correlation models for characterizing dynamics is quite compelling.  
Most extant studies on the evaluation of conditional correlation estimators largely focus on 
statistical metrics.  Engle and Sheppard (2001) are the first to show that the dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC) model outperforms the industry standard RiskMetrics 
exponential smoother on the basis of iid normal standardized residuals and more accurate 
portfolio standard deviations, while Engle and Colacito (2006) rank different multivariate 
conditional correlation minimum variance portfolios. 
Continuous advances in correlation modelling could potentially facilitate profitable 
investment or better risk management.  Several recent contributions have documented the 
economic value of conditional volatility forecasts for market timing (Fuertes et al, 2009; 
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Chong, 2005; Noh et al, 1994) or asset allocation (Fleming et al, 2001), but less attention has 
been paid to the value of explicitly modelling correlation dynamics.  This is an important 
issue with direct implications for investors and portfolio managers entertaining the use of 
conditional correlation models, such as the popular DCC (Engle, 2002), for correlation 
timing.  The well-documented statistical merits of multivariate volatility models are of 
little use if they do not translate into economic value.  The typically low association 
between statistical accuracy and profitability (Satchell and Timmermann, 1995) renders the 
question of whether there are incentives for investors to opt for dynamic asset allocation 
based on conditional correlation models even more pertinent.   
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold.  First, the benefits of 
correlation timing vis-à-vis static allocation are assessed and the impact of transaction 
costs on the strategy performance is scrutinized.  Second, the role of asset-specific 
dynamics, correlation asymmetries and structural breaks in sector portfolio management 
is statistically and economically evaluated.  Finally, we investigate the effect of rebalancing 
frequency on the performance of the correlation timing strategies.   
The empirical analysis is based on daily prices from ten sector indices in three 
markets (Japan, UK, US) over July 1, 1996 to May 31, 2007. The evaluation framework is 
designed to appraise the differences arising from rival correlation forecasting approaches, 
and for this reason the sample is divided into an in-sample estimation period (July 1, 1996 
to May 31, 2005) and a holdout evaluation period (June 1, 2005 to May 31, 2007). A 
dynamic mean-variance framework is deployed to construct portfolios based on different 
daily covariance matrix forecasts obtained using DCC models, which allow for time 
variation in both volatility and correlation. Variants of the DCC estimator are used to 
facilitate the modelling of asymmetries in the conditional correlations as well as structural 
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breaks in the long-run mean and in the dynamics of correlations. We adopt as industry 
benchmark the RiskMetrics exponential smoother which is a simple and viable way of 
estimating large dimensional covariance matrices. The evaluation framework draws upon 
the seminal work of Fleming et al. (2001), where the relative economic value of dynamic 
strategies is gauged by their ability to generate incremental utility to investors relative to 
static allocation as well as statistically significant increases in the Sharpe Ratio. The 
feasibility of correlation timing is judged on the basis of breakeven transaction costs, 
which account for the economic value and the turnover rate of the strategies, and the issue 
of optimal rebalancing frequency is explored. 
The findings suggest that timing correlation is fruitful to sector investors.  
Correlation timing strategies provide superior performance than the static constant 
covariance strategy and generally outperform the volatility-only timing strategy.  
Incorporating DCC-type models in asset allocation can enhance risk-adjusted returns and 
investor utility and even more so if correlation asymmetries and breaks are allowed for.  
The latter are found to be more beneficial than the nonparametric RiskMetrics approach 
whose incremental value dissipates in the presence of transaction costs.  Different portfolio 
construction strategies perform differently across the three equity markets under 
examination.  For instance, return oriented strategy performs better in the Japanese equity 
market compared to risk oriented strategy, and vice versa for the UK and UK markets.  
Furthermore, reducing the rebalancing frequency is proved to be beneficial. 279   For 
instance, monthly rebalancing investors adopting a non-overlapping approach are willing 
to pay performance fees in the range of 700-1100 bps per annual compared to 550-1010 bps 
                                                          
279 For further interpretation on the return and risk oriented portfolio strategy, please refers to Section 5.4.2.  
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paid by investors with a daily rebalancing frequency.280  Finally and most importantly, the 
incremental gains from conditional correlation models over and above static strategies are 
robust to reasonable levels of transaction costs and are more pronounced for monthly than 
daily rebalancing.    
The empirical findings have three potential implications for managers in the fund 
management industry.  First, fund managers should focus more on correlation timing 
instead of volatility timing in order to generate higher economic value for risk adverse 
clients.  Second, fund managers invested in different markets should first investigate 
which portfolio construction strategy is best suited to the corresponding equity market in 
order to achieve the highest possible risk adjusted return.  Third, managers should reduce 
the rebalancing frequency of their portfolios to cut trading costs.  Besides, in order to 
achieve a nice balance between low turnover rate and high flexibility, a non-overlapping 
approach might be the optimal choice for fund managers.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 5.2 reviews the 
relevant literature.  Section 5.3 describes the data, while section 5.4 illustrates the 
correlation forecasting models, the portfolio construction strategies and performance 
assessment criterions.  Section 5.5 reports the empirical results and section 5.6 concludes.   
  
5.2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
5.2.1. Stylized Facts of Volatility and Correlation 
A burgeoning literature in financial economics has focused on the volatility of asset 
returns and their comovement.  As a result several features of volatility and covariance 
dynamics have by now become stylized facts.  The prolific literature on the relationship 
                                                          
280  For further interpretation on the non-overlapping approach for low rebalancing frequency (e.g. 
weekly/monthly rebalancing), please refers to Section 5.5.4. 
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between stock returns and their volatility has established that volatility is not only time 
varying but also asymmetric, which implies that negative shocks have a greater impact on 
future volatility than positive shocks of equal-size.  Black (1976) was the first empirical 
study on the return-risk relation and found that the future conditional stock volatility is 
negatively linked with the current stock return.  He attributed the phenomenon to the 
increased leverage surfacing when the market value of a firm declines, which is in turn 
reflected in an increase in the volatility of the firm’s equity.281  Christie (1982) empirically 
corroborates the “leverage hypothesis” by finding a positive relation between the firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio and volatility.  On the other hand Campbell and Hentschel (1992), the 
proponents of the “volatility feedback” hypothesis behind volatility asymmetry, argue 
that negative unlike positive shocks increase volatility which has to be compensated for by 
a sufficiently high expected return, thereby causing more volatility.  Many econometric 
specifications have been developed to capture asymmetric effects in volatility (EGARCH 
by Nelson, 1991; GJR by Glosten et al, 1993; APARCH by Ding et al, 1993).282   
A second strand of this literature focuses on the dynamics of asset correlations.  The 
consensus view is that correlation is time varying (Bollerslev et al, 1988) and correlations 
between international equity markets increased over time (Longin and Solnik, 1995).  Erb 
et al (1994) link correlation dynamics to cyclicality and show that correlations are higher in 
recessions relative to expansions and low when business cycles are out of phase.  
Conditional correlation asymmetry is another regularity that has been found in the second 
moment of equity returns, although less attention has been paid in empirically capturing it.  
                                                          
281 Black (1976) argues that even for pure equity firms the leverage (in the form of “operating leverage”) of 
the firm will increase as the value of the company fall.  The increased operating leverage is caused by the 
relatively constant cost the firm facing over the short-term. 
282 The “leverage” and “volatility feedback” interpretations of asymmetric volatility differ in regards to 
causalities: leverage hypothesis rests on the conjecture that return shocks lead to changes in conditional 
volatility; whereas the volatility feedback theory contends that return shocks are caused by changes in 
conditional volatility. Bekaert and Wu (2000) show that the two arguments are complementary and confirm 
that peaks in portfolio volatility typically correspond to large market declines.  
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Ang and Bekaert (2002) document the presence of a high volatility-high correlation regime 
in the US, UK and Germany, which tends to coincide with a bear market but does not 
negate the long-term benefits of international diversification.  Longin and Solnik (2001) 
corroborate that correlations rise in bear markets, but not in bull markets.  Cappiello et al 
(2006) exploit an asymmetric DCC model and find strong evidence of asymmetry in 
conditional correlations of international equity and bond returns.  Although the economic 
rationale behind asymmetric effects is a relatively less researched terrain, a few studies 
have put forth some potential explanations.  Bekaert and Wu (2000) attribute covariance 
asymmetry among financial assets to volatility feedback and postulate using a conditional 
CAPM – GARCH - M model that volatility increases dramatically upon a large price 
decline but does not react to price increase, therefore, negative shocks among financial 
assets generate higher conditional covariance than positive shocks.  Bekaert et al (2005) 
rationalize sudden jumps in correlation between equity market indices during crises as a 
result of dependence on a common factor and not of volatility spillovers.   
More recently, researchers have also documented structural breaks in correlations.  
Billio and Pelizzon (2003) find an increase in the levels of conditional correlation of 
European equity markets in the aftermath of the EMU introduction and note that the effect 
was not only regional but had a fundamental impact on global markets.  Goetzmann et al 
(2005) suggest that the structure of global correlations shifted considerably over time, 
while Cappiello et al (2006) find significant correlation increase post-EMU not mirrored in 
conditional volatility.  Hyde et al (2007) corroborate correlation asymmetry and an Asian 
crisis structural break in the Asian-Pacific, European and US equity returns, and also show 
that correlations rise over time suggesting greater market integration. 
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5.2.2. Performance of Volatility and Correlation Timing 
The upshot of the extant literature is that although, under extreme conditions, investors 
cannot gain extra protection from global or domestic diversification, the long-term benefits 
are still attainable (De Santis and Gerard, 1997; Xia and Phylaktis, 2009).  Since asset 
allocation is still an attractive investment route, the efficient construction of such a 
diversified portfolio comes to the forefront.  One key input is the asset covariance matrix 
but the question emanating is whether it pays off to accurately capture all the stylized 
facts of covariance structure of asset returns.  Balasubramanyan (2004) compares the 
performance of portfolios constructed on the basis of different covariance matrix 
estimators and finds value in incorporating time-varying correlation, asymmetric volatility 
and spillovers.  Engle and Colacito (2006) investigate the variance minimization problem 
subject to a required return and find that the efficiency loss of the portfolio is minimized 
when the estimated correlation equals the true value.  They further argue that assuming 
constant correlation during volatile correlation phases can be very costly and as much as 
40% of return can be dismissed, if the wrong conditional correlation model were 
employed.  In a simple stock and bond portfolio exercise, Engle and Colacito (2006) show 
that the asymmetric DCC was the best performer among the range of multivariate 
GARCH models examined.  
An alternative way to assess the potential gain from accurately modelling the 
stylized facts of the conditional covariance of the asset returns is to compare dynamic and 
static strategies.  Fleming et al (2001) deploy a utility criterion to examine the economic 
value of volatility timing for short-horizon investors and find that the predictability of 
conditional volatility models with rolling nonparametric correlations is economically 
significant and robust to transaction costs.  In a similar vein, Della Corte et al (2009) 
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document economic gains from the short-horizon predictive ability of economic 
fundamentals and forward premia on the volatility of monthly exchange rate returns.  
Della Corte et al (2010) find that accounting for correlation dynamics in exchange rate 
returns is fruitful for daily portfolio rebalancing even after transaction costs. 
 
5.3. DATA 
The empirical analysis is based on daily prices for sector indices from the Nikkei 225, 
FTSE-All and S&P500 obtained from Thomson DataStream International.  The industry 
data pertain to ten broad sectors: Energy (ENG), Basic Material (BML), Industrial (IND), 
Consumer Goods (CGS), Health Care (HCR), Consumer Service (CSV), 
Telecommunication (TEL), Utility (UTL), Financial (FIN) and Technology (TEC).  The 
sample spans the period from July 1, 1996 to May 31, 2007, which results in a total of 2681, 
2758, 2747 logarithmic local currency daily returns, respectively, for the Japanese, UK, US 
sector portfolios.  The three-month Japanese interbank loan, the LIBOR, and the Treasury 
bill middle rates are employed as risk free assets for Japan, UK and US, respectively.  The 
summary statistics in Table 5.1 suggest positive mean daily returns over the period for 
most sectors. 
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Table 5.1  Unconditional Daily Stock Return Distribution 
 
 
Note: Returns and StDev are in percentage terms. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic for the null hypothesis of normality. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the null of 
a unit root with 5% and 1% critical values -2.862 and -3.433, respectively. The trunaction lag is chosen based on a max lag of ⅟2√T = 27, and a downward selection procedure based on 
the SIC so as no serial correlation is present. LB(p) and LB2(p) are the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the null of no serial correlation up to a maximum lag of p days in the residuals and 
squared residuals, respectively.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
ENG BML IND CGS HCR CSV TEL UTL FIN TEC
Japan
Mean 0.000 0.006 0.015 0.022 0.019 -0.011 0.006 0.011 -0.017 0.008
Maximum 11.926 8.488 5.622 7.189 7.775 6.567 10.343 5.699 11.267 8.861
Minimum -11.220 -7.251 -7.459 -8.622 -5.386 -5.583 -11.602 -5.264 -8.317 -9.428
StDev 1.891 1.452 1.428 1.447 1.084 1.195 1.893 0.978 1.848 1.900
Skewness 0.09* 0.05 -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.13*** 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 0.29*** 0.01
Kurtosis 5.11*** 5.40*** 4.29*** 5.21*** 5.13*** 4.87*** 5.93*** 5.77*** 5.72*** 4.52***
JB test 503.11*** 645.52*** 191.95*** 552.42*** 514.04*** 395.98*** 958.36*** 863.49*** 866.14*** 256.67***
ADF test -51.95*** -47.64*** -37.68*** -38.89*** -56.99*** -51.81*** -37.73*** -52.53*** -36.26*** -44.68***
LB(5) 13.83** 27.38*** 19.75*** 22.33*** 46.60*** 22.36*** 25.96*** 18.36*** 82.22*** 63.86***
LB2(5) 348.16*** 334.68*** 242.71*** 364.85*** 209.30*** 247.56*** 501.20*** 373.33*** 300.51*** 469.62***
UK 
Mean 0.031 0.027 0.01 0.011 0.021 0.009 0.02 0.046 0.033 -0.058
Maximum 8.867 7.312 8.266 13.856 7.286 5.48 8.044 4.818 6.791 14.47
Minimum -7.618 -6.213 -15.639 -10.878 -6.323 -7.755 -8.006 -5.707 -9.969 -23.194
StDev 1.484 1.289 1.503 1.887 1.22 1.117 1.788 0.994 1.406 2.747
Skewness -0.02 -0.13*** -0.71*** 0.09* -0.12*** -0.09** 0.15** -0.01 -0.06 -0.58***
Kurtosis 5.27*** 5.49*** 11.17*** 7.30*** 5.95*** 6.18*** 4.96*** 5.19*** 6.38*** 10.34***
JB test 590.95 718.86 7906.18 2131.31 1007.83 1166.96 450.01 550.77 1316.93 6351.73
ADF test -33.66*** -33.82*** -47.08*** -53.10*** -38.89*** -49.19*** -34.11*** -53.89*** -49.43*** -49.87***
LB(5) 31.11*** 31.91*** 36.66*** 13.52** 21.23*** 16.28*** 29.18*** 4.83 30.66*** 10.49**
LB2(5) 448.73*** 579.30*** 132.92*** 427.96*** 357.96*** 657.65*** 643.39*** 386.66*** 692.24*** 126.62***
US
Mean 0.048 0.029 0.035 0.011 0.029 0.029 0.015 0.021 0.043 0.032
Maximum 8.679 7.292 8.281 6.475 6.84 8.619 6.967 8.45 8.139 15.929
Minimum -7.469 -9.958 -9.616 -12.382 -7.71 -10.628 -8.177 -9.023 -7.681 -10.103
StDev 1.441 1.394 1.302 1.292 1.07 1.28 1.35 1.128 1.378 2.054
Skewness -0.03 0.08* -0.14*** -0.25*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.12*** -0.40*** 0.11*** 0.22***
Kurtosis 4.69*** 6.11*** 7.16*** 8.68*** 8.05*** 8.25*** 5.83*** 9.92*** 6.22*** 6.59***
JB test 327.77*** 1107.81*** 1991.10*** 3722.58*** 2936.51*** 3173.80*** 924.59*** 5558.63*** 1190.30*** 1499.44***
ADF test -39.46*** -51.38*** -51.77*** -53.98*** -33.91*** -38.06*** -53.15*** -49.88*** -50.93*** -52.46***
LB(5) 21.78*** 11.31** 13.39** 14.11** 32.65*** 25.99*** 8.02 9.69* 6.35 10.10*
LB2(5) 193.79*** 327.58*** 504.95*** 295.23*** 370.18*** 284.22*** 288.24*** 1011.4*** 643.51*** 459.28***
Sector Indices
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All daily returns are non-normally distributed, particularly in the form of leptokurtosis.  
The extent and direction of skewness differs across sectors and equity markets.  Most of 
the sector returns in the UK and US markets are significantly negatively skewed, whereas 
in Japan sector returns are positively skewed. 283   The ADF test strongly rejects the 
hypothesis of a unit root for all returns series.  The Ljung-Box Q test on daily and squared 
daily returns portrays serial dependence and volatility persistence in virtually all sector 
returns and supports the stylized fact that there is far more predictability in conditional 
volatility than in mean returns with strong volatility clustering in all sectors.  
Table 5.2 reports the unconditional sector correlations over the sample period.  Sector 
correlations are significantly positive in all markets.  The mean unconditional sector 
correlation for Japan, UK and US is 54.9%, 44.3% and 52.5%, respectively.284  Overall, CSV 
and IND exhibit the highest correlations with other sectors 61.6% and 58.3%, respectively, 
averaged across sectors and markets, while the UTL sector is the least correlated at 
36.4%.285  
  
                                                          
283 The lack of symmetry in the return distribution is consistent with previous findings (Bekaert and Wu, 
2000; Glosten et al, 1993).  
284 The three mean correlations are significant with t-statistics at 38.8, 35.3 and 27.26, respectively. The t-
statistic is computed as ρ√(t-2)/(1-ρ2) and follows a Student-t distribution with (t-2) degrees of freedom. The 
critical value at the 95%significance level is 0.01253. 
285 The mean correlation across sectors within a market and the average correlation of one sector against 
other sectors are not reported in Table 2 to save space.  All the aforementioned information is available from 
the author upon request. 
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Table 5.2  Unconditional Daily Return Correlations 
  
Sector Indices
ENG BML IND CGS HCR CSV TEL UTL FIN TEC
Japan
ENG 1
BML 0.61 1
IND 0.44 0.78 1
CGS 0.38 0.65 0.80 1
HCR 0.46 0.66 0.59 0.58 1
CSV 0.54 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.71 1
TEL 0.29 0.51 0.65 0.57 0.44 0.61 1
UTL 0.35 0.42 0.30 0.31 0.48 0.46 0.22 1
FIN 0.50 0.77 0.70 0.61 0.56 0.76 0.54 0.32 1
TEC 0.27 0.58 0.83 0.68 0.42 0.64 0.67 0.14 0.58 1
UK
ENG 1
BML 0.48 1
IND 0.41 0.59 1
CGS 0.33 0.45 0.49 1
HCR 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.35 1
CSV 0.44 0.60 0.58 0.48 0.49 1
TEL 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.64 1
UTL 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.46 0.47 0.35 1
FIN 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.48 0.60 0.72 0.57 0.49 1
TEC 0.26 0.39 0.41 0.30 0.24 0.60 0.51 0.22 0.47 1
US
ENG 1
BML 0.47 1
IND 0.41 0.72 1
CGS 0.35 0.69 0.72 1
HCR 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.53 1
CSV 0.35 0.65 0.79 0.73 0.59 1
TEL 0.32 0.47 0.59 0.52 0.51 0.63 1
UTL 0.45 0.39 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.37 1
FIN 0.37 0.64 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.76 0.60 0.45 1
TEC 0.23 0.43 0.65 0.55 0.39 0.68 0.55 0.24 0.58 1
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An economic evaluation framework is designed to gauge the value of correlation timing 
and appraise the economic differences materializing from rival correlation forecasting 
approaches.  To this end, the sample is divided into an in-sample estimation period July 1, 
1996 to May 31, 2005 (T= 2274, 2266, 2209 days, respectively, for the UK, US and JPN sector 
portfolios) and a holdout evaluation period June 1, 2005 to May 31, 2007 (T*= 484, 481, 472 
days, respectively, for the UK, US and Japanese sector portfolios) over which we generate 
one-step-ahead rolling covariance forecasts on the basis of the fixed length-T window.  
  
5.4. METHODOLOGY 
The ensuing analysis builds upon the recursive construction of optimal mean-variance 
sector portfolios in the Japanese, UK and US equity markets and their performance 
evaluation on the basis of utility metrics and risk-adjusted returns.  First, daily sector 
correlation and volatility forecasts, the main inputs alongside expected returns for 
dynamic asset allocation, are generated.  The covariance forecasting approaches deployed 
range from the simplest constant covariance model (static strategy) and the constant 
correlation (volatility timing strategy) to dynamic specifications where various stylized 
facts of correlations such as time variation, asymmetry, and structural breaks are 
accounted for (correlation timing strategy). 
 
5.4.1. The Conditional Covariance Structure 
Let rt denote the day t logarithmic close-to-close return vector on n risky assets andξt-1 be 
the information set available at the end of day t-1.  The [n x 1] conditional expected return 
vector of rt is defined as µt ≡ µt|t-1 = E[rt |ξt-1] and Ht ≡ Ht|t-1 = E[(rt - µt) (rt - µt)′|ξt-1] is the 
symmetric [n x n] asset conditional covariance matrix.  At the open of day t, the investor 
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formulates a target return/volatility quadratic optimization problem and different 
forecasts for the covariance matrix Ht are considered as inputs.   
The most basic estimator for Ht is the unconditional covariance matrix t t tH rr′= , 
which is kept constant throughout the out-of-sample period.  We make the covariance 
matrix dynamic by adopting in a multivariate setting the RiskMetrics estimator widely 
used in the industry.286  The RiskMetrics EWMA conditional covariance estimator is as 
follows 
111 )1( −−− −+′= tttt HrrH λλ       (1) 
where the decay factor (0 < λ < 1) is λ=0.94 for daily data and the sample covariance matrix 
can be taken as H0.  The RiskMetrics model is computationally very simple given its 
nonparametric nature, however, its disadvantage is that it imposes identical dynamics to 
all assets represented by the constant decay factor λ = 0.94. 
Allowing for more flexibility while at the same time preserving parsimony we 
consider the conditional correlation models and extend their basic versions to account for 
correlation asymmetries and structural breaks in the data.  Correlation models rely on 
decomposing the conditional covariance into conditional standard deviations and 
correlations.  The simplest is the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) GARCH model 
introduced by Bollerslev (1990) which imposes time invariant correlation and covariance 
that changes over time proportionally as dictated by the time-varying volatilities.  The 
CCC model is estimated in two steps.  First, a univariate GARCH (p,q) model is fitted to 
each return series to generate the conditional variance hit , i = 1,…, n.  Then, the covariance 
is specified as  
Ht = Dt R Dt       (2) 
                                                          
286 RiskMetrics was originally proposed by JP Morgan as part of their market VaR methodology. It has by 
now become a standard model for portfolio risk assessment.  
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where ( )nttt hhdiagD ,...,1=  and R is a positive definite [n x n] correlation matrix typically 
estimated by the unconditional correlation matrix. 
The constant correlation assumption has been found to be too restrictive in several 
empirical studies (Korner and Ng, 1998; Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Tse and Tsui, 2002), and 
so the covariance decomposition in (2) has been extended to allow for dynamics in the 
correlation matrix.  Among the many specifications proposed for the evolution of Rt the 
Generalized Dynamic Conditional Correlation (G-DCC) GARCH model of Engle (2002) is 
the most popular.  The G-DCC estimator has the same first step as the CCC approach, but 
for each series the standardized errors, εit = uit / √ hit where uit are the whitened returns, are 
also generated alongside the conditional variance.  In the second step, the time-varying 
correlation matrix is formalized via the following process 
Rt = (Qt*)-1 Qt (Qt*)-1        (3) 
Qt = ( BQBAQAQ ′−′− ) + A’εt-1 ε’t-1A + B’Qt-1B      
whereQ = E[εtεt’] is the unconditional covariance matrix of standardized innovations, A 
and B are [n x n] diagonal parameter matrices, Qt* = diag(√qi,t,…, √qn,t) and ensures that Rt 
has the structure of a correlation matrix as long as the conditional covariance matrix Qt is 
positive definite. 287   The diagonal formulation in (3) poses asset-specific correlation 
dynamics but permits no transmission of shocks between assets.  The DCC is obtained as a 
special case of the G-DCC where the parameter matrices are replaced by scalars, A= [a] 
and B= [b], and implies identical correlation dynamics for all assets.288   
The Asymmetric Generalized DCC (AG-DCC) of Sheppard (2002), extends (3) by 
allowing for asymmetries in the conditional covariance as follows 
         Qt = C + A’εt-1 ε’t-1A + B’Qt-1B + G’ηt-1 η’t-1G     (4) 
                                                          
287 Qt will be positive definite with probability one if (Q – A’QA – B’QB) is positive definite.  
288 Appendix D.1 sets out the details of the DCC in the two-asset case.  
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where ηt = I[εt<0]⊗ εt and ⊗  indicates the element-by-element Hadamard product, G is [n x 
n] diagonal parameter matrix, GNGBQBAQAQC ′−′−′−= andN = E[ηtη’t] where 
expectation is replaced by its sample analogue.  Model (4) allows joint negative shocks to 
have a stronger impact on the future variances and correlations than positive shocks of the 
same magnitude.  When G= 0 (no asymmetry) the model collapses to the G-DCC.  The 
Asymmetric DCC (A-DCC) is the restricted scalar version of (4), where A= [a], B= [b], C= [c] 
and G= [g].289   
We consider also an extension of (4) which accommodates the presence of structural 
breaks both in the long-run mean and in the dynamics of correlations (AG-DCC-break) as 
in Cappiello et al (2006).  The AG-DCC-break model accounts for two regimes as follows 
Qt = d Qt1 + (1-d) Qt2 
             Qtj = Cj + Aj’εt-1 ε’t-1Aj+ Bj’Qt-1Bj + Gj’ηt-1 η’t-1Gj  j =1, 2 (5) 
where d is a break indicator defined as d = 1 for t < τ, and 0 else.  When G1 = G2 = 0 the 
model collapses to G-DCC-break, while the corresponding scalar model is the A-DCC-
break.  
The News Impact Surface (NIS) for MGARCH, the analogue to a news impact curve 
for univariate GARCH models, portrays how the conditional correlation of two assets 
reacts to their joint past shocks (Kroner and Ng, 1998).  The NIS correlation function ƒ(ε1,ε2) 
for the ADCC model is given by290    
   
)(),( jijijijiijji ggaacf ηηεεεε ++=      (6) 
                                                          
289 Appendix D.2 gives details of the A-DCC in the two asset case. 
290 This is a simplified form of the NIS function under the assumption of linearity. Appendix D.7 gives the 
exact form. 
272 
 
where cij is the ijth element of the constant matrix in (4).  In the presence of asymmetry g is 
significant and it is expected that joint bad news (εi < 0, εj <0) has a greater impact on future 
correlation than joint good news or a combination of good and bad news, ceteris paribus.  
Model estimation is by quasi maximum likelihood (QML).291  Inferences are based on 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge non-normality robust standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 
1992).  Individual significance and joint hypothesis tests are based on t-statistics. 
 
5.4.2. Dynamic Asset Allocation using Correlation Timing Strategies 
A dynamic mean-variance framework is deployed to construct portfolios based on the 
daily covariance matrix forecasts from the different models.  We consider an investor with 
a short or medium term investment horizon who allocates funds across n risky assets plus 
a riskless security according to two different objectives.  The investor solves the following 
constrained optimization problems at time t, 
 
A. Maximize the conditional expected portfolio return subject to a target conditional 
volatility σp* (Max-R, hereafter).  
max 			X = ′ + `1 − ′Ib+s. t.							X∗ = ′@       (7) 
B. Minimize the conditional portfolio variance subject to a target conditional expected 
return µp* (Min-V, hereafter).   
 min 		′@s. t.			X∗ = ′ + `1 − ′Ib+          (8) 
                                                          
291 Detail information about the QML is provided in Appendix D.3. 
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where tw  is an [n x 1] vector of portfolio weights on the risky assets, rf is the return on the 
risk free asset, I is an [n x 1] vector of 1s.  In order to guarantee a feasible solution, no short 
selling constraints are imposed.  The optimal risky asset weight vectors are as follows 
 = ∗vv0Iv0I′vv0I,  for the Max- R strategy, 
 = ∗0Ivv0Iv0I′vv0I,  for the Min-V strategy, 
and the weight on the risk free asset is (1 – tw′ I). 
When the conditional expected return µt and/or covariance Ht are perceived to be 
time-varying, the investors will rebalance their portfolio weights accordingly following 
the dynamic strategies outlined above.  In order to purely focus on the quality of the 
covariance forecast the expected return is treated as constant and equal to the ex-post 
unconditional mean return (r = Σrt/n).292  The target return and variance levels (X∗ 	, X∗b	are 
proxied by the out-of-sample mean values for an equally weighted portfolio.  The 
portfolios are rebalanced daily, weekly or monthly using the alternative covariance 
forecasts to produce a sequence of optimal mean-variance portfolios spanning the out-of-
sample period.  The benchmark static strategy is that adopted by an investor who believes 
that the conditional expected return and covariance are constant, and thus the optimal 
portfolio weights will be constant over time.  The static optimal weights are based on the 
in-sample unconditional covariance matrix and are rebalanced every period back to their 
initial (first iteration) values. 
 
 
                                                          
292 Our purpose is to isolate the effect on asset allocation of different correlation forecasting approaches, and 
so attempting to model return dynamics goes beyond the scope of this study.  The r refers to the ex-post 
mean return vector of the sector indices over the out-of-sample period; rt refers to the daily return vector for 
sector indices over day t; and n refers to number of days over the out-of-sample period. 
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5.4.3. Evaluation Framework and Transaction Costs 
The adequacy of the correlation timing strategies based on alternative covariance forecasts 
is judged on the basis of the incremental utility vis-a-vis the benchmark static strategy.  We 
follow the utility-based evaluation framework of Fleming et al (2001) drawing upon the 
presumption that at a given point in time, one estimate of conditional covariance is better 
than another if it leads to higher average utility. 
The quadratic utility function introduced by West et al (1993) as a second-order 
approximation to the investor’s true utility in period t+1 is   
 ` ¡1b =  X,¡1 − ¢£v¤V X,¡1V      (9) 
X,¡1 = `1 − ′Ib+ + ′+¡1 
where Wt+1 is the wealth in period t+1, α is the absolute risk aversion and Rp,t+1 is the 
portfolio return at t+1.  The expected end-of-period utility for a given level of initial 
wealth W0 is estimated as 
` ¡1b =   ⋅ |X,¡1 − ¦V`1¡¦bX,¡1V               (10)  
We follow Fleming et al (2001) and assume a constant relative risk aversion
( )/ 1t t tW Wγ α α= −  equal to γ = 1, 10 to represent reasonably low and high risk-aversions.  
Han (2006) focus only on a moderate risk aversion level implied by γ = 6.  The incremental 
value of correlation timing vis-a-vis the static allocation is assessed by the return that 
would render an investor indifferent between the two strategies as follows 
∑ §¨,¡1 − ∆ − ¦V`1¡¦b ¨,¡1 − ∆Vª =J∗01« ∑ §,¡1 − ¦V`1¡¦b,¡1V ªJ∗01«    (11) 
where Rd,t+1 and Rs,t+1 denote the returns for the dynamic and static strategies, respectively.  
The equality in (11) implies that the investor would incur a daily expense ∆ for the 
dynamic strategy, and so we interpret ∆ as the maximum performance fee (PF) in 
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annualized basis points the investor would be willing to pay to switch from the static to 
the dynamic strategy.   
Transaction costs play an important role when assessing the profitability of active 
trading strategies.  Accurate estimation of the size of transaction costs is challenging since 
it requires information on the type of investor, the value of transaction, and the nature of 
the broker (Della Corte et al, 2009).  In order to sidestep these issues we compute break-
even transaction costs (BTC) per trade as proposed by Han (2006).  The BTC is a fixed 
proportion (τ ) of the value traded in each transaction, which makes an investor with the 
quadratic utility function in (9) indifferent between the two strategies (i.e. dynamic and 
static) considered.  Thus, the total cost of a transaction in period t can be represented as 
follows 
n ∑ ¬, − ,01 1¡­,v1¡P,v¬®«1                 (12) 
where ,01 1¡­,v1¡P,v is the weight of asset i in the portfolio just before rebalancing in period t.  
In comparing a dynamic strategy with a static one, an investor who pays transaction costs 
lower than the BTC would prefer the dynamic strategy and in selecting between two 
equally performing dynamic strategies the one with higher BTC is preferable.  BTC is 
proportional to the value of each trade, and so we report it at the relevant trading 
frequency.  Finally, we compute the average daily turnover rate (TO), defined as the 
proportion of the portfolio value rebalanced each day TO = 1 K∗¯ ∑ ∑ ¬, −®«1J∗«1
,01 1¡­,v1¡P,v¬	, reported monthly. 
The turnover rate directly affects the post-transaction cost strategy performance to 
the extent that realistic levels of transaction costs can negate the advantages of 
incorporating daily correlation fluctuations in the determination of the optimal asset 
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allocation weights.  We account for transaction costs by taking a generic approach that 
avoids assuming investor-specific levels of transaction costs.  For each strategy we 
compute break-even transaction costs per trade (BTC, reported in Table 5.5 and 5.6 in daily 
bp) as the minimum cost that renders the investor indifferent between the dynamic 
strategy at hand and the static strategy, i.e. the transaction cost beyond which the benefits 
of the dynamic strategy over the static strategy disappear.  As the daily correlation timing 
strategies trigger rather extensive rebalancing, BTCs would be an indication of the viability 
of the strategies. 
Sector index trading can be effectively replicated with Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
at a relatively low cost.293  The total cost of investing in ETFs comprises the total expense 
ratio (TER), bid-ask spread, commission, and cost of market impact.  TER refers to the 
annual management fee charged for operating expenses and is comparatively lower for 
ETFs than mutual funds or other actively traded equity funds.  The average level of TER 
for a US investor trading sector SPDR ETFs listed on the NYSE is 20 bp.294 Sector ETFs 
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange incur a TER of 22-28 bp.295  Despite the fact that no 
UK sector ETFs have been launched as yet, the TER associated with the SPDR MSCI 
Europe Sector ETFs, 30 bp, can be used as a reasonable proxy for UK sector index-linked 
trading.  For a daily trader the TER seems negligible (Jares and Lavin, 2004), however, for 
monthly traders TER can play a role in the total trading cost.  Assuming investors will pay 
                                                          
293 Since the first ETF introduced by State Street Global Advisor which tracks the performance of S&P 500 
(SPDR S&P 500 listed on NYSE) in 1993, the number of actively traded ETFs has ballooned due to their 
popularity among investors.  In 2008, the number of actively traded ETFs has reached 797 in the US and 350 
in Europe. The cost of investing in ETFs has been brought down significantly in recent years as the turnover 
volume soared.  
294 SPDR is the division of State Street Global Advisor responsible for running and managing ETF products.  
Their Select Sector SPDR Index Funds split the S&P 500 into nine sectors traded individually on the NYSE.   
295 Daiwa Asset Management provides 19 different sector ETFs for TOPIX constituent companies (see, for 
instance, Daiwa ETF-TOPIX Energy Resources, Daiwa ETF-TOPIX Banks). 
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a fraction of the TER proportional to the length of the holding period a sector ETF trader 
who adjusts her position monthly should bear a TER around 2 bp per trade. 
For frequent traders of ETFs the trading cost depends primarily on the bid-ask 
spread.  Previous studies on ETFs tend to use the close bid-ask price on a trading day to 
calculate the bid-ask spread (Engle and Sarkar, 2002; Jares and Lavin, 2004).  However, 
bid-ask spreads tend to be wider at the end of the trading day compared to the ones 
during the trading hours since traders face a higher risk that their order might not be 
executed (Foucault, 1999; McInish and Wood, 1992).  The higher bid-ask spread of the last 
trade(s) can also be attributed to the introduction of the closing auction on most of the 
exchanges.296  This implies that using the end-of-day bid-ask spread would inflate the 
actual trading cost.  To circumvent this problem we use intraday price quotations and 
compute the bid-ask spread on day t as Bid-Askt = min(∆Pjt) /Low Pt  for j =1,…M 
intraday intervals, where ∆Pjt is the smallest intraday bid and ask spread that can be 
observed. 297   Using intraday data on Japanese, US and European sector ETFs we 
corroborate that bid-ask spreads during the trading hours are considerably smaller than at 
the last trade.  The average Bid-Askt over the last 200 trading days based on the lowest 
price level is 3 bp for SPDR US Industrial Sector ETF and ranges from 1.8 to 4.5 bp for 
other US sectors, with the exception of the Financial Sector which is at 7 bp.  For Daiwa 
                                                          
296 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue that the bid-ask spread or terms of trade is determined by the number 
of informed traders in the market.  If the number of informed traders increases, the terms of trade will 
worsen especially when the opinions of these informed traders are diversified.  The closing auction will 
attract more informed traders into the price discovery process as they possess more information about the 
underlying asset and could form a better strategy in the auction.  Therefore, the terms of trade will worsen.   
297 The bid and ask spread is derived as the difference between the bid and ask price.  In order to translate 
the spread into percentage measures in a conservative manner, we further divide the spread over the bid 
price (as the bid price is relatively lower, therefore, the Bid-Ask will be relatively higher compared to the one 
use ask price as denominator).  When using intraday price information, once again, we measure the Bid-Ask 
spread in a conservative manner by using the lowest observed price as denominator. 
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JPN ETF-TOPIX Construction & Material the average bid-ask spread is 28.5 bp, whereas 
for the SPDR MSCI Europe Sector ETF it is typically at 48 bp.298   
Similar to trading other securities, investors who buy ETFs need to pay commissions 
to their brokers.  However, since the commission fee is charged on the number of trades, 
the percentage cost of commission can be very small when the volume of transactions per 
trade is very high.  Dellva (2001) shows that the commission for SPDR ETFs is only $20 per 
trade, which means the cost of commission is only 2 bp if one invests $100,000 at once.  For 
institutional or large individual investors the percentage cost of commission can be even 
lower.  Furthermore, in order to reduce the trading cost and attract more investors, some 
of the ETF providers have introduced commission-free ETFs in recent years.299   
Finally, transaction costs are affected by the cost of market impact, that is, the 
influence of an investor’s decision on the market price of the underlying asset.  The cost of 
market impact tends to be lower for highly liquid assets, which implies the behaviour of 
one trader does not have a big influence on the price.  Given that the trading volume of 
popular ETFs exceeds tens of millions per day, the market impact of a single institutional 
or individual investor is almost negligible.300  Jares and Lavin (2004) do not take the cost of 
market impact into account when considering the trading cost of ETFs, however, 
practitioners still count it as one of the trading cost components.301  We take a conservative 
approach and use a cost of market impact of 2 bp as suggested for large cap index ETFs.  
In general, the total trading cost of ETFs for a daily trader can be represented as the 
sum of bid-ask spread and the cost of market impact as both the commission and TER are 
                                                          
298 The average close bid-ask spread is found to be 45 bp for the SPDR US Industrial Sector ETF and 54 bp for 
the DAIWA JPN ETF-TOPIX Construction & Material.  
299 For instance, Fidelity and Vanguard Asset Management have recently waived the commission for some of 
their widely traded ETFs, see: www.fidelity.com and www.vanguard.com. 
300 For instance, the average daily trading volume of SPDR US Industrial ETF and SPDR US Financial ETF is 
30.15 and 120.5 million over the last three months of 2011, respectively. 
301 See Frontier Investment Management report at: 
 http://www.frontierim.com/uploads/frontierinvestmentmanagement -whenisaternotater.pdf. 
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negligible.  In the context of sector-linked ETFs this amounts to approximately 7 bp per 
day for US investors, 30 bp per day for Japanese investors and 50 bp per day for European 
sector investors.  For monthly traders we follow the industry practice and assume an 
additional TER proportional to the holding period that is equal to of 2 bp.  The total 
trading cost in each case will be used as a benchmark to assess the practical feasibility of 
the correlation timing strategies.  If the BTC of the dynamic strategy exceeds the realistic 
benchmark level, the strategy can generate economic value not wiped out by transaction 
costs.  In our asset allocation framework, all inputs but the covariance matrix are constant 
across strategies, and so differences in BTC would reflect the variability in the forecasted 
covariance.   
 
5.4.4. Significance of Sharpe Ratio Differentials 
We statistically evaluate the risk-adjusted performance of correlation timing by assessing 
the significance of the observed differences between the Sharpe Ratios (SR) of the dynamic 
allocation strategy and the static benchmark denoted by d and s, respectively.  In order to 
test the null hypothesis H0: (SRd - SRs) = 0 we follow the framework developed by Christie 
(2005) and Opdyke (2007) for deriving the asymptotic variance of the SR differential 
U+`'°¨b = '°¨ − '°  under very general conditions as follows 
U+`'°¨b = 1 + 'V¨4 ²Z¨Z¨ − 1³ − '¨ Y¨Y¨ + 1 + 'V4 ´ZZ − 1µ − ' YY  
−2 ´¶¨ + 3P·3P¸Z s¤·,¤¸·¤¤¸ − 1w − 1V '¨ ¸,¤·¸·¤ − 1V ' ·,¤¸·¤¸ µ     (13) 
where µnd,ms=E[(rd-E(rd)n(rs-E(rs))m] is the joint central (n,m) moment of the joint distribution 
of the two portfolio returns rd and rs.  Unlike Lo (2002) where iid returns are required, the 
asymptotic distribution in (13) requires only stationarity and ergodicity of returns and is 
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therefore valid under the more realistic conditions of time-varying volatilities, serial 
correlation and otherwise non-iid returns.  A minimum variance unbiased estimator for 
this joint moment is provided by the h-statistic of Rose and Smith (2002).  Since the SR 
statistic is asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed via the Central Limit 
Theorem 
                      √K'°¨		∼	» 	0, U+`'°¨b          (14) 
Thus, the test statistic for SR equality of the competing strategies is	H = √J`3P°·03P¸° b¼»`3P°·­b	.  
 
5.5. EMPIRICAL RESULT 
5.5.1. The Dynamics of Asset Correlations 
We start by examining the estimation results of the different multivariate correlation 
estimators.  The correlation matrices are estimated over the entire sample period (July 1, 
1996 to May 31, 2007) for the three domestic sector portfolios (Japan, UK and US sectors).  
The first-step in the estimation of conditional correlation models is to specify the 
univariate conditional variance.  Thus, for each daily return series we fit a GARCH (1,1) 
and an EGARCH (1,1,1) to account for potential asymmetry in the impact of news on 
conditional volatility.  The Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SIC) information criteria are 
deployed to select the most appropriate model.  We find no evidence of volatility 
asymmetry and the GARCH specification is favored for all sector index returns.302     
Given the conditional volatilities, the conditional correlations are estimated using 
equations (2) to (5) for each of the three portfolios.  Following the pertinent literature 
(Baele, 2005; Billio and Pelizzon, 2003 inter alios), we introduce a structural break at the 
                                                          
302 Appendix D.4 reports the estimated parameters of the GARCH and EGARCH models alongside the log-
likelihood values and the AIC and SIC. 
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onset of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999, when all the EMU 
members irrevocably fix their exchange rate and the Euro is introduced to replace the 
national currency.  The radical transform of the European money market influenced the 
interdependence of the EMU member economies and that of the closely integrated UK, US 
and Japanese markets.303    
Figure 5.1 shows the rolling daily unconditional correlations between financial-
industrial and energy-utility sectors over the sample period. 
 
Figure 5.1  Unconditional Daily Correlation Dynamics 
Time series graphs of daily correlation among selected sector indices and the three national market indices. 
The correlations are estimated using a rolling window of one month. "ENG", "IND", "CGS", "CSV", "UTL", 
"FIN", and "TEC" refer to the Engineering, Industrial, Consumer Goods, Consumer Service, Utility, Financial 
and Technology sector, respectively. 
Panel A: Unconditional correlation between Japanese FIN-IND and UTL-ENG. 
 
                                                          
303 The transformation of the European money market also affected the US dollar cash flows, through its 
impact on Euro-dollar interest rates.  The change in the term structure influenced the value of the US dollar 
and consequently impacted the US economy.  The fundamental changes in the European and US money 
markets affected the domestic equity markets, and further transmitted to the Japanese market due to the 
strong degree of globalization (Hamao, Masulis and Ng, 1990; Koutmos and Booth, 1995).  Nonetheless, the 
time taken for the effects of the money market transformation in Europe to transmit to the US and then 
further influence Japan is less clear. 
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
07/1996 07/1997 07/1998 07/1999 07/2000 07/2001 07/2002 07/2003 07/2004 07/2005 07/2006
FIN-IND UTL-ENG
282 
 
Panel B: Unconditional correlation between the UK FIN-IND and UTL-ENG. 
 
Panel C: Unconditional correlation between the US FIN-IND and UTL-ENG. 
 
The graphs confirm the extensive time variation in sector correlations and provide support 
for a regime change after 1999.  Correlations tend to bottom out in 1999 and gradually 
recover over the next few years.  Figure 5.2 illustrates the daily price dynamics of the three 
national market indices rescaled to 100 at the beginning of the sample period.   
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Figure 5.2  Daily Price Dynamics of the National Market Indices 
The graph shows the evolution of the Nikkei, FTSE-All and S&P 500 over the sample period, rescaled to 100 
at the beginning of the period. 
 
The figure shows that the very low correlations observed in 1999 coincide with the 
upward trend in the three national markets, while the subsequent correlation rise relates 
to the bear market observed globally over 2000-2002.  This is in line with previous studies 
on correlation dynamics which support the conjecture that correlations among financial 
assets tend to increase during bear markets and decrease during bull markets (see, inter 
alios, Longin and Solnik, 1995; Ang and Bekaert, 2002).  Default risk plays an important 
role in explaining the increase in sector correlations during bear markets.  As a common 
risk factor for all sectors, default risk tends to be higher in economic downturns which will 
increase the sector exposure to this common risk factor, and therefore result in higher 
sector correlations.  Düllmann et al (2007) provides evidence in this regard by finding a 
positive link between asset correlations and borrowing size, which tends to increase 
during recessions. 
Empirical likelihood ratio (LR) tests reported in Table 5.3 give strong evidence for the 
existence of a regime switch in sector correlation dynamics.   
284 
 
Table 5.3  Empirical Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Note: AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion AIC = 2 x k – 2 x ln(LLF) where k is the number of parameters and LLF is the log-likelihood 
value, SIC is the Schwarz Information Criterion SIC = k x ln(LLF) - 2 x ln(LLF).  Bold indicates the selected model under each criterion. 
Reported for each model is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test for the hypothesis that correlation dynamics is sufficiently characterized by the 
model under the null. 
Model Log-likelihood Number of AIC SIC LR test p-value Model under Inference 
parameters H0 on correlation
CCC 87722 75 127.24 569.28
Scalar DCC 88526 32 41.22 229.82
Scalar ADCC 88528 33 43.22 237.72 4 0.046 Scalar DCC Asymmetry
Scalar DCC-Break 88651 34 45.22 245.61 250 0.000 Scalar DCC Break
Scalar ADCC-Break 88659 36 49.21 261.40 262 0.000 Scalar ADCC Break
Diagonal DCC 88587 50 77.22 371.91 122 0.000 Scalar DCC Different asset dynamics
Diagonal ADCC 88765 60 97.21 450.85 356 0.000 Diagonal DCC Asymmetry
Diagonal DCC-Break 88734 70 117.21 529.79 294 0.000 Diagonal DCC Break
Diagonal ADCC-Break 88935 90 157.21 1002.82 402 0.000 Diagonal DCC-Break Asymmetry
CCC 86218 75 127.27 571.44
Scalar DCC 86623 32 41.26 230.77
Scalar ADCC 86632 33 43.26 238.70 18 0.000 Scalar DCC Asymmetry
Scalar DCC-Break 86737 34 45.26 246.62 228 0.000 Scalar DCC Break
Scalar ADCC-Break 86745 36 49.26 262.46 226 0.000 Scalar ADCC Break
Diagonal DCC 86676 50 77.26 373.37 106 0.000 Scalar DCC Different asset dynamics
Diagonal ADCC 86834 60 97.26 452.59 316 0.000 Diagonal DCC Asymmetry
Diagonal DCC-Break 86927 70 117.25 531.81 502 0.000 Diagonal DCC Break
Diagonal ADCC-Break 86949 90 157.25 690.26 44 0.002 Diagonal DCC-Break Asymmetry
CCC 92008 75 127.14 571.01
Scalar DCC 92603 32 41.13 230.51
Scalar ADCC 92603 33 43.13 238.43 0 1.000 Scalar DCC No Asymmetry
Scalar DCC-Break 92684 34 45.13 246.35 162 0.000 Scalar DCC Break
Scalar ADCC-Break 92687 36 49.13 262.18 168 0.000 Scalar ADCC Break
Diagonal DCC 92603 50 77.13 373.04 0 1.000 Scalar DCC Identical asset dynamics
Diagonal ADCC 92887 60 97.12 452.22 568 0.000 Diagonal DCC Asymmetry
Diagonal DCC-Break 92639 70 117.13 531.41 72 0.000 Diagonal DCC Break
Diagonal ADCC-Break 92992 90 157.12 689.76 706 0.000 Diagonal DCC-Break Asymmetry
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Moreover, the diagonal G-DCC outperforms its scalar counterpart for all three sector 
portfolios - LR tests reject the null hypothesis of restricting correlation dynamics to be the 
same across assets.  Asymmetry in sector correlations is also borne out by a significant 
increase in the value of the log-likelihood function.  On the other hand, the AIC and SIC 
information criteria that trade-off fit and parsimony provide evidence towards the more 
parsimonious DCC model.   
The parameter estimates for the dynamic conditional correlation models are set out 
in Table 5.4.  Most parameters are statistically significant at the conventional levels.   
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Table 5.4  Estimation Output of Dynamic Conditional Correlation Models 
 
Scalar Models a b g a b g
DCC-Break 0.023 *** 0.878 *** 0.014 *** 0.980 ***
A-DCC-Break 0.023 *** 0.878 *** 0.000 0.011 0.980 *** 0.004 ***
DCC-Break 0.015 *** 0.910 *** 0.014 *** 0.975 ***
A-DCC-Break 0.010 *** 0.914 *** 0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.974 *** 0.005 ***
DCC-Break 0.023 *** 0.897 *** 0.011 *** 0.987 ***
A-DCC-Break 0.015 *** 0.908 *** 0.012 *** 0.010 *** 0.987 *** 0.001
Diagonal Models a i
2 b i 2 a i 2 b i 2
G-DCC-Break
ENG 0.011 0.894 *** 0.009 *** 0.961 ***
BML 0.031 ** 0.874 *** 0.021 *** 0.970 ***
IND 0.013 *** 0.973 *** 0.019 *** 0.978 ***
CGS 0.009 * 0.947 *** 0.014 *** 0.986 ***
HCR 0.007 * 0.898 *** 0.012 *** 0.977 ***
CSV 0.011 0.952 *** 0.021 *** 0.962 ***
TEL 0.009 0.958 *** 0.020 *** 0.951 ***
UTL 0.012 * 0.833 *** 0.003 *** 0.997 ***
FIN 0.056 * 0.890 *** 0.037 *** 0.933 ***
TEC 0.023 *** 0.940 *** 0.023 *** 0.968 ***
ENG 0.011 *** 0.893 0.011 *** 0.982 ***
BML 0.008 0.989 *** 0.013 *** 0.979 ***
IND 0.020 0.897 *** 0.016 *** 0.976 ***
CGS 0.035 0.732 *** 0.007 0.993 ***
HCR 0.035 *** 0.894 *** 0.022 *** 0.966 ***
CSV 0.047 0.773 *** 0.016 *** 0.975 ***
TEL 0.022 0.917 *** 0.017 *** 0.970 ***
UTL 0.002 0.884 *** 0.008 *** 0.978 ***
FIN 0.021 *** 0.933 *** 0.019 *** 0.971 ***
TEC 0.000 0.950 *** 0.010 *** 0.981 ***
ENG 0.008 0.963 *** 0.009 *** 0.982 ***
BML 0.009 *** 0.989 *** 0.009 *** 0.990 ***
IND 0.020 *** 0.945 *** 0.009 *** 0.986 ***
CGS 0.015 *** 0.953 *** 0.006 *** 0.993 ***
HCR 0.017 *** 0.941 *** 0.068 *** 0.922 ***
CSV 0.013 *** 0.947 *** 0.002 *** 0.997 ***
TEL 0.020 ** 0.866 *** 0.005 *** 0.991 ***
UTL 0.061 0.732 *** 0.008 *** 0.981 ***
FIN 0.015 *** 0.958 *** 0.008 *** 0.988 ***
TEC 0.020 ** 0.932 *** 0.006 *** 0.991 ***
Period 1 Period 2
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Note: The table presents parameter estimates for the AG-DCC-Break model for daily stock returns and for its 
special cases G-DCC-Break, G=[0], A-DCC-Break, A=[α], B=[b], G=[g] and DCC-Break, A=[α], B=[b], G=[g]=0 .  
The sample period is July 1, 1996 to May 31, 2007.  Period 1 and 2 represents the two sub-periods before and 
after the introduction of EMU on January 1, 1999, respectively. 
ENG, BML, IND, CGS, HCR, CSV, TEL, UTL, FIN, TEC are Engineering, Basic Material, Industrial, Consumer 
Goods, Health Care, Consumer Service, Telecommunication, Utility, Financial and Technology sectors, 
respectively.  JPN is the Nikkei 225, UK is the FTSE-All and US is the S&P500.    
*, **, *** indicate parameters significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
AG-DCC-Break a i
2 b i 2 g i 2 a i 2 b i 2 g i 2
ENG 0.009 0.905 *** 0.009 0.008 *** 0.969 *** 0.003 **
BML 0.032 *** 0.820 *** 0.034 ** 0.019 *** 0.972 *** 0.005 ***
IND 0.019 *** 0.774 *** 0.010 0.016 *** 0.977 *** 0.007 ***
CGS 0.010 0.741 *** 0.019 0.009 *** 0.985 *** 0.017 ***
HCR 0.003 *** 0.999 *** 0.002 *** 0.012 *** 0.970 *** 0.002 **
CSV 0.023 *** 0.786 *** 0.006 *** 0.018 *** 0.961 *** 0.009 ***
TEL 0.012 0.849 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.970 *** 0.004 ***
UTL 0.018 *** 0.989 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.997 *** 0.000
FIN 0.073 *** 0.789 *** 0.029 * 0.029 *** 0.948 *** 0.012 ***
TEC 0.038 ** 0.672 *** 0.023 0.017 *** 0.973 *** 0.006 ***
ENG 0.000 0.771 0.072 0.010 *** 0.978 *** 0.010 *
BML 0.003 0.995 *** 0.006 0.014 *** 0.977 *** 0.001
IND 0.006 0.925 *** 0.033 * 0.018 *** 0.973 *** 0.000
CGS 0.016 0.768 *** 0.025 * 0.007 *** 0.995 *** 0.001
HCR 0.018 0.882 *** 0.024 * 0.019 *** 0.962 *** 0.014 ***
CSV 0.011 0.710 *** 0.091 *** 0.016 *** 0.974 *** 0.002
TEL 0.055 0.896 *** 0.012 ** 0.015 *** 0.970 *** 0.004 **
UTL 0.003 0.094 0.000 0.006 *** 0.979 *** 0.009 **
FIN 0.020 0.923 *** 0.015 ** 0.018 *** 0.970 *** 0.004 **
TEC 0.002 0.926 *** 0.000 0.011 *** 0.980 *** 0.000
ENG 0.009 *** 0.995 *** 0.000 0.008 *** 0.988 *** 0.000
BML 0.003 0.988 *** 0.012 *** 0.019 *** 0.975 *** 0.004 ***
IND 0.009 0.948 *** 0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.973 *** 0.006 ***
CGS 0.006 0.950 *** 0.022 *** 0.015 *** 0.979 *** 0.007 ***
HCR 0.013 *** 0.941 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.986 *** 0.002
CSV 0.005 0.953 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.978 *** 0.007 ***
TEL 0.019 0.876 *** 0.013 *** 0.010 *** 0.980 *** 0.000
UTL 0.073 ** 0.735 *** 0.000 0.006 *** 0.988 *** 0.000
FIN 0.004 0.941 *** 0.048 *** 0.014 *** 0.981 *** 0.002 ***
TEC 0.010 ** 0.926 *** 0.040 *** 0.014 *** 0.976 *** 0.005 ***
Period 1 Period 2
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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We find evidence of correlation asymmetry in most of the U.S. and UK sector correlations 
indicated by the significance of the asymmetry parameter over the entire sample period.  
For the Japanese sector indices, however, the correlation asymmetry is only observed over 
the post-EMU sub-period.  The findings also indicate a change in the dynamic structure of 
conditional correlations following the introduction of the EMU.  Asymmetric effects in 
correlations tend to dampen significantly in magnitude post-EMU. In addition, the 
dynamic of the time varying correlation (i.e. parameter a and b in the scalar model and a2 
and b2 in the diagonal model) among the sector index returns has also changed 
significantly over the post-EMU period. 304   The degree of persistence in conditional 
correlation, measured by a + b + g in the scalar models and a2 + b2 + g2 in the diagonal 
models, also undergoes a structural break.  Conditional correlations become more 
persistent after the introduction of the EMU. For instance, the persistence in conditional 
correlation for the US sectors is 0.920 (DCC-break) and 0.935 (A-DCC-break) in the pre-
break period, and rises to 0.998 and 0.997, respectively, in the post-break period.  
Time series graphs of the conditional sector correlations obtained from the AG-DCC-
Break model are presented in Figure 5.3. 
 
  
                                                          
304 Appendix D.5 presents the Welch’s Student’s t-test to assess the difference between the parameters in the 
two periods.  Appendix D.6 reports the test results. 
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Figure 5.3  Conditional Daily Correlation Dynamics 
Time series graphs of daily conditional correlations among selected sector indices obtained using the AG-
DCC-Break model with a structural break on 1 Jan 1999 (DCC-Break). "ENG", "IND", "CGS", "CSV", "UTL", 
"FIN", and "TEC" refer to the Engineering, Industrial, Consumer Goods, Consumer Service, Utility, Financial 
and Technology sector, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Conditional correlation from AG-DCC-Break model between Japanese FIN-IND and 
UTL-ENG. 
 
Panel B: Conditional correlation from AG-DCC-Break model between the UK FIN-IND and 
UTL-ENG. 
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Panel C: Conditional correlation from AG-DCC-Break model between the US FIN-IND and 
UTL-ENG. 
 
 
In all three markets sectors correlations decrease sharply at the end of 1998 and recover to 
their pre-EMU level by the end of 2002.  To gain more insight into the effect of the 
structural break and asymmetries on correlation dynamics, in Figure 5.4 we plot the 
correlation news impact surface (NIS) derived from the AG-DCC-Break.   
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Figure 5.4  Correlation News Impact Surfaces for Pre- and Post-Event Periods  
The graphs below show the conditional correlation News Impact Surface (NIS) between industrials and financials derived from the Diagonal ADCC model with 
structural break on January 1, 1999 (AG-DCC-Break).  The horizontal axis represents the shocks originated from the IND and FIN sector indices in terms of units of 
standard deviation, while the vertical axis represents the changes in conditional correlation between the two sector indices. 
Panel A1: The correlation NIS for Japanese IND-FIN during the pre-event period 
 
Panel A2: The correlation NIS for Japanese IND-FIN during the post-event period 
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Panel B1: The correlation NIS for the UK IND-FIN during the pre-event period 
 
Panel B2: The correlation NIS for the UK IND-FIN during the post-event period 
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Panel C1: The correlation NIS for the US IND-FIN during the pre-event period 
 
Panel C2: The correlation NIS for the US IND-FIN during the post-event period 
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Figure 5.4 shows the NIS for industrial and financial sectors across the three markets 
during the pre- and post-1999 periods.  The NIS corroborates the evidence obtained 
from the parameter estimates in Table 5.4 regarding the presence of sector asymmetric 
effects and structural break.  Pre-1999 the correlation between industrials and financials 
increases dramatically when both sectors suffer negative returns, while the impact of 
joint positive returns is relatively lower.  However, asymmetry in correlation dynamics 
is largely eliminated post-1999.   
In summary, the results suggest that there is significant asymmetry in domestic 
sector correlation dynamics.  Moreover, accounting for a structural break is important, 
particularly for the US and UK sectors, as asymmetric effects in correlations dampen 
post-1999 and correlations tend to become more sluggish.  
 
5.5.2. Timing the Correlation Signals 
We now turn to investigate whether accounting for correlation dynamics as vindicated 
by the statistical evidence in Section 5.5.1 would be fruitful for fund managers.  To this 
end, we assess the performance of the correlation timing strategies against static sector 
allocation.  The alternative covariance estimators are contrasted within the economic 
framework outlined in Section 5.4.3 that gauges their ability to generate excess risk-
adjusted returns and incremental utility.  The mean-variance portfolios are recursively 
constructed based on one-step-ahead covariance forecasts, while the static portfolio is 
based on the constant unconditional covariance matrix over the in-sample period.   
Table 5.5 presents the out-of-sample evaluation of the correlation timing strategies 
for the conditional covariance estimators against the static benchmark under the Max-R 
scheme.   
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Table 5.5  Portfolio performance for maximum return strategy (daily rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. daily bps) that renders the investor is indifferent 
between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the portfolio 
total position.  
 
 
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR p-value TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static
Constant Weights 36.63 18.35 2.00 0.71
Dynamic
EWMA 55.53 25.80 2.15 0.156 (0.377) 25.00 1890.88 6.43 1892.18 6.38
CCC 43.17 18.23 2.37 0.371 (0.198) 8.68 680.97 7.12 704.19 7.34
DCC 42.47 17.44 2.44 0.439 (0.177) 9.30 613.83 5.50 640.16 5.36
A-DCC 42.08 17.46 2.41 0.413 (0.191) 9.79 573.38 4.85 598.54 4.72
DCC-Break 43.38 17.67 2.46 0.459 (0.175) 8.87 706.62 6.73 733.81 6.57
A-DCC-Break 43.36 17.69 2.45 0.454 (0.177) 8.96 704.34 6.63 731.36 6.48
G-DCC 43.43 18.00 2.42 0.420 (0.199) 14.55 708.64 4.25 733.70 4.37
AG-DCC 44.77 17.83 2.51 0.514 (0.147) 14.13 847.79 4.95 877.33 4.86
G-DCC-Break 42.73 18.11 2.36 0.363 (0.231) 12.21 635.91 4.59 658.60 4.73
AG-DCC-Break 46.16 18.14 2.54 0.548 (0.134) 13.32 989.11 6.19 1019.84 6.10
Static
Constant Weights 31.44 16.54 1.90 0.28
Dynamic
EWMA 44.50 20.10 2.21 0.313 (0.239) 17.24 1282.24 5.97 1293.43 5.98
CCC 36.54 12.28 2.98 1.075 (0.041) 5.12 554.29 9.08 591.57 9.66
DCC 39.33 12.14 3.24 1.340 (0.018) 5.49 838.53 12.45 879.88 12.79
A-DCC 39.44 12.19 3.24 1.334 (0.018) 5.52 849.50 12.56 890.79 12.89
DCC-Break 38.14 12.25 3.11 1.212 (0.031) 5.53 717.03 10.56 756.66 10.89
A-DCC-Break 38.31 12.31 3.11 1.210 (0.032) 5.56 733.79 10.75 773.42 11.08
G-DCC 38.83 12.37 3.14 1.239 (0.025) 6.19 786.45 11.08 826.44 11.58
AG-DCC 39.75 12.48 3.19 1.285 (0.021) 5.92 879.74 12.78 920.38 13.13
G-DCC-Break 38.61 12.57 3.07 1.171 (0.035) 6.20 763.16 10.76 802.22 11.26
AG-DCC-Break 38.33 12.60 3.04 1.143 (0.039) 6.14 735.16 10.26 773.80 10.60
Static
Constant Weights 16.94 8.97 1.89 0.20
Dynamic
EWMA 33.13 16.46 2.01 0.125 (0.490) 21.31 1596.96 6.26 1584.20 6.17
CCC 26.41 10.21 2.59 0.698 (0.063) 4.75 950.84 17.34 953.51 17.32
DCC 26.54 10.50 2.53 0.640 (0.117) 5.27 945.27 15.48 932.71 15.22
A-DCC 26.55 10.50 2.53 0.640 (0.117) 5.27 946.17 15.49 933.58 15.23
DCC-Break 26.86 10.70 2.51 0.622 (0.130) 5.07 975.75 16.65 961.31 16.33
A-DCC-Break 26.83 10.71 2.51 0.618 (0.132) 5.10 972.04 16.49 957.52 16.17
G-DCC 25.29 10.55 2.40 0.508 (0.173) 9.22 836.27 7.70 836.92 7.68
AG-DCC 23.96 10.59 2.26 0.376 (0.238) 7.34 702.33 8.17 701.88 8.14
G-DCC-Break 25.53 10.76 2.37 0.485 (0.201) 10.25 858.93 7.09 858.93 7.06
AG-DCC-Break 27.01 10.73 2.52 0.629 (0.125) 9.32 1008.78 9.17 1010.16 9.13
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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First we appraise the standard portfolio performance measures.  Reported for each 
domestic sector portfolio is the annualized mean portfolio return (µ), annualized returns 
standard deviation (σ), Sharpe Ratio (SR) along with SR differentials relative to the static 
benchmark strategy and the associated p-values for Opdyke’s (2007) test of equality of 
SRs between the two strategies.  A significant test statistic (i.e. p-value is less than the 5% 
or 10% level) indicates rejection of H0: SRd=SRs in favour of the alternative that the 
dynamic strategy yields a higher SR than the static.  The results suggest that dynamic 
sector allocation strategies are generally able to generate higher reward-to-risk ratios 
than the static constant covariance strategy.  In the UK, a dynamic strategy entails 
significantly (5% level) better SR than the static strategy irrespective of the model 
employed.  The best model for the UK sector portfolio turns out to be the DCC which 
accrues significant incremental gains in risk-adjusted return of ∆SR = 1.340 in excess of 
the static strategy, while for the US the CCC model that maintains constant correlation 
achieves a significant (10% level) increase in the SR of 0.698 relative to the static sector 
allocation.  In Japan dynamic allocation increases the SR albeit not significantly so (top-
ranked model is AG-DCC-Break).   
We now turn attention to the economic value of the covariance forecasting models 
on the basis of annualized performance fee (PF) of the strategy at hand vis-à-vis the 
static benchmark.  We find large and positive performance fees across all portfolios 
providing overwhelming evidence that the dynamic strategies outperform the static 
constant covariance strategy in all three markets.  Among the various strategies, the 
EWMA entails the largest gains for sector investors with PFs ranging from a low of 1282 
bp to a high of 1892 bp depending on the portfolio and risk-aversion coefficient.  That is, 
a highly risk averse Japanese sector investor would be willing to pay up to a maximum 
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of 1892 bp per annum to reap the benefits of a dynamic covariance strategy, whereas a 
similar US investor would be willing to pay up to 1584 bp.  Focusing on conditional 
correlation models, it turns out that it pays off to account for correlation asymmetries 
and possibly breaks as the more flexible models provide the highest performance fee 
(AG-DCC-Break for Japan and US, and the AG-DCC for the UK). 
Table 5.6 reports the performance evaluation of the dynamic versus the static 
portfolios under the Min-V portfolio construction scheme.   
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Table 5.6  Portfolio performance for minimum variance strategy (daily 
rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. daily bps) that renders the investor is indifferent 
between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the portfolio 
total position.  
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR p-value TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static
Constant Weights 21.91 10.91 2.01 0.37
Dynamic
EWMA 19.40 11.02 1.76 -0.247 (0.364) 10.01 -259.11 - -266.26 -
CCC 20.73 9.58 2.16 0.155 (0.355) 4.11 -114.61 - -111.17 -
DCC 20.81 9.62 2.16 0.154 (0.367) 4.79 -106.67 - -103.22 -
A-DCC 20.46 9.58 2.14 0.127 (0.389) 4.96 -142.40 - -139.54 -
DCC-Break 21.14 9.65 2.19 0.182 (0.349) 4.55 -72.96 - -68.92 -
A-DCC-Break 21.01 9.60 2.19 0.181 (0.349) 4.59 -85.77 - -81.77 -
G-DCC 21.12 9.67 2.18 0.176 (0.351) 7.62 -75.06 - -71.14 -
AG-DCC 21.36 9.59 2.23 0.220 (0.320) 7.74 -49.77 - -44.98 -
G-DCC-Break 20.43 9.65 2.12 0.108 (0.409) 6.93 -144.94 - -142.46 -
AG-DCC-Break 21.67 9.65 2.25 0.237 (0.307) 7.20 -18.12 - -12.92 -
Static
Constant Weights 16.92 7.53 2.25 0.13
Dynamic
EWMA 15.90 5.29 3.00 0.754 (0.095) 4.69 -110.11 - -105.32 -
CCC 17.53 4.84 3.63 1.378 (0.013) 2.08 69.81 2.99 77.37 3.31
DCC 18.11 4.72 3.84 1.591 (0.007) 2.26 128.25 4.82 136.48 4.95
A-DCC 18.07 4.71 3.84 1.590 (0.007) 2.25 124.03 4.66 132.25 4.80
DCC-Break 17.68 4.73 3.74 1.488 (0.012) 2.22 85.54 3.22 93.42 3.35
A-DCC-Break 17.65 4.72 3.74 1.489 (0.013) 2.21 82.23 3.09 90.10 3.23
G-DCC 17.69 4.72 3.75 1.501 (0.009) 2.36 86.21 3.23 94.13 3.53
AG-DCC 17.93 4.71 3.80 1.556 (0.008) 2.29 110.07 4.06 118.18 4.21
G-DCC-Break 17.53 4.75 3.69 1.443 (0.014) 2.38 69.79 2.59 77.52 2.88
AG-DCC-Break 17.51 4.75 3.69 1.440 (0.015) 2.36 68.00 2.38 75.72 2.52
Static
Constant Weights 14.38 7.15 2.01 0.16
Dynamic
EWMA 15.58 6.15 2.53 0.522 (0.279) 7.69 117.21 1.30 118.11 1.31
CCC 16.91 5.60 3.02 1.007 (0.014) 2.46 256.28 9.26 259.57 9.37
DCC 16.31 5.44 3.00 0.990 (0.034) 2.63 191.26 6.44 189.69 6.39
A-DCC 16.31 5.43 3.00 0.989 (0.034) 2.63 190.66 6.42 189.06 6.36
DCC-Break 16.30 5.42 3.01 0.995 (0.036) 2.47 189.36 6.82 187.54 6.75
A-DCC-Break 16.27 5.42 3.00 0.989 (0.037) 2.48 186.28 6.69 184.42 6.62
G-DCC 16.32 5.44 3.00 0.987 (0.034) 4.98 197.26 3.41 200.36 3.46
AG-DCC 15.36 5.49 2.80 0.788 (0.068) 4.15 99.91 2.09 102.10 2.13
G-DCC-Break 16.46 5.50 2.99 0.982 (0.039) 5.92 211.92 3.06 215.01 3.10
AG-DCC-Break 15.93 5.44 2.93 0.920 (0.046) 5.54 158.14 2.45 160.93 2.49
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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The results suggest that the dynamic strategies outperform the static benchmark on the 
basis of lower portfolio volatility and significantly higher risk-adjusted returns of the 
sector portfolios.  There is strong evidence that dynamic strategies significantly enhance 
the SR of the static strategy in the UK sector portfolio with all models and in the US 
with the CCC and all the diagonal DCC-type models.  From the viewpoint of risk-
adjusted returns in sector allocation the best performing model for the UK is the DCC 
and for US it is the CCC, both with significant SR differentials of ∆SR = 1.591 (p-value = 
0.007) and ∆SR = 1.007 (p-value = 0.014).  In Japan dynamic allocation entails SR gains 
but these are not statistically significant. 
In terms of utility-based PF dynamic strategies outperform the static for strategy 
for the UK and US sector portfolios.  A highly risk-averse UK investor is willing to pay 
up to 136 bp per annum to switch from the static constant weights strategy to the top-
ranked DCC correlation timing strategy.  In the US, such an investor is willing to pay up 
to 259 bp per annum to switch from the static strategy to one where rebalancing is 
driven by CCC volatility forecasts.   
In contrast, the Japanese sector investor does not seem to benefit from correlation 
or volatility timing consistent with the evidence derived from SRs.  One potential 
explanation could be that the Japanese equity market is comparatively more efficient 
compared to the UK and US in the sense that market timing strategy cannot yield 
positive abnormal performances in a systemic way.  However, difficult to generate 
conditional volatility and correlation forecast with sufficiently high accuracy might also 
attribute to the poor performances of the dynamic strategy in Japan.  From the table, one 
can see that dynamic strategies do manage to achieve a lower volatility compared to the 
static one (e.g. σ = 9.58% A-DCC vs. σ = 10.91% Static), which means the volatility and 
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correlation forecasts are meaningful.  However, this is gain from lower portfolio risk is 
not sufficient to compensate the relatively lower portfolio return generated by the 
dynamic portfolio compared to the static one (µ = 20.46% A-DCC vs. µ = 21.91% Static). 
 
5.5.3. Turnover Rate and Break-Even Transaction Costs 
The empirical results obtained thus far suggest that the dynamic strategies outperform 
the static constant covariance strategy in terms of reward-to-risk ratio and performance 
fees for risk-averse investors with a quadratic utility function.  However, active trading 
strategies are prone to high turnovers and are therefore substantially impacted by 
transaction costs.  For each strategy the corresponding monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio (TO) can also be seen in Table 5.5 and 5.6.  The TO of the static strategy that 
builds upon constant covariance and only rebalances in order to maintain constant 
weights as required by returns fluctuations is as low as 0.20 – 0.71 (Max-R) and 0.13 – 
0.37 (Min-V), or equivalently 13% - 37% of total portfolio value.  The monthly turnover 
for the conditional correlation timing strategies is considerable, ranging at 4.75 – 14.55 
(Max-R) and 2.08 – 7.74 (Min-V) across models/portfolios.  The strategy with the lowest 
TO employs the CCC model that rebalances in response to volatility but not correlation 
changes.  In case the EWMA approach is used for forecasting the covariance matrix, the 
TO increases even further to 17.24 – 25 (Max-R) and 4.69 – 10.01 (Min-V).   
The results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 suggest that among the dynamic strategies the one 
based on the EWMA covariance forecast has the highest TO, around twofold that of 
conditional correlation models, which in turn materializes in relatively low BTC.  For 
instance, a highly risk-averse US sector investor using the Max-R (Min-V) EWMA model 
faces a BTC of 6.17 bp (1.31 bp) per trade, much lower than the actual transaction cost 
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for US Sector ETFs (7 bp), thereby rendering the EWMA strategy unsustainable under 
realistic trading conditions.  On the other hand, a US investor opting for the CCC model 
faces a higher and economically plausible BTC of 17.32 bp (9.37 bp) per trade under 
Max-R (Min-V).  Therefore, portfolio managers opting for the simple EWMA rather than 
conditional correlation models would face a much higher level of transaction costs 
which would severely undermine its performance.  Nonetheless, for UK and Japanese 
sector-linked ETFs the BTC of conditional correlation models with daily rebalancing is 
below the indicated average trading costs.  Despite the positive PFs consideration of 
transaction costs casts doubt on the practical feasibility of sector correlation timing in 
these two markets. 
 
5.5.4. The Impact of Rebalancing Frequency on the Performance of Dynamic Strategies 
As seen in the previous section, day traders engaging in dynamic correlation strategies 
face small BTCs, implying that realistic levels of transaction costs are bound to wipe out 
their incremental gains relative to the static strategy.  Lower rebalancing frequency will 
reduce the TO, which is negatively related to the revision interval, and result in BTCs 
that are high enough for investors to be able to implement the dynamic strategies.  
There is, however, a trade-off between rebalancing frequency and portfolio performance.  
By holding a portfolio with low rebalancing frequency, the investor might have to rely 
on less accurate long term (weekly or monthly) variance-covariance forecasts which 
might reduce the economic value of the portfolio (Han, 2006).  Furthermore, an investor 
with low rebalancing frequency cannot react timely to the arrival of new information.   
In order to investigate the impact of rebalancing frequency on the performance of 
dynamic asset allocation, we conduct the same analysis for monthly and weekly 
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investment horizons.  To this end, we rebalance the portfolio daily based on the daily 
covariance matrix forecast and hold the new portfolio for a m-day holding period, 
where m = 21 for a monthly horizon and m = 5 for a weekly horizon.  This overlapping 
approach assumes that, the investor will hold multiple portfolios simultaneously on 
every trading day, each formed one day apart.  The weights for each portfolio are equal 
at the beginning of the sample period (i.e. 20% each for the 5 portfolios hold by an 
investor with weekly rebalancing frequency).  On each trading day, only one of the m 
portfolios will be revised.305  The return on day t is then calculated as the weighted 
average return of the m portfolios held on day t.   As the time elapses, the weight of each 
portfolio will change as the value of each portfolios changes on a daily basis.  The 
turnover ratio on each trading day is equal to the turnover ratio of the revised portfolio 
(one of the m portfolios due to rebalance on that trading day) multiplied by its relative 
weight to the total asset holding on the corresponding day.306   A non-overlapping 
approach, which assumes the investor only holds one portfolio and rebalances it at the 
end of each holding period, is used instead in Fleming et al. (2003).  The advantage of 
the overlapping approach is twofold.  First, it enables the use of all available one-day-
ahead variance-covariance forecasts in the rebalancing process.  Second, it eliminates the 
potential bias arising from different rebalancing dates, and accounts for uncertainty 
over the choice of rebalancing day by creating the empirical distribution of portfolio 
returns across the different rebalancing occurrences.   
                                                          
305 This approach is inspired by Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) and Rouwenhorst’s (1998) early work on 
portfolio trading strategies, which propose an overlapping method to evaluate the performance of stock 
picking techniques with different rebalancing frequencies. 
306 Our approach differs from De Pooter et al (2008) in that they use static equal weights to calculate the 
overall day-t return and turnover ratio for the m portfolios whereas we allow for time-varying weights.   
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Tables 5.7 to 5.10 set out the impact of lowering the rebalancing frequency on the 
out-of-sample performance of the dynamic correlation strategies. By using the same 
benchmark (i.e. daily static portfolio) for all dynamic strategies, we are able to directly 
assess the impact of the different rebalancing frequency on the performance of dynamic 
portfolios.   
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Table 5.7  Portfolio performance for maximum return strategy (weekly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 36.63 18.35 2.00 0.71
Static 38.19 18.38 2.08 0.082 (0.334) 0.31 156.5072 - 156.97 -
Dynamic
EWMA 61.89 26.06 2.38 0.379 (0.277) 12.16 2410.27 17.60 2321.04 16.86
CCC 47.19 18.45 2.56 0.562 (0.093) 4.04 1053.34 26.48 1051.00 26.25
DCC 46.85 17.72 2.64 0.648 (0.080) 4.47 1026.19 22.87 1029.33 22.83
A-DCC 46.68 17.75 2.63 0.633 (0.085) 4.52 1008.27 22.18 1011.31 22.14
DCC-Break 48.59 18.01 2.70 0.702 (0.074) 4.29 1195.09 27.97 1194.60 27.80
A-DCC-Break 48.57 18.03 2.69 0.698 (0.075) 4.31 1193.16 27.72 1192.59 27.56
G-DCC 47.75 18.02 2.65 0.653 (0.079) 5.19 1111.88 20.76 1112.15 20.65
AG-DCC 45.93 18.09 2.54 0.542 (0.124) 5.24 930.84 17.25 932.01 17.20
G-DCC-Break 49.17 18.45 2.66 0.668 (0.085) 4.75 1248.52 25.85 1244.24 25.63
AG-DCC-Break 49.32 18.47 2.67 0.673 (0.082) 4.93 1263.15 25.11 1258.55 24.90
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 31.44 16.54 1.90 0.28
Static 32.83 16.51 1.99 0.088 (0.306) 0.16 139.92 - 140.65 -
Dynamic
EWMA 47.75 19.81 2.41 0.509 (0.236) 8.68 1590.39 15.75 1558.12 15.37
CCC 38.03 12.45 3.05 1.152 (0.036) 2.60 688.23 24.89 712.17 25.67
DCC 40.47 12.28 3.30 1.396 (0.014) 2.81 931.65 30.84 954.81 31.49
A-DCC 40.63 12.34 3.29 1.393 (0.015) 2.82 947.64 31.20 970.37 31.83
DCC-Break 39.79 12.42 3.20 1.302 (0.023) 2.82 863.15 28.45 886.12 29.10
A-DCC-Break 40.01 12.49 3.20 1.303 (0.023) 2.83 884.83 28.99 907.31 29.61
G-DCC 40.24 12.54 3.21 1.309 (0.019) 2.88 907.50 29.19 929.55 29.79
AG-DCC 40.59 12.65 3.21 1.308 (0.020) 2.86 941.16 30.51 962.37 31.06
G-DCC-Break 40.19 12.75 3.15 1.252 (0.027) 2.91 900.96 28.71 922.00 29.27
AG-DCC-Break 39.90 12.76 3.13 1.225 (0.030) 2.90 872.05 27.88 893.22 28.45
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 16.94 8.97 1.89 0.20
Static 17.10 8.96 1.91 0.021 (0.451) 0.10 37.14 - 53.73 -
Dynamic
EWMA 35.80 16.55 2.16 0.275 (0.329) 10.70 1871.71 14.48 1860.65 13.99
CCC 26.36 10.23 2.58 0.688 (0.063) 2.21 953.33 38.90 962.29 38.45
DCC 26.71 10.49 2.55 0.659 (0.107) 2.44 988.10 36.26 996.52 35.84
A-DCC 26.72 10.49 2.55 0.659 (0.107) 2.44 988.84 36.28 997.25 35.86
DCC-Break 27.04 10.69 2.53 0.641 (0.119) 2.37 1020.09 38.61 1028.00 38.11
A-DCC-Break 27.03 10.70 2.53 0.639 (0.120) 2.37 1019.78 38.49 1027.70 38.00
G-DCC 26.49 10.54 2.51 0.626 (0.117) 2.40 966.58 36.03 975.34 35.56
AG-DCC 25.50 10.56 2.42 0.528 (0.153) 2.58 869.38 29.81 879.57 29.40
G-DCC-Break 26.12 10.75 2.43 0.542 (0.157) 3.03 930.23 26.81 939.53 26.43
AG-DCC-Break 27.28 10.71 2.55 0.659 (0.112) 2.92 1044.38 31.42 1051.89 30.95
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.8  Portfolio Performance for minimum variance strategy (weekly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 21.91 10.91 2.01 0.37
Static 22.52 10.92 2.06 0.054 (0.389) 0.18 60.38 - 60.51 -
Dynamic
EWMA 20.92 10.94 1.91 -0.097 (0.437) 4.89 -100.36 - -100.90 -
CCC 22.30 9.58 2.33 0.319 (0.212) 1.97 45.82 2.42 51.55 2.71
DCC 22.59 9.66 2.34 0.331 (0.225) 2.33 74.65 3.20 80.14 3.44
A-DCC 22.40 9.61 2.33 0.323 (0.230) 2.34 55.58 2.38 61.23 2.62
DCC-Break 23.15 9.71 2.39 0.377 (0.205) 2.23 130.48 5.90 135.87 6.14
A-DCC-Break 23.06 9.65 2.39 0.381 (0.202) 2.24 121.37 5.47 126.97 5.72
G-DCC 22.86 9.64 2.37 0.362 (0.204) 2.72 101.70 3.64 107.29 3.83
AG-DCC 21.47 9.60 2.24 0.228 (0.305) 2.75 -37.67 - -32.26 -
G-DCC-Break 22.96 9.71 2.36 0.356 (0.219) 2.56 111.59 4.29 116.93 4.50
AG-DCC-Break 23.32 9.64 2.42 0.410 (0.185) 2.57 147.58 5.64 153.25 5.86
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 16.92 7.53 2.25 0.13
Static 17.29 7.51 2.30 0.054 (0.396) 0.07 36.76 - 36.89 -
Dynamic
EWMA 15.99 5.23 3.06 0.807 (0.137) 2.25 -86.85 - -81.09 -
CCC 17.87 4.86 3.68 1.428 (0.012) 1.02 103.28 9.81 110.23 10.46
DCC 18.36 4.74 3.87 1.626 (0.006) 1.11 152.36 13.09 159.57 13.69
A-DCC 18.33 4.73 3.87 1.626 (0.007) 1.11 149.74 12.89 156.96 13.50
DCC-Break 18.05 4.76 3.79 1.544 (0.010) 1.10 121.61 10.63 128.77 11.25
A-DCC-Break 18.04 4.75 3.79 1.545 (0.011) 1.10 119.85 10.49 127.02 11.11
G-DCC 18.01 4.75 3.79 1.542 (0.008) 1.12 117.50 10.05 124.68 10.66
AG-DCC 18.07 4.75 3.80 1.556 (0.008) 1.11 123.58 10.64 130.76 11.25
G-DCC-Break 17.80 4.78 3.72 1.476 (0.013) 1.11 95.76 8.27 102.86 8.87
AG-DCC-Break 17.79 4.77 3.73 1.480 (0.013) 1.11 94.94 8.17 102.06 8.77
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 14.38 7.15 2.01 0.16
Static 14.46 7.14 2.02 0.014 (0.470) 0.08 7.90 - 7.94 -
Dynamic
EWMA 16.03 6.14 2.61 0.601 (0.182) 3.78 168.24 3.90 171.16 3.97
CCC 16.80 5.58 3.01 0.998 (0.013) 1.14 246.54 21.04 250.72 21.37
DCC 16.26 5.41 3.01 0.996 (0.031) 1.22 193.36 15.36 197.98 15.72
A-DCC 16.25 5.41 3.01 0.995 (0.031) 1.22 192.72 15.31 197.35 15.67
DCC-Break 16.20 5.39 3.00 0.993 (0.035) 1.16 187.78 15.78 192.44 16.17
A-DCC-Break 16.19 5.39 3.00 0.991 (0.035) 1.16 186.55 15.66 191.21 16.05
G-DCC 16.27 5.40 3.01 1.002 (0.031) 1.52 194.81 12.03 199.45 12.31
AG-DCC 15.69 5.43 2.89 0.882 (0.047) 1.41 136.86 9.17 141.46 9.47
G-DCC-Break 15.51 5.42 2.86 0.849 (0.060) 1.64 118.19 6.73 122.80 6.99
AG-DCC-Break 16.24 5.40 3.01 0.995 (0.031) 1.51 191.36 11.91 195.99 12.18
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.9  Portfolio performance for maximum return strategy (monthly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
 
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 36.63 18.35 2.00 0.71
Static 37.34 18.61 2.01 0.010 (0.479) 0.15 68.45 - 66.78 -
Dynamic
EWMA 61.28 26.31 2.33 0.333 (0.292) 5.47 2347.10 42.71 2256.72 40.70
CCC 46.96 19.14 2.45 0.457 (0.128) 1.69 1023.80 92.82 1016.49 90.90
DCC 46.01 18.36 2.51 0.509 (0.121) 1.92 937.12 68.18 936.30 67.38
A-DCC 46.01 18.40 2.50 0.504 (0.123) 1.93 936.33 67.86 935.24 67.06
DCC-Break 47.93 18.71 2.56 0.566 (0.114) 1.89 1123.54 84.03 1118.67 82.58
A-DCC-Break 48.02 18.69 2.57 0.573 (0.111) 1.89 1132.77 84.31 1127.92 82.87
G-DCC 46.09 18.73 2.46 0.465 (0.143) 2.11 941.39 59.34 937.83 58.55
AG-DCC 45.61 18.72 2.44 0.439 (0.160) 2.14 893.49 55.07 890.26 54.35
G-DCC-Break 47.98 19.16 2.50 0.508 (0.141) 1.93 1124.27 80.69 1115.97 79.02
AG-DCC-Break 47.64 19.26 2.47 0.477 (0.155) 2.02 1089.71 73.05 1080.96 71.56
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 31.44 16.54 1.90 0.28
Static 33.05 16.49 2.00 0.103 (0.293) 0.08 162.50 - 163.38 -
Dynamic
EWMA 51.99 19.57 2.66 0.755 (0.156) 3.99 2006.46 47.14 1968.97 45.98
CCC 39.67 12.63 3.14 1.241 (0.024) 1.08 850.52 94.98 872.61 96.77
DCC 41.94 12.54 3.34 1.442 (0.010) 1.19 1075.84 105.46 1096.37 106.68
A-DCC 42.14 12.60 3.34 1.443 (0.011) 1.19 1095.49 106.96 1115.52 108.10
DCC-Break 42.00 12.72 3.30 1.400 (0.015) 1.21 1080.92 103.57 1100.49 104.66
A-DCC-Break 42.28 12.79 3.31 1.404 (0.015) 1.21 1107.35 105.60 1126.32 106.59
G-DCC 42.26 12.81 3.30 1.398 (0.013) 1.23 1105.34 104.06 1124.23 105.08
AG-DCC 42.56 12.91 3.30 1.395 (0.013) 1.24 1134.78 105.80 1152.84 106.68
G-DCC-Break 42.40 13.03 3.25 1.354 (0.017) 1.25 1118.04 102.29 1135.68 103.15
AG-DCC-Break 42.55 13.08 3.25 1.352 (0.018) 1.26 1132.93 103.23 1150.13 104.03
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 16.94 8.97 1.89 0.20
Static 17.16 8.91 1.93 0.039 (0.419) 0.05 22.61 - 22.83 -
Dynamic
EWMA 31.15 16.21 1.92 0.034 (0.453) 4.97 1364.84 24.92 1320.56 24.07
CCC 25.99 10.37 2.51 0.619 (0.085) 0.93 894.48 107.49 886.16 105.94
DCC 27.35 10.65 2.57 0.681 (0.103) 1.04 1027.95 106.72 1017.15 105.11
A-DCC 27.36 10.65 2.57 0.682 (0.103) 1.04 1028.86 106.81 1018.04 105.20
DCC-Break 27.88 10.89 2.56 0.671 (0.112) 1.04 1078.79 111.66 1066.39 109.80
A-DCC-Break 27.87 10.90 2.56 0.670 (0.113) 1.04 1078.13 111.42 1065.71 109.57
G-DCC 27.16 10.72 2.53 0.646 (0.111) 1.01 1008.40 108.60 997.49 106.78
AG-DCC 26.70 10.69 2.50 0.609 (0.125) 1.11 963.79 91.99 953.47 90.58
G-DCC-Break 27.58 10.88 2.54 0.648 (0.116) 1.20 1049.26 91.39 1037.26 89.89
AG-DCC-Break 28.43 10.89 2.61 0.723 (0.094) 1.17 1133.04 101.98 1120.05 100.21
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.10  Portfolio Performance for minimum variance strategy (monthly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 21.91 10.91 2.01 0.37
Static 21.94 10.99 2.00 -0.011 (0.476) 0.09 2.66 - 2.37 -
Dynamic
EWMA 20.07 10.52 1.91 -0.100 (0.430) 2.22 -183.18 - -182.26 -
CCC 22.54 9.59 2.35 0.342 (0.185) 0.81 69.99 14.31 75.75 15.45
DCC 22.49 9.68 2.32 0.316 (0.222) 0.99 64.21 9.19 69.61 9.95
A-DCC 22.39 9.63 2.32 0.315 (0.222) 0.99 54.27 7.76 59.81 8.54
DCC-Break 23.06 9.71 2.38 0.367 (0.200) 0.97 121.72 17.95 127.09 18.70
A-DCC-Break 23.04 9.65 2.39 0.379 (0.193) 0.98 119.37 17.46 124.96 18.24
G-DCC 22.06 9.68 2.28 0.271 (0.252) 1.08 21.39 2.67 26.71 3.33
AG-DCC 21.76 9.64 2.26 0.247 (0.277) 1.11 -9.29 - -3.94 -
G-DCC-Break 22.55 9.70 2.32 0.316 (0.234) 1.01 70.07 9.76 75.37 10.49
AG-DCC-Break 22.34 9.67 2.31 0.302 (0.242) 1.04 48.75 6.49 54.11 7.19
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 16.92 7.53 2.25 0.13
Static 17.42 7.49 2.33 0.079 (0.357) 0.03 50.04 - 50.26 -
Dynamic
EWMA 16.52 5.09 3.25 0.998 (0.099) 1.05 -32.91 - -26.67 -
CCC 18.00 4.85 3.71 1.462 (0.010) 0.41 116.26 36.75 123.24 38.89
DCC 18.52 4.76 3.89 1.642 (0.005) 0.46 168.64 45.82 175.81 47.69
A-DCC 18.51 4.75 3.89 1.645 (0.005) 0.46 167.52 45.55 174.70 47.43
DCC-Break 18.45 4.78 3.86 1.609 (0.008) 0.46 161.73 44.15 168.86 46.01
A-DCC-Break 18.45 4.78 3.86 1.614 (0.008) 0.46 161.76 44.19 168.90 46.06
G-DCC 18.39 4.78 3.85 1.600 (0.006) 0.46 155.46 41.82 162.59 43.67
AG-DCC 18.43 4.78 3.86 1.609 (0.006) 0.47 159.10 42.35 166.24 44.18
G-DCC-Break 18.33 4.80 3.82 1.574 (0.009) 0.46 149.59 39.95 156.69 41.78
AG-DCC-Break 18.32 4.79 3.82 1.576 (0.009) 0.47 148.60 19.97 155.71 21.37
Static (Daily Rebalancing) 14.38 7.15 2.01 0.16
Static 14.52 7.10 2.05 0.034 (0.432) 0.04 13.97 - 14.11 -
Dynamic
EWMA 12.96 5.94 2.18 0.172 (0.379) 1.76 -138.56 - -135.70 -
CCC 16.01 5.62 2.85 0.836 (0.031) 0.47 168.01 47.03 172.16 48.10
DCC 15.87 5.45 2.91 0.902 (0.047) 0.51 154.68 38.57 159.23 39.65
A-DCC 15.87 5.45 2.91 0.902 (0.047) 0.51 154.19 38.46 158.74 39.54
DCC-Break 15.88 5.44 2.92 0.907 (0.051) 0.50 155.20 39.62 159.77 40.72
A-DCC-Break 15.87 5.44 2.92 0.906 (0.051) 0.50 154.06 39.34 158.62 40.44
G-DCC 15.73 5.43 2.90 0.886 (0.050) 0.57 140.64 30.04 145.23 30.97
AG-DCC 15.56 5.46 2.85 0.839 (0.057) 0.57 123.62 26.35 128.14 27.29
G-DCC-Break 15.67 5.45 2.87 0.864 (0.059) 0.62 134.52 25.81 139.06 26.64
AG-DCC-Break 15.71 5.43 2.89 0.883 (0.050) 0.57 138.77 29.57 143.35 30.50
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
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Reducing the rebalancing frequency increases considerably the mean return of the 
dynamic portfolios, while the increases in portfolio volatility are negligible.  This trade-off 
leads to enhanced risk-adjusted performance when rebalancing less frequently.  Our 
findings are in line with Fleming et al (2003) and De Pooter et al (2008).307  Investors are 
prepared to pay higher PFs in favour of the dynamic strategy when rebalancing less often.  
Correlation timing with weekly or monthly rebalancing generate PFs ranging from 688 bp 
to 2410 bp (Max-R) a notable increase from 554 bp to 1892 bp for daily rebalancing.308   
Furthermore, the decrease in the TO rate when switching from daily rebalancing to 
weekly or monthly is quite dramatic, thereby substantially benefiting the post-transaction 
cost performance of the dynamic strategies.  The TO of weekly dynamic portfolios is less 
than half the trading volume of the daily portfolios (Tables 5.7 and 5.8), while revising the 
dynamic portfolios on a monthly basis (Tables 5.9 and 5.10) reduces the TO even further to 
less than a quarter of the turnover of the daily portfolios.  For instance, in the US/Japanese 
sector portfolios, the daily dynamic portfolio based on the CCC model has a TO rate of 
4.75/8.68 under Max-R whereas the TO rate of the corresponding weekly and monthly 
portfolios is only 2.21/4.04 and 0.93/ 1.69, respectively.   
As a result, the BTCs per trade with a lower rebalancing frequency are substantially 
higher, which implies that dynamic portfolios are more likely to maintain post-transaction 
cost benefits over the static benchmark if they are revised less frequently.  Weekly 
rebalancing correlation timing is only feasible within the US market.  However, as borne 
                                                          
307  De Pooter et al (2008) assess the impact of rebalancing frequency on the performance of dynamic 
portfolios and find that lower frequencies are preferable in terms of utility-based performance fees investors 
are willing to pay to switch from daily to weekly or monthly rebalancing.  In addition, they find that a lower 
rebalancing frequency emphasizes more the benefits of using intraday data for covariance matrix estimation. 
308 Della Corte et al (2010) explore monthly and weekly rebalancing in the context of correlation timing. 
However, the lower rebalancing frequency also means lower sampling frequency.  In essence, for monthly 
rebalancing they re-sample the data at lower frequency and use monthly information to estimate the 
covariance matrix. They find that dynamic strategies are poor performers at low rebalancing frequencies and 
attribute this to the diminishing persistence of correlation and volatilities as investors move from daily to 
monthly or weekly frequencies. 
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out in Table 5.9 (Max-R) monthly rebalancing generates BTCs that are markedly above 
realistic levels of transaction costs pointing towards the use of dynamic strategies in all 
markets.  Depending on the model and risk-aversion level, the BTCs generated by 
portfolios based on conditional correlation models range from 40 bp to 111 bp per trade.  
Monthly Min-V correlation timing (Table 5.10) is feasible for US based investors and 
although not convincingly above the quite high realistic levels of transaction costs for UK 
and Japan, the improvement is noticeable.  In contrast the EWMA fails to beat the static 
strategy by providing BTCs that are higher than the realistic level of transaction costs.   
In summary, conditional correlation models outperform the industry standard 
EWMA model when transaction costs are brought into the picture.  The longer holding 
period not only entails a much higher BTC per trade for the dynamic strategies relative to 
the static, thus making the strategies more feasible but also their outperformance of the 
dynamic strategies relative to the static benchmark becomes typically more pronounced.  
In order to more directly evaluate the effect of rebalancing frequency on the dynamic 
investment strategies we compute for a given model the maximum return an investor is 
willing to forfeit to switch from daily to weekly and monthly rebalancing.  Table 5.11 
presents these performance fees for each strategy/model and level of investor risk-
aversion.  
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Table 5.11  Performance of weekly/monthly relative to daily rebalancing frequency  
 
 
Note: The table reports for each model the performance fee, in annualized basis points, an investor is willing to pay to switch from weekly/monthly to daily rebalancing.  
 
 
Dynamic Strategy 
Model PF γ =1 PF γ =10 PF γ =1 PF γ =10 PF γ =1 PF γ =10 PF γ =1 PF γ =10 PF γ =1 PF γ =10 PF γ =1 PF γ =10
Panel A. Maximum return target variance
EWMA 636.46 636.17 365.91 368.93 341.09 395.47 571.29 568.31 791.00 795.43 -190.84 -190.46
CCC 401.86 401.74 147.91 147.58 20.84 42.56 371.98 366.47 311.80 310.97 -43.90 -44.84
DCC 438.11 437.56 113.15 112.90 71.57 115.93 348.15 342.71 259.49 258.33 107.17 128.47
A-DCC 459.27 458.62 118.63 118.37 71.47 115.90 386.67 381.17 268.73 267.54 107.23 128.59
DCC-Break 519.24 518.30 164.19 163.96 75.56 123.14 446.87 440.67 384.71 383.36 130.13 153.63
A-DCC-Break 519.63 518.71 169.71 169.46 78.87 126.54 458.51 452.61 395.10 393.71 133.11 156.69
G-DCC 427.81 429.18 139.96 139.64 148.59 171.45 255.28 250.95 340.54 339.31 186.69 186.34
AG-DCC 114.49 113.23 81.91 81.34 181.32 204.17 76.61 70.33 278.53 277.26 273.44 273.37
G-DCC-Break 642.49 641.24 156.77 156.44 88.51 112.51 516.94 510.44 376.75 375.43 204.94 204.90
AG-DCC-Break 314.41 313.39 155.21 154.93 56.52 80.45 138.05 130.24 419.46 417.98 141.34 140.99
Panel B. Minimum variance target return 
EWMA 151.96 152.56 21.98 22.08 48.60 48.66 69.52 71.87 75.91 76.31 -258.84 -259.46
CCC 157.86 158.17 33.99 33.93 -10.98 -11.05 182.03 182.28 46.99 46.98 -89.87 -90.28
DCC 178.89 179.09 25.10 25.02 1.06 6.41 168.52 168.59 41.42 41.33 -37.75 -32.58
A-DCC 194.71 194.93 26.66 26.58 1.02 6.39 193.45 193.51 44.51 44.39 -37.64 -32.46
DCC-Break 201.75 201.88 36.73 36.66 -2.62 3.02 193.02 193.12 76.91 76.87 -35.30 -29.85
A-DCC-Break 205.16 205.30 38.24 38.17 -0.80 4.85 203.18 203.29 80.22 80.18 -33.40 -27.94
G-DCC 175.23 175.66 31.90 31.82 -4.57 -4.56 95.09 95.26 69.92 69.85 -58.94 -59.15
AG-DCC 11.31 11.29 14.26 14.11 34.18 34.31 39.70 39.57 49.90 49.77 20.86 20.94
G-DCC-Break 253.17 253.26 26.44 26.35 -95.89 -96.09 211.77 211.88 80.34 80.31 -79.51 -79.71
AG-DCC-Break 165.43 165.80 27.40 27.32 30.90 30.97 66.63 66.74 81.12 81.11 -21.89 -21.95
Weekly Rebalancing Portfolio
Japan UK US
Monthly Rebalancing Portfolio
Japan UK US
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The results suggest that dynamic portfolios with lower rebalancing frequency (i.e. weekly 
or monthly) outperform their daily counterparts by generating positive PFs regardless the 
risk-aversion levels.  This finding is in line with De Pooter et al (2008). For the Max-R 
strategy we find that the PF for switching from daily to weekly/monthly rebalancing is 
between 20 bp - 795 bp for sector investors with different risk-aversions, while for the Min-
V strategy PFs are lower but still largely positive.  The only exception come from the US 
market where the gains of conditional correlation models seem to be more pronounced for 
daily rebalancing, especially under Min-V.  By comparing the risk-return performances of 
daily and weekly/monthly US sector portfolios under Min-V (Table 5.6 and 5.8/5.10), one 
can see that the negative PFs generated by the weekly/monthly portfolios over their daily 
counterparts are mainly due to the decrease in portfolio returns when rebalancing less 
frequently. 
However, from Tables 5.7 to 5.10, one can see that static portfolios also benefit from 
reducing the rebalancing frequency as their dynamic rivals.  For instance, the TO of 
Japanese static portfolio under Max-R has decreased from 0.71 (daily rebalancing) to 
0.31/0.15 (weekly/monthly rebalancing).  Besides, the risk-adjusted reward (i.e. SR) of the 
static portfolio has increased as well when rebalancing less often.  For instance, the SR of 
the static portfolio in the UK market under Min-V is 2.25 when rebalancing on a daily 
basis, while the SR of the weekly and monthly static portfolio is 2.30 and 2.33, respectively.   
Our findings are in line with Fleming et al (2003), who argue that both static and 
dynamic portfolios benefit from longer revision interval.  Therefore, the relative 
performance of the dynamic strategies over their static rival with the same rebalancing 
frequency is unclear.  Tables 5.12 to 5.15 summarize the performance evaluation of the 
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dynamic verse the static portfolio with the same weekly/monthly rebalancing frequency 
under the Max-R/Min-V portfolio construction scheme. 
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Table 5.12  Portfolio performance for maximum return strategy (weekly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static 
strategy and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of 
the static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static 38.19 18.38 2.08 0.31
Dynamic
EWMA 61.89 26.06 2.38 0.297 (0.321) 12.16 2259.83 15.98 2174.41 15.31
CCC 47.19 18.45 2.56 0.480 (0.130) 4.04 899.28 20.22 898.51 20.12
DCC 46.85 17.72 2.64 0.566 (0.111) 4.47 872.06 17.59 876.75 17.64
A-DCC 46.68 17.75 2.63 0.551 (0.116) 4.52 854.09 17.02 858.64 17.07
DCC-Break 48.59 18.01 2.70 0.620 (0.102) 4.29 1041.41 21.96 1042.82 21.93
A-DCC-Break 48.57 18.03 2.69 0.616 (0.102) 4.31 1039.52 21.78 1040.79 21.74
G-DCC 47.75 18.02 2.65 0.572 (0.110) 5.19 957.97 16.45 959.96 16.43
AG-DCC 45.93 18.09 2.54 0.460 (0.164) 5.24 776.46 13.24 778.95 13.25
G-DCC-Break 49.17 18.45 2.66 0.587 (0.114) 4.75 1094.98 20.67 1092.69 20.57
AG-DCC-Break 49.32 18.47 2.67 0.592 (0.111) 4.93 1109.64 20.18 1107.07 20.09
Static 32.83 16.51 1.99 0.16
Dynamic
EWMA 47.75 19.81 2.41 0.421 (0.274) 8.68 1454.01 14.17 1423.69 13.83
CCC 38.03 12.45 3.05 1.064 (0.049) 2.60 549.68 18.74 574.13 19.54
DCC 40.47 12.28 3.30 1.308 (0.020) 2.81 793.66 24.89 817.84 25.59
A-DCC 40.63 12.34 3.29 1.305 (0.021) 2.82 809.69 25.27 833.47 25.95
DCC-Break 39.79 12.42 3.20 1.214 (0.031) 2.82 724.99 22.65 748.85 23.34
A-DCC-Break 40.01 12.49 3.20 1.215 (0.032) 2.83 746.73 23.19 770.13 23.86
G-DCC 40.24 12.54 3.21 1.221 (0.027) 2.88 769.45 23.49 792.47 24.13
AG-DCC 40.59 12.65 3.21 1.220 (0.028) 2.86 803.19 24.70 825.44 25.31
G-DCC-Break 40.19 12.75 3.15 1.164 (0.036) 2.91 762.90 23.08 784.89 23.69
AG-DCC-Break 39.90 12.76 3.13 1.137 (0.041) 2.90 733.91 22.27 755.98 22.89
Static 17.10 8.96 1.91 0.10
Dynamic
EWMA 35.80 16.55 2.16 0.254 (0.340) 10.70 1835.88 14.22 1810.22 13.74
CCC 26.36 10.23 2.58 0.667 (0.069) 2.21 916.83 36.42 910.27 36.03
DCC 26.71 10.49 2.55 0.637 (0.114) 2.44 951.62 34.13 944.56 33.75
A-DCC 26.72 10.49 2.55 0.637 (0.114) 2.44 952.36 34.15 945.29 33.77
DCC-Break 27.04 10.69 2.53 0.619 (0.127) 2.37 983.63 36.31 976.10 35.87
A-DCC-Break 27.03 10.70 2.53 0.618 (0.128) 2.37 983.32 36.21 975.79 35.77
G-DCC 26.49 10.54 2.51 0.604 (0.125) 2.40 930.10 33.88 923.34 33.46
AG-DCC 25.50 10.56 2.42 0.507 (0.163) 2.58 832.83 28.06 827.39 27.69
G-DCC-Break 26.12 10.75 2.43 0.520 (0.167) 3.03 893.72 25.43 887.47 25.09
AG-DCC-Break 27.28 10.71 2.55 0.638 (0.120) 2.92 1007.99 29.83 1000.03 29.41
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.13  Portfolio Performance for minimum variance strategy (weekly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static strategy 
and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of the 
static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
  
 
 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static 22.52 10.92 2.06 0.18
Dynamic
EWMA 20.92 10.94 1.91 -0.151 (0.403) 4.89 -160.91 - -161.73 -
CCC 22.30 9.58 2.33 0.266 (0.254) 1.97 -14.61 - -8.97 -
DCC 22.59 9.66 2.34 0.277 (0.264) 2.33 14.25 0.56 19.67 0.77
A-DCC 22.40 9.61 2.33 0.269 (0.269) 2.34 -4.81 - 0.73 0.03
DCC-Break 23.15 9.71 2.39 0.323 (0.240) 2.23 70.18 2.88 75.51 3.09
A-DCC-Break 23.06 9.65 2.39 0.327 (0.237) 2.24 61.06 2.50 66.60 2.72
G-DCC 22.86 9.64 2.37 0.308 (0.241) 2.72 41.37 1.37 46.88 1.55
AG-DCC 21.47 9.60 2.24 0.175 (0.348) 2.75 -98.15 - -92.95 -
G-DCC-Break 22.96 9.71 2.36 0.302 (0.256) 2.56 51.27 1.81 56.54 2.00
AG-DCC-Break 23.32 9.64 2.42 0.356 (0.219) 2.57 87.30 3.07 92.92 3.27
Static 17.29 7.51 2.30 0.07
Dynamic
EWMA 15.99 5.23 3.06 0.753 (0.153) 2.25 -123.69 - -118.12 -
CCC 17.87 4.86 3.68 1.374 (0.016) 1.02 66.57 5.90 73.42 6.50
DCC 18.36 4.74 3.87 1.572 (0.008) 1.11 115.68 9.33 122.83 9.90
A-DCC 18.33 4.73 3.87 1.572 (0.008) 1.11 113.05 9.14 120.21 9.71
DCC-Break 18.05 4.76 3.79 1.490 (0.013) 1.10 84.91 6.96 91.99 7.54
A-DCC-Break 18.04 4.75 3.79 1.491 (0.013) 1.10 83.14 6.83 90.23 7.41
G-DCC 18.01 4.75 3.79 1.489 (0.011) 1.12 80.80 6.49 87.89 7.06
AG-DCC 18.07 4.75 3.80 1.502 (0.011) 1.11 86.88 7.03 93.98 7.60
G-DCC-Break 17.80 4.78 3.72 1.422 (0.016) 1.11 59.04 4.79 66.05 5.35
AG-DCC-Break 17.79 4.77 3.73 1.426 (0.017) 1.11 58.22 4.70 65.25 5.27
Static 14.46 7.14 2.02 0.08
Dynamic
EWMA 16.03 6.14 2.61 0.587 (0.186) 3.78 160.37 3.64 163.26 3.70
CCC 16.80 5.58 3.01 0.984 (0.014) 1.14 238.64 18.87 242.84 19.19
DCC 16.26 5.41 3.01 0.982 (0.033) 1.22 185.49 13.72 190.09 14.06
A-DCC 16.25 5.41 3.01 0.981 (0.033) 1.22 184.85 13.67 189.45 14.01
DCC-Break 16.20 5.39 3.00 0.979 (0.037) 1.16 179.91 14.03 184.55 14.39
A-DCC-Break 16.19 5.39 3.00 0.977 (0.037) 1.16 178.68 13.92 183.32 14.28
G-DCC 16.27 5.40 3.01 0.988 (0.033) 1.52 186.94 10.92 191.56 11.18
AG-DCC 15.69 5.43 2.89 0.868 (0.049) 1.41 128.99 8.14 133.56 8.42
G-DCC-Break 15.51 5.42 2.86 0.835 (0.063) 1.64 110.31 5.96 114.89 6.21
AG-DCC-Break 16.24 5.40 3.01 0.981 (0.033) 1.51 183.49 10.79 188.10 11.06
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.14  Portfolio performance for maximum return strategy (monthly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static strategy 
and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of the 
static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position 
 
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static 37.34 18.61 2.01 0.15
Dynamic
EWMA 61.28 26.31 2.33 0.322 (0.298) 5.47 2281.37 37.16 2194.39 35.57
CCC 46.96 19.14 2.45 0.447 (0.133) 1.69 956.51 54.21 951.73 53.73
DCC 46.01 18.36 2.51 0.499 (0.127) 1.92 869.78 42.71 871.38 42.64
A-DCC 46.01 18.40 2.50 0.494 (0.129) 1.93 868.98 42.56 870.32 42.49
DCC-Break 47.93 18.71 2.56 0.556 (0.119) 1.89 1056.40 52.89 1054.12 52.57
A-DCC-Break 48.02 18.69 2.57 0.562 (0.115) 1.89 1065.65 53.18 1063.39 52.86
G-DCC 46.09 18.73 2.46 0.454 (0.148) 2.11 874.05 38.89 872.92 38.73
AG-DCC 45.61 18.72 2.44 0.429 (0.166) 2.14 826.09 36.16 825.25 36.01
G-DCC-Break 47.98 19.16 2.50 0.498 (0.146) 1.93 1057.13 51.48 1051.41 50.98
AG-DCC-Break 47.64 19.26 2.47 0.467 (0.160) 2.02 1022.54 47.51 1016.33 47.02
Static 33.05 16.49 2.00 0.08
Dynamic
EWMA 51.99 19.57 2.66 0.652 (0.190) 3.99 1849.17 40.98 1814.69 40.05
CCC 39.67 12.63 3.14 1.138 (0.035) 1.08 690.05 59.55 712.98 61.39
DCC 41.94 12.54 3.34 1.339 (0.016) 1.19 915.94 71.43 937.87 72.96
A-DCC 42.14 12.60 3.34 1.339 (0.016) 1.19 935.65 72.74 957.12 74.22
DCC-Break 42.00 12.72 3.30 1.297 (0.022) 1.21 921.04 70.53 942.02 71.95
A-DCC-Break 42.28 12.79 3.31 1.301 (0.022) 1.21 947.55 72.29 967.98 73.65
G-DCC 42.26 12.81 3.30 1.294 (0.019) 1.23 945.53 71.40 965.87 72.76
AG-DCC 42.56 12.91 3.30 1.292 (0.020) 1.24 975.05 73.07 994.62 74.34
G-DCC-Break 42.40 13.03 3.25 1.251 (0.025) 1.25 958.25 70.73 977.38 71.96
AG-DCC-Break 42.55 13.08 3.25 1.248 (0.026) 1.26 973.19 71.59 991.90 72.78
Static 17.16 8.91 1.93 0.05
Dynamic
EWMA 31.15 16.21 1.92 -0.005 (0.474) 4.97 1342.78 23.76 1298.60 22.95
CCC 25.99 10.37 2.51 0.580 (0.098) 0.93 872.23 86.47 863.90 85.48
DCC 27.35 10.65 2.57 0.643 (0.115) 1.04 1005.75 88.27 994.98 87.18
A-DCC 27.36 10.65 2.57 0.643 (0.115) 1.04 1006.66 88.35 995.87 87.26
DCC-Break 27.88 10.89 2.56 0.633 (0.125) 1.04 1056.62 92.51 1044.26 91.25
A-DCC-Break 27.87 10.90 2.56 0.631 (0.126) 1.04 1055.96 92.34 1043.58 91.07
G-DCC 27.16 10.72 2.53 0.607 (0.124) 1.01 986.19 89.28 975.31 88.06
AG-DCC 26.70 10.69 2.50 0.571 (0.139) 1.11 941.57 76.93 931.26 75.93
G-DCC-Break 27.58 10.88 2.54 0.609 (0.129) 1.20 1027.08 77.57 1015.10 76.49
AG-DCC-Break 28.43 10.89 2.61 0.685 (0.105) 1.17 1110.89 86.34 1097.96 85.08
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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Table 5.15  Portfolio Performance for minimum variance strategy (monthly rebalancing) 
 
Note: The table reports the annualised mean return (%µ), standard deviation (%σ) and Sharpe Ratio (SR) of portfolios 
based on static constant covariance matrix and dynamic covariance forecasting models. The Sharpe Ratio differential 
(∆SR) and p-value are also reported for the null hypothesis of equality of Sharpe Ratios (SR) between the static strategy 
and a given dynamic covariance strategy against the alternative that the dynamic strategy has a higher SR. A 
significantly positive (negative) t-statistic indicates that the SR of the dynamic strategy is higher (lower) than that of the 
static strategy. Performance Fee (PFγ) is the average annualized fee in basis points (bp) an investor with quadratic 
utility and constant relative risk-aversion γ = {1, 10} would be willing to pay to switch from the static to a dynamic 
covariance strategy. Bold indicates the model that yields the highest metric relative to the static strategy. Break-even 
Transaction Cost (BTCγ) is the minimum average cost per trade (i.e. monthly bps) that renders the investor is 
indifferent between the static and the dynamic strategy at hand. TO is the average monthly turnover volume of the 
portfolio total position. 
  
  
Strategy µ σ SR ∆SR TO PF γ =1 BTC γ =1 PF γ =10 BTC γ =10
Static 21.94 10.99 2.00 0.09
Dynamic
EWMA 20.07 10.52 1.91 -0.089 (0.438) 2.22 -185.85 - -184.59 -
CCC 22.54 9.59 2.35 0.354 (0.177) 0.81 67.34 8.17 73.44 8.90
DCC 22.49 9.68 2.32 0.327 (0.214) 0.99 61.55 5.96 67.29 6.50
A-DCC 22.39 9.63 2.32 0.327 (0.214) 0.99 51.61 4.99 57.50 5.55
DCC-Break 23.06 9.71 2.38 0.379 (0.193) 0.97 119.06 11.76 124.78 12.31
A-DCC-Break 23.04 9.65 2.39 0.390 (0.186) 0.98 116.71 11.46 122.65 12.03
G-DCC 22.06 9.68 2.28 0.282 (0.243) 1.08 18.73 1.65 24.40 2.14
AG-DCC 21.76 9.64 2.26 0.259 (0.269) 1.11 -11.96 - -6.26 -
G-DCC-Break 22.55 9.70 2.32 0.327 (0.226) 1.01 67.41 6.40 73.06 6.94
AG-DCC-Break 22.34 9.67 2.31 0.313 (0.234) 1.04 46.09 4.24 51.83 4.76
Static 17.42 7.49 2.33 0.03
Dynamic
EWMA 16.52 5.09 3.25 0.919 (0.118) 1.05 -83.00 - -77.05 -
CCC 18.00 4.85 3.71 1.383 (0.014) 0.41 66.30 15.25 73.10 16.80
DCC 18.52 4.76 3.89 1.563 (0.008) 0.46 118.73 24.41 125.76 25.85
A-DCC 18.51 4.75 3.89 1.566 (0.008) 0.46 117.60 24.19 124.65 25.63
DCC-Break 18.45 4.78 3.86 1.530 (0.011) 0.46 111.82 23.07 118.80 24.50
A-DCC-Break 18.45 4.78 3.86 1.535 (0.011) 0.46 111.85 23.09 118.85 24.52
G-DCC 18.39 4.78 3.85 1.521 (0.009) 0.46 105.53 21.54 112.53 22.95
AG-DCC 18.43 4.78 3.86 1.530 (0.009) 0.47 109.18 22.11 116.18 23.51
G-DCC-Break 18.33 4.80 3.82 1.495 (0.012) 0.46 99.66 20.23 106.61 21.62
AG-DCC-Break 18.32 4.79 3.82 1.497 (0.012) 0.47 98.67 19.98 105.63 21.37
Static 14.52 7.10 2.05 0.04
Dynamic
EWMA 12.96 5.94 2.18 0.138 (0.397) 1.76 -152.57 - -149.92 -
CCC 16.01 5.62 2.85 0.802 (0.036) 0.47 154.07 30.97 158.08 31.76
DCC 15.87 5.45 2.91 0.868 (0.053) 0.51 140.75 26.00 145.15 26.80
A-DCC 15.87 5.45 2.91 0.868 (0.053) 0.51 140.25 25.92 144.65 26.72
DCC-Break 15.88 5.44 2.92 0.874 (0.056) 0.50 141.27 26.56 145.69 27.37
A-DCC-Break 15.87 5.44 2.92 0.872 (0.057) 0.50 140.12 26.34 144.54 27.16
G-DCC 15.73 5.43 2.90 0.852 (0.056) 0.57 126.70 20.82 131.14 21.54
AG-DCC 15.56 5.46 2.85 0.805 (0.063) 0.57 109.67 18.00 114.04 18.71
G-DCC-Break 15.67 5.45 2.87 0.830 (0.065) 0.62 120.57 18.23 124.96 18.88
AG-DCC-Break 15.71 5.43 2.89 0.849 (0.056) 0.57 124.82 20.48 129.26 21.20
Japanese Sectors
UK Sectors
US Sectors
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The results suggest that dynamic portfolios are able to outperform static ones even both 
are rebalanced at a lower frequency (i.e. weekly/monthly) as the former still enjoys 
positive PFs over the latter in most cases regardless the risk aversion level of the investor 
and portfolio construction strategies.  However, due to the enhanced risk-return 
performances of the static strategy with lower rebalancing frequency, the magnitude of 
positive PFs enjoyed by dynamic portfolios in Tables 5.12 to 5.15 is comparatively lower 
than the ones in Tables 5.7 to 5.10.  For instance, in the UK market, the PF earned by the 
monthly dynamic portfolio based on AG-DCC-Break over daily static portfolio is 1132 bp 
for investor with lower risk aversion (i.e. γ = 1) under Max-R (Table 5.9), while the PF over 
monthly static portfolio is only 973 bp for the same investor (Table 5.14).  Additionally, 
since the TO of the static portfolio also decreased when rebalancing less often, the BTC of 
the dynamic portfolio also decreases in Tables 5.12 to 5.15 compared to the one in Tables 
5.7 to 5.10.  For instance, the weekly US dynamic portfolio based on CCC under Min-V is 
able to generate 21 bp BTC over the static strategy when the latter is daily rebalanced 
(Table 5.8), while the figure drops to around 19 bp when the static portfolio is also 
rebalanced on a weekly basis (Table 5.13).   
However, despite the drop in BTCs when comparing dynamic portfolios verse static 
ones with the same rebalancing frequency, the former is still able to bring benefits to 
investors when realistic level of transaction costs are taking into account.  As borne out in 
Table 5.14, the BTCs generated by monthly dynamic strategies under Max-R are noticeably 
higher than realistic levels of transaction costs in all markets.  Besides, weekly dynamic 
portfolios based on the US sector indices (Table 5.12) can also generate sufficient amount 
of BTCs (ranging from 25 bp to 36 bp), which are reasonably higher than the transaction 
cost facing by investors under realistic conditions.  Similar to findings from Tables 5.7 to 
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5.10, the EWMA fails to beat the static strategy with the same rebalancing frequency by 
providing BTCs which are higher than the realistic level. 
 
5.5.5. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we conduct two robustness checks of the relative performance of dynamic 
correlation strategies vis-à-vis the static strategy.  First, we address whether the value 
added over the constant covariance strategy is sensitive to portfolio construction strategies 
(i.e. Max-R or Min-V) by comparing the efficient frontier of the dynamic and static 
strategies over the out-of-sample period.  The efficient frontier based on ex-post 
unconditional variance-covariance matrices is also produced as the optimal frontier the 
best correlation timing strategy can ever achieve.  Second, we investigate whether the 
superior performance of dynamic portfolios is sensitive to different target return and 
variance settings by comparing the risk-return efficiency (i.e. SR) of the dynamic portfolios 
under both Max-R and Min-V scheme against the capital market line (CML) based on the 
static benchmark.   
Although both robustness tests involve the efficient frontier of dynamic and static 
strategies, their motivation and purpose are different. 309   The first test is effectively 
assessing the variance-covariance forecast accuracy of the dynamic and static strategies.  
Engle and Colacito (2006) show that portfolio based on more accurate variance-covariance 
forecast provides lower volatility.  That means the portfolio based on more accurate 
variance-covariance forecasts should have a higher efficient frontier compared to 
portfolios based on less accurate forecasts, as the former can provide the same expected 
return with lower portfolio variance.  Therefore, one can inspect the forecast accuracy of 
                                                          
309 One could argue that the second robustness test also involves the efficient frontier of static strategy as the 
CML is derived based on risk-free rate and efficient frontier.  
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different correlation timing strategies visually.  The second robustness test is focusing on 
the sensitivity of dynamic and static portfolios’ risk-return efficiency under different target 
return and variance levels.  Although it can be seen as another way to investigate the 
accuracy of the variance-covariance forecast by different strategies, the main emphasis of 
the two tests is different.  The second test concerns the asset allocation implication of the 
variance-covariance forecast accuracy, but not the accuracy itself.  It may be intuitive that 
asset allocation strategy triggered by more accurate variance-covariance forecast should 
perform better under Max-R/Min-V regardless the target return/variance settings.  
However, the conclusion cannot be draw until proper empirical analysis is conducted.  
Therefore, the two robustness tests are not over-lapped as they focus on different aspects 
of the various correlation timing strategies. 
In order to carry out the first robustness test, we track the efficient frontier of all 
strategies using the one-day ahead variance-covariance forecasts based on a given strategy 
and a set of target returns.310  For each target return, the realized daily portfolio volatility 
is generated based on the weighting scheme derived from the variance-covariance forecast 
together with the ex-post return vector and ex-post variance-covariance matrix over the 
out-of-sample period.311   The target return setting of these daily efficient frontiers is 
constant, while the realized daily portfolio volatility for each target return on the frontier 
may vary as the weighting scheme may vary on a daily basis.  Finally, we average the 
realized daily portfolio volatilities for each target return over the out-of-sample period and 
plot these pair-wised target returns and average realized daily volatilities into an 
                                                          
310 We employed 20 target returns in the current study.  These target returns are equally distributed between 
the lower and upper limit of the efficient frontier. 
311 The ex-post return vector is generated by averaging the daily return vector of sector indices over the out-
of-sample period (r = Σrt/n; n is number of trading days over the out-of-sample period), while the ex-post 
variance-covariance matrix is derived from the daily realized variance-covariance matrix over the out-of-
sample period (Ht = Σht/n; ht = rtrt’). 
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aggregated efficient frontier.  We also produce the efficient frontier based on weighting 
scheme derived from the ex-post variance-covariance matrix as an alternative benchmark 
to evaluate the performance of dynamic correlation timing strategies.  The ex-post efficient 
frontier represents the best possible efficient frontier a correlation timing strategy can 
achieve.   
The estimated efficient frontiers of both the static and dynamic strategies are 
presented in Figure 5.5.  In each graph, the ex-post efficient frontier (dashed line) is plotted 
together with the efficient frontier of the static strategy (dotted line) and the one of the 
dynamic strategy (solid line).  The portfolio returns and volatilities are in annualized 
percentage figures. 
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Figure 5.5  Comparison of Efficient frontier based on Dynamic and Static Models  
The graphs below illustrate the aggregated efficient frontier of dynamic and static strategies over the out-of-
sample period.  In each graph, the aggregated efficient frontier of a given dynamic portfolio (solid line) is 
plotted together with the static (dotted line) and ex-post (dash line) efficient frontier.    
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Panel B: Aggregated efficient frontier for the UK sector portfolios 
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Panel C: Aggregated efficient frontier for the US sector portfolios 
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In all three markets the efficient frontier of the dynamic strategies (solid line) is always 
above the static frontier (dotted line), which implies that efficient dynamic portfolios can 
achieve a better risk return trade-off than the efficient static portfolio.  In addition, the 
efficient dynamic frontier (solid line) is closer to the ex-post efficient frontier (dash line) 
compared to the static one (dot line) suggesting that the daily conditional covariance 
matrix forecasts are more accurate than the unconditional covariance matrix benchmark.  
The results, therefore, confirm that the superior performance of dynamic strategies is due 
to more accurate variance-covariance forecasts and is robust across all efficient portfolios 
that can be generated by any given portfolio construction strategy. 
The second robustness test is motivated by Fleming et al’s (2001) argument that PF 
results based on the Max-R and Min-V portfolio construction strategies may be sensitive to 
the target return/variance settings.  That means dynamic portfolios may outperform the 
static one because the target return/variance setting is unfavourable to the latter.  In order 
to evaluate the robustness of PF results for different target return/variance settings, we 
construct the CML based on the static model with ex-post return vector over the out-of-
sample period.  Portfolios on the CML provide the highest possible SR for any given target 
return/ variance.  Therefore, if dynamic portfolios under both Max-R and Min-V scheme 
(Table 5.5 and 5.6) can outperform the CML based on the static model, we can claim that 
the positive PFs enjoyed by the former is robust to different target return/variance 
settings. 
We construct the CML by generating Min-V portfolios for the static strategy with 
different target return settings.  For each market, the highest target return setting equals to 
the highest realized return achieved by dynamic strategies (Table 5.5 and 5.6), while the 
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lowest target return setting equals to zero.312    Figure 5.6 illustrates the risk-adjusted 
performance of dynamic portfolios in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 against the CML of the static 
model for the three markets. 
  
                                                          
312 In this study, we use Min-V portfolios to substitute portfolios on CML as both strategies maximize the 
Sharpe ratio of the portfolio.  In addition, both strategies allow investors to hold risk-free asset in their 
portfolio and have no restriction on leverage. 
328 
 
Figure 5.6  Dynamic Strategies versus the Capital Market Line Based on the Static 
Strategy 
The graphs below demonstrate the relative performance of dynamic portfolios under Max-R and Min-V 
compared to the capital market line (CML) based on static stratgy.  The CML is constructed as Min-V static 
portfolio with different target returns.  The upper level of the target return setting equals to the highest 
realized portfolio return achieved by the dynamic strategy under Max-R over the out-of-sample period.  The 
risk-return performance of dynamic portfolio under Max-R and Min-V is plotted in the graph as rectangles.  
The blue rectangles represent the risk-return performance of dynamic portfolios based on conditional 
correlation models, while the gray rectangles represent the performance of dynmaic portfolios based on 
EWMA.  The risk-return performance of dynmaic portfolios under Max-R and Min-V can be found in Table 
5.5 and 5.6.    
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Panel B: Comparison result for the UK sector portfolios 
 
 
 
Panel C: Comparison result for the US sector portfolios 
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From the above figure, one can see that dynamic portfolios based on dynamic correlation 
timing strategies outperform the CML of static model by providing higher SR for all the 
three markets.  For instance, in the UK market, the SR of dynamic portfolios based on 
conditional correlation models ranges from 2.98/3.63 to 3.24/3.84 under the Max-R/Min-
V scheme, while the SR of portfolios on the CML with similar volatility is only between 
1.90 and 2.25.  Therefore, the results validate the robustness of the positive PFs enjoyed by 
dynamic portfolios under different target return/variance settings for all the three markets. 
 
5.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Forecasting the covariance of asset returns is crucial for portfolio management and asset 
pricing.  Various covariance estimation techniques have been developed for this purpose.  
However, a comprehensive evaluation of the different approaches has not been carried out 
as yet.  In the current study, we investigate the economic value of correlation timing 
relative to static investment strategies using a utility based framework that accounts for 
the impact of transaction costs.  In this vein, we gauge the relative merits of various 
multivariate conditional correlation estimators by looking at the risk-return profile and 
incremental utility of the resulting portfolios.  For completeness we undertake a statistical 
evaluation of the competing correlation forecasting approaches using goodness of fit 
criteria. 
The empirical results suggest that additional economic value can be achieved from 
correlation timing compared to static asset allocation strategy.313  The findings based on 
sector portfolios suggest that the dynamic asset allocation strategies based on one-day-
                                                          
313 In this empirical study, we only test the significance of the additional economic value obtained by the 
dynamic strategy in terms of SR but not in terms of utility gain or positive PF.  However, it is worth noting 
that none of the previous empirical studies (e.g. Fleming et al., 2001; 2003; Della Corte et al., 2009; De Pooter 
et al., 2008) have performed significant test to verify the difference between the economic value (in terms of 
PF) obtained by the dynamic and static strategy. 
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ahead covariance forecasts outperform the optimal static portfolios both in terms of risk-
adjusted returns and economic value post transaction costs.  Risk-averse investors are 
willing to pay up to 2000 bps per annum to switch from a static target variance strategy to 
one based on the nonparametric RiskMetrics approach.   
Although correlation timing has been found to afford gains to investors over and 
above the static covariance benchmark, transaction costs have been shown to impinge 
substantially on the performance of daily rebalancing strategies.  Correlation timing 
conducted monthly can outperform static allocation.  The result is robust to trading costs 
as it generates economically plausible break-even transaction costs.  Our findings further 
suggest that the incremental gains of dynamic strategies relative to the static one are more 
pronounced when considering monthly holding periods instead of daily.  Switching fees 
imply that exploiting correlation dynamics is more beneficial for longer horizon investors.  
Overall, we show that the statistical evidence in favour of models that account for the 
stylized facts of asset correlations such as time-variation, asymmetry and structural breaks 
is mirrored by substantial economic payoffs in the context of dynamic asset allocation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis investigates the risk-related behaviours of financial institutions (banking, 
insurance, and fund management based financial service firms) across the global financial 
markets and provides reasonable explanations for the empirical findings.  The results of 
this thesis not only add to the existing body of literature but also have important 
implication for regulators, risk managers and investors alike both at the firm level and 
public policy level.  Identification of these risk-related behaviours and the precise measure 
of their magnitudes would help the relevant stakeholders to improvement their 
management/investment performances.  Besides, the empirical results could also be 
useful for government agencies and international regulatory bodies.  The ultimate goal of 
any regulation/policy for financial sector is to secure the stability and prosperity of the 
financial market while stimulate the real economy through steady growth in credit supply.  
Better understanding of financial intermediaries’ behaviours upon changes in different 
risk exposures, therefore, provides valuable information for formulating successful 
regulation/policy in the future. 
The application of modern econometric approaches in applied time series analysis of 
financial data is another very important issue which has been covered throughout this 
research.  The existing empirical studies, related to our research questions, failed to 
employ a more comprehensive framework, which provides better estimation efficiency 
and accuracy through capturing the conditional interactions among the return series.  
Each procedure is discussed and explained in the light of its application on our data and 
the research interest concerned. 
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A number of stylised facts have been drawn from the present study.  As a starting 
point we address the cross-country spillovers among financial markets.  To be specific, we 
investigate the return and risk transmission among banking/insurance sector portfolios 
across markets in chapter 2.  By using a multivariate conditional correlation estimation 
framework with up-to-date data, the empirical findings provide valuable insights 
regarding the interdependence among global financial industries during the recent 
financial turmoil.  First, return contagion across the global financial market is strong, 
especially during the financial turmoil, which is supported by previous studies on the 
globalization/consolidation trend of the financial industry (e.g. De Nicolo et al, 2004) and 
the contagion effect during economic downturns (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Tai, 2007).  
Second, the return transmission between the U.S. and Japanese banking sector is absent 
even during the financial turmoil, which could attribute to the structural differences 
between the two financial markets (i.e. market- and bank-oriented financial system).   
Third, cross-country return and volatility spillovers among insurance sectors show 
different pattern during the crisis period.  The magnitude of return transmissions remains 
unchanged, while the magnitude of volatility transmissions intensified.  Finally, strong 
interdependence has been recorded between the banking and insurance sector portfolios 
both on the country and global level during the pre-crisis period, which verifies the 
increasing integration/convergence between the two financial intermediary types (e.g. 
Staikouras, 2006b).  During the crisis, however, insurers enjoyed a competitive edge over 
banks in the sense that negative shocks for banks have a positive impact on insurers’ 
return.  These findings is in line with the industrial and academic reports, which claim that 
insurers, in general, perform better compared to banks due to their different credit and 
liquidity risk characteristics (e.g. Eling and Schmeiser, 2010).   
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The two major risk factors - interest rate and foreign exchange rate risk - for financial 
intermediaries are examined in chapter 2 and 3, respectively.  Existing literatures on the 
interest rate exposure of financial intermediaries often employ changes in interest rate 
environment with fluctuations in a bond index/spot rate with fixed maturity or the spread 
between long- and short-term rates as approximation of changes in the interest rate 
environment.  The relationship between the behaviour of financial intermediaries’ equity 
value and the evolution of the whole term structure, however, is rarely examined.  The 
examination of the latter constitutes the empirical work of chapter 3, which measures 
fluctuations in the entire yield curve using the Nelson-Siegel three-factor model.   
Using a more general multivariate estimation framework that takes the non-linear 
and heteroskedasticity property of the return series into account, we yield five main 
findings.  First, the profitability of banking institutions is sensitive to changes in the term 
structure of interest rates.  Steeper yield curve (i.e. decrease/increase in short/long-term 
rates) seems to enhance the profitability of banks.  This finding coincides with the funding 
and investment mismatch commonly seen in the banking industry, where long-term 
investments are usually financed by short-term funding (e.g. Saunders and Cornett, 2010).  
Second, the positive relationship between changes in long-term rates and banks’ equity 
value intensified during the recent financial turmoil.  We argue the enhancement may 
attribute, at least partially, to the “flight to quality” hypothesis (Vayanos, 2004).  As 
investors’ risk aversion increases during the economic downturn, they switch from risky 
investments (i.e. banks’ equity) to more secure securities (i.e. long-term government bonds).  
That means, the long-term interest rate will have a positive relationship with the equity 
value of banks as they both go down.  Third, insurers expose to evolution in the yield 
curve in a similar fashion as banks, which indicates that the two intermediary types share 
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similar risk factors.  This finding reinforces the evidence from chapter 2, which suggests 
increasing convergence between banks and insurers.  Fourth, contrary to the previous 
empirical findings, industrial firms also have similar interest rate exposure as banks across 
markets.  The empirical evidence seems to support the “pass on” hypothesis (Drehamann 
et al, 2010; Alessandri and Drehamnn, 2010), which suggests that banks are able to “pass” 
the changes in interest rate and/or credit risk onto their borrowers.  Last but not least, our 
empirical work shows that market interventions (e.g. government bailouts and stimulus 
packages) play an important role in the equity value of financial intermediaries during the 
recent financial turmoil.         
Having analysed the interest rate risk exposure of financial intermediaries, we turn 
to evaluate their behaviours upon fluctuations in currency value in chapter 4.  The collapse 
of Bretton Woods system in early 1970s has introduced uncertainties into the foreign 
exchange market ever since.  The recent financial turmoil also plays an important role in 
the foreign currency market as the world’s major currencies (i.e. the U.S. Dollar, British 
Pound and Japanese Yen) fluctuate violently as the crisis intensified (Melvin and Taylor, 
2009).  In this study, we propose an alternative estimation framework that takes the first 
and second moment of both the home and foreign currency value fluctuations into 
account.    
Four stylised facts have been identified from the empirical analysis.  First, both home 
and foreign currency value changes can affect the equity value of financial intermediaries 
across markets, while the latter are more pervasive.  The recent crisis significantly alters 
the return sensitivity of financial intermediaries and changes in foreign currency value, 
which may due to the “flight to quality” phenomenon observed during the financial 
turmoil.  We argue that investors prefer high quality assets during the economic 
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downturns and have an incentive to switch from countries with poor economic 
performance to better ones (Naes et al, 2011).  This “shift of fund” behaviour has a 
significant impact on the currency value of the involved markets (e.g. Branson, 1983; 
Frankel, 1983; Kanas, 2000), which further influence the equity value of their financial 
intermediaries.  Second, the volatility of currency value fluctuation has no influence on the 
equity value of financial intermediaries.  This finding is contrary to previous empirical 
studies (e.g. Koutmos and Martin, 2003b), which argue that higher the variability of 
currency value better the bank’s equity performances since the latter benefits from the 
former by collecting more underwriting premiums through increased hedging demands 
for currency derivatives.  We argue the difference is mainly driven by the different 
hedging demand in our sample period from the one in theirs.  Given that investors are 
more emphasis on credit risk during the recent decade, the influence of underwriting 
premium collected from currency derivative is, therefore, relatively small and hard to 
detect.  Finally, the relationship between currency value fluctuation and equity value of 
financial intermediaries shows size effects.  That means small institutions are more likely 
to expose to changes in home currency value, while large one are more sensitive to foreign 
currency fluctuations.  The incentive to hedge foreign exposure (e.g. Nance et al, 1993) and 
the risk characteristic (e.g. Tai, 2000; Chamberlain et al, 1997) associated with the firm size 
could be the main reason behind this size effect.  
Finally, the economic value of dynamic correlation timing strategies is investigated in 
chapter 5.  This is the first study to comprehensively assess the role of introducing equity 
return correlation dynamics in sector asset allocations and the findings suggest that timing 
correlation is fruitful to sector investors.  The empirical evidence indicates four main 
stylized facts.  First, correlation timing strategies provide superior performance than the 
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static asset allocation by providing economically meaningful performance fees.  
Additionally, correlation timing strategies generally outperform the volatility-only timing 
strategies.  The empirical study shows that incorporating DCC-type models in asset 
allocation can enhance risk-adjusted returns and investor utility and even more so if 
correlation asymmetries and break are allowed for.  Second, our results are robust to 
trading costs as it generates economically plausible break-even transaction costs.  Third, 
transaction costs are positively related to rebalancing frequency.  Revise the portfolio at a 
lower frequency, therefore, can improve the performance by reducing the transaction cost.  
The empirical evidence shows that monthly rebalancing correlation timing strategies do 
outperform static asset allocation in a more favorable way than the daily ones.  
Furthermore, weekly/monthly correlation timing strategies generally perform better than 
the daily ones indicating that reducing the rebalancing frequency not only increases the 
transaction cost but also increases their risk-adjusted performance.  Finally, our results are 
robust to different target return/volatility settings, as well as the portfolio construction 
strategies.   
The findings from the thesis pave ways for future researches in, at least, three 
directions.  First, chapter 2 shows that the interdependence among global financial 
intermediaries increased over the recent decade, especially during the financial turmoil.  
In this chapter, the financial turmoil refers to the crisis originated from the credit and 
liquidity risk within the banking sector from 2007 to 2009.  The latest episode regarding 
the sovereign credit issues of the European countries and its influence on the global 
financial markets is, therefore, not yet been revealed.  The impact of the recent European 
sovereign-debt crisis on the interdependence of financial institutions and its influence on 
the real economy across the global provides valuable information for international 
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investors seeking for better risk-adjusted performance through international 
diversification.  Besides, it is important from a regulatory perspective as it offers valuable 
insight about the cause and consequence of the recent events, which is helpful for 
designing better regulatory frameworks and fiscal policies.   
The second direction is pointing toward the better understanding of investor’s 
behavior during market downturns.  In chapter 3 and 4, we have shown that investor’s 
sentiment (i.e. increased risk aversion) and behavior (i.e. “flight to quality”) plays an 
important role in the risk-related behavior of financial intermediaries and their equity 
values.  The understanding about the determinants of investor’s sentiment, therefore, is 
very important for practitioners in risk management and investment, as well as policy 
makers.   
Finally, the rebalancing frequency of dynamic asset allocation strategies is worth 
further investigation in the future studies.  The empirical evidence from chapter 5 shows 
that the practical feasibility of the correlation timing strategies is sensitive to rebalancing 
frequency through its impact on transaction costs.  Conventional approaches usually use 
equally distributed revise intervals (i.e. daily or monthly) to rebalance the portfolio, which 
is convenient but failed to capture the stochastic nature of the arrival of new information.  
For instance, the weighting scheme of weekly/monthly rebalancing portfolios is unable to 
reflect the influence of the new arrival information (i.e. systemic shocks like unexpected 
jump in inflation) on portfolio’s risk-return profile in a timely manner (i.e. new 
information arrives on Monday, but the rebalancing date is on Friday).  Correlation timing 
strategies that incorporate the stochastic nature of the arrival of new information (i.e. 
rebalancing with a “trigger mechanism”), therefore, are urgently needed.  
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APPENDIX 
SECTION A 
 
A.1 Monthly Outstanding Volume of the Asset Backed Securities   
The following figure represents the monthly movements of the outstanding volume of the asset backed 
securities.  The asset backed security is represented by the commercial paper.  The monthly information on 
the outstanding volume of commercial paper is provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  The unit of measurement is million USD on the vertical axis. The gray shading area represents the 
crisis period from the April 2007 till the March 2009. 
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A.2 Time Series of Equity Market Indices 
The following figure represents the daily movements of the equity market indices.  For EU, Japanese, UK 
and US market the national equity market indices are represented by STOXX EUROPE 600, NIKKEI 225, 
FTSE 100, and S&P 500, respectively.  In order to present the movements of the market indices in a better 
manner, the level of these market indices are rebased at 100 level at the beginning of the sample period. The 
gray shading area represents the crisis period from the April 2, 2007 till the March 9, 2009. 
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A.3 Time Series of Financial Sector Portfolios’ Value 
The following figures represent the daily movements of the financial sector equity value.  All the financial 
sector portfolios are equally weighted, and rebalanced on a daily basis.  In order to demonstrate the value of 
the portfolios in a better manner, the values of these portfolios are rebased at 100 level at the beginning of 
the sample period. The gray shading area represents the crisis period from the April 2, 2007 till the March 9, 
2009. 
 
Panel A: Banking Portfolios. 
 
 
Panel B: Insurance Sector Portfolios. 
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Panel C: Large Size Banking Portfolios. 
 
 
Panel D: Small Size Banking Portfolios. 
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A.4 Technical Detail of the BEKK Model 
The BEKK model is named after Baba-Engle-Kraft-Kroner (BEKK) which first introduced by Engle 
and Kroner (1995).  The BEKK specification can be viewed as a restricted version of the VEC model, 
which developed by Bollerslev et al (1988). 
 Compare to the VEC model, the BEKK model is preferable as it guarantee the conditional 
covariance matrices are positive definite by construction.  The first order model, which can also be 
viewed as a multi-dimensional GARCH(1,1), has the following functional form.  
1t t t tH C C A A B H Bε ε −′ ′ ′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  
where parameter C is a [k x k] lower triangle matrix, while A and B are [k x k] matrices.   
The number of parameters involved in the BEKK model is highly sensitive to the 
dimension of Ht314, the total number of parameter is equal to 2k2+k(k+1)/2.  There is a simplified 
version of the full BEKK model to significantly reduce the number of estimated parameters.  The 
simple model is named diagonal BEKK, where the parameter A and B are [k x k] diagonal matrices.  
The following equation demonstrates the diagonal BEKK model with diagonal parameters setting. 
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314 For a [3 x 3] system, the total number of parameters in a full BEKK model is 24, while for a [5 x 5] system, the total number of parameters in the full BEKK model 
will increase to 65. 
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A.5 Technical Detail of the BEKK Model 
The LLF ratio test is designed to compare the fit of the two competing models.  The two 
competing models are related, as one of the models is a restricted version of the other one.  
The restricted model poses restrictions on one or several parameters of the unrestricted 
model, which makes the restricted model less flexible.  The LLF ratio test investigates 
whether the restrictions posed by the restricted model is suitable by using a Chi-square 
test. 
Assume there are two models A and B, while model A is the restricted version of 
model B. In other words, model A is the restricted model and model B is the unrestricted 
one.  In order to perform the log-likelihood ratio test, we first estimate the two models, 
and generate the value of their log-likelihood functions (LLF).  Then, we compare the 
difference between the two LLFs, and assess the significance of the difference based on a 
Chi-square test.  The degree-of-freedom (DoF) of the Chi-square test is equal to the 
number of restrictions in model A compares to model B.  The number of restrictions can be 
calculated as the difference of the DoFs between the two models.  The log-likelihood ratio 
test can be illustrated as follow: L∼	χ½V  
where, 
L = .¾¿¨ − P¿¨ = À − 	Á	^ = lP¿¨ − l.¾¿¨ = lÁ − 	lÀ 
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SECTION B 
 
B.1 Selected SIFIs across Markets 
U.S. UK Japan 
Bank of America Barclays Mitubishi UFJ Financial Group 
Bank of New York Mellon HSBC Mizuho Financial Group 
Citigroup Lloyds Banking Group Sumitomo Financial Group 
Goldman Sachs Royal Bank of Scotland  
JP Morgan Chase   
Morgan Stanley   
State Street   
Wells Fargo   
The SIFIs in the banking sector are provided by the Financial Stability Board.  
The above institutions are listed according to alphabetic order. 
 
B.2 Selected Large Insurers across Markets 
U.S. UK Japan 
Aflac Aviva Dai-Ichi Life Insurance 
AIG Legal and General Tokio Marine Holdings 
AllState Old Mutual T&D Holdings 
Berkshire Hathaway Prudential MS and AD Insurance Group 
Genworth Financial Standard Life NKSJ Holdings 
Hartford Financial Resolution  
Lincoln National   
MetLife   
Principal Financial   
Prudential Financial   
Travelers   
The large insurers are selected according to their total asset value. The entry level is $100 billion on 
the December 31, 2010.  For institutions in the UK and Japanese market, the value of the total asset is 
first converted into the U.S. dollar terms based on the corresponding bilateral exchange rate on the 
December 31, 2010.  
The above institutions are listed according to alphabetic order. 
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B.3 Selected Large Industrial Firms across Markets 
U.S. UK Japan 
3M 3i Group Astellas Pharma 
Alcoa BAE System Canon 
AT&T British Gas East Japan Railway 
Boeing BP Honda Motor 
Caterpillar British American Tobacco Japan Tobacco 
Chevron Corporation BT Kansai Electric Power 
Cisco System Compass Group KDDI 
Coca-Cola Diageo Komatsu 
DuPont GKN Mistubishi Estate 
Exxon Mobile GlaxoSmithKline Nintendo 
General Electric IAG*  Nippon Steel 
Hewlett-Packard Invensys Nippon Telegraph and Telecom 
The Home Depot ITV Nissan Motor 
Intel Ladbrokes NTT Docomo Inc 
IBM Land Securities Group Panasonic 
Johnson & Johnson Logica Seven and I Holding Group 
Kraft Foods Man Group Shin-Etsu Chemical 
McDonald’s Marks & Spencer Softbank 
Merch National Grid Sony 
Microsoft Reckitt Benckiser Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Pfizer Smiths Group Tokio Marine Holding 
Procter & Gamble Tate & Lyle Toshiba 
United Technologies Corp. TESCO Toyota Motor 
Verizon Communication Vodafone Yokyo Electric Power 
Wal-Mart Wolseley  
Walt Disney WPP  
*IAG, International Airlines Group, is the holding company for British Airway (BA) and Iberia 
after the two merged in January 2011. We use the stock price information from BA for the period 
before the establishment of IAG. 
The large industrial firms are the non-financial institutions from the DJIA, FT 30 and TOPIX Core 
30 indices for the U.S., the UK and Japanese market, respectively. 
The above institutions are listed according to alphabetic order. 
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B.4 Daily Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The term structure of interest rate is based on the daily interest rate of Treasury security with maturity 
equals to 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-month, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, 8-, 9-, 10-, 15-, 20-, 25-, and 30-year from January 31, 2003 till 
January 31, 2010.  The yield curve data is collected from Bloomberg®.  The vertical axis in the following 3 
dimensional graph represents the level of the interest rate (in percentage terms) at different maturity; the 
horizontal axis on the left hand side refers to the maturity of the interest rate on the yield curve, while the 
horizontal axis on the right hand side refers to the dates when the yield curve is recorded. 
 
Panel A: Daily term structure of the U.S. interest rates 
 
Panel B: Daily term structure of the UK interest rates 
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Panel C: Daily term structure of Japanese interest rates 
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B.5 Time Series of Sector Portfolios’ Value 
The following figures represent the daily movements of the sector portfolio value. All the sector portfolios 
are equally weighted, and rebalanced on a daily basis. In order to demonstrate the value of the portfolios in a 
better manner, the values of these portfolios are rebased at 100 level at the beginning of the sample period. 
The sample period is from January 31, 2003 till January 31, 2010.  The crisis period starts from the August 9, 
2007 when BNP Paribas seized the redemption its investment funds. 
 
Panel A1: The U.S. Banking Sector Portfolios 
 
Panel A2: The U.S. Insurance Sector Portfolios 
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Panel A3: The U.S. Industrial Sector Portfolios 
 
 
Panel B1: The UK Banking and Insurance Sector Portfolios 
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Panel B2: The UK Industrial Sector Portfolios 
 
 
Panel C1: Japanese Banking Sector Portfolios 
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Panel C2: Japanese Insurance Sector Portfolios 
 
 
Panel C3: Japanese Industrial Sector Portfolios 
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B.6 Factor Loadings in Nelson-Siegel Three Factor Model 
 
 
 
B.7 Short-Term Interest Rates in the UK Financial Market 
 
Note: the short-term interest rates represented in the above figure is collected from the Bank of England, which is 
available from: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/index.htm.   
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B.8 Net Mortgage Lending in the U.S. Financial Market 
 
Note: the data for net mortgage lending in the above figure is collected from the two Flow of Fund reports issued by 
Federal Reserve on the June 11, 2009 and June 10, 2010. 
 
B.9 Daily Value Changes in the Equity Market Index and Banking portfolio in Japan 
 
Note: the value of banking portfolio and market equity index is on the left-and right-hand side axis, respectively. The 
equity market index for Japan is presented by the NIKKEI 225.  The value of the equity market index and banking 
portfolio has been rescaled at 100-level at the beginning of the sample period.   
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SECTION C 
 
C.1 Conditional Mean Equation of VAR-BEKK model 
The conditional mean equation of the VAR-BEKK model is an extended multifactor model.  
In the VAR-BEKK model, there is a system of conditional mean equations, which can be 
represented in a matrix form.  In this section, we provide the detail explanation of the 
parameters used in the system of equations.  We also illustrate the conditional mean 
equation in a scalar form. 
The system of conditional mean equations presented as follow: 
 = ⨂ + E ∙ NJ + F ∙ N_U+J + ∙ Γ ∙ NJ +  ∙ Θ ∙ N_U+J +  
As discussed in the Methodology Section, the parameters used in the above equations 
are all in matrix forms.  The detail structure of these parameter matrices is represented as 
follow: 
β = >T,»X»¾ ,»X»¾,I»½ ,»X»¾,OPT./ ./,I»½ ./,OPT.3 .3,I»½ .3,OP ? 
G = o G,»X»¾ G,»X»¾,./ G,»X»¾,.3G./,,»X»¾ G./ G./,.3G.3,,»X»¾ G.3,./ G.3 x 
Z = o H,»X»¾ H,»X»¾,./ H,»X»¾,.3H./,,»X»¾ H./ H./,.3H.3,,»X»¾ H.3,./ H.3 x 
Γ = > γ,»X»¾ γ,»X»¾,./ γ,»X»¾,.3γ./,,»X»¾ γ./ γ./,.3
γ.3,,»X»¾ γ.3,./ γ.3 ? 
Θ = > θ,»X»¾ θ,»X»¾,./ θ,»X»¾,.3θ./,,»X»¾ θ./ θ./,.3
θ.3,,»X»¾ θ.3,./ θ.3 ? 
where, 
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ci  = the constant of the conditional mean equation for national market  i. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for regional 
market i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D].  
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in regional 
market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i over the whole 
sample period. gi represents the FX effect of the home currency over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in 
regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i over the 
whole sample period. zi represents the FX_Var effect of the home currency over the 
whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in regional 
market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i during the crisis 
period. γi represents changes in the FX effect of the home currency during the crisis 
period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in 
regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i during 
the crisis period. θi represents changes in the FX_Var effect of the home currency 
during the crisis period. 
With i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US] 
The conditional mean equation can also be presented in scalar form, which is 
demonstrated as follow: 
+, = T +	∑,e`Nb, +∑G,SNS, + ∑H,SN_U+S, + ∑ γ,S,NS, + ∑ θ,S,N_U+S, + S,    
with i and j ∈ [Japan, UK, US]. 
where, 
ci  = the constant of the conditional mean equation for national market  i. 
βi,x  = the parameter for the two macroeconomic factors (Market and IR) for regional 
market i over day t, with x ∈ [	U+^k, D].  
MF(X)i,t = represents the two macroeconomic factors: 1) the market risk factor represents 
by domestic stock market index return (Market), and 2) the interest rate risk factor 
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represents by the unexpected changes of long-term benchmark interest rate (IR) for 
national market i over day t, with X ∈ [	U+^k, D]. 
FXi,t = the unexpected changes of trade weighted currency price index for currency in 
country j over day t, which is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH 
model. 
FX_Vari,t = the conditional variance of the trade weighted currency price index for 
country j over day t, which is generated from a fitting ARMA-GARCH model 
together with the FXi,t. 
gi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in regional 
market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i over the whole 
sample period. gi represents the FX effect of the home currency over the whole 
sample period. 
zi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in 
regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i over the 
whole sample period. zi represents the FX_Var effect of the home currency over the 
whole sample period. 
γi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX effect from currency in regional 
market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i during the crisis 
period. γi represents changes in the FX effect of the home currency during the crisis 
period. 
θi,j  = the parameter represents the impact of the FX_Var effect from currency in 
regional market j towards the financial sector portfolio in regional market i during 
the crisis period. θi represents changes in the FX_Var effect of the home currency 
during the crisis period. 
DUM = a dummy variable represents the potential structural break in the crisis period. 
DUM = 0 before the September 15, 2008, and DUM = 1 afterwards. 
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C.2 Trade Weighted Currency Price Index 
The relative currency value used in the current study is the trade weighted currency price 
index provided by Bank of England (BoE).  The index represents the relative value of one 
currency against a basket of other currencies used by major industrial countries.  The 
following table shows the industrial countries employed by Bank of England to derive the 
trade weighted currency price index. 
Geographic Distribution 
Asian Pacific Europe North America 
 
Eurozone Non-Eurozone 
 
Australia Austria Republic of Ireland Canada 
Netherlands Belgium-Luxembourg United Kingdom United States 
Japan Denmark 
  
 
Finland 
  
 
France 
  
 
Germany 
  
 
Greece 
  
 
Italy 
  
 
Netherlands 
  
 
Norway 
  
 
Portugal 
  
 
Spain 
  
 
Sweden 
  
 
Switzerland 
  
Note: the list of industrial countries is provided by BoE. 
The weight for the trade weighted currency price index is generated based on relative 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sectors among these industrial countries.  The 
formula for the trade weighted currency price index can be illustrated as follow: 
DÅÆS =	ÇÈ­V«1  
where, 
Indexj = the trade weighted currency price index for national market j. 
Ni = the bilateral exchange rate between the currency in national 
market j and the currency in national market i. 
wi = the weighting scheme of national market i in relation to national 
market j. 
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C.3 NASDAQ Composite Index during the Internet Bubble 
The figure below demonstrates the price level of the NASDAQ Composite Index from June 1996 till 
December 2003. The NASDAQ Composite Index covers all the common stocks listed on the 
NASDAQ stock market, which has more than 3000 components.  It is commonly regarded as an 
indicator for the performances of technology firms and firms with high growth potential.  
 
 
Note: the price information of the NASDAQ Composite Index is collected from DataStream International. 
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C.4 Time Series of Banking Sector Portfolios’ Value 
The figure below demonstrates the time series of banking portfolio value across the three national 
markets from the January 1, 2003 till March 31, 2011.  The value of the portfolios has been rescaled, 
which makes portfolio values equal to 100 at the beginning of the sample period. 
 
Panel A: Banking Portfolios for the Japanese, UK and US markets. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Large and Small Banking portfolios for the Japanese and US markets. 
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C.5 Time Series of Insurance Sector Portfolios’ Value 
The figure below demonstrates the time series of the insurance (life and non-life) portfolio value 
across the three national markets from the January 1, 2003 till March 31, 2011.  The value of the 
portfolios has been rescaled, which makes portfolio values equal to 100 at the beginning of the 
sample period. 
 
Panel A: Life Insurance Portfolios for the UK and US markets. 
 
 
Panel B: Non-Life Insurance Portfolios for the Japanese, UK and US markets. 
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C.6 Variance Inflation Factor Test 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) test is a measure for multicolinearity for explanatory variables 
in a regression model.  The VIF test statistics can be calculated in a three steps: 
 
Step One: Run auxiliary regressions with the related explanatory variables. 
Assume there are three highly related variables, namely x1, x2 and x3.  In the first step, for each 
variable we run an auxiliary regression with this variable as dependent variable and the remaining 
two as the independent variables.  The R2 for each of the auxiliary regression will be calculated and 
recorded. Æ1 = T1 + U1ÆV + β1ÆY + ε1 => 1V ÆV = TV + UVÆ1 + βVÆY + εV => VV ÆY = TY + UYÆ1 + βYÆV + εY => YV 
where, 
ci = the constant for auxiliary regression with xi as dependent 
variable. 
ai/bi = the regression parameter for auxiliary regression with xi as 
dependent variable. 
εi = the estimated error for xi. 
R2i = the R2 of the auxiliary regression with xi as dependent variable. 
with i ∈ [1, 2, 3]. 
 
Step Two: Calculate the VIF statistics for Auxiliary Regressions. 
 D = 110P­¤ ; with i ∈ [1, 2, 3]. 
 
 
Step Three: Compare the VIF statistics with Critical Value. 
The commonly used critical value for VIF test is 5.  If test statistics (VIFi) is large than 5, then we 
suggest the multicolinearity among the three related explanatory variables is high, and one should 
not incorporate all the three variables into the regression model at once.  
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C.7 Time Series of National Stock Market Index 
The figure below demonstrates the time series of the three national stock market indices from the 
January 1, 2003 till March 31, 2011.  The value of the index price has been rescaled, which makes all the 
index values equal to 100 at the beginning of the sample. 
 
 
Note: the stock market indices used in the above figure are the S&P 500 Composite Index, the FTSE 100 Stock Market Index, 
and the NIKKEI 225 Stock Market Index for the Japanese, UK and US market, respectively. 
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SECTION D 
 
D.1 Technique Aspects of the DCC MGARCH model 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation MGARCH, for a two-asset case, follows the process 
rt = 
1/ 2
tH ξt 
1, 1, 2,
1, 2, 2,
t t t t
t
t t t t
h h h
H
h h h
ρ
ρ
 
 =
 
 
 
where the conditional variances are specified as 
h1,t = ω1 + α1 
2
1, 1tr − + β1 h1,t-1 
and 
h2,t = ω2 + α2 
2
2, 1tr − + β2 h2,t-1 
and ρt = h12,t/ * *1, 2,t th h  comes from 
*
1,th = (1 - θ1 -θ2) + θ1 
2
1, 1tε −  + θ2
*
1, 1th −  
*
2,th = (1 - θ1 -θ2) + θ2 
2
2, 1tε −  + θ2
*
2, 1th −  
and 
12,th = φ12 (1 - θ1 -θ2) + θ1 1, 1 2, 1't tε ε− −  + θ2 12, 1th −  
with φ12 equal to the average sample correlation of returns. Finally, ε1,t = µ1,t / 1,th  and ε2,t = µ2,t /
2,th . 
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D.2 Technique Aspects of the A-DCC MGARCH model 
Asymmetric Generalized Dynamic Conditional Correlation MGARCH model gives higher tail 
dependence for both the upper and lower tails of the multi-period joint density.  However, it may 
be interesting to have higher tail dependence in the lower tail of the multi-period density.  This 
situation can be studied by using A-DCC.  An A-DCC estimator has the following structure in a 
two assets case 
rt = 
1/ 2
tH ξt 
1, 1, 2,
1, 2, 2,
t t t t
t
t t t t
h h h
H
h h h
ρ
ρ
 
 =
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where  
h1,t = ω1 + α1 
2
1, 1tr − + β1 h1,t-1 
and 
h2,t = ω2 + α2
2
2, 1tr −  + β2 h2,t-1 
and ρt = h12,t/ * *1, 2,t th h , comes from 
*
1,th = (1 - θ1 -θ2 -θ3/2) + θ1 
2
1, 1tε −  + θ2 
*
1, 1th −  +θ3 d1,t-1
2
1, 1tε −  
*
2,th = (1 - θ1 -θ2 -θ3/2) + θ1 
2
2, 1tε −  + θ2 
*
2, 1th −  + θ3 d2,t-1
2
2, 1tε −  
and  
12,th = φ12 (1 - θ1 -θ2) - φ3 θ3 + θ1 1, 1 2, 1't tε ε− −  + θ2 12, 1th −  + θ3 (d1,t-1 1, 1tε − ) (d2,t-1 2, 1tε − )’ 
The variables d1,t and d2,t are dummies for r1,t and r2,t that assume value 1 whenever these 
variables are negative and 0 otherwise, and the coefficient θ3/2 relies on the assumption that ε1 and 
ε2 have a symmetric distribution.  φ12 and φ3 are the average correlation of returns and the average 
asymmetric component (d1,t-1 1, 1tε − ) (d2,t-1 2, 1tε − )’, and ε1,t and ε2,t are defined as before. 
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D.3 Quasi–Maximum Likelihood (QML) Estimation 
The two-step estimation of DCC and AG-DCC MVGARCH model assume that 
rt|Ωt-1 ~ N(0, Ht) ~ N(0, Dt Rt Dt) 
 The normality assumption of rt gives rise to a log-likelihood function.  Without the normality 
assumption, the estimator will still have the QML interpretation.  The log likelihood for this 
estimator can be written as 
L = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + log |Ht| + log |Rt| + r’t 1tH − rt) 
       = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + log |Dt Rt Dt| + r’t 1 1 1t t tD R D− − − rt) 
Since the standardized residual, εt = rt / √ ht = 1tD− rt, the log-likelihood function can be 
expressed as  
L = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + 2 log |Dt| + log |Rt| + ε’t 1tR− εt) 
                                      = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + 2 log |Dt| + r’t 1 1t tD D− − rt - ε’t εt + log |Rt| + ε’t 1tR− εt) 
 It is clear that there are two separate parts of the log-likelihood function, the volatility part 
containing Dt and the correlation part containing Rt.  This gives rise to the two stage estimation 
procedure.  In the first stage, each of Dt can be considered as an univariate GARCH model, 
therefore the log-likelihood of the volatility term is simply the sum of the log-likelihoods of the 
individual GARCH equations for the involved return series 
L = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + 2 log |Dt| + r’t 1 1t tD D− − rt) 
= 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) + 2 log |Dt| + r’t 2tD− rt) 
= 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ (n log(2pi) +
1
n
i=
∑ (log(hit) + 2itr / hit) ) 
= 
1
1
2
n
t =
− ∑ (T log(2pi) +
1
T
i=
∑ (log(hit) + 2itr / hit) ) 
 
 In the second stage, the parameters of the correlation evolution are estimated using the 
specified log-likelihood of the correlation part, conditioning on the parameters estimated in the 
first stage likelihood 
LC = 
1
1
2
T
t =
− ∑ ( log |Rt| + ε’t 1tR− εt -ε’t εt) 
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 The properties of the QMLE and related test statistics in dynamic models that jointly 
parameterize conditional means and conditional covariances are discussed in Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge (1992). 
It should be noted that the two step estimation of the likelihood function means that 
estimation is inefficient, though consistent (Engle and Sheppard, 2001; Engle, 2002). 
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D.4 GARCH-type Model Selection for the Two-Step MGARCH Estimation 
Panel A: Sector Indices from the Japanese Equity market 
Series Models c  a  b  e  LLF AIC SIC 
ENG GARCH 0.000  0.131  0.830    3940.9 -10.56 5.51 
 EGARCH -0.479  -0.049  0.959  0.207  3945.6 -8.56 12.87 
BML GARCH 0.000  0.099  0.873    4471.4 -10.81 5.26 
 EGARCH -0.325  -0.054  0.977  0.172  4474.0 -8.81 12.61 
IND  GARCH 0.000  0.080  0.904    4505.6 -10.826 5.24 
 EGARCH -0.279  -0.045  0.979  0.136  4506.7 -8.827 12.60 
CGS GARCH 0.000  0.088  0.886    4403.8 -10.78 5.29 
 EGARCH -0.359  -0.020  0.973  0.172  4398.4 -8.78 12.65 
HCR GARCH 0.000  0.085  0.847    4796.2 -10.95 5.12 
 EGARCH -0.472  -0.063  0.960  0.148  4799.0 -8.95 12.47 
CSV GARCH 0.000  0.083  0.858    4734.0 -10.93 5.14 
 EGARCH -0.419  -0.070  0.964  0.134  4735.2 -8.93 12.50 
TEL GARCH 0.000  0.106  0.894    4069.2 -10.62 5.45 
 EGARCH -0.281  -0.031  0.984  0.209  4071.5 -8.62 12.80 
UTL GARCH 0.000  0.146  0.785    5023.8 -11.04 5.02 
 EGARCH -0.849  -0.055  0.928  0.243  5021.7 -9.04 12.38 
FIN GARCH 0.000  0.124  0.836    4072.3 -10.62 5.44 
 EGARCH -0.505  -0.056  0.958  0.222  4072.6 -8.62 12.80 
TEC GARCH 0.000  0.072  0.926    4043.0 -10.61 5.46 
 EGARCH -0.157  -0.013  0.992  0.129  4071.7 -8.62 12.80 
Note: The table above indicates the univariate GARCH parameters for the 10 industry sector 
series returns in the Japanese equity market.   The sample period is from July/1/1996 to 
June/28/2002.  The 'c' is the constant parameter in the GARCH model; the 'a' is the 
parameter of the ARCH factor; the 'e' is the parameter of the EGARCH factor; the 'b' is the 
parameter of the GARCH factor.  LLF is the log-likelihood value; the AIC is the Akaike 
Information Criterion, AIC = 2 x K – 2 x ln(LLF), where K is the number of parameter; the 
SIC is the Schwarz Information Criterion, SIC = K x ln(LLF) - 2 x ln(LLF). 
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Panel B: Sector Indices from the UK Equity market 
Series Models c  a  b  e  LLF AIC SIC 
ENG GARCH 0.000  0.069  0.917  0.109  4367.3 -10.76 5.30 
 EGARCH -0.211  -0.049  0.985    4371.2 -8.77 12.66 
BML GARCH 0.000  0.232  0.681  0.377  4986.8 -11.03 5.04 
 EGARCH -1.295  -0.043  0.890    4990.1 -9.03 12.39 
IND  GARCH 0.000  0.163  0.827  0.200  4475.4 -10.81 5.25 
 EGARCH -0.433  -0.070  0.966    4492.5 -8.82 12.60 
CGS GARCH 0.000  0.060  0.935  0.116  4116.5 -10.65 5.42 
 EGARCH -0.173  -0.031  0.989    4119.1 -8.65 12.78 
HCR GARCH 0.000  0.060  0.928  0.106  4655.4 -10.90 5.18 
 EGARCH -0.204  -0.043  0.986    4662.6 -8.90 12.53 
CSV GARCH 0.000  0.103  0.886  0.177  4979.1 -11.03 5.04 
 EGARCH -0.329  -0.061  0.979    4978.7 -9.03 12.40 
TEL GARCH 0.000  0.066  0.934  0.125  4178.0 -10.68 5.39 
 EGARCH -0.179  -0.035  0.990    4177.4 -8.68 12.75 
UTL GARCH 0.000  0.082  0.859  0.153  5045.1 -11.05 5.02 
 EGARCH -0.591  -0.049  0.948    5039.9 -9.05 12.37 
FIN GARCH 0.000  0.074  0.910  0.073  4470.800 -10.81 5.26 
 EGARCH -0.234  -0.089  0.979    4494.700 -8.82 12.60 
TEC GARCH 0.000  0.155  0.753  0.068  3314.1 -10.21 5.86 
 EGARCH -0.178  -0.031  0.982    3332.1 -8.22 13.20 
Note: The table above indicates the univariate GARCH parameters for the 10 industry sector 
series returns in the Japanese equity market.   The sample period is from July/1/1996 to 
June/28/2002.  The 'c' is the constant parameter in the GARCH model; the 'a' is the parameter 
of the ARCH factor; the 'e' is the parameter of the EGARCH factor; the 'b' is the parameter of 
the GARCH factor.  LLF is the log-likelihood value; the AIC is the Akaike Information 
Criterion, AIC = 2 x K – 2 x ln(LLF), where K is the number of parameter; the SIC is the 
Schwarz Information Criterion, SIC = K x ln(LLF) - 2 x ln(LLF). 
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Panel C: Sector Indices from the US Equity market 
Series Models c  a  b  e  LLF AIC SIC 
ENG GARCH 0.000  0.051  0.935    4445.8 -10.80 5.27 
 EGARCH -0.218  -0.070  0.983  0.091  4459.2 -8.81 12.62 
BML GARCH 0.000  0.097  0.898    4510.0 -10.83 5.24 
 EGARCH -0.241  -0.057  0.983  0.128  4516.7 -8.83 12.59 
IND  GARCH 0.000  0.071  0.921    4539.7 -10.84 5.23 
 EGARCH -0.241  -0.112  0.978  0.072  4589.2 -8.86 12.56 
CGS GARCH 0.000  0.074  0.911    4577.1 -10.86 5.21 
 EGARCH -0.231  -0.080  0.982  0.098  4600.4 -8.87 12.56 
HCR GARCH 0.000  0.101  0.853    4779.5 -10.94 5.12 
 EGARCH -0.471  -0.135  0.959  0.136  4812.6 -8.96 12.47 
CSV GARCH 0.000  0.108  0.887    4598.8 -10.87 5.20 
 EGARCH -0.321  -0.130  0.974  0.127  4638.1 -8.88 12.54 
TEL GARCH 0.000  0.065  0.911    4500.8 -10.82 5.24 
 EGARCH -0.463  -0.069  0.958  0.139  4507.1 -8.83 12.60 
UTL GARCH 0.000  0.085  0.910    5024.2 -11.04 5.02 
 EGARCH -0.276  -0.037  0.984  0.169  5025.2 -9.04 12.38 
FIN GARCH 0.000  0.077  0.896    4395.1 -10.78 5.29 
 EGARCH -0.309  -0.094  0.973  0.113  4416.2 -8.79 12.64 
TEC GARCH 0.000  0.083  0.901    3757.1 -10.46 5.60 
 EGARCH -0.352  -0.114  0.965  0.112  3787.5 -8.48 12.94 
Note: The table above indicates the univariate GARCH parameters for the 10 industry sector 
series returns in the Japanese equity market.   The sample period is from July/1/1996 to 
June/28/2002.  The 'c' is the constant parameter in the GARCH model; the 'a' is the parameter 
of the ARCH factor; the 'e' is the parameter of the EGARCH factor; the 'b' is the parameter of 
the GARCH factor.  LLF is the log-likelihood value; the AIC is the Akaike Information 
Criterion, AIC = 2 x K – 2 x ln(LLF), where K is the number of parameter; the SIC is the 
Schwarz Information Criterion, SIC = K x ln(LLF) - 2 x ln(LLF). 
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D.5 Technical Details of the Welch’s Student’s t-test 
In the current study, four MGARCH estimators have the structural break specification.  They are 
the DCC and ADCC Break MVGARCH models with both the scalar and diagonal parameter 
settings.  As shown in the equation, for each break model, two sets of dynamic parameters need to 
be estimated for the pre- and post-break period.   
Since the coefficients for pre- and post-break period have different population (t1 = 910 for 
the pre-break period and t2 = 655 for the post-break period), and is assumed to have different 
variance, we deployed the Welch’s Student’s t-test (Welch, 1947) to assess the statistical significance 
of the difference between the two sets of parameters. 
 The Welch’s t-test can be showed as follows 
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where t is the t-test statistic; X1 and X2 are the corresponding coefficients for the pre- and post-
break period;  S1 and S2 are the variance for the parameter X1 and X2; S1-2 is the pooled variance 
between the two parameter; and the N1 and N2 are the number of observations to estimate the two 
coefficients. 
In the Welch’s t-test, the degree of freedom of the Student-t distribution is differently defined 
from the simple t-test, which can be written as 
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D.6 Welch’s Student’s t-test for the Significance of Structural Break 
The Tables below showed the result of structural break tests of the various MVGARCH models.  The sample period is 
from July 1, 1996 till May 31, 2007.  The “a” is the parameter of the ARCH factor in the second step of the DCC-type 
MVGARCH model; the “b” is the parameter of the GARCH factor in the second step of the DCC-type MVGARCH model; 
the “g” is the parameter of the asymmetry effect in the second step of the DCC-type MVGARCH model estimation.  The 
structure break is set on the date: January 1, 1999.  The test statistics is generated based on the Welch’s student’s t-test.  
The Mean (abs.) is the absolute value of the difference between the two parameters before and after the structural break; 
the S.D. refers to the standard deviation of the pool variance (S1-2); the d.f. refers to degree of freedom of the test. 
 
Panel A: Structural Break Test for the Japanese Sector Portfolio  
DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0233 0.0001 a2 0.0136 0.0000 0.0098 0.0000 4.5460 614.7252 0.0000 *** 
b1 0.8777 0.0063 b2 0.9802 0.0001 0.1024 0.0003 6.4431 612.1951 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
A-DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0233 0.0001 a2 0.0108 0.0002 0.0125 0.0000 5.0634 2088.1199 0.0000 *** 
b1 0.8777 0.0079 b2 0.9796 0.0001 0.1019 0.0003 5.7062 612.1200 0.0000 *** 
g1 0.0000 0.0006 g2 0.0039 0.0003 0.0039 0.0000 0.8029 685.1310 0.2112 - 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
G-DCC-Break 
                    
Series Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0109 0.0001 a22 0.0089 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 1.0866 618.5728 0.1388 - 
  b12 0.8935 0.0135 b22 0.9609 0.0005 0.0673 0.0005 2.8819 612.4368 0.0020 *** 
BML a12 0.0310 0.0003 a22 0.0214 0.0000 0.0096 0.0000 2.9536 612.9713 0.0016 *** 
  
b12 0.8744 0.0065 b22 0.9701 0.0000 0.0957 0.0003 5.9233 612.0216 0.0000 *** 
IND  a12 0.0130 0.0000 a22 0.0189 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 6.1553 959.2652 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.9728 0.0013 b22 0.9782 0.0000 0.0054 0.0001 0.7494 612.4228 0.2270 - 
CGS a12 0.0087 0.0000 a22 0.0140 0.0000 0.0053 0.0000 5.2054 741.2654 0.0000 *** 
  
b12 0.9467 0.0006 b22 0.9860 0.0000 0.0394 0.0000 8.1658 612.1761 0.0000 *** 
HCR a12 0.0065 0.0000 a22 0.0119 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 5.9201 2153.1145 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.8980 0.0009 b22 0.9767 0.0001 0.0787 0.0000 13.4344 616.8350 0.0000 *** 
CSV a12 0.0109 0.0000 a22 0.0213 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000 7.4185 643.2957 0.0000 *** 
  
b12 0.9521 0.0053 b22 0.9621 0.0001 0.0100 0.0002 0.6853 612.0910 0.2467 - 
TEL a12 0.0088 0.0002 a22 0.0200 0.0000 0.0111 0.0000 4.1966 623.7042 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.9581 0.0662 b22 0.9510 0.0004 0.0070 0.0027 0.1362 612.0182 0.4459 - 
UTL a12 0.0124 0.0000 a22 0.0030 0.0000 0.0093 0.0000 6.8821 612.0055 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.8327 0.0066 b22 0.9970 0.0000 0.1643 0.0003 10.0876 612.0049 0.0000 *** 
FIN a12 0.0557 0.0011 a22 0.0369 0.0002 0.0188 0.0000 2.7999 619.7722 0.0026 *** 
  b12 0.8896 0.0070 b22 0.9328 0.0010 0.0431 0.0003 2.5537 619.3290 0.0054 *** 
TEC a12 0.0235 0.0001 a22 0.0229 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.2562 644.7617 0.3989 - 
  b12 0.9404 0.0005 b22 0.9681 0.0001 0.0277 0.0000 6.3116 636.2847 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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Panel A: CONT’D 
AG-DCC-Break           
Series Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0222 0.0001 a22 0.0050 0.0000 0.0172 0.0000 7.7777 614.1362 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.7843 0.0050 b22 0.9928 0.0002 0.2086 0.0002 14.6363 612.7172 0.0000 *** 
  
g12 0.0459 0.0004 g22 0.0021 0.0000 0.0439 0.0000 10.7778 613.2082 0.0000 *** 
BML a12 0.0508 0.0001 a22 0.0197 0.0000 0.0311 0.0000 16.0145 618.0269 0.0000 *** 
 
b12 0.8036 0.0028 b22 0.9717 0.0000 0.1681 0.0001 15.8035 612.0863 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0036 0.0003 g22 0.0047 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.3159 613.4456 0.3761 - 
IND  a12 0.0162 0.0001 a22 0.0209 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000 3.0369 676.6740 0.0012 *** 
 b12 0.8746 0.0116 b22 0.9677 0.0001 0.0931 0.0005 4.2989 612.0120 0.0000 *** 
  
g12 0.0016 0.0003 g22 0.0101 0.0000 0.0086 0.0000 2.5526 613.7777 0.0055 *** 
CGS a12 0.0067 0.0001 a22 0.0230 0.0002 0.0163 0.0000 7.1913 2607.5316 0.0000 *** 
 
b12 0.9786 0.0754 b22 0.9489 0.0005 0.0297 0.0030 0.5385 612.0220 0.2952 - 
  g12 0.0001 0.0012 g22 0.0056 0.0002 0.0055 0.0000 0.7925 618.7239 0.2142 - 
HCR a12 0.0061 0.0000 a22 0.0125 0.0001 0.0064 0.0000 5.1557 2079.4644 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.9929 0.0000 b22 0.9405 0.0002 0.0524 0.0000 25.2888 2281.4312 0.0000 *** 
  
g12 0.0001 0.0000 g22 0.0356 0.0002 0.0355 0.0000 18.3614 2063.0446 0.0000 *** 
CSV a12 0.0264 0.0000 a22 0.0207 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 3.9859 678.7185 0.0000 *** 
 
b12 0.7740 0.0052 b22 0.9517 0.0001 0.1777 0.0002 12.2452 612.1477 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0057 0.0203 g22 0.0082 0.0000 0.0024 0.0008 0.0857 612.0053 0.4659 - 
TEL a12 0.0096 0.0001 a22 0.0197 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 5.3641 620.2024 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.8788 0.0039 b22 0.9454 0.0001 0.0666 0.0002 5.3374 612.2894 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0222 0.0001 a22 0.0050 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.5553 631.3602 0.2894 - 
UTL a12 0.7843 0.0050 b22 0.9928 0.0002 0.0026 0.0000 2.2504 613.6808 0.0124 ** 
 b12 0.0459 0.0004 g22 0.0021 0.0000 0.0692 0.0000 73.0599 612.9495 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0508 0.0001 a22 0.0197 0.0000 0.0140 0.0000 53.5417 2063.0016 0.0000 *** 
FIN a12 0.8036 0.0028 b22 0.9717 0.0000 0.0599 0.0000 10.6134 613.4746 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.0036 0.0003 g22 0.0047 0.0000 0.1380 0.0001 14.5986 621.4085 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0162 0.0001 a22 0.0209 0.0000 0.0036 0.0001 0.4954 616.1851 0.3102 - 
TEC a12 0.8746 0.0116 b22 0.9677 0.0001 0.0087 0.0000 1.8543 614.1952 0.0321 ** 
 b12 0.0016 0.0003 g22 0.0101 0.0000 0.0035 0.0031 0.0623 612.0051 0.4752 - 
  g12 0.0067 0.0001 a22 0.0230 0.0002 0.0089 0.0003 0.5229 612.0197 0.3006 - 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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Panel B: Structural Break Test for the UK Sector Portfolio  
DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0152 0.0001 a2 0.0141 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.4741 652.4188 0.3178 - 
b1 0.9101 0.0013 b2 0.9750 0.0006 0.0649 0.0001 8.9532 707.5547 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
A-DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0097 0.0008 a2 0.0112 0.0010 0.0014 0.0000 0.2257 1231.1827 0.4107 - 
b1 0.9136 0.0031 b2 0.9742 0.0005 0.0606 0.0001 5.4590 641.1645 0.0000 *** 
g1 0.0131 0.0032 g2 0.0046 0.0018 0.0085 0.0001 0.7377 753.9945 0.2305 - 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
G-DCC-Break 
                    
 Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0113 0.0025 a22 0.0110 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0238 631.0378 0.4905 - 
  b12 0.8929 0.3491 b22 0.9819 0.0002 0.0891 0.0139 0.7565 631.0048 0.2248 - 
BML a12 0.0077 0.0000 a22 0.0126 0.0000 0.0049 0.0000 4.2881 710.2178 0.0000 *** 
  
b12 0.9890 0.0002 b22 0.9789 0.0001 0.0101 0.0000 4.0326 743.2111 0.0000 *** 
IND  a12 0.0196 0.0005 a22 0.0162 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.7722 633.0463 0.2201 - 
  b12 0.8972 0.0281 b22 0.9755 0.0002 0.0783 0.0011 2.3429 631.0191 0.0097 *** 
CGS a12 0.0353 0.0033 a22 0.0070 0.0001 0.0282 0.0001 2.4610 631.1081 0.0071 *** 
  
b12 0.7324 0.0612 b22 0.9930 0.0007 0.2606 0.0024 5.2841 631.0501 0.0000 *** 
HCR a12 0.0349 0.0001 a22 0.0221 0.0000 0.0128 0.0000 6.2703 710.7134 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.8941 0.0013 b22 0.9659 0.0002 0.0718 0.0001 10.1063 637.0755 0.0000 *** 
CSV a12 0.0473 0.0024 a22 0.0157 0.0000 0.0317 0.0001 3.2780 631.0156 0.0006 *** 
  
b12 0.7729 0.0476 b22 0.9754 0.0000 0.2025 0.0019 4.6602 631.0050 0.0000 *** 
TEL a12 0.0222 0.0005 a22 0.0170 0.0000 0.0052 0.0000 1.2278 631.2870 0.1100 - 
  b12 0.9166 0.0020 b22 0.9696 0.0000 0.0530 0.0001 5.9452 631.1518 0.0000 *** 
UTL a12 0.0021 0.0000 a22 0.0085 0.0000 0.0064 0.0000 5.9600 677.9991 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.8835 0.0593 b22 0.9777 0.0001 0.0942 0.0024 1.9418 631.0067 0.0263 ** 
FIN a12 0.0215 0.0001 a22 0.0190 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 1.3271 647.5504 0.0925 * 
  b12 0.9331 0.0005 b22 0.9714 0.0001 0.0382 0.0000 8.5359 634.7351 0.0000 *** 
TEC a12 0.0004 0.0000 a22 0.0098 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 13.4598 2257.3954 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.9497 0.0105 b22 0.9810 0.0001 0.0313 0.0004 1.5304 631.0537 0.0632 * 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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Panel B: CONT’D 
AG-DCC-Break          
 Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0000 0.0002 a22 0.0099 0.0000 0.0099 0.0000 3.5152 634.1530 0.0002 *** 
 b12 0.7864 43.8370 b22 0.9782 0.0002 0.1918 1.7410 0.1453 631.0047 0.4422 - 
  
g12 0.0653 3.6437 g22 0.0103 0.0002 0.0549 0.1447 0.1444 631.0047 0.4426 - 
BML a12 0.0044 0.0001 a22 0.0137 0.0000 0.0092 0.0000 5.7882 680.1105 0.0000 *** 
 
b12 0.9489 2.4159 b22 0.9767 0.0001 0.0278 0.0959 0.0897 631.0047 0.4643 - 
  g12 0.0182 0.0319 g22 0.0009 0.0000 0.0173 0.0013 0.4847 631.0047 0.3140 - 
IND  a12 0.0064 0.0003 a22 0.0183 0.0001 0.0119 0.0000 3.6427 644.4849 0.0001 *** 
 b12 0.9054 0.2511 b22 0.9733 0.0002 0.0679 0.0100 0.6801 631.0050 0.2484 - 
  
g12 0.0459 0.0058 g22 0.0004 0.0000 0.0455 0.0002 2.9925 631.0049 0.0014 *** 
CGS a12 0.0155 0.0021 a22 0.0066 0.0000 0.0089 0.0001 0.9791 631.0059 0.1640 - 
 
b12 0.7855 0.0745 b22 0.9947 0.0000 0.2092 0.0030 3.8474 631.0048 0.0001 *** 
  g12 0.0300 0.0016 g22 0.0014 0.0000 0.0286 0.0001 3.5832 631.0088 0.0002 *** 
HCR a12 0.0161 0.0025 a22 0.0194 0.0000 0.0033 0.0001 0.3327 631.0298 0.3698 - 
 b12 0.8843 0.4763 b22 0.9615 0.0001 0.0772 0.0189 0.5615 631.0047 0.2873 - 
  
g12 0.0289 0.0200 g22 0.0143 0.0001 0.0146 0.0008 0.5197 631.0083 0.3017 - 
CSV a12 0.0082 0.0035 a22 0.0160 0.0000 0.0078 0.0001 0.6621 631.0195 0.2541 - 
 
b12 0.7388 0.0953 b22 0.9741 0.0001 0.2353 0.0038 3.8257 631.0049 0.0001 *** 
  g12 0.1036 0.0155 g22 0.0016 0.0000 0.1020 0.0006 4.1059 631.0048 0.0000 *** 
TEL a12 0.0564 0.1452 a22 0.0151 0.0000 0.0413 0.0058 0.5445 631.0047 0.2931 - 
 b12 0.8951 0.0053 b22 0.9705 0.0000 0.0754 0.0002 5.2002 631.0288 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0000 0.0002 a22 0.0099 0.0000 0.0094 0.0003 0.5560 631.0069 0.2892 - 
UTL a12 0.7864 43.8370 b22 0.9782 0.0002 0.0032 0.0002 0.2180 631.0058 0.4138 - 
 b12 0.0653 3.6437 g22 0.0103 0.0002 0.9173 2.9161 0.5372 631.0047 0.2957 - 
  g12 0.0044 0.0001 a22 0.0137 0.0000 0.0087 0.0006 0.3489 631.0059 0.3637 - 
FIN a12 0.9489 2.4159 b22 0.9767 0.0001 0.0015 0.0000 0.5633 633.9865 0.2867 - 
 b12 0.0182 0.0319 g22 0.0009 0.0000 0.0447 0.0083 0.4912 631.0047 0.3117 - 
  g12 0.0064 0.0003 a22 0.0183 0.0001 0.0159 0.0001 1.6948 631.0268 0.0453 ** 
TEC a12 0.9054 0.2511 b22 0.9733 0.0002 0.0091 0.0002 0.6652 631.0074 0.2531 - 
 b12 0.0459 0.0058 g22 0.0004 0.0000 0.0212 0.2403 0.0432 631.0047 0.4828 - 
  g12 0.0155 0.0021 a22 0.0066 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0529 631.0449 0.4789 - 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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Panel C: Structural Break Test for the US Sector Portfolio 
DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0230 0.0002 a2 0.0110 0.0000 0.0120 0.0000 4.6157 631.6411 0.0000 *** 
b1 0.8965 0.0057 b2 0.9868 0.0007 0.0902 0.0002 5.9687 635.4971 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
 
A-DCC-Break 
                    
Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
 Mean S.E.   Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
a1 0.0151 0.0022 a2 0.0100 0.0014 0.0051 0.0001 0.5316 784.7248 0.2976 - 
b1 0.9077 0.0118 b2 0.9868 0.0006 0.0791 0.0005 3.6583 630.9578 0.0001 *** 
g1 0.0121 0.0061 g2 0.0011 0.0016 0.0110 0.0002 0.7037 656.9000 0.2409 - 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
 
G-DCC-Break 
                    
 Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0081 0.0001 a22 0.0201 0.0176 0.0120 0.0004 0.6135 2112.1983 0.2698 - 
  b12 0.9628 0.0008 b22 0.9799 0.0118 0.0172 0.0003 1.0694 2169.2249 0.1425 - 
BML a12 0.0086 0.0000 a22 0.0143 0.0012 0.0057 0.0000 1.1056 2115.4189 0.1345 - 
  
b12 0.9894 0.0002 b22 0.9857 0.0012 0.0037 0.0000 0.7073 2364.7307 0.2397 - 
IND  a12 0.0200 0.0001 a22 0.0131 0.0082 0.0069 0.0002 0.5155 2113.6416 0.3031 - 
  b12 0.9454 0.0006 b22 0.9869 0.0097 0.0415 0.0002 2.8405 2171.2988 0.0023 *** 
CGS a12 0.0154 0.0001 a22 0.0178 0.0259 0.0025 0.0006 0.1045 2112.4386 0.4584 - 
  
b12 0.9535 0.0009 b22 0.9815 0.0379 0.0280 0.0008 0.9765 2120.5623 0.1645 - 
HCR a12 0.0170 0.0001 a22 0.0106 0.0084 0.0063 0.0002 0.4693 2113.2503 0.3195 - 
  b12 0.9414 0.0002 b22 0.9822 0.0196 0.0408 0.0004 1.9745 2113.3328 0.0242 ** 
CSV a12 0.0133 0.0001 a22 0.0100 0.0001 0.0033 0.0000 1.7087 2441.0398 0.0438 ** 
  
b12 0.9468 0.0001 b22 0.9801 0.0014 0.0334 0.0000 5.9747 2163.5899 0.0000 *** 
TEL a12 0.0200 0.0079 a22 0.0065 0.0067 0.0135 0.0003 0.7286 913.0074 0.2332 - 
  b12 0.8661 0.0035 b22 0.9935 0.0233 0.1274 0.0005 5.5518 2400.3183 0.0000 *** 
UTL a12 0.0607 0.0067 a22 0.0154 0.0004 0.0453 0.0003 2.7736 631.2365 0.0029 *** 
  b12 0.7320 0.0197 b22 0.9846 0.0005 0.2526 0.0008 9.0368 630.2120 0.0000 *** 
FIN a12 0.0149 0.0001 a22 0.0031 0.0000 0.0118 0.0000 7.8081 816.8628 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.9580 0.0003 b22 0.9815 0.0008 0.0235 0.0000 5.2433 2682.0946 0.0000 *** 
TEC a12 0.0198 0.0000 a22 0.0092 0.0001 0.0106 0.0000 6.0037 2717.9268 0.0000 *** 
  b12 0.9316 0.0006 b22 0.9901 0.0003 0.0585 0.0000 11.7066 695.9265 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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Panel C: CONT’D 
AG-DCC-Break 
                    
 Period 1 Period 2 Difference  
   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. Mean(abs.) S.D. t-test d.f. p-value Significance 
ENG a12 0.0041 0.0120 a22 0.0084 0.0010 0.0044 0.0005 0.2008 632.7202 0.4205 - 
 b12 0.9995 0.0087 b22 0.9886 0.0061 0.0110 0.0004 0.5682 819.8899 0.2850 - 
  
g12 0.0059 0.0115 g22 0.0001 0.0000 0.0058 0.0005 0.2703 630.0047 0.3935 - 
BML a12 0.0053 0.0006 a22 0.0192 0.0002 0.0139 0.0000 2.8091 654.6019 0.0026 *** 
 
b12 0.9420 0.0272 b22 0.9747 0.0003 0.0327 0.0011 0.9950 630.0609 0.1601 - 
  g12 0.0312 0.0132 g22 0.0045 0.0000 0.0267 0.0005 1.1675 630.0051 0.1217 - 
IND  a12 0.0103 0.0001 a22 0.0176 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 5.0574 639.3582 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.9353 0.0004 b22 0.9726 0.0000 0.0373 0.0000 9.3896 632.3203 0.0000 *** 
  
g12 0.0231 0.0003 g22 0.0061 0.0000 0.0170 0.0000 4.8683 630.4757 0.0000 *** 
CGS a12 0.0059 0.0004 a22 0.0146 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 2.2461 632.9299 0.0125 ** 
 
b12 0.9331 0.0015 b22 0.9788 0.0001 0.0457 0.0001 5.8981 632.3411 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0290 0.0005 g22 0.0073 0.0000 0.0217 0.0000 4.6686 630.7740 0.0000 *** 
HCR a12 0.0134 0.0009 a22 0.0115 0.0004 0.0019 0.0000 0.3117 715.5929 0.3777 - 
 b12 0.9346 0.0032 b22 0.9862 0.0019 0.0516 0.0001 4.4649 763.1073 0.0000 *** 
  
g12 0.0151 0.0005 g22 0.0015 0.0000 0.0136 0.0000 3.1863 631.0204 0.0008 *** 
CSV a12 0.0048 0.0002 a22 0.0150 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 4.1101 631.2099 0.0000 *** 
 
b12 0.9452 0.0004 b22 0.9779 0.0000 0.0327 0.0000 7.8125 631.8012 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0169 0.0002 g22 0.0068 0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 3.6467 631.0081 0.0001 *** 
TEL a12 0.0231 0.0021 a22 0.0096 0.0001 0.0135 0.0001 1.4594 630.2467 0.0725 * 
 b12 0.8804 0.0199 b22 0.9811 0.0003 0.1007 0.0008 3.5810 630.0799 0.0002 *** 
  g12 0.0137 0.0002 g22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 5.5175 630.0047 0.0000 *** 
UTL a12 0.0707 0.0045 a22 0.0062 0.0000 0.0645 0.0002 4.8326 630.0049 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.7464 0.0162 b22 0.9898 0.0000 0.2435 0.0006 9.6084 630.0057 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0000 0.0005 g22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 630.0047 0.5000 - 
FIN a12 0.0036 0.0000 a22 0.0133 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000 12.3916 666.4326 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.9150 0.0282 b22 0.9821 0.0000 0.0672 0.0011 2.0046 630.0049 0.0227 ** 
  g12 0.0651 0.0040 g22 0.0016 0.0000 0.0635 0.0002 5.0122 630.0048 0.0000 *** 
TEC a12 0.0086 0.0000 a22 0.0141 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 5.0435 863.3517 0.0000 *** 
 b12 0.9247 0.0017 b22 0.9760 0.0001 0.0513 0.0001 6.2342 630.4631 0.0000 *** 
  g12 0.0370 0.0005 g22 0.0051 0.0000 0.0320 0.0000 7.0611 630.6271 0.0000 *** 
The "*"s indicates the parameter's significance level: *** -- 99%, ** -- 95%, * -- 90%.  
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D.7 Exact New Impact Surface for Correlation 
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, for e1, e2 > 0 
where εi, i = 1, 2 are the standardized residuals; cij is the corresponding element of the constant 
matrix in the correlation equation (i.e. the matrix Cj in eq.5 in page 271); ai and gi are the 
corresponding elements of matrices A and G. 
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